Deterrence and War Initiation Decisions

Two simple propositions are at the heart of contemporary policy discussions about interstate war. In simple terms these propositions conclude, war principally results from a perception of a military imbalance. Therefore, the obvious policy prescription to avoid war is to ensure there is no perception of a military imbalance. In practical terms, this means greater investment in the armed forces or building stronger relationships with countries that maintain powerful armed forces.

At the heart of contemporary policy discussions about interstate war is the idea that war principally results from a perception of a military imbalance. Therefore, the obvious policy prescription to avoid war is to ensure there is no perception of a military imbalance. In practical terms, this means greater investment in the armed forces or building stronger relationships with countries that maintain powerful armed forces.

This short brief by Jeffrey H. Michaels, part of the deterrence paper series, argues these propositions are not just overly simple but misleading. The principal reason for the weakness of the propositions is a fundamental lack of understanding about contemporary interstate war, specifically why and how states decide to go to war.

The author concludes that the problem with the vast majority of contemporary war scenarios is that they tend to focus on how a military conflict might play out with only a superficial discussion of the motives and cost-benefit calculus of the enemy leadership leading up to the decision to embark upon war. By approaching a deterrence strategy from the perspective of how an adversary could translate military success into a favorable political outcome, very different light can be shed on an aggressor’s cost-benefit calculus and campaign design for waging a successful war, and hence the most appropriate means of deterring them.

Author: Dr. Jeffrey H. Michaels

This is the fifth short paper of a new HCSS series on deterrence, edited by Paul van Hooft and Tim Sweijs.

Find the other papers from the series here:

• Pick Your Poison: Comparing the Deterrence Problem in Asia and Europe‘  by Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
• ‘Raising the Costs of Access: Active Denial Strategies by Small and Middle Powers against Revisionist Aggression‘, by HCSS analysts Paul van Hooft, Nora Nijboer and Tim Sweijs.
• Strengthening Taiwan’s Integrated Deterrence Posture: Challenges and Solutions‘ by Jyun-yi Lee of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR).
• Deterrence in the Baltic Sea Region – a View from Poland by Wojciech Lorenz (Polish Institute of International Affairs)