Sea infrastructure under attack | Michel Rademaker speaks at Wind Finland Offshore seminar 

On 21 May 2025, HCSS Deputy Director Michel Rademaker will share his insights on the vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure and strategies to enhance resilience amid growing geopolitical and hybrid threats, at the Wind Finland Offshore seminar in Helsinki, Finland. The event brings together more than 300 professionals and stakeholders from across the offshore wind sector, offering a full day of expert presentations, discussion, and networking opportunities centred on the future of offshore wind energy in the Baltic Sea region. 

The programme features twelve distinguished speakers addressing key developments and challenges in offshore wind. Among the highlighted sessions:

  • Sea infrastructure under attack: how to be prepared? – Michel Rademaker (HCSS);
  • Sustainability and circularity in the offshore wind sector – Nina Vielen-Kallio (ECHT regie in transitie).

Michel Rademaker, Deputy Director of HCSS, will be present at the event to share insights on the vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure and strategies to enhance resilience amid growing geopolitical and hybrid threats.

The event will conclude with a networking dinner and cocktail reception, fostering dialogue and collaboration among policymakers, industry leaders, and service providers.

The Netherlands will be represented by the OffshoreWind initiative, hosting a dedicated booth to facilitate Dutch-Finnish cooperation. A Dutch mission organised under the Partners for International Business (PIB) programme will also take part. The draft programme for the Dutch delegation and registration details are available here.

Key topics include:

  • The resilience of maritime infrastructure;
  • SCircular design principles in offshore wind;
  • Lessons from Dutch offshore wind development;
  • Strategic prospects for Finland’s offshore energy future.

This event presents a timely opportunity to engage with leading voices in the field, gain actionable insights, and contribute to a resilient, secure, and sustainable offshore wind ecosystem.

For more information, ticketing, and speaker details, visit: https://www.windfinland.fi/wind-finland-offshore-2025/

Podcast Haags Bakkie | In gesprek met Marnix Felius en Michel Rademaker

“De krijgsmacht vecht, maar de staat voert oorlog”. Voor Haags Bakkie, de podcast van de SGP-jongeren, sprak Floris van Willigen uitgebreid met luitenant-kolonel Marnix Felius en Michel Rademaker, Adjunct-Directeur en mede-oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS).

Felius en Rademaker bespreken onder andere hoe Nederland haar defensie-inzet kan schalen en volhouden in een mogelijk conflict. Ons voortzettingsvermogen is namelijk niet alleen een militaire uitdaging; ook politieke wil, industriële capaciteit en maatschappelijke weerbaarheid zijn van groot belang. De toenemende dreiging vanuit Rusland maakt dit essentieel, zowel voor afschrikking als daadwerkelijke inzet bij een grootschalige NAVO-confrontatie. Dit vereist strategische keuzes, financiële investeringen én maatschappelijke acceptatie.

Deze podcast is opgenomen na afloop van het NATO Summit pre-event over het Russische regeneratie vermogen en ons eigen voortzettingsvermogen, dat plaatsvond bij HCSS op 17 april 2025.

Het Haags Bakkie is dé podcast van SGP-jongeren waarin hosts Floris en Carla je iedere maand meenemen in de wereld van de Haagse politiek. Als politiek hoofdstad van Nederland is Den Haag een belangrijke plek waar beslissingen worden genomen die ons allemaal raken, of het nu gaat om de formatie van een nieuw kabinet, het opstellen van wetten en regels of het voeren van debatten.

De podcast is nu te luisteren via Spotify, of – mét beeld – via YouTube hieronder:

Bron: SGP Jongeren, 8 mei 2025

De Strateeg: Zorgt Trump ervoor dat Europa militair écht gaat samenwerken?

De Europese defensiesamenwerking wordt op dit moment verder vormgegeven. De aanleiding vormde in eerste instantie het uitbreken van de oorlog in Oekraïne. Maar nu, na de harde woorden vanuit het Witte Huis, zijn we echt wakker geworden lijkt het.

