De gemiddelde Europeaan is niet gek en ziet heel goed wat er in de wereld aan de hand is, dacht ik bij het lezen van een recent onderzoek van de European Council on Foreign Relations. Je hoeft kennelijk geen professor in de internationale betrekkingen te zijn om haarscherp de impact aan te voelen van de verkiezing van Joe Biden tot Amerikaanse president op de rest van de wereld.

De meeste Europeanen juichten zijn verkiezing toe, maar zij zien ook dat Amerika geen comeback kan maken als wereldleider. Grote meerderheden in de belangrijkste lidstaten van de EU denken, zo blijkt uit dit onderzoek, dat het Amerikaanse politieke systeem kapot is. In Nederland is dat 68 procent van de bevolking.

Wie nog twijfelde, moet toch wel uit de droom ­geholpen zijn door de opstelling van de Republikeinen tijdens het tweede impeachmentproces dat ex-president Trump aan zijn broek kreeg. Ik vond de goedpraterij en de verdraaiing van de feiten van wat er op 6 januari in het Capitool is gebeurd, ronduit beledigend.

Niet meer de geloofwaardige leider

Je hebt eerst met eigen ogen gezien dat Trump de meute tot een opstand opriep. Je zag hoe opstandelingen het Capitool aanvielen. Maar vervolgens zou je de advocaten van Trump en Republikeinse senatoren moeten geloven dat Trump nooit gepolariseerd heeft en nooit tot rebellie heeft aangezet.

Ik geloof best dat de angst voor Trump er bij de senatoren diep inzit. Ik geloof ook dat ze vrezen dat Trump een nieuwe partij kan oprichten die de Grand Old Party vernietigt. En ik geloof ook dat vrees voor Trumps electoraat terecht is. De volgende keer kunnen de knokploegen niet alleen het Capitool, maar ook het Witte Huis bestormen.

Omdat Amerika zichzelf niet kan herpakken, kan het niet meer de geloofwaardige leider zijn die samen met andere landen een vuist tegen China maakt om onze manier van leven te beschermen. Volgens het genoemde opinieonderzoek ziet een ruime meerderheid van de Europanen dat ook in.

Opmerkelijk is dat ik tijdens een van de vele videobijeenkomsten deze week werd geconfronteerd met hooggeplaatste Amerikanen en experts die diep teleurgesteld waren in Europa. Vooral Duitsland was de gebeten hond. Daar verwerpt 85 procent van de bevolking de gedachte dat Amerika nog kan worden vertrouwd. Waarom niet meer enthousiasme over Biden? Alles komt toch goed? Mijn weerwoord was dat dat wij Europeanen Biden wel vertrouwen, maar Amerika niet. En dat dit vertrouwen niet snel zal terugkomen.

Vertrouwen in Europa

Wat volgde was een ongemakkelijke discussie over de trans-Atlantische betrekkingen die eindigde met een frontale aanval op de EU. Die zou volgens mijn Amerikaanse vrienden nooit wat worden.

Onbedoeld bevestigde deze discussie de conclusie van het onderzoek dat de gemiddelde Europeaan meer vertrouwen in ‘Europa’ dan in de VS heeft. Vooral Zweden, Duitsland, Denemarken en Nederland scoren hoog. Ook uit andere onderzoeken blijkt keer op keer dat de steun voor de Unie hoog is en stijgt.

Dat is overigens een totaal ander beeld dat ontstaat wanneer je de debatten in politiek Den Haag volgt. Maar goed, mensen zijn niet gek en begrijpen heel goed hoe de wereld verandert en wat daarvan de gevolgen zijn.

Rob de Wijk, Trouw, 19 februari 2021

Rob de Wijk is hoogleraar internationale relaties en veiligheid aan de Universiteit Leiden en oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Hij schrijft wekelijks over internationale verhoudingen. Lees zijn columns hier terug. 

Deterrence is not only about stopping a nuclear bomb. It’s about shaping your opponent’s behavior. We need new concepts for Cross Domain Deterrence (CDD) to address today’s challenges. Read all about it in a piece by Tim Sweijs & Samuel Zilincik on the Essence of Cross Domain Deterrence.

Deterrence is about convincing adversaries to refrain from certain behaviour through the prospect of costs that outweigh the benefits. Deterrence has been a central tenet of strategic practice throughout history, even if its logic was only clearly articulated in the aftermath of the Second World War. Deterrence scholarship has since then evolved in four consecutive waves. The first, second and third wave of the deterrence literature, which emerged during the Cold War, tended to almost exclusively focus on deterrence of high-intensity aggression including most importantly the possible use of nuclear weapons alongside large scale conventional invasion. Lower-intensity threats which were considered mere nuisances were largely left outside of the scope of investigation. 

However, these became more important in the 1990s with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of non-traditional threats such as terrorism. This gave birth to the fourth wave of deterrence literature that focused on the question whether deterrence would work against such threats that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. Over the past decade, a new body of ideas has been emerging concerning the application of deterrence in today’s strategic environment. 

An important characteristic of our age is the proliferation of ways and means by which hostile activities can be perpetrated. Accordingly, strategists have started to pay more attention to the application of deterrence in new domains and to cross domain deterrence (CDD), across both traditional and new domains. This chapter appraises the contribution of the emerging body of cross domain deterrence literature to deterrence theory and deterrence practice. It situates CDD in the context of today’s challenges and identifies the prerequisites for the use and utility of CDD. It finds that one strand of the emerging body of literature predominantly focuses on practical and technical prerequisites in order for CDD to be effective, leaving the framework of traditional deterrence theory intact. It also finds a second strand that holds that the nature of today’s challenges requires more than mere innovation in application. The ideas about deterrence proposed by this second strand are expanding on common understandings of deterrence to the extent that deterrence is no longer only about fear nor about convincing opponents to refrain from certain behaviour. The conclusion summarises the findings and elaborates their implications for theory and practice.

Tim Sweijs and Samuel Zilincik

Access the chapter here: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_8

On Thursday February 18, the Netherlands Atlantic Association organized a debate on American Foreign Policy: “Biden’s new transatlantic agenda and Europe’s soul searching process.

With the new engagement from the White House towards Europe, hopes run high that transatlantic relations under President Biden will quickly return to a state of pre-Trump ‘normalcy’. But how realistic is this assumption? The Biden administration will be forced to focus on its own domestic agenda (‘healing the nation’). Besides, Europe has developed a different political mindset in response to four years of uncertainty created by Donald Trump (and Brexit). Meanwhile, the Atlantic alliance is still the cornerstone of European security, but its importance is no longer self-evident. ‘Strategic autonomy’ is the talk of the town in many European capitals. Europe must ‘take its destiny into its own hands’, according to Angela Merkel’s famous words.  How and when, remain yet to be seen.

In this context, what realistic agenda should be developed? Should Washington and Brussels focus on pressing geopolitical issues (China, Russia, Iran) or should attention first go out to multilateral issues such as climate change and international trade?

Three experts, Han ten Broeke (HCSS), Stan Sloan (Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council) and Roberta Haar (professor of Foreign Policy Analysis & Transatlantic Relations, Maastricht University) discussed the above mentioned issues, moderated by Paul Brill, journalist and foreign policy expert.

Rewatch the debate here:

De Nederlandse Landmacht is bezig zichzelf ingrijpend en blijvend te veranderen. Steeds meer aandacht en geld is er voor een belangrijke innovatie: robotica en autonome systemen. Die systemen nemen steeds meer werk over dat eerst door mensen werd gedaan. Hoe ver is ons leger hiermee?

Wat zijn de voordelen en wat de heikele punten? En in hoeverre zijn mensen straks überhaupt nog nodig om oorlog te voeren? Dat bespreekt Paul van Liempt in deze aflevering van De Strateeg. Te gast zijn Sjoerd Mevissen, binnenkort commandant van de RAS-eenheid van de Landmacht, en Michel Rademaker, mede-oprichter en adjunct-directeur van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies.

Luister de uitzending hier: Kan een militair een computer vertrouwen?, of via Spotify of Apple Podcasts.

Van links naar rechts: Michel Rademaker, Sjoerd Mevissen en Paul van Liempt (fotocredit: Sjoerd Mevissen)

Over deze podcast:

De Strateeg verschijnt eens in de twee weken. Abonneer je via bnr.nl/destrateeg om geen enkele aflevering te missen.

Host: Paul van Liempt | Redactie: Diederik de Groot

Documentaire

Het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies maakte een documentaire over robotisering bij de Landmacht:

It’s all about that RAS! This week’s HCSS Digest brings you everything you need to know about Robotics & Autonomous Systems, from the very first HCSS documentary to our impressive Capstone report.

President Trump stunned his allies this week, when he… sorry, old habit.

Want to know more about how and why the Dutch Army is experimenting with Robotics & Autonomous Systems? HCSS proudly presents our very first documentary, Robotisering bij de Nederlandse Landmacht, a must-see film! Also available with English subtitles on our YouTube channel.

Militaries around the world are developing, integrating and using robotic and autonomous systems (RAS). Over a two-year period, the HCSS project “RAS in a Military Context” sought to contribute to the discussion. Our research papers cover military applicability, ethical considerations, legal discourse, requirements for cooperation and the implementation of RAS in a military context. All papers are now combined in this impressive Capstone document:

At the OSCE’s High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar (HLMDS) this week, Tim Sweijs presented on “Managing Competition, Avoiding Conflict” for over 200 high-level military officials and experts.

The trip of EU representative Borrell to Russia was an excellent illustration that the diplomacy European parliamentarians love so much, will have zero effect in a country that doesn’t care what we think over here, Rob de Wijk commented in his column for Trouw. Power politics should be met with power politics.

For the European Commission, 2021 has so far been a disaster year: the European vaccination strategy is faltering, and the visit to Russia by Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, turned into a complete humiliation. Bernard Hammelburg and Han ten Broeke, HCSS director of political affairs therefore had plenty to talk about in BNR De Wereld.

According to Han ten Broeke, Borell went to Moscow "unarmed" to meet the most experienced and cynical diplomat, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. “Europe is always looking for a 'compromise figure' for these functions”, ten Broeke continued on BNR Nieuwsradio, “but it should instead be someone with authority and charisma.”

Modern warfighting will see an increased use of Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and the accompanying AI. How can we implement this technology and address the risks and challenges? This new paper by Patrick Bolder, Michel Rademaker and Bianca Torossian assesses some relevant elements for the implementation of RAS into the armed forces and especially the Army.

We have to think about importing energy, such as green hydrogen. It’s unavoidable, Rob de Wijk analyzed in the New Energy for Europe bulletin. That would make us more dependent on Saudi Arabia, while Russia could become the biggest loser.

To meet the current demand for gas, the Groningen field and the small gas fields are no longer sufficient. Gas must therefore also come from abroad, but the Netherlands has to compete there with other countries that do not have their own gas reserves - countries that already have long-term contracts with gas suppliers, HCSS energy specialist Jilles van den Beukel explained to NOS.

Busy Van den Beukel was also asked for comments this week in Trouw, RTL Nieuws and the Financieele Dagblad.

Medical experts say buying the Sputnik vaccine is an option, if the EMA approves it. But there are political reasons not to do so, Rob de Wijk explains in Dit Is De Dag on NPO Radio 1: Putin is trying to achieve a political victory by selling the vaccine to the West.

This Sunday you can listen to the new episode of our BNR podcast De Strateeg, where host Paul van Liempt will discuss the future plans of the Dutch Army on Robotics and Autonomous Systems with Michel Rademaker and Lkol. Sjoerd Mevissen.

(online on Sunday morning; and did you know you can also listen to De Strateeg on Spotify and Apple Podcasts?)

Last but not least: HCSS is very happy to welcome new Assistant Analyst Salma Daadouch this week!

Wat zou ik hebben gedaan als ik EU-buitenlandvertegenwoordiger Borrell was? Zou ik naar Rusland zijn gegaan? Een ding is zeker, zijn reis werd een publicitaire ramp. In de media en het Europees Parlement viel te horen dat ‘dit niet het goede moment was’. Want de relatie tussen Rusland en de EU was te verslechterd. Ach, het goede moment is er sinds de annexatie van de Krim in 2014 nooit meer geweest. Maar dat is nog geen reden om niet naar Rusland te gaan. Of we willen of niet, dat land is en blijft onze grote buur.

Een ander argument was dat Borrell zich heeft laten schofferen en daarmee de Unie in haar hemd heeft gezet. Tientallen Europarlementariërs drongen in een brief aan commissievoorzitter Von der Leyen aan op zijn aftreden. Hij zou de gevangenneming van Navalny niet hebben veroordeeld en hem niet in de gevangenis hebben opgezocht.

In werkelijkheid vroeg Borrell om zijn ‘onvoorwaardelijke vrijlating’ en toestemming hem in de gevangenis op te mogen zoeken. Borrell werd naar de rechtbank verwezen waar Navalny op dat moment moest voorkomen. Een bezoekje zat er dus niet in.

‘Principiële diplomatie’

Feit is dat Borrell inderdaad geen sterke indruk maakte tijdens de persconferentie met de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, bulldozer Lavrov. Die schoffeerde Borrell en de Unie door precies op dat moment Duitse, Poolse en Zweedse diplomaten uit te wijzen omdat ze wederrechtelijk aan een demonstratie zouden hebben deelgenomen. Het verwijt was dat Borrell op dat moment had moeten vertrekken.

Ik denk dat het echte probleem dieper ligt en goed illustreert wat het probleem van ons, Europeanen is. In zijn blog schreef Borrell dat hij ging om ‘principiële diplomatie’ te bedrijven. Dat is het soort diplomatie waar ook onze parlementariërs dol op zijn. Borrell wilde een punt maken van mensenrechtenschendingen en de ontmanteling van de rechtstaat. Vandaar dat hij vroeg om een onpartijdig onderzoek naar de moordaanslag op de dissident.

Dit soort politiek van het geheven vingertje is passé. Het klinkt mooi, