On the 23rd of September 2024, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) invited experts from across the globe, specifically South Africa, Brazil and global organisations such as the UN to exchange views on ‘possible futures’ of future security trends and to establish a global baseline in foresight. This was the second event in a three-part series called ‘The Hague Strategic Foresight Forum Talks’. The second event was titled ‘Global Perspectives on Future Security Trends.’ Check out the event recap here.
The first event was titled ‘Navigating Tomorrow: Transatlantic Outlooks on the Future Security Landscape and its Implications for the Netherlands’. Check out the event recap here and the official write-up here.
During our first event, experts from various transatlantic foresight institutions were struck by the similarities of their reports. Pervasive competition, enabled by technological advancements and intensified by climate change, was the overarching trend from the transatlantic perspective. The similarity of their observations hinted towards a Western bias through which the future was perceived, raising the question whether transatlantic perspectives can accurately grasp the full spectrum of global dynamics.
During the second event, it became clear that key elements of the transatlantic baseline were viewed differently by our second group of experts. Critical reflections on the efficacy of capitalism alongside liberal democracy as a guiding structure for developing countries, essentially the foundation of the transatlantic worldview, reflected a fundamental disparity in perceptions between our first and second group of experts.
Futures exist in the minds of policy-makers and are determined by perceptions shaped by political, social, and economic factors. The observed divergence in global perceptions served as an indicator of larger discrepancies. As one of the speakers summarised: “How you view the future depends on where you are.” The Western baseline established in the first event appeared to be incomplete and reflective of a quite homogeneous, consensus view of the future amongst foresight practitioners.
This write-up of the second event represents the perceptions of non-Western experts and attendees as expressed during the Forum, on several key elements featuring in the Western baseline, including models of cooperation and competition, the role of democracy, and the relationship between multipolarity and multilateralism. It also offers their analysis of the key drivers underpinning future security drivers, this time from an African, Latin American, and UN perspective. It concludes with a set of key takeaways and conclusions offered by the participants.
On the 3rd of July 2024, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) invited experts from across the transatlantic community, specifically the US National Intelligence Council, NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and the EU Institute for Security Studies to exchange views on future security trends in the transatlantic community and their implications for the Netherlands and Europe. This was the first event in a three-part series called ‘The Hague Strategic Foresight Forum Talks’. The first event was titled ‘Navigating Tomorrow: Transatlantic Outlooks on the Future Security Landscape and its Implications for the Netherlands’. Check out the event recap here and read the official write-up here.
This guest paper What divides us? And the impact on democracy and stability was written by Dr. Jakkie Cilliers in anticipation of the second The Hague Strategic Foresight Forum Talks ‘Global Perspectives on Future Security Trends’. This closed-door event will be held on the 23rd of September 2024.
The paper examines the widening gap between the Global North and Global South amid shifting economic and political dynamics. It explores how these global divisions—fueled by economic disparities, geopolitical tensions, and climate change—affect democratisation, governance, and global stability. With rising authoritarianism and declining democracy worldwide, the paper raises important questions about the future of multilateral cooperation and the role of different regions in shaping a more stable global order. The piece also delves into Africa’s unique challenges and opportunities within this evolving landscape.
Dr. Jakkie Cilliers the founder and the former Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. He currently serves as Chairman of the ISS Board of Trustees and Head of the African Futures and Innovation Programme in the Pretoria office of the Institute.
On the 3rd of July 2024, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) invited experts from across the transatlantic community, specifically the US National Intelligence Council, NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and the EU Institute for Security Studies to exchange views on future security trends in the transatlantic community and their implications for the Netherlands and Europe. This was the first event in a three-part series called ‘The Hague Strategic Foresight Forum Talks’. The first event was titled ‘Navigating Tomorrow: Transatlantic Outlooks on the Future Security Landscape and its Implications for the Netherlands’. Check out the event recap here and read the official write-up here.
This guest paper A Latin American perspective on the key drivers of future international security trends was written by Prof. Alcides Costa Vaz in anticipation of the second The Hague Strategic Foresight Forum Talks ‘Global Perspectives on Future Security Trends’. This closed-door event will be held on the 23rd of September 2024.
The paper discusses the major factors shaping global security from a Latin American viewpoint. It identifies two broad categories of drivers: those affecting state power and global power distribution, and those shaping how actors perceive and prioritise security threats. The text emphasises both traditional geopolitical challenges (such as the U.S.-China rivalry, weakening collective security frameworks, and military technology advancements) and emerging issues like climate change, cyber vulnerabilities, and the empowerment of non-state actors.
A specific focus is placed on four key drivers that will shape the future of international security:
- Geopolitical Rivalries and Weakening Collective Security: The resurgence of power struggles, particularly between the U.S. and China, is complicating global and regional security governance. Countries are increasingly adopting deterrence strategies, sidelining cooperative security mechanisms.
- Sophisticated Conventional Arms and Cyber Vulnerabilities: Nations are more exposed to advanced conventional weapons and cyberspace threats, with limited global governance to mitigate these risks. The global arms market remains dominated by a few major powers, while non-state actors are gaining access to advanced missile technologies.
- Technological Dependencies and Vulnerabilities: The growing reliance on digital technologies, satellite systems, and cyber infrastructures makes countries more vulnerable, particularly in regions like Latin America, where dependence and asymmetries are pronounced.
- The Rise of Violent Non-State Actors: Organised crime, particularly in Latin America, is becoming more influential, contributing to violence, illegal activities (e.g., drug and arms trafficking), and even environmental crimes. This challenges both domestic and international security frameworks.
The paper highlights how Latin America, while generally free from interstate wars, faces significant security threats from organised crime, geopolitical rivalries, technological vulnerabilities, and environmental degradation. These trends are likely to persist, shaping both regional and global security landscapes in the near future.
Prof. Alcides Costa Vaz is the Professor and Coordinator of Graduate Studies at the Institute of International Relations of the University of Brasilia and former President of the Brazilian Defense Studies Association.
The International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a 5-year strategic cooperation to address water-related conflict and instability around the world. This signifies a mutual commitment to jointly address the global risk of water-induced conflicts and promote sustainable water management practices around the world. The two parties value the many potential areas of collaboration at the global, regional, national and community level.
The IFRC and WPS wish to work together to advance global peace and security by addressing challenges along the humanitarian, development and peace nexus; supporting sustainable and equitable water resource and ecosystem management; building anticipatory action; and mitigating water-related conflicts while strengthening water-based cooperation and peace.
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) will represent the WPS partnership and as such act as the coordinator of the MoU on behalf of the WPS partnership. During the launch event at the Stockholm Water Week in September 2024, HCSS senior strategic analyst Laura Birkman stated, “HCSS is proud to coordinate this effort with the IFRC on behalf of the WPS partnership. Combining our expertise on the water-peace nexus with the world’s largest humanitarian network significantly enhances our ability to address water-induced instability in fragile regions on a meaningful scale.”
Maria Pinzon, IFRC Global Head of Water Systems Strengthening, explained IFRC’s motivation for the collaboration: “Our National Societies have been identifying tensions in communities around water. Joining efforts with The WPS Consortium will enable communities to learn, understand, and take action.” WPS pioneers innovative tools and services that empower stakeholders to identify, understand, and address water-related security risks at an early stage and creating opportunities for water-based cooperation and peace. This process is built on a foundation of global data collection and validation, and a deep understanding of how water scarcity or floods can manifest as social consequences in local contexts.
In the short term, IFRC and WPS aim to reduce water-related tensions at the community level. Long-term goals include enhancing community resilience by building capacity for equitable and sustainable water cooperation, ultimately reducing water-related instability and migration. The initial focus of the partnership will be on supporting the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies in the MENA region, starting in September with an inception workshop taking place in Amman, Jordan.
About the IFRC:
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world’s largest humanitarian network of 191 National Red Cross Red Crescent Societies and over 17 million volunteers, delivering assistance to vulnerable communities worldwide, before, during and after disasters and health emergencies to meet the needs and improve the lives of vulnerable people without discrimination as to nationality, race, religion, beliefs, class or political opinions.
About the WPS Partnership:
The Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mitigates water-induced conflict through cooperation on water resource management. The WPS consortium was established in 2018 with a clear mission: to facilitate timely, informed, and inclusive action in regions susceptible to water-related conflicts, thereby placing a crucial role in global peace and security.
For more information, contact: Nicola Chadwick, Mobile +31 621405472, Email: n.chadwick@un-ihe.org / info@waterpeacesecurity.org Coordinator of WPS communications.
On the 3rd of July 2024, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) invited experts from across the transatlantic community, specifically the US National Intelligence Council, NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and the EU Institute for Security Studies to exchange views on future security trends in the transatlantic community and their implications for the Netherlands and Europe. This was the first event in a three-part series called ‘The Hague Strategic Foresight Forum Talks’. The first event was titled ‘Navigating Tomorrow: Transatlantic Outlooks on the Future Security Landscape and its Implications for the Netherlands’. Check out the event recap here.
The energy transition, climate change, artificial intelligence, great-power competition between the United States and China, and large-scale war on the European continent. These challenges are currently at the centre of attention for policymakers in Europe and the Netherlands, but their buildup has been years in the making.
Preparing for such future challenges is always difficult, since ‘the future’, does not exist. Futures are created by the perceptions of those making policy today. Therefore, engaging in conversation with other producers or consumers of foresight exercises is valuable, as it can augment collective understanding of certain trends and actors, thereby informing thinking about the future. Further, as choices are made the possible number of futures becomes more restricted as alternative paths are closed off.
Aside from the billions of possible futures floating around in the minds of people all over the world, there are also ‘dominant futures’. These are the result of capstone exercises from a select group of elite organisations specialised in foresight, which translate the perceptions of their experts into a single document, thereby establishing ‘a baseline’ in foresight, often-times for elected political leaders. Finding areas of agreement, possible disagreement, and exploring mutual blind spots are important areas for the community of foresight experts to engage in.
This write-up of the event provides a summary of what was discussed, the trends, drivers, shocks and provides some key takeaways for practitioners.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership have announced a multi-year cooperation to address water-related conflict and instability around the world.
On August 26, the first day of World Water Week 2024 in Stockholm, Sweden, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Water, Peace and Security (WPS) Partnership proudly announced their collaboration on Water and Peace. The cooperation agreement, that has since been formalised in a 5-year Memorandum of Understanding, signifies a mutual commitment to jointly address the global risk of water-induced conflicts and promote sustainable water management practices around the world.
During the launch event panel, the IFRC and WPS emphasised their mutual commitment to preventing and managing water-related instability in fragile regions.
Moderator Laura Birkman, senior strategic analyst of WPS consortium member The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) stated, “HCSS is proud to coordinate this effort with the IFRC on behalf of the WPS partnership. Combining our expertise on the water-peace nexus with the world’s largest humanitarian network significantly enhances our ability to address water-induced instability in fragile regions on a meaningful scale.”
The initial focus of the partnership will be on supporting the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies in the MENA region, starting in September with an inception workshop taking place in Amman, Jordan. The SWWW24 launch event attracted many practitioners, academics, and policymakers working on water-related challenges around the world.
Panellists Yasir Mohamed (IHE Delft) and Audrey Legat (Deltares) highlighted the potential for impactful collaboration is significant. In the short term, IFRC and WPS aim to reduce water-related tensions at the community level. Long-term goals include enhancing community resilience by building capacity for equitable and sustainable water cooperation, ultimately reducing water-related instability and migration.
Maria Pinzon, IFRC Global Head of Water Systems Strengthening, explained IFRC’s motivation for the collaboration: “Our National Societies have been identifying tensions in communities around water. Joining efforts with The WPS Consortium will enable communities to learn, understand, and take action.”
The event concluded with a ceremonial ribbon-cutting to officially mark the start of this strategic partnership. “The WPS is looking forward to collaborating with IFRC and local partners worldwide to turn water-related tensions into opportunities for peace and cooperation,” said Yasir Mohamed (IHE Delft), coordinator of the WPS consortium.
About the IFRC:
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world’s largest humanitarian network, delivering assistance to vulnerable communities worldwide.
About the WPS Partnership:
The Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mitigates water-induced conflict through cooperation on water resource management.
For more information, contact: Nicola Chadwick, Mobile +31 621405472, Email: n.chadwick@un-ihe.org / info@waterpeacesecurity.org Coordinator of WPS communications.
HCSS is thrilled – and very proud – to welcome back Nora Nijboer! Nora was an intern with us from 2021-2022, and as of this month, she has joined our team as a Strategic Analyst.
Nora’s primary research interests regard the deterrence-arms control nexus, European defence and security policies, sanctions and small/middle power strategies.
Prior to joining HCSS, she has contributed to policy- and risk analyses at governmental, non-profit, financial and academic research institutes in the Netherlands, Germany and the Czech Republic. As an intern at HCSS back in 2021-2022, she co-published on active denial strategies by European and Asian small and middle powers against revisionist aggression.
She holds a MSSc degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University, where her thesis examined the relation between interstate island disputes and violent escalation. Additionally, she attained her MA degree in International Relations in Historical Perspective from Utrecht University and her BA in Liberal Arts and Sciences with a focus on European History at Tilburg University. She is fluent in Dutch, English and German.
On rejoining HCSS, she stated:
“With faltering arms control regimes and intensified geopolitical competition around the globe, finding common ground and raising awareness of the military and civilian risks to escalation is a must. Joining forces with HCSS’ team of interdisciplinary experts gives me the opportunity make a difference with the skills and knowledge I have gained so far and that I am hoping to develop during my time here.”
On July 23rd, HCSS data scientist Maarten Vonk presented his research at the International Conference on Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems (IPMU2024) in Portugal.
The IPMU conference is organized every two years with the focus of bringing together scientists working on methods for the management of uncertainty and aggregation. It also provides a forum for the exchange of ideas between theoreticians and practitioners in these and related areas. The 2024 edition of IPMU took place at the Instituto Superior Técnico, University of Lisbon, Portugal.
In his peer-reviewed paper, “Optimizing Causal Interventions in Hybrid Bayesian Networks”, Maarten shows how heuristic optimization can be used to retrieve policy-interventions using a discretization and knowledge compilation approach.
Causality is increasingly integrated into decision-making processes. Often, the goal is to optimize over causal interventions to achieve specific policy objectives. However, research into causal optimization has bifurcated into either the online optimization of interventions in causal models or the offline optimization of decision rules in causal influence diagrams.
Vonk introduces an approximate method for offline optimizing interventions in arbitrary hybrid Bayesian networks using observational data. The optimization problem is approached by compiling discretized Bayesian networks as binary decision diagrams, whereafter running interventional queries is very efficient. This efficiency is exploited by running heuristic optimization algorithms to optimize over the interventional queries. By running experiments on a variety of large hybrid Bayesian networks, Vonk demonstrates the practical utility of the method and discusses policy relevance.
The paper is the product of a successful collaboration between the Natural Computing group of Leiden University’s Institute of Advanced Computer Science (LIACS) and the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), aiming to use Natural Computing’s optimization expertise for policy development purposes. In addition, the theory research group of LIACS helped by providing a framework for dealing with the computational challenges involved.
Author: Maarten Vonk
Contributors: Diederick Vermetten, Jacob de Nobel, Sebastiaan Brand, Ninoslav Malekovic, Thomas Bäck, Alfons Laarman, and Anna Kononova.
On July 23rd, HCSS data scientist Maarten Vonk presented his research at the International Conference on Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems (IPMU2024) in Portugal.
The IPMU conference is organized every two years with the focus of bringing together scientists working on methods for the management of uncertainty and aggregation. It also provides a forum for the exchange of ideas between theoreticians and practitioners in these and related areas. The 2024 edition of IPMU took place at the Instituto Superior Técnico, University of Lisbon, Portugal.
In his peer-reviewed paper, “Optimizing Causal Interventions in Hybrid Bayesian Networks”, Maarten shows how heuristic optimization can be used to retrieve policy-interventions using a discretization and knowledge compilation approach.
Causality is increasingly integrated into decision-making processes. Often, the goal is to optimize over causal interventions to achieve specific policy objectives. However, research into causal optimization has bifurcated into either the online optimization of interventions in causal models or the offline optimization of decision rules in causal influence diagrams.
Vonk introduces an approximate method for offline optimizing interventions in arbitrary hybrid Bayesian networks using observational data. The optimization problem is approached by compiling discretized Bayesian networks as binary decision diagrams, whereafter running interventional queries is very efficient. This efficiency is exploited by running heuristic optimization algorithms to optimize over the interventional queries. By running experiments on a variety of large hybrid Bayesian networks, Vonk demonstrates the practical utility of the method and discusses policy relevance.
The paper is the product of a successful collaboration between the Natural Computing group of Leiden University’s Institute of Advanced Computer Science (LIACS) and the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), aiming to use Natural Computing’s optimization expertise for policy development purposes. In addition, the theory research group of LIACS helped by providing a framework for dealing with the computational challenges involved.
Author: Maarten Vonk
Contributors: Diederick Vermetten, Jacob de Nobel, Sebastiaan Brand, Ninoslav Malekovic, Thomas Bäck, Alfons Laarman, and Anna Kononova.
HCSS strategic analyst Davis Ellison contributed to the latest volume of the Georgetown Security Studies Review, with a paper titled “The Role of Conventional Counterforce in NATO Strategy: Historical Precedents and Present Opportunities“.
Multiple NATO states have acquired long-range, highly precise conventional missiles and have discussed using these to target Russia’s nuclear weapons, risking possible nuclear escalation. How has conventional counterforce strategy shaped NATO’s history, and would such a strategy be viable today?
This paper addresses these questions by first reviewing the literature on conventional counterforce, thereby exploring various models that explain why states pursue such capabilities. It argues that, due to the complexities of alliance politics and the role of nuclear weapons within them, there is mounting pressure for non-nuclear-armed states to acquire conventional capabilities to credibly and independently threaten a nuclear-armed competitor’s secure second-strike capability.
The paper then applies this explanation to two case studies: 1) NATO’s Cold War counterforce strategies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; and 2) current NATO counterforce strategies in the context of deteriorating NATO-Russia relations and the global arms control regime.
The paper finds that non-nuclear NATO states are acquiring conventional counterforce capabilities to target Russia’s nuclear arsenal without sufficient attention being paid to escalation risks or broader strategic opportunities to bolster arms control.
The Georgetown Security Studies Review (GSSR) is an official publication of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Author Davis Ellison is a PhD Candidate at King’s College London and a strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for
Strategic Studies. His dissertation research focuses on the internal dynamics of NATO political and military structures both during and after the Cold War, using this lens as an explanatory variable for important NATO shifts over time. He has written widely on civil-military relations, arms control, and national security policymaking.
Source: Georgetown Security Studies Review, Volume 12, Issue 1
HCSS strategic analyst Davis Ellison contributed to the latest volume of the Georgetown Security Studies Review, with a paper titled “The Role of Conventional Counterforce in NATO Strategy: Historical Precedents and Present Opportunities“.
Multiple NATO states have acquired long-range, highly precise conventional missiles and have discussed using these to target Russia’s nuclear weapons, risking possible nuclear escalation. How has conventional counterforce strategy shaped NATO’s history, and would such a strategy be viable today?
This paper addresses these questions by first reviewing the literature on conventional counterforce, thereby exploring various models that explain why states pursue such capabilities. It argues that, due to the complexities of alliance politics and the role of nuclear weapons within them, there is mounting pressure for non-nuclear-armed states to acquire conventional capabilities to credibly and independently threaten a nuclear-armed competitor’s secure second-strike capability.
The paper then applies this explanation to two case studies: 1) NATO’s Cold War counterforce strategies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; and 2) current NATO counterforce strategies in the context of deteriorating NATO-Russia relations and the global arms control regime.
The paper finds that non-nuclear NATO states are acquiring conventional counterforce capabilities to target Russia’s nuclear arsenal without sufficient attention being paid to escalation risks or broader strategic opportunities to bolster arms control.
The Georgetown Security Studies Review (GSSR) is an official publication of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Author Davis Ellison is a PhD Candidate at King’s College London and a strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for
Strategic Studies. His dissertation research focuses on the internal dynamics of NATO political and military structures both during and after the Cold War, using this lens as an explanatory variable for important NATO shifts over time. He has written widely on civil-military relations, arms control, and national security policymaking.
Source: Georgetown Security Studies Review, Volume 12, Issue 1
From 19-21 June, 2024, the Third International Conference on Environmental Peacebuilding was held in The Hague, convening leading practitioners, academics, and thought leaders in the field of environmental peacebuilding.
Experts of the Water, Peace & Security (WPS) Partnership were active in various sessions to discuss issues such as harnessing water as a tool for peace, and the power of data, for instance through the use of the WPS Global Early Warning tool, illustrated by case studies from Mali, Kenya, and Iraq. The WPS Global Early Warning Tool predicts water-induced conflict up to 12 months in advance.
On behalf of WPS, HCSS Data Scientist Maarten Vonk gave a presentation on “Causal Modeling of Climate-Related Conflicts”, during the breakout session “Harnessing the Power of Data, Machine Learning, and Advanced Statistics for Proactive Environmental Conflict Prevention”.
Organized by the Environmental Peacebuilding Association (EnPax) and the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at Leiden University, the three-day conference was packed with high-level plenary sessions, breakout sessions and keynote speeches.
The conference featured 5 themes key to environmental peacebuilding, as well as a 6th open theme:
- Climate Change
- Water
- Peace, Justice, and Accountability
- Natural Resources and Conservation
- Data and Digital Technologies
- Open: Abstracts on other topics at the intersection of environment, conflict, and peace
Though trainings and dialogue, WPS raises awareness about the mutual benefits of cooperation when water is scarce. WPS analyses the root causes of water-related conflicts, leading to strategies to address these causes. For example, in Iraq, WPS programmes have resulted in the adoption of conflict-sensitivity in Integrated Water Resource Management policies. And in Kenya and Ethiopia, cross-border cooperation has arisen thanks to agreements between stakeholders on both sides of the border.
By understanding and addressing the drivers of climate-related conflict, we can turn cycles of violence into cycles of cooperation for peace.
At the opening of each academic year, the Faculty of Military Sciences (FMS) of the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) publishes the Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies (NL ARMS). This peer-reviewed series offers an overview of cutting-edge scientific research on military sciences drawing on scholarship from researchers at the FMS and colleagues around the world.
The theme for the 2023 edition is “Climate Security and the Military: Concepts, Strategies and Partnerships”.
Edited by Georg Frerks, Rinze Geertsma, Jeroen Klomp and Tom Middendorp, the book reviews the climate Security Nexus from the military angle and proposes the design of climate security strategies and how they can contribute to adaptation to and mitigation of the related challenges.
HCSS strategic analysts Laura Birkman, Irina Patrahau, Tim Sweijs and assistant analyst Matti Suomenaro contributed a chapter to the book, “Cooling the Cauldron: A Climate Security Intervention Framework.” To support strategic and operational decision making, there is a need to move beyond current thinking of climate change as a conflict multiplier and consider the causal mechanisms that lead from climate change to conflict outcomes, the authors state.
The HCSS chapter offers a framework for the design of climate security interventions that may prevent and mitigate climate-related security effects. The framework is based on qualitative and quantitative studies of the climate and conflict nexus, theoretical and empirical studies on early warning and public policy programming, and in-depth case studies.
More specifically, the framework informs interventions that can reduce the security risks of climate change and bolster climate adaptation policy and programming. It employs an implementation logic based on an integrated and multi-level stakeholder approach, that includes the security sector. Using the case of Iraq, the chapter builds on but goes beyond the current body of academic literature by showcasing concrete intervention options that are conflict-sensitive and inclusive, leveraging local knowledge and capabilities.
“Climate Security and the Military: Concepts, Strategies and Partnerships” is available now from the Leiden University Press website.
Europese nucleaire afschrikking is gevaarlijk en moeilijk te verwezenlijken, schrijft HCSS senior strategisch analist Paul van Hooft in een opiniestuk voor NRC. Europa kan zich beter richten op geavanceerde conventionele wapens.
Zogenaamde ‘Europese’ kernwapens staan weer op de agenda. Volgens de huidige opiniepeilingen is het goed mogelijk dat Donald Trump in januari 2025 weer president van de VS is. Afschrikking hangt af van geloofwaardigheid en onlangs verklaarde Trump dat hij president Poetin geen duimbreed in de weg zou leggen bij een aanval op een NAVO-lidstaat die in gebreke was bij het betalen van de afdracht aan de verdragsorganisatie.
Net als in 2016 en 2017 is de publieke discussie in Duitsland over Europese nucleaire alternatieven weer opgelaaid. Ook Poolse leiders zetten deze keer vraagtekens bij Amerikaanse geloofwaardigheid. Maar hoewel Europese nucleaire afschrikking nodig is voor daadwerkelijke strategische autonomie is het moeilijk en gevaarlijk te verwezenlijken en kan Europa zich daarom voorlopig beter op geavanceerde conventionele wapens richten.
De Europese nucleaire alternatieven bestaan uit een EU-kernwapen, nieuwe Europese kernwapenstaten, of een grotere rol voor Frankrijk en het VK, de enige twee kernwapenmachten in Europa naast Rusland. Alleen de laatste optie is mogelijk haalbaar.
Nucleaire codes
De huidige staatsrechtelijke vormgeving van de EU maakt een EU-kernwapen nagenoeg onmogelijk. Tijdens een crisis zouden nooit alle lidstaten binnen enkele minuten unaniem tot een beslissing kunnen komen. En als het één leider was, wie zou dan de codes mogen invoeren? De president van de Europese Raad, de president van de Europese Commissie? We zijn eraan gewend deze soevereiniteit aan een Amerikaanse president over te dragen.
Is Frankrijk eigenlijk bereid de technologische kennis te delen? Bovendien kunnen neutrale EU-lidstaten, zoals Oostenrijk en Ierland, de ontwikkeling blokkeren.
Een Pools of Duits kernwapen is eveneens risicovol en niet alleen omdat het een breuk zou zijn met het non-proliferatieverdrag dat nu de verspreiding van kernwapens binnen de perken houdt. Het ontbreekt in beide landen aan technische kennis, voor zover de wil in Duitsland daadwerkelijk bestaat. Ze zouden tijdens de bouw van het wapen onveiliger zijn totdat ze een preventieve aanval kunnen overleven, behalve als de VS, VK, en Frankrijk expliciet aan Rusland duidelijk maakten de bouw van het wapen te steunen en ze ondertussen de beschermen.
Amerikaanse tactische wapens
De Franse en Britse kernwapens zijn op zichzelf waarschijnlijk niet afdoende zonder de Amerikaanse tactische wapens. Hoe bizar het misschien ook lijkt omdat kernwapens zo vernietigend zijn, maar juist daarom laten ze weinig ruimte tussen niets doen en algehele vernietiging. Zowel Frankrijk en het VK hebben kleine aantallen wapens en geen tactische kernwapens. Daardoor hebben ze weinig mogelijkheden om in stappen te escaleren. Het maakt de Franse en Britse afschrikking tijdens een crisis minder geloofwaardig.
Escalatiemogelijkheden bestaan nu omdat de vliegtuigen van een aantal NAVO-lidstaten – België, Duitsland, Italië, Turkije, en ook Nederland – Amerikaanse tactische wapens dragen. Polen zou ook graag lid van deze club zijn. Maar deze landen hebben geen operationele controle over de wapens. Een Amerikaanse president besluit of kernwapens geactiveerd worden – dus daadwerkelijk een nucleaire explosie op gang brengen. Daardoor hebben ze ook weinig betekenis als er een Amerikaanse president in het Witte Huis zit die ze niet wil gebruiken.
De Amerikaanse rol als beschermer is onzeker, met of zonder Trump
HCSS senior analist Paul van Hooft
Het probleem is daarom niet alleen Trump. De geloofwaardigheid en het voortbestaan van de NAVO hangt en hing altijd af van een onmogelijke belofte: dat de VS hun voortbestaan op het spel zullen zetten voor de veiligheid van bondgenoten aan de andere kant van de Atlantische Oceaan. Omdat de VS deze belofte deden aan Europese en Aziatische bondgenoten (en impliciet ook aan andere staten), is kernwapenproliferatie grotendeels beperkt gebleven tot de grootmachten – de VS, Rusland, China, het VK, Frankrijk, en India – en een paar andere staten zoals Pakistan, Israël, en Noord-Korea.
Vliegtuigen en langeafstandsraketten
Wij zijn nu bijna terug bij af. De Amerikaanse rol als beschermer van Europa is onzeker, ook met of zonder Trump, gezien de Amerikaanse draai richting Azië, die ook duidelijk werd in de laatste National Defense Strategy. Ook ná Trump hebben Amerikaanse kiezers elke vier jaar de Europese veiligheid in hun handen en moet Europa wachten hoe het muntje landt. De roep om Europese strategische autonomie groeit daarom, maar autonomie zal relatief zijn omdat Europa meer of minder afhankelijk is van de VS. Het gebrek aan nucleaire afschrikking blijft een groot obstakel.
Voor Europa is conventionele afschrikking als escalatiemiddel een meer haalbare optie. Dit kan door het ontwikkelen en aanschaffen van meer geavanceerde conventionele wapens, zoals vijfde of toekomstige zesde generatie vliegtuigen en langeafstandskruisraketten, waarmee Europese staten Russische militaire en industriële doelen zouden kunnen bedreigen. Dan is het hopen dat de Franse en Britse kernwapens genoeg twijfels zaaien bij Russische leiders om ze te weerhouden van aanvallen op EU- of NAVO-lidstaten. Ook als Amerika een stap terugdoet bij de verdediging van Europa.
Gepubliceerd in NRC op16 april 2024.
Do new military concepts promise too much? Are military thinkers being held to account for these new ideas? HCSS Strategic Analyst Davis Ellison and Director of Research Tim Sweijs contributed an article to War On The Rocks in which they appraise the state of MDO development and ask: Will Multi-Domain Operations actually help win wars? If so, how?
Link: WOTR Article
The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2023 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China report noted a 2021 “core military concept” in China centered on multi-domain precision warfare. The concept is “intended to leverage a [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.”
Sound familiar? It should. It is nearly an exact mirror image of multi-domain operations, the warfighting concept initially developed by the U.S. Army since at least 2015 that has since been copied across NATO. Despite its faddishness, or perhaps because of it, the multi-domain operations concept is now guiding the transformation and modernization of Western armed forces and of their peers. Yet, there are real concerns about whether multi-domain operations will mature into a fully functional warfighting concept or whether it will go by the wayside like effect-based operations in the past.
For nearly a year, we visited some of the main centers for thinking on multi-domain operations. We sat with planners in the Pentagon, officers in the German and Dutch army headquarters, strategists from the Israel Defense Forces, and experts and operators from France, Denmark, and NATO. One of us even worked on the NATO concept once upon a time. We appraised the state of multi-domain operations development with a primary question in mind: Will it actually help to win wars? If so, how?
What we found is that there are few clear answers to these questions. New concepts are often highly optimistic, uncoordinated with other services and allies, and lack any clear theory of success. A warfighting concept is a description in general terms of the application of military art and science within a defined set of parameters. For many contemporary concepts, what has stood out is a mish-mash of ideas, visions, and terms that often have little to do with one another. For some, multi-domain operations is just another step in another revolution in military affairs, with images of missiles and satellites and networks all linked up to destroy an enemy. For others, it is a call for new energy to be put into whole-of-government style integration that can deter everything, everywhere, all of the time.
Far more important is the impact this thinking has on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces in the field have been forced to toss out the maneuver-centric concepts taught to them by their NATO trainers as they have fought to overcome Russian defensive lines. Israeli forces were caught out by a massive surprise attack by Hamas, despite Gaza being perhaps the most heavily surveilled area on the planet, and the war in Gaza has already ground into intense urban combat, contrary to the expectations of the Israeli multi-domain concept. Claims to be able to see all, move quickly, and strike anywhere in order to rapidly resolve a conflict with minimum civilian impact are once again being challenged. Maneuver-centered, multi-domain operations style thinking seems to be making empty promises.
All this means that armed services should be prepared to pivot their efforts from the “thinkers” to the “doers” at training centers and better refine the actual feedback mechanisms between new ideas and the needs and realities of battlefield experience. Concept development should be informed by insights distilled from ongoing wars, as well as from exercises and experimentation within joint forces. It should also seek to articulate theories of success against specific adversaries. Finally, the effective implementation of multi-domain operations depends on the availability of mature technologies, in sufficient numbers, deployed by trained and ready forces.
What Makes a Good Warfighting Concept
In the past, warfighting concepts have helped military organizations win wars. The development of combined arms warfare during World War I and the embrace of mechanization ahead of World War II are archetypes of this success. AirLand Battle (Follow-On Forces Attack in NATO parlance), developed in the 1980s as part of the U.S. Army’s post-Vietnam transformation, set the conceptual stage for the lopsided Gulf War victory. The centrality of precision-guided airpower across warfighting concepts would seemingly be proved again over Kosovo in 1999.
For the joint warfighting concepts above to be successfully adopted and implemented, a number of factors needed to be in place. A shared understanding across services and allies with aligned incentive structures contributed to the concepts’ actual formal adoption. Military officers enlisted the support of civilian leaders. In the cases above, clear threats focused the concepts on actual operational challenges, rather than theoretical ones. This then allowed for the articulation of a theory of success that spelled out defeat mechanisms that actually made a testable argument, which then drove exercise programs. The technology was sufficiently mature and available in sufficient numbers.
Our research has revealed a gloomy picture for the state of multi-domain operations development in NATO countries and some of their closest partners. Few of the conditions listed above are in place in the cases we studied, creating real risks that new concepts overpromise, underdeliver, and distract vital attention away from solving concrete strategic and operational challenges.
Babylonian Confusion
Multi-domain operations concept development has lacked clarity and worsened confusion across multinational efforts. Across the cases we studied, there was a wide variation of terms and meanings. “Multi-domain” is followed by a range of terms, chiefly “operations” (Denmark, NATO, and the United States), “integration” (the United Kingdom), “maneuver” (Israel) and “deterrence” (Taiwan). Multimilieux/multichamps is the French term, while Germany references Multidimensionalität. “Domain” and “dimension” often take on different meanings, with some (Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, and the United States) referring explicitly and only to the five military domains (air, sea, land, cyber, space), while others (the United Kingdom and Taiwan) understand the term more broadly to possibly include other government functions. This gallery of terms becomes even more complex outside of English, where the terms “domain” and “dimension” are sometimes used interchangeably, such as in German and Hebrew.
Even within individual concepts, language and even images confound as much as explain. Take the case of the U.K. Multi-Domain Integration Joint Concept Note, and the image below taken from it.
Figure 1.Image Source
The concept’s working definition of multi-domain integration is:
The posturing of military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power, allies and partners; configured to sense, understand and orchestrate effects at the optimal tempo, across the operational domains and levels of warfare.
So the concept is simultaneously strategic, operational, and tactical, encompasses nearly all state functions, and is highly dependent on exploiting a “window of opportunity.” This is classic “buzzword bingo,” and actually makes it less easy to understand the concept. Ambiguous and vague language, filled with generalities, is quite likely the result of significant bureaucratic compromise. Form, in other words, trumps substance.
Poor Regime Fit
In many cases, the multi-domain operations concept does not sit well within existing political and military structures. This is particularly the case when a new concept seems to put the military or defense in a leading or coordinating role for other ministries or departments. The British concept, which carries an implicit centrality for the military in a coordination role for all security affairs, has been at odds with the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office and Parliament. The concept is then less digestible within the British political-military system as it proposes an outsized role for defense.
In the U.S. case, inter-service rivalry has been particularly strong and has had a direct impact on efforts to institutionalize multi-domain operations across the whole joint force. The U.S. Army and Air Force led competing development efforts, while the Navy and Marine Corps developed their own service-specific approaches that focused very narrowly on the Western Pacific. Importantly, differing service processes in training, budgeting, and procurement hinder joint efforts by locking implementation into service-specific channels.
At the lowest level, within the services themselves, tensions can be found as well. For many countries pursuing multi-domain operations, namely the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Israel, the army division has been envisaged as the most appropriate echelon within which to locate it. However, this has not been consistent across cases. Both the United States and Israel have multi-domain units (the U.S. Multi-Domain Task Force and the Israeli Ghost unit) that sit at different levels. In the U.S. case it is effectively a series of theatre-level missile brigades (based in both Europe and the Pacific), and in the Israeli case it is an experimental special forces battalion. Who “does” multi-domain operations remains contentious in Israel in keeping with the long-running rivalry within the army between the airborne and armored corps.
There is dissonance between and within each of these three levels. Concepts stressing a “whole-of-government” type approach risk civil-military tension over command, while those that emphasize precision-strike systems risk inter-service rivalries over who owns these new capabilities or who leads in command. And while these are, largely, peacetime debates, tensions have persisted in wartime, making them all the more crucial to understand.
Technological Immaturity
Much of the technological emphasis in multi-domain operations concepts is on speed: speed in communication, speed in action, and speed in movement. From a certain perspective, positing that war can be resolved early and quickly, this makes perfect sense. Another view, however, is that constantly pushing for speed ignores tempo, and that operations can spin out of control of both commanders and political leaders. Additionally, linking tactical and operational speed to strategic outcomes is itself an unproven assumption. Alongside this is the simple material fact that many of these game-changing capabilities just are not there yet. This is especially true for European forces that continue to face significant shortages in these capabilities.
Most concepts fall prey to this technological overconfidence, particularly in the field of communications. Assured connectivity in combat is central to nearly all multi-domain operations work. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and NATO all place some style of next-generation command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the core of their concept, assuming an assured availability of strong networks in the relatively near future. In reality, and despite a significant amount of attention in recent years, the level of assured connectivity upon which much multi-domain operations thought is predicated is far from realistic. Given that Russian, Chinese, and Iranian forces have invested heavily in electronic warfare capabilities and degrading their opponent’s battlefield connectivity over the past decades, this remains a blind spot.That a significant amount of conceptual and even higher strategic-level work is being done on the assumption of technological maturity is a serious flaw in the current generation of efforts.
There is little reason to assume that the speed and decisiveness imagined by multi-domain operations concepts is technologically feasible or leads to the outcomes desired. High-level efforts in recent years such as the U.S. Joint All-Domain Command and Control system have yet to take major steps.This hubris poses a risk that continues to pervade thinking on the Western way of warfare.
Vague Threats
It seems self-evident that a military concept should designate a specific adversary. If the envisaged result is to compel an enemy to do your will, it makes sense that the adversary and the threat it poses is explicitly taken into account. Many concepts, however, fail to single out adversaries and offer only the vaguest threat descriptions. Though the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Denmark are implicitly focused on Russia and NATO’s eastern front, this does not translate into detailed threat descriptions based on enemy approaches. NATO itself is aided in its specificity in that the alliance, through its 2022 Strategic Concept, has two threats that it has agreed to identify: Russia and terrorist organizations. For the United States this is arguably more challenging as its efforts must span global interests. The U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations concept is implicitly designed around both a Baltic and Taiwan scenario, implicitly identifying the main problem as ensuring maneuverability in a missile-dominated environment.
For countries that still face very direct threats at their borders, such as Israel, Taiwan, or South Korea, this is not a problem. Their concepts identify adversaries and contain clear threat descriptions. The major NATO states do not, which poses a problem from both a strategy-making and defense-planning perspective.
No Theory of Success
Very few of the countries explicitly formulate a theory of success. Only France, Israel, and Taiwan make a tentative causal case for how the new approaches envisioned within their respective multi-domain operations concepts will lead to defeating an opponent.
In practice, such an argument could look like: “IF NATO forces adopt a multi-domain operations approach that incorporates long-range precision fires alongside forward defensive systems, THEN these forces can effectively defeat a Russian attack along the eastern front, BECAUSE these divisions can effectively target rear-echelon targets while blunting assaults by frontline Russian units.”
What appears in the hypothetical above is a defeat mechanism. Described by Eado Hecht, a leading Israeli military analyst, these mechanisms describe the various processes that cause the damage that is intended to defeat an enemy. Such a mechanism can be rigorously tested, falsified, and refined at training centers.
Naturally, any fully developed theory is imperfect. There is nothing guaranteeing that the NATO example above would work (and in Ukraine, evidence suggests it wouldn’t). However, it can be tested in joint exercises, tried in simulations, and measured against observations from contemporary conflicts so that it can be improved and reapplied.
Opaque Risks
A key element that is often missed in new warfighting concepts, and indeed in many assessments of them, is the inherent risk in adopting a new approach. Each new concept involves implicit trade-offs that carry risks. By prioritizing one or another threat, selecting specific capabilities, or proposing new organizational structures, choices are made whose drawbacks are rarely made explicit. At present, none of the cases we studied assesses risks in the way described above. If risk is noted, it is only to argue for the risks if the respective concept is not implemented and funded, a calculation as influenced by bureaucratic considerations as it is by threat perceptions.
There are at least four risks that stem from an uncritical approach to developing multi-domain operation-type concepts: the possibility for commanders to become overloaded by an overly broad span of control; an over-reliance on connectivity; a mechanistic, over-engineered approach that becomes top heavy; and the assumption that the whole is ultimately more than the sum of its parts. Each has and will continue to derail new work if unaddressed.
The Way Ahead
Spending a year with multi-domain operations operators and strategists, we fear that it risks remaining a fashionable idea that is not implemented at scale. The “why” but especially the “how” of multi-domain operations simply does not have a clear or entirely convincing argument. This is not to say it is impossible to improve prevailing concepts going forward, but the current trajectory is not promising. With this in mind, we offer several recommendations.
First, shift from what Buzz Philips calls the “thinkers” to the “doers,” without severing the ties. It is almost impossible to test, invalidate, and revisit ideas if they are not being experimented with. For multi-domain operations to progress, it needs to leave the staff office and go to the training center.
Second, stop trying to make war “not war” by being overly clever. New concepts cannot erase attrition from the battlefield or lift the fog of war. Attempts to do so are quixotic at best. Focus on concrete operational problems and build solutions from there.
Third, be specific about adversaries and articulate how multi-domain operations can help defeat them. Task strategists to formulate defeat mechanisms that make clear, causal claims about how a new idea will resolve a tangible military problem posed by enemy forces. Practice these in wargames, simulations, and exercises at the national and the international level.
Fourth, continue to align efforts within NATO and within allies’ forces on terms and core ideas. New concepts, particularly for smaller and middle powers, should be multinational by design and language and concepts should be aligned.
Finally, consider the availability of the technologies that are at the core of visions of multi-domain operations. Draw up roadmaps for these technologies with direct links to different force mixtures. Recognize that capacity is just as much if not more important than qualitative capability. Quantity is a quality. Mass cannot be effectively substituted, certainly not in wars of attrition.
In conclusion, are the promises of multi-domain operations empty? Not necessarily. By the criteria identified above, the Chinese approach actually appears quite robust. It has a clear enemy, a theory of success, seemingly clearer inter-service and political-military relations, and is based on existing military capabilities. Regrettably, Western military organizations cannot say the same. They have their work cut out for them to make sure that multi-domain operations delivers on its many promises.
Published by War On The Rocks on January 22, 2024
About the authors:
Davis Ellison is a strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Ph.D. candidate in the King’s College London Department of War Studies.
Tim Sweijs is the research director at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a senior research fellow at the Netherlands’ War Studies Research Centre.
Image: Official Air Force Photograph by Tech Sgt. Burt Traynor
HCSS proudly presents our Annual Report! The year 2023 was a year in which the challenges piled up, and power politics dominated the international discourse.
As we look back, we take stock of our achievements and formulate our plans for the next. The HCSS research portfolio is in a very good state. In 2023, we once again expanded our thematic scope while at the same time deepening our focus. Our portfolio currently covers a wider spectrum of the challenges that our societies face in today’s world, from great power politics and international security at the highest level down to the micro-fabrics of individual interactions that shape our everyday world from below.
This Annual Report offers you a comprehensive overview of the many issues we work on everyday: geopolitics, defence policies, coercion, emerging technologies, economic statecraft, climate change, cyber governance, societal security and public order.
As we approach the year 2024, you might look back and assess our balancing act towards a multipolar order was stressful, precarious, and sometimes disruptive. You might believe that next year surely will be more stable. We hate to bring you the bad news, but 2024 is likely to be another year of geopolitical and economic instability. It’s improbable we’ll see a softening of US policy towards China and there is a high probability that in 2024 pivotal elections, not only in the U.S., but also in India, U.K., Russia, South Africa and Taiwan converge with the potential for conflicts and will add to the odds of the global economy diverging from its current path.
The geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the reshaping world economic framework are still to be determined, but we’re already witnessing a reversal of global supply chains with an upward pressure on inflation as an outcome. The competition between unrestricted globalisation and national sovereignty will lead to insecurity and instability and will put pressure on the way we relate to each other, who we identify with and on our social contract. Meanwhile most scientists and politicians are aware that there is only a theoretical chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 Celsius above preindustrial levels.
Geoeconomic fragmentation will accelerate. Securing energy supplies, restraining inflation, ensuring supply chain resilience, guaranteeing security, rebalancing the distribution of wealth, and achieving sustainability: it seems inevitable that (geo)politics and cultural values will lead to supply chains becoming more and more local and regional.
At the same time, we are approaching Christmas and the closing of the year. A time to get together with friends, family and loved ones. This Annual Report contains food for thought, as we focus on some of the highlights of 2023 and on future developments in the world. Through this we hope to look ahead to a brighter future beyond the gloom of the daily headlines.
At HCSS we do not pretend to know the future, to solve all highly complex problems with our analyses, or to instantaneously improve the relations between nations or mankind in an age of great-power competition, technological breakthroughs and climate change. But we expect that our fact-based analyses contribute to an increased understanding of the future path of the world and to provide ideas of how governments, businesses, and individuals, can help to make this world a better and safer place to live in.
Our team had an absolutely phenomenal output publishing in-depth research reports, shorter policy briefs, academic articles, book chapters, and books, as this Annual Report will attest to. As we look forward, we expect another challenging year given the enormous geopolitical turbulence we do not expect to calm down anytime soon. We continue to work on our future by conducting objective, neutral, impartial, and fact-based research. We will be ready to offer our insights – now more than ever.
The HCSS team wishes you a very merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!
Authors: Alessandra Barrow and Patrick Willemsen.
With contributions by: Rob de Wijk, Paul Sinning, Tim Sweijs, Laura Birkman, Frank Bekkers, Paul van Hooft, Irina Patrahau, Maarten Vonk, Han ten Broeke, Abe de Ruijter and Joris Teer.
In a world subject to increasing geopolitical competition, global value chains have become significantly vulnerable. Geopolitical threats related to great power competition, political rivalry, and maritime disputes pose serious risks to supply chains worldwide.
Other disruptions such as global pandemics, economic shocks, and monopolised supply chains are also tangible risk factors that could have serious impacts on the smooth functioning of the global economy. The Indo-Pacific represents the heart of several global value chains, among which those of critical raw materials, semiconductors, and various machinery. This region is also the theatre of mounting Sino-American competition, that causes a great geopolitical risk to global value chains, largely because while bilateral relations are at their lowest, the economic interdependence between them remains higher than ever.
To avoid disastrous consequences for global trade and supply chains, it is vital that like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond work together to anticipate risk, minimise exposure, and help each other resist and adapt to sudden shocks brought along by geopolitical threats. For both industry leaders and governmental bodies, the key challenge lies in utilising predictive models and analytics to grasp potential risks and mitigate vulnerabilities. This effort should not be isolated but rather adopt a holistic approach, encompassing suppliers, processes, and markets.
Author: Dr. Jagannath Panda
This paper is part of the Europe in the Indo-Pacific Hub (EIPH) Guest Author Series: Access or Absence in an era of geopolitical competition: insights on critical resources, global value chains, and maritime security. Edited by Paul van Hooft, Benedetta Girardi and Alisa Hoenig.
The research for and production of this report was made possible by a financial contribution from the Taipei Representative Office in the Netherlands to the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. The conclusions and recommendations presented in this report are the result of independent research. Responsibility for the content rests with the authors and the authors alone.
Warfighting concepts shape our views on past, present and future wars. They contain an implicit criticism of past approaches, while offering proposals to avoid earlier mistakes and/ or to address current challenges. Today the dominant concept within NATO and other technologically advanced militaries is multi-domain operations (MDO). MDO aim to combine and coordinate effects from across military and sometimes non-military actions. Different militaries stress the need to act across military services and to better coordinate with civilian authorities. They highlight how sensors, communication technologies augur in a new way of warfighting, but often fail to articulate the mechanisms that could lead to the defeat of the opponent.
This study, by Strategic Analyst Davis Ellison and HCSS Director of Research Tim Sweijs, examines whether and how the adoption of MDO concepts can help armed forces achieve military success. The report argues that MDO could break away from the worst patterns of past conceptual work, though this will require concerted changes in prevailing approaches. As such, this study provides an intellectual framework as well as a set of guidelines that strategists and force developers can use to better assess and qualify MDO-type approaches across different countries, and, importantly, how such concepts can best be further developed.
Based on a historical review of Western warfighting concepts over the past fifty years, complemented by interviews with defence planners and experts and field visits, this study assesses MDO’s promise as a warfighting concept through a framework of factors. The framework comprises the following six factors: (1) clarity of language, (2) regime fit, (3) technological maturity, (4) threat specificity, (5) theory of success, and (6) risk consideration.
The framework is applied to the state of MDO development in Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, NATO, Taiwan, the UK, and the US. These cases were selected in the context of the present study’s applicability to the Dutch land force’s development, but the lessons contained in this paper have a wider application to the armed forces of small and middle powers as well as great powers.
Authors: Davis Ellison and Tim Sweijs
Contributors: Carlina Grispen-Gelens and Björn de Heer, Matti Suomenaro, Nathan Lokhorst, and Tom Connolly.
The research for this report has been conducted within a framework agreement between HCSS and the Royal Netherlands Army. Responsibility for the contents of the report rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Royal Netherlands Army.
Warfighting concepts shape our views on past, present and future wars. They contain an implicit criticism of past approaches, while offering proposals to avoid earlier mistakes and/ or to address current challenges. Today the dominant concept within NATO and other technologically advanced militaries is multi-domain operations (MDO). MDO aim to combine and coordinate effects from across military and sometimes non-military actions. Different militaries stress the need to act across military services and to better coordinate with civilian authorities. They highlight how sensors, communication technologies augur in a new way of warfighting, but often fail to articulate the mechanisms that could lead to the defeat of the opponent.
This study, by Strategic Analyst Davis Ellison and HCSS Director of Research Tim Sweijs, examines whether and how the adoption of MDO concepts can help armed forces achieve military success. The report argues that MDO could break away from the worst patterns of past conceptual work, though this will require concerted changes in prevailing approaches. As such, this study provides an intellectual framework as well as a set of guidelines that strategists and force developers can use to better assess and qualify MDO-type approaches across different countries, and, importantly, how such concepts can best be further developed.
Based on a historical review of Western warfighting concepts over the past fifty years, complemented by interviews with defence planners and experts and field visits, this study assesses MDO’s promise as a warfighting concept through a framework of factors. The framework comprises the following six factors: (1) clarity of language, (2) regime fit, (3) technological maturity, (4) threat specificity, (5) theory of success, and (6) risk consideration.
The framework is applied to the state of MDO development in Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, NATO, Taiwan, the UK, and the US. These cases were selected in the context of the present study’s applicability to the Dutch land force’s development, but the lessons contained in this paper have a wider application to the armed forces of small and middle powers as well as great powers.
Authors: Davis Ellison and Tim Sweijs
Contributors: Carlina Grispen-Gelens and Björn de Heer, Matti Suomenaro, Nathan Lokhorst, and Tom Connolly.
The research for this report has been conducted within a framework agreement between HCSS and the Royal Netherlands Army. Responsibility for the contents of the report rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Royal Netherlands Army.
The sight of Nigeriens waving pro-Putin signs and Russian flags left many in the West feeling uneasy, yet Russia’s presence in Africa is hardly new, writes HCSS subject matter expert Collin Meisel in an op-ed for TIME magazine. If U.S. and European leaders are keen to avoid another repeat of this pattern, they will need to change tack. A business-as-usual mindset will lead to an African continent that is far more closely aligned with Russia and its “no limits friendship” with China than to the West.
Opinion | Last week’s coup in Niger sent shockwaves across not only Africa’s Sahel region, but the international community at large. Niger had been the last pro-Western holdout in a region known as Africa’s “coup belt,” fueling concerns the military takeover could destabilize the region and hurt longstanding counterterrorism efforts there. Yet the sight of Nigeriens waving pro-Putin protest signs and Russian flags has left many in the West feeling uneasy. These images provide a sharp contrast for a Western public that has frequently been told that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a “pariah around the world.”
In recent years, we have witnessed a “new scramble for Africa,” with major powers like Russia and China as well as growing regional powers such as the United Arab Emirates making substantial diplomatic and economic forays into the continent. These powers, the somewhat problematic “new scramble” narrative goes, are displacing the influence of traditional colonial powers like Britain and France. For example, in largely francophone West Africa, France was once the dominant foreign power in nine of the region’s 16 countries as of 1980 compared with only three today, according to our team’s Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index.
Yet part of what the “new scramble” narrative misses is that Russia’s presence in Africa is hardly new. Ghana, Guinea, and Mali are cases in point, where the Soviet Union, led by Russia, is remembered as a potent anti-colonial force seeking to free Africans from European and American (and capitalist) oppression. Soviet involvement in Africa was widespread, featuring economic and military assistance for socialist-leaning governments and militias fighting liberation wars. Then and since, Russia has maintained a decades-long diplomatic presence in most African countries.
In recent years, Russian arms transfers have poured into Africa, providing 40% of arms imported by African countries since 2018. Meanwhile, the state-sponsored Wagner mercenary group has become deeply involved in the security interests of countries such as the Central African Republic and Sudan, providing not only military training but also security for gold and other mines—in return for a share of the profits.
While Russia’s overall trade with Africa is far outmatched by China, it maintains outsized influence in the continent. That includes not just arms but the crucial agricultural sector—the continent has severe food import dependence that places Russia in a unique position that China or others cannot easily fill. Disinformation campaigns have also boosted Russian influence, through anti-colonialist memes that have turned into action in the streets of Chad, Mali, and elsewhere. These efforts appear to have paid dividends for Russia at the U.N., where in repeated U.N. General Assembly votes several African nations have either voted against or abstained from condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Last year, protestors waved Russian flags following a coup in Burkina Faso. This year it is Niger. If U.S. and European leaders are keen to avoid another repeat of this pattern, they will need to change tack. According to our own team’s forecasts, a business-as-usual mindset will lead to an African continent that is far more closely aligned with Russia and its “no limits friendship” with China than to the West. Unless a course correction is made, the U.S. and Europe are poised to fall further and further behind in terms of aid, trade, arms transfers, and diplomatic engagement—key sources of international influence.
To reverse the tide, the West should make further commitments to expanding trade ties and investment in Africa. Previous trade deals have been characterized as a “Kiss of Death” by promoting unfair competition that hurts African workers. (Though allegations of “debt-trap diplomacy” and exploitative resource extraction have also been lobbed at China and Russia, respectively.) To properly win hearts and minds, new trade and investment deals must be fair and sustainable, encouraging the development of African industries and the reduction of poverty.
The U.S. and Europe should also increase their budgets for the U.S. Agency for International Development and similar organizations, lest Western countries lose much of their aid-based influence in sub-Saharan Africa. Sharing more power in international organizations—including “sharing the pen” with non-permanent members at the U.N. Security Council—would also help. Otherwise, Western publics should prepare for more waving of the white, blue, and red—Russia’s tricolor flag—than of the American red, white, and blue.
Source: Collin Meisel and Adam Szymanski-Burgos for TIME Magazine, August 3rd, 2023.
Collin Meisel is the associate director of geopolitical analysis at the University of Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, a geopolitics and modeling expert at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, and a nonresident fellow at the Stimson Center.
Adam Szymanski-Burgos is a research associate at the University of Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures.
TIME Ideas hosts the world’s leading voices, providing commentary on events in news, society, and culture. We welcome outside contributions. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.
Artsen waarschuwen voor de dreiging van een nucleaire oorlog. Hun oproep aan publiek en politiek staat vandaag in vakbladen wereldwijd. Ze hopen zo mensen wakker te schudden. “We zijn een beetje vergeten hoe erg nucleaire wapens zijn.”
Aanstaande zondag wordt het vernietigende atoombombardement op Hiroshima herdacht. Een belangrijk moment voor een serieuze waarschuwing, vindt een grote groep artsen. Nog steeds zijn er wereldwijd zo’n 13.000 kernwapens. Hun catastrofale potentie wordt volgens de medici zwaar onderschat.
Extreme gevolgen
Zelfs een beperkte inzet van enkele tientallen tot honderden van deze wapens zou extreme gevolgen kunnen hebben voor mens en natuur, dat schrijven artsen in een gemeenschappelijke oproep.
Een grootschalige kernoorlog, bijvoorbeeld tussen Rusland en de NAVO, zou driekwart van de mensheid kunnen vernietigen, waarschuwen de artsen. De oproep is gepubliceerd in meerdere toonaangevende medische bladen over de hele wereld, waaronder het Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde.
Meer crisishaarden
Een zeer begrijpelijke oproep van de artsen, zegt onderzoeker Paul van Hooft van het Haagse Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) bij EenVandaag. “Maar de realiteit is erg ingewikkeld. Er waren veel spanningen tijdens de Koude Oorlog, maar de situatie was vrij overzichtelijk. Het ging grotendeels over Europa, met een duidelijke grens tussen de twee grote blokken.
Tegenwoordig zijn er niet alleen veel potentiële crisishaarden, er zijn ook meer landen met kernwapens bijgekomen. Pakistan en India bezitten ze, en China heeft zelfs een kleine 400 nucleaire wapens.”
‘Diplomatie doe je niet alleen met vrienden’
De Verenigde Staten en Rusland hebben dankzij eerdere afspraken nog maar 10 procent van de kernwapens die ze vroeger bezaten, legt Van Hooft uit. “Dat zijn nog steeds circa 5.500 kernwapens per land. We weten dat wederzijdse afschrikking werkt, maar als je geen escalatie wilt, moet je óók communiceren.”
En daar schort het volgens de onderzoeker aan, zeker nu de geopolitieke spanningen snel toenemen. “We moeten echt praten, ook met Rusland bijvoorbeeld. Diplomatie doe je niet alleen met je vrienden, het is niet zoals een biertje drinken met je maat. Diplomatie doe je juist met partijen waar je een hekel aan hebt. dat helpt beter dan eenzijdig je kernwapens wegdoen.”
Words matter. And the word “enemy” is particularly unhelpful in the context of U.S.-China relations, writes HCSS subject matter expert Collin Meisel in an op-ed for The Hill. A more productive approach to take “the China challenge” seriously is through face-to-face dialogue. Such dialogue between international leaders holds a significant weight in diplomacy. Critics might call this approach appeasement. But the reality is that, even if U.S.-China relations were to devolve into open hostilities and officially transform the two states into enemies, communication with an enemy during a conflict is critical for avoiding an escalation spiral.
Opinion | “I think China’s an enemy. I think we have to take them incredibly seriously,” Nikki Haley recently said. Haley, the former U.N. ambassador and current GOP presidential candidate, had other incendiary remarks to share on CNBC’s “Squawk Box,” accusing China of “killing Americans,” a reference to Beijing’s failure to curb shipment of fentanyl precursor chemicals to Mexico, which are then smuggled into the U.S.
With regards to fentanyl, Haley has a point, even if her rhetoric is unnecessarily inflammatory. In 2022, opioid overdoses, largely involving fentanyl, killed approximately 70,000 Americans — roughly the population of Wilmington, Delaware. And there is no doubt that China must be taken seriously. In a recent meeting between Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Chinese side explicitly referenced a “spiraling decline” in relations between the world’s two largest economies, which continue to approach global power parity.
That said, words matter. And the word “enemy” is particularly unhelpful in the context of U.S.-China relations.
Sadly, Haley’s rhetoric neatly follows “the traditional American assumption that only a few evil leaders stood in the way of a worldwide acceptance of American values and hence of peace” — a diagnosis made by historian Eric F. Goldman regarding some American leaders’ attitudes during the Cold War, but one that remains apt today. This tradition, embodied by words such as “enemy,” are an act of “othering,” dividing the world in an “us vs. them” mentality.
There are three problems with describing China as an “enemy.” First, it’s factually untrue according to U.S. law, which describes an enemy as “any country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized, with the United States.” While U.S.-China relations have at times become hostile, any actual hostilities, meaning direct combat between U.S. and Chinese forces, have been avoided for quite some time.
Second, it requires clarification that it is not the Chinese people who are the enemy but the Chinese Communist Party, which has “taken over China,” in Haley’s words. Surely, the Chinese Communist Party does not represent all Chinese, and the party has legally situated itself above the government, but it would be a mistake to act as if China would embrace Western-style liberal democracy if not for the CCP. There is a broad range of perspectives among Chinese intellectuals and the public, some of which are even more hard-line than official party policy.
Third, and most importantly, a declaration that “China’s an enemy” casts U.S.-China relations in an explicitly antagonistic light. As political scientist David Finlay has argued, “When decision-makers become overly concerned with enemies, actual or imagined, they tend to lose sight of goals and fail to establish equitable or appropriate priorities in balancing interests.”
A case in point is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s explicit “enemization” of the Zelensky government in Ukraine and mistaken assumption that the Ukrainian people were Russians who had been separated from their homeland. Of course, this is not to say that Haley’s remarks are the precursor to a U.S. invasion of China. But they do risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, where both sides begin to internalize what social psychologist Ralph K. White called the “diabolical enemy image.” History is replete with examples of geopolitical competitors transforming into actual enemies thanks to ideological othering and “enemization.”
In contrast to Haley’s “enemy” bombast, a more productive approach to take “the China challenge” seriously is through face-to-face dialogue. Such dialogue between international leaders holds a significant weight in diplomacy. It can offer insights into diplomatic priorities; build trust and rapport; facilitate conflict resolution; encourage cultural exchange; and enhance consensus, cooperation and commitment.
Secretary Blinken’s recent high-stakes visit to Beijing to hold bilateral talks with senior Chinese officials to discuss rising tensions between the U.S. and China is an important example. Since the incident with the Chinese spy balloon and Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s refusal to meet with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin earlier this year, U.S.-China ties have continued to deteriorate. Blinken’s trip to Beijing communicates the Biden administration’s intentions to repair and reignite diplomacy and bilateral relations with China.
Critics might call this approach appeasement. But the reality is that, even if U.S.-China relations were to devolve into open hostilities and officially transform the two states into enemies, communication with an enemy during a conflict is critical for avoiding an escalation spiral. To prevent this outcome, Haley and others should cool their metaphorical jets and consider firing up their actual jets for more shuttle diplomacy between Washington and Beijing — a practice that has successfully eased U.S.-China conflict in the past and has reduced tensions between other capitals more recently.
Collin Meisel is the associate director of Geopolitical Analysis at the University of Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, a Geopolitics and Modeling Expert at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Nonresident Fellow at the Stimson Center. Kylie McKee is a research associate and project manager at the University of Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures.
Source: Collin Meisel and Kylie McGee, The Hill, August 2nd, 2023
This year HCSS launched The Socio-Political Instability Survey, inviting over 500 think tankers from around the world to give their views on the short-term likelihood and location of volatility and conflict globally using multiple-choice questions. The survey also delved into three ‘hot-topics’ using open-ended questions formulated by our Strategic Analysts. For this version of the survey the topics included the China-Taiwan conflict and world trade, western dependencies on critical minerals and the impact of climate change on Africa. The results of the open-ended questions were gained through a process of quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis, with specified themes or coding categories determined by the authors.
The survey was completed throughout the month of May 2023 and is the first of a series of surveys, to be completed three times a year. The survey results will contribute to the Socio-Political Instability Monitor.
This ‘Observer’ outlines the results of the first Socio-Political Instability Survey and provides analysis. In this survey, socio-political instability in the extreme is the probability of conflict fatalities, specifically, the incidence of armed conflict that leads to fatalities. This includes drivers of volatility, be that economic, diplomatic, environmental, demographic or armed that could lead to conflict fatalities.
You can view the latest, September, Socio-Political Observer here.
Summary
The first edition of the Observer highlights Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a significant factor in shaping expert perceptions of global socio-political instability in the short term. Russia is a major source of instability, both internally and through military and political involvement in various locations. The instability in Sudan underscores the potential for volatile situations, whether due to environmental or armed conflicts, to escalate and spread across fragile neighbouring states in Middle and Eastern Africa, making them potential sources of future socio-political instability. While China is a dominant global player, experts downplay its disruptive power in the short term compared to Russia. Many experts emphasise China’s inter-dependencies with the west and uncertainties surrounding its next moves regarding Taiwan and Ukraine.
Findings
Socio-political instability: feeling the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
According to the experts surveyed, Sudan (42%) and Ukraine (33%) were predicted to have the most short-term socio-political instability. In April 2023, Sudan experienced fighting between rival generals in Khartoum, drawing international attention. Ukraine is an active conflict zone and a Ukrainian counteroffensive was expected in May. Additionally, 9% of experts believed Russia would face socio-political instability. With over a year past since the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military has failed to meet expectations whilst its economy has continued to suffer as a result. Tensions between the Wagner group and Russian defence establishment further escalated in May 2023, leading to a mutiny in June.
9% of experts believed Russia would face socio-political instability.
HCSS Socio-Political Instability Survey (May 2023)
Eastern Europe (40%) and Middle Africa (25%) were predicted to have the most short-term socio-political instability. This result maps onto the countries expected to have the most Socio-Political Instability, with Ukraine and Russia as key sources of conflict in Eastern Europe. Sudan represented an unstable situation in Eastern Africa (12%). Middle Africa, incorporating the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C) and Rwanda, was also expected to face instability according to 25% of experts surveyed. For example, On May 9th, the D.R.C experienced severe flooding and landslides, adding to ongoing conflict and tensions with Rwanda, due to paramilitary activity.
63% of respondents believed that Russia would have the greatest impact on global socio-political instability, considering the prominence of the Ukraine war and perhaps Russian armed activity in Africa. Meanwhile, 24% of respondents thought that China would have the most impact, likely reflecting China’s significance in the global order and potential involvement in the Ukraine conflict and a potential conflict over Taiwan.
A future China-Taiwan conflict: trade disruption and division
Experts predict that China-Taiwan tensions will primarily impact supply chains and trade routes (28%) in the medium term. Scarcities in raw materials and semiconductors (12%) are likely to arise, given their reliance on Taiwan, South Korea, China, and the U.S. This would adversely affect the East Asian economy. Furthermore, tensions between China and the West are expected (11%) and 8% felt this would cause division, with European companies expected to limit relations with China. Experts are divided (6%) on whether this will result in “de-risking“, reducing ties, or “de-coupling”, cutting ties, with China, reflecting official disagreements over loosening ties with the west’s largest trading partner. However, only 5% of respondents anticipate a trade war escalating into military action.
Critical minerals, autocratic states and the dependency dilemma
7% feel there will be no influence because China is dependent on the west too or because the west will find alternative sources of critical minerals.
HCSS Socio-Political Instability Survey (May 2023)
The majority of respondents (70%) predict that western dependencies on critical minerals (critical raw materials and rare earths) will likely be used as a bargaining chip for political advantage by autocratizing states that produce critical minerals, such as China, Russia, D.R.C and Zimbabwe. For example, to tolerate future conflict, human rights or environmental abuses. Of these 14% feel that dependencies will be exploited for financial advantage, perhaps through price raising or export restrictions. 5% draw parallels with Russia’s weaponization of metals and gas, following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, 7% feel there will be no influence because China is dependent on the west too or because the west will find alternative sources of critical minerals. In fact, 9% of experts predict that mining and production in alternative or friendly states will be expanded, for example in South America or in Europe itself.
The impact of climate change in Africa: scarcities and migration
Experts predict that the main climate security challenge facing Africa will be food and water scarcities caused by drought or famine (27%). Soil degradation, and extreme weather events, as seen in 2023 in the D.R.C and Sudan, were highlighted. These factors will also contribute to migration and displacement (20%), particularly from rural to urban areas and out of Africa. Displacement itself is expected to cause instability, with 6% emphasising population growth and urbanisation, and 5% noting the loss of human capital (brain drain) in African countries. Experts predict (16%) that fragile or corrupt governments will struggle to respond to the climate crisis, potentially leading to armed conflict. The role of paramilitaries in African politics, the decline in international solidarity (2% foreign aid), and increased foreign influence (3%) from countries like Russia and China are also significant factors that need to be managed.
Our participants
68 experts from universities, think tanks and research institutes completed this version of the survey. 34% of respondents were from the Netherlands, 7% from the U.S.A, 5% from Austria and Belgium and 4% from Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Most of the respondents were Europe-based perhaps accounting for the importance placed on the war in Ukraine. We endeavour to expand participation in future surveys.
Authors and contributors:
Alessandra Barrow, Linde Arentze, Diederik Dekkers and Henrik Kathmann
Take part in the next Socio-Political Instability Survey
Are you a geopolitics, economics, security, climate, area or international affairs expert affiliated with a think tank, university or research institute? Interested in taking part in the next Socio-Political Instability Survey? Sign up via the Socio-Political Instability Survey page
If integrated deterrence is to succeed, the hammer must not be the tool of first resort, writes HCSS geopolitics and modelling expert Collin Meisel in an op-ed for Defense One.
The United States faces a fundamental deterrence problem in Taiwan. In a recent poll of more than 2,500 U.S. adults, fewer than half said they would support a direct U.S. military intervention if China invades the self-governing island. Yet to be successful, deterrence requires one’s adversary to perceive that one has both the capability and the will to carry out their threats.
There are already questions about whether U.S. forces are equipped to defend and, if necessary, take back Taiwan. Recent well-publicized wargames have found that a U.S. victory would cost tens of lost ships, hundreds of lost aircraft, and thousands of lost U.S. servicemember lives in a matter of weeks. This may give Chinese President Xi Jinping reason to believe that America’s will to come to Taiwan’s defense may be lacking—if not during the tenure of President Joe Biden, who has on multiple occasions said the U.S. would intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf, then perhaps as soon as his successor comes to office.
The U.S. has a variety of instruments of power available for deterrence, including expansive diplomatic connections, alliance networks, and economic and financial carrots and sticks. As such, the apparent solution to the U.S. credibility problem is the Defense Department-led concept of integrated deterrence: “the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits” via integration of efforts “across domains,” “across regions,” “across the spectrum of conflict,” “across the U.S. government,” and “with allies and partners.”
But if deterrence requires coordination across the governments of allies and partners—many of which are not interested in a fight with China—then placing the organization tasked primarily with preparing for a fight with China in the lead sends the wrong message. It also casts U.S.-China competition in a more antagonistic light than may be necessary and underemphasizes critical non-military instruments of power.
Hammer time
That the Defense Department is in the lead of the U.S. integrated deterrence mission is no surprise. Modern deterrence theory originated as a martial concept. Even if it didn’t, in recent years many traditionally nonmilitary activities have become martial ones as “the military became everything”—a recent case in point being its lead role in the emergency airlift of baby formula.
This militarization of traditionally nonmilitary activities has consequences. As the saying goes, if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
For strategic deterrence, military threats alone appear to have worked quite well. Happily, few leaders seem to be keen on global thermonuclear war. But strategic deterrence successes do not always translate well to the local, conventional level. U.S. military threats across great distances in defense of non-allied states often lack the credibility required for effective deterrence.
The phrase “integrated deterrence” provides a useful cognitive distance from earlier notions of deterrence. It makes clear that to be most effective, deterrence requires the purposeful use of non-U.S. and nonmilitary resources. Unfortunately, the Defense Department’s lead role in integrated deterrence illustrates that this cognitive distance hasn’t translated from U.S. minds to U.S. actions.
U(S) can’t touch this
For Xi Jinping, the stakes for Taiwan involve his legacy and his party’s promise of national rejuvenation. Meanwhile, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, as communicated to Xi, is ostensibly about democracy—except that Taipei enjoyed Washington’s support for four decades before it shook off authoritarianism with its first fully free parliamentary elections in 1992. Less idealistically, others have made the case for defending Taiwan based on the importance of free and open shipping lanes and air routes—except that, once in control of the island, China would have ample reasons to allowing shipping and air travel to resume as normal given its economy’s heavy reliance on trade for growth.
Control of microchip manufacturing is a more well-founded concern, at least in the short term. But the United States and its European allies are investing heavily in the development of more robust microchip industries to reduce their reliance on the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. What happens to Taiwan’s TSMC-comprised “silicon shield” when these U.S. and European efforts are successful?
China has also been working to wean itself off its dependence on Taiwanese microchips since at least 2020, when TSMC was banned from shipping semiconductors to Chinese telecom giant Huawei. Sooner or later, Taiwan’s “silicon shield” will begin to show cracks.
Meanwhile, Xi has other options beyond invasion. What of a blockade? Would a Berlin Airlift-style response be possible? Some flights during Operation Vittles were as short as 110 miles. The distance from Taiwan to the nearest non-Chinese-controlled airfield is about ten times that. More likely would be a non-military response—one that will be hard to communicate in advance as part of the U.S. integrated deterrence package if the Pentagon is in the lead.
Stop hammer time
To be sure, any deterrence strategy must include the hammer that the Defense Department can wield. But, beyond questions of its effectiveness in deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, over-reliance on the military and securitization generally is likely to have broader deleterious effects on U.S. relations in the Indo-Pacific. Americans risk becoming the “Hessians of Asia” by taking a security-first approach in the region.
To prevent this, integrated deterrence must give more equal weight to nonmilitary and non-U.S. components. In a recent report, my colleagues and I proposed that this be done by tying integrated deterrence to our notion of formal bilateral influence capacity, whereby the U.S. capacity to compel and deter others is the product of an array of economic, political, and security-based policymaking instruments that can be leveraged bilaterally as well as through a network of allies and partners. If successful, such an approach would provide the United States and its partners a “collective resilience.”
Even if a U.S. deterrence-by-denial strategy with respect to Taiwan is not convincing to Xi, the U.S. and partner capacity for deterrence by resilience ought to be, especially given China’s heavy dependence on the U.S. and several of its allies for hundreds of key goods. Relatedly, substantial, sustained decreases in imports from China to the U.S. and Europe would force Chinese leadership to make hard choices: “a further increase in infrastructure investment (and in the country’s debt burden) or it will have to allow unemployment to rise.”
China’s debt is already quite high, and many of the major debt holders—local governments wrapped up in real estate—have little ability to repay their debts. China is also in the middle of a youth unemployment crisis. As such, neither an increase in debt nor an increase in unemployment is a good option for Chinese leadership, which could face a legitimacy crisis—and even threaten Xi’s survival—if it were to face major post-invasion economic blowback.
Convincing partners and allies to join the U.S. in a coordinated response to deter an invasion of Taiwan will be difficult. A recent survey from the European Council on Foreign Relations showed that the majority of the more than 16,000 respondents across 11 European countries thought their respective countries should remain neutral in the event of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. It will take substantial diplomatic efforts to turn the tide of European public opinion—efforts ill-suited for the Defense Department.
The National Security Council is an obvious candidate to lead U.S. integrated deterrence efforts given its primary mission of managing the interagency. The NSC would of course need to task organizations such as the Pentagon with implementation, but NSC coordination would allow for a larger role for the State Department as well as Treasury. Military options would remain available, just not as the tool of first resort.
2 legit 2 quit
Deterrence is an imperfect art, and any approach to integrated deterrence may fail. By deemphasizing the Defense Department’s role in integrated deterrence, it increases the chances of success by substantially increasing the credibility of U.S. threats. And if it fails to deter China—after all, economic and diplomatic threats did not stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—it offers a softer landing on the other side of the “brink,” should the United States, China, and Taiwan slip past it.
Meanwhile, calls have been made, and apparently heeded, to boost Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and U.S. capabilities to respond to potential hostilities across the Taiwan Strait. These are important and necessary steps. But questions around the will to use these capabilities are likely to remain. By taking the Defense Department out of the lead for the U.S. integrated deterrence strategy and instead treating its metaphorical hammer as one tool among many, the U.S. will to act—and ability to act in a coordinated fashion that uses its suite of national power instruments—will be much less in question.
Source: Defense One, July 19th, 2023
Collin Meisel is associate director of geopolitical analysis at the University of Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He is also a geopolitics and modeling expert at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, and a nonresident fellow with The Henry L. Stimson Center’s Strategic Foresight Hub.