Maar is dat ook echt zo? Want sommige landen lopen nog altijd uit de pas. Hoe krijg je zoveel mogelijk landen bij elkaar en stem je de militaire apparatuur op elkaar af? Of is dat simpelweg een illusie?

Dat bespreekt Paul van Liempt in deze aflevering van De Strateeg met:

  • Michelle Haas, defensieonderzoeker verbonden aan de Universiteit Gent.
  • Hans van der Louw, generaal-majoor buiten dienst en adviseur bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies.

Bron: BNR Nieuwsradio, De Strateeg, 11 mei 2025

Over deze podcast

De Strateeg is een podcast van BNR in samenwerking met het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Abonneer je via bnr.nl/destrateeg om geen enkele aflevering te missen.

Host: Paul van Liempt

Redactie: Michaël Roele

Visit Recap | The Malaysian National Resilience College

On 17th April, officers from the Malaysian National Resilience College visited our centre to discuss the evolving global security landscape. The conversation covered multiple pressing issues ranging from the changing character of warfare, especially observed in Ukraine, to the critical importance of sustainment and mobilisation in modern defence strategies. With technology playing an increasingly central role in today’s conflicts, discussions touched upon the use of drones and the development of hybrid warfare. While technological innovation drives defence industries, the resurgence of conventional warfare stresses the significance of traditional mobilisation in contemporary conflict. Participants also raised concerns about engaging younger generations and fostering education on warfare. Finally, the conversation shifted to the Russian threat and its implications for Europe’s security and NATO members with for instance, the Netherlands increasing defence spending. These exchanges highlighted the need for continued collaboration and dialogue between partners around the globe to enhance resilience and better understand the evolving trends of modern warfare.

Visit Recap:

Presentation by Dr Tim Sweijs, Director of Research at HCSS

Presentation by Dr Tim Sweijs, Director of Research at HCSS, on his new book De Oorlog van Morgen, exploring future warfare and strategic foresight.

Final exchange of insights between representatives of the Malaysian delegation and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, concluding a session of dialogue and mutual learning.

Exchange of commemorative plaques between the Malaysian delegation and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, marking a gesture of mutual appreciation and institutional recognition.

HCSS Datalab Internship (Summer 2025 OPEN)

The Datalab of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies offers an exciting internship to aspiring data scientists. Our clients include major corporations, key government ministries, development aid agencies, and security providers, both domestic and global. The HCSS data internship therefore offers invaluable experience working on some of the most significant global issues of our time. Candidates should either have a strong quantitative background or demonstrated affinity for all things quantitative. They should also demonstrate transferable programming skills, as well as a keen interest in the topics covered by HCSS policy research.

Starting time: End of July/beginning of August

Deadline vacancy: 15th of June

Want to know more about the experience of HCSS general interns? Look out for the HCSS Internship Blogs entries from our current interns!

Requirements

  • An affinity with computer science, statistics, mathematics, physics, engineering, econometrics, or a related field;
  • Fluency in Python;
  • Very good communication skills in English, both orally and in writing;
  • Ability to work independently in a fast-paced environment;
  • Strong work ethic and willingness to learn;
  • An affinity for policy research;
  • Structured way of working, the ability to document your own work.

The following attributes are considered an asset:

  • Prior experience with statistical and scientific computing, machine learning, Natural Language Processing (NLP) or optimization;
  • Prior experience with dashboarding, visualization, or web development (e.g., HTML, CSS, JavaScript, React, Streamlit);
  • Prior experience with Generative AI, LLM’s and LMstudio;
  • Prior experience with Version Control tools such as Git;
  • Prior experience with Docker, containerization and deploying code on servers;
  • Data management and/or systems engineering skills;
  • First-principles thinking.

Prospective tasks of a data intern

  • Conduct research;
  • Collect, analyze and visualize data;
  • Assist in policy development and recommendations;
  • (optional) Basic software or monitor development;
  • (optional) Professionalize and standardize NLP pipeline;
  • (optional) Plan and write your own snapshot paper for publication or give a presentation. 

Eligibility

  • Candidates must be enrolled as a student at a university during the whole internship period.
  • An internship period of six months is highly preferred, although shorter periods can be discussed (minimum is 5 months). Please indicate your availability in your cover letter. Interns should be able to commit to working 40 hours a week.
  • If successful in obtaining a position, candidates are asked to provide a certificate of good conduct (‘Verklaring Omtrent het Gedrag’), available from the Dutch Ministry of Justice. Candidates residing outside of the Netherlands should provide a certificate from their country of residence.

Frequently asked questions

Can I apply if I am no longer a student (recently graduated)? Data internships are for enrolled students. Without a proof of enrolment, which is valid for the entire duration of data internship, you are not eligible for an internship position.

Is it possible to do a part-time internship? At present, HCSS does not offer part-time data internships within the Data Internship Program for a work week under 32 hours.

Is it possible to work remotely as an intern? No, HCSS only offers in-person internships and positions at our offices in The Hague.

Application Procedure

To apply, send the following items to internship@hcss.nl, using ‘Data Internship/2025’ as the subject line:

  • A resume, including a list of references;
  • A cover letter, thoroughly demonstrating why and how your data skills can be applied to data-intensive policy research and mentioning when you are available to start the internship;
  • Proof of university enrolment, valid for the entire duration of the data internship;
  • An official transcript of academic grades;
  • A portfolio of previous data projects, including the code (or a GitHub address).

Notes regarding the application procedure:

  • Please ensure that your application is complete before sending it in. Providing a list of references with contact details as part of your CV (at least two) is a mandatory requirement- we will not request them at a later stage;
  • The whole application should be written in English including the writing sample;
  • Please apply only if you are available for the above mentioned start date. HCSS recruits interns on a bi-annual basis; later start dates will be announced in due time.

Practical Information

The HCSS internship is paid: € 675,- per month. Our internship takes place in person at our offices in The Hague.

At HCSS, we firmly believe in prioritising qualifications and skills when making hiring decisions, without any discrimination based on personal characteristics such as race, religion, gender, age, disability, and sexual orientation.   HCSS only considers candidates that submit a complete application and fulfill all eligibility requirements. Successful applicants will be invited for an interview.discrimination based on personal characteristics such as race, religion, gender, age, disability, and sexual orientation.

The deadline for applying is June 15th, 2025 at 12 PM. Starting dates of the internship are preferably end of July.

Strategische Vragen | De Strateeg: Kan China Noord-Korea te lijf gaan?

Noord-Korea wordt steeds beter in digitale oorlogsvoering. Kan het land gestopt worden door China? En werken wij al samen met andere landen om Noord-Korea te bestrijden?

Dat bespreekt Paul van Liempt in deze aflevering van De Strateeg, opnieuw met:

  • Remco Breuker, hoogleraar Koreastudies aan de Universiteit Leiden.
  • Hans Horan, strategisch analist bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies.

Bron: BNR Nieuwsradio, De Strateeg, 7 mei 2025

Over deze podcast

De Strateeg is een podcast van BNR in samenwerking met het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Abonneer je via bnr.nl/destrateeg om geen enkele aflevering te missen.

Host: Paul van Liempt

Redactie: Michaël Roele

The Diplomat | China Watches, Taiwan Learns: Ukraine’s War and the Indo-Pacific

How can Taiwan ensure its defense strategy evolves in time to counter China’s growing military pressure? Over the course of a year-long study, we analyzed the campaign in Ukraine, comparing it with Taiwan’s military strategies and defense posture. Here’s what we found.

The Diplomat | March 18, 2025, by Benedetta Girardi, Davis Ellison, and Tim Sweijs | Photo credit: Office of the President, ROC (Taiwan)

China’s coercive campaign against Taiwan has escalated in recent years. Beijing’s approach has evolved from putting political and economic pressure on the island’s leadership and now includes expansive military exercises considered by many to be rehearsals for forced unification. It has sparked debate amongst political and military experts about what form such forced unification could take: Will the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) services seek to strangle the island’s economy through a semi-permanent blockade? Will they boil the frog over time through an on-and-off blockade? Or will they land a knock-out punch in a Sea Land Invasion? 

If one thing is certain, it’s this: Beijing’s calculation will be shaped by whether Taiwan is ready to defend itself. For Taiwan to do so successfully, it will have to learn lessons from the war against Ukraine, a country that failed to deter an attack from a much more powerful neighbor, yet has been able to successfully defend itself since.  

From the Steppes of Ukraine to the Shores of Formosa

Though distinct in terms of geography, size, and military doctrine, Taiwan and Ukraine share many parallels. Both are democracies with strong national identities threatened by authoritarian neighbors that claim historical sovereignty over their territories. They are strategic hotspots in their respective regions. Ukraine serves as a buffer between Russia and NATO, while Taiwan is a critical component of the Indo-Pacific security and trade architecture. Last but not least, Kyiv and Taipei both face overwhelming military asymmetry against their adversaries. 

While it is not possible to claim full transferability of lessons learned from the Ukrainian theater to the Taiwanese one, dismissing the comparison between the two would also be a mistake. The PLA’s strategists are in fact closely watching the developments in Ukraine and adapting accordingly. Taipei is well advised to do the same. 

Over the course of a year-long study, we analyzed the campaign in Ukraine, comparing it with Taiwan’s military strategies and defense posture. We combined scenario-based exercises related to Taiwan with on-the-ground fieldwork on the island. During our time in Taipei, we met with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense (MND), engaging in discussions with policy planners and military strategists about Taiwan’s position vis-à-vis China and its preparedness for a potential military confrontation. While awareness in Taipei is at an all-time high, our study found that Taiwan still has much it can learn from the Ukrainian battlefield.

Still, if asked about the one key lesson Taiwan should take away from the war in Ukraine, it is the necessity for the island to recognize that its ability to withstand an invasion depends on fortifying its denial-based strategy. The conflict has shown that advanced military hardware alone does not determine outcomes; rather, success hinges on a combination of robust strategy, resilient command structures, and effective logistics. Taiwan’s ability to adapt its military strategy will be a decisive factor in shaping the outcome of any potential conflict over the island.

With the stakes so high, the question remains: how can Taiwan ensure its defense strategy evolves in time to counter China’s growing military pressure?

From Conventional Deterrence to Asymmetric Denial: Practice What You Preach

Taipei needs to double down on a strategy centered around denial. For many decades, Taiwan relied on conventional deterrence, heavily investing in fighter jets and warships, to dissuade Beijing from military adventurism and raise the perceived costs of military actions. Ukraine’s experience has underscored the need for agility and asymmetric warfare capabilities when facing a superior adversary. 

This has not been lost on military decision makers. Since February 2022, Taiwan has ostensibly recalibrated its posture to one aimed at denial, prioritizing the combination of gradual air denial with asymmetric warfare means such as cyber, drone technology, and resilient battlefield communication – key factors in Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian advances.

The idea of investing in asymmetric warfare capability to increase the cost of aggression for a possible invasion from China is not new to the Taiwanese military. In 2018, Admiral Hsi-min Lee proposed in the Overall Defense Concept (ODC) to shift the definition of “winning the war” from “totally destroying enemy forces” to “fail[ing] the enemy’s mission to occupy Taiwan” by complementing traditional platforms with asymmetric assets. 

Yet progress in this field has been slow. Chronic underinvestment in the military, low troop quality, and the MND’s ambivalence toward asymmetric warfare have delayed the realization of the concept outlined in the ODC, creating shortcomings in Taiwan’s self-defense. 

Resistance to fully embrace a denial posture still persists within the Taiwanese MND. Yet, a deterrence-by-punishment strategy for Taiwan is likely infeasible due to escalation risks, especially against a nuclear power. In contrast, denial is more viable as it relies less on conditions that weaken punishment strategies. Taiwan can effectively communicate its denial capabilities through exercises and demonstrations, reducing the risk of misinterpretation by China. Additionally, if deterrence fails, a denial strategy can support Taiwan’s actual defense by countering attacks across multiple domains. 

Arming for Denial: Taiwan’s Key Investments 

It is time for Taiwan to further prioritize the adoption of a denial posture. Key investments span across the sea, land, and air domains. They include acquiring a mix of aerial capabilities such as drones and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), enhancing naval strike capabilities through the procurement and indigenous development of anti-ship missiles and land-attack cruise missiles, building up stockpiles of sea-denial assets like mines and unmanned surface vehicles, and accommodating engineered defensive fortifications and infrastructure on the island.

Investments in a mix of conventional and asymmetric aerial capabilities, such as IAMD and drones, enhanced Ukraine’s success rate. At sea, Ukrainian use of unmanned underwater and surface vessels and aerial drones proved to be a game-changer to deny Russian control of the seas. On land, the increased battlefield transparency provided by drones has been vital in upkeeping Ukrainian operations.

As there is no scenario in which Taiwan can go toe-to-toe with China in terms of conventional advanced military capabilities, Taipei needs to seek other ways by leveraging its asymmetric advantages. Learning from the Ukrainian battlefield, Taiwan should thus build up its arsenal while keeping in mind that a force posture based on a denial strategy should be increasingly asymmetric in nature.

Know Your Enemy, Know Yourself

Awareness, understanding, and the ability to communicate and trust one another in the battlefield are key components of a successful denial strategy. Taiwan must ensure a coherent command structure across its military services, preventing inter-service rivalries and inefficiencies through pre-war exercises and clear operational coordination. Resilient communication systems, including terrestrial and space-based backups, are crucial to maintaining connectivity during conflict, alongside a robust cyber defense and electronic warfare strategy. Intelligence operations must be streamlined by breaking down bureaucratic processes and fostering collaboration among services and decision-makers to prevent miscalculations. Finally, Taiwan should invest in cyber capabilities, counter-electronic warfare assets, and a broad network of sensors, including drones of various sizes, to improve intelligence gathering and targeting capabilities while minimizing reliance on foreign sources.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has shown the importance of keeping communication nodes active on the battlefield, as well as the vital role of anticipating strategic surprise. Command failures, faulty communications, and poor intelligence plagued Russia’s initial campaigns. At the same time, Ukraine benefited from stable coverage and secure and accessible military/government functions, aided by foreign-supported cloud and intelligence services. 

Quantity Is a Quality of Its Own

Taiwan should recognize that while quality can compensate for numerical inferiority, it cannot do so indefinitely. In the initial stages of a PLA attack on the island, a well-trained force with robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as high-tech weaponry can outperform a larger, less prepared adversary. However, over time, quantity matters. 

Ukraine has been able to avoid being out-produced and out-mobilized thanks to the uninterrupted supply of foreign assistance that replenished its depots where domestic production could not keep up. Sustaining prolonged resistance requires a deep reserve of manpower, munitions, and logistical resilience, even more so in an insular context such as Taiwan’s. Taipei must establish stockpiles and prioritize voluminous and disposable assets that can be replaced at lower costs and be manufactured on the island if it wants to be able to sustain wartime efforts in the long run. 

With Enemies Like These, You Need Powerful Friends

Yet, the most vital lesson from Ukraine is not military but geopolitical: international support and alignments are indispensable. Ukraine would have not resisted as long as it did without the global endorsement it received. From economic sanctions on Russia to military aid, from intelligence to medical equipment, Ukraine has largely benefited from its international network. While a part of this support was motivated by humanitarian reasons, another was definitely driven by the strategic considerations of other countries. 

Taiwan’s denial strategy is a calculated approach to deterrence, leveraging asymmetric capabilities to counterbalance China’s military superiority. However, it hinges on external backing, especially from the United States. Military aid, arms transfers, intelligence cooperation, trade – all are vital factors if a smaller, insular actor is to deter a far superior adversary in the long run. While the island’s geopolitical position might grant some of the same assistance Ukraine received, the threat of an escalation with China is a powerful deterrent for many countries. 

Taiwan’s adoption of a so-called “hedgehog denial strategy” – making itself as indigestible as possible to China – has broader implications for international dynamics and alignments in the region. By enhancing its deterrence posture, Taiwan will contribute to collective security in the Indo-Pacific, aligning with the strategic interests of countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. However, this approach requires careful diplomatic navigation to avoid escalating tensions with China.

Once more, Ukraine’s experience comes in useful as it demonstrates the critical importance of a support base that is not only international but also diversified. Taiwan must cultivate diversified alignments, engaging not only with the “usual suspects” but also with other regional actors through multilateral forums such as the Quad and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Strategic communication is a vital component of this. Ukraine successfully leveraged strategic messaging to portray itself as a defender of democratic values, garnering international support. Taiwan should similarly utilize its democratic identity to build international solidarity, influencing global political relations and public opinion.

Strength Through Strategy: Taiwan’s Path Forward

While Taiwan’s geography and strategic context differ from Ukraine’s, the core insights remain clear: a robust denial-based strategy, bolstered by asymmetric capabilities and resilient command structures, is essential for deterring aggression. However, military preparedness alone is insufficient. Ukraine’s experience underscores the indispensable role of international support, diversified alliances, and strategic communication in sustaining long-term resistance. 

By adapting a denial defense posture, strengthening its regional partnerships, and proactively shaping global narratives, Taiwan can enhance its deterrence while reinforcing broader Indo-Pacific security. The critical challenge now for Taipei is not just to learn from Ukraine, but also to act on it before it is too late.

Authors

Guest Author Benedetta Girardi

Benedetta Girardi is a strategic analyst at  The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and principal researcher for the HCSS “Europe in the Indo-Pacific Hub.” Her primary research interests regard the geopolitics and geoeconomics of the Indo-Pacific, European defence and security policy, and the interactions and ties between Europe, China, and the United States.

Guest Author Davis Ellison

Davis Ellison is a strategic analyst at  The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) specializing in security and defense affairs and chair of the HCSS Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relations. His primary focus areas include deterrence, arms control, and strategy. He joins HCSS from NATO Allied Command Transformation, where he served for over three years as a strategist. Davis is currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the King’s College London Department of War Studies, where he is writing his dissertation on civil-military relations in NATO. 

Guest Author Tim Sweijs

Dr. Tim Sweijs is the director of research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and a senior research fellow at the Netherlands’ War Studies Research Centre of the Netherlands Defence Academy. He is the scientific adviser to the Secretariat of the Global Commission on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain, an initiative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Sweijs is also a Research Affiliate at the Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute for Technology in the United States. His most recent book is a volume on future war titled ”Beyond Ukraine: Debating the Future of War” (Hurst, 2024).

Event Recap | NATO Future Fuels Workshop

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the Federation of European Tank Storage Associations (FETSA) hosted a NATO Future Fuels Closed-Door Workshop on 24 April 2025 in The Hague, The Netherlands.

For the first time in decades a full-scale war erupted on the European continent, which prompted European governments and NATO members to increase military spending. The rise of China and the shift of the United States strategic interest from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s military threat, and conflicts in the Middle East point to the need for European militaries to strengthen operational readiness.

At the same time, European governments are setting carbon neutrality targets not only for their economies but also their militaries. As low-carbon fuels gain a more prominent role In the European economy, energy production, storage and transportation infrastructure are changing. Militaries are investing in reducing emissions as well, with NATO pledging to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, yet fossil fuels remain the most reliable for militaries during conflict in the short-term.

For the first time, this workshop brought together representatives of the commercial and military infrastructure sectors to discuss the impact and risks of the changing global environment as well as commercial and military infrastructure needs. It featured short pitches from speakers that opened the room for discussion, debate and networking.

A report ‘Securing European Military Fuels in a Tense Security Environment: Supply, Distribution and Storage’ was also written by Ron Stoop, Irina Patrahau & Ciaran Cassidy and shared with participants in anticipation of the event. The report investigates the challenges to fuel logistics that NATO could face if forced into a large-scale conflict on its Eastern Flank. It finds that several core features of the European fuel supply system could emerge as serious constraints on military effectiveness and provides several recommendations to address these challenges.

Event Recap:

Welcome Word by Mr. Michel Rademaker; Deputy Director HCSS

Opening Remarks by Mr. Ravi Bhatiani; Executive Director FETSA

Scene Setting Presentation by Ms. Lucia van Geuns; HCSS Strategic Advisor Energy & Raw Materials

Keynote Speech by Mr. Marc Thoreson; Programme Manager, Central European Pipeline System

Round Table 1: European Infrastructure, Security Risks and Decarbonisation

Round Table 2: European Fuel Distribution and Storage in Peace and Wartime

Round Table 3: Challenges and Opportunities of Fuels in High-Intensity Armed Conflict

Closing Remarks: Take-Aways for the NATO Summit by Mr. Michel Rademaker; Deputy Director HCSS

De Strateeg: Vormt Noord-Korea het grootste gevaar voor de NAVO?

Bij cyberdreigingen kijken we snel naar Rusland, maar onderschat Noord-Korea niet! De dreiging op dat gebied uit dat land wordt steeds groter. En dan gaat het niet alleen om hackpogingen, maar ook veel geniepiger onder de radar.

Waarom doet Noord-Korea dit en wat kunnen de gevolgen voor ons zijn? Dat bespreekt Paul van Liempt in deze aflevering van De Strateeg met:

  • Remco Breuker, hoogleraar Koreastudies aan de Universiteit Leiden.
  • Hans Horan, strategisch analist bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies.

Bron: BNR Nieuwsradio, De Strateeg, 4 mei 2025

Over deze podcast

De Strateeg is een podcast van BNR in samenwerking met het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Abonneer je via bnr.nl/destrateeg om geen enkele aflevering te missen.

Host: Paul van Liempt

Redactie: Michaël Roele

Delta Tango podcast | Drones, AI en cyberaanvallen: hoe bereiden we ons voor op een moderne oorlog?

De oorlogsdreiging komt steeds dichterbij, ook voor Nederland. Maar hoe ziet een hedendaags gewapend conflict eruit door alle snelle ontwikkelingen op het gebied van wapens, technologieën en strategieën? En nog belangrijker, hoe kunnen we ons beschermen tegen zo’n moderne oorlog?

Daarover gaat Olof van Joolen in Telegraaf podcast DELTA TANGO in gesprek met experts Martijn Kitzen en Tim Sweijs, auteurs van het onlangs verschenen boek ‘De oorlog van morgen’ waarin zij antwoord proberen te geven op de vraag hoe een toekomstige oorlog eruit ziet.

Tim Sweijs is onderzoeksdirecteur bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies, en Martijn Kitzen is hoogleraar irreguliere oorlogsvoering en speciale operaties aan de Nederlandse Defensie Academie, en bijzonder hoogleraar krijgswetenschappen. In ‘De oorlog van morgen’ (Uitgeverij Balans) analyseren zij hoe moderne oorlogvoering razendsnel verandert door nieuwe wapens, technologieën en strategieën, van AI tot drones en van sabotage tot desinformatie en deepfakes.

‘Het is hoogtijd voor ons om onze krijgsmacht op te bouwen.’

Bron: Telegraaf podcast Delta Tango, 30 april 2025

Delta Tango is de defensie en internationale veiligheidspodcast van De Telegraaf. Van marineschepen tot F-35’s, en van veteranen tot jihadisten. Elke twee weken praten onze deskundigen je bij over nationale en internationale veiligheidsvraagstukken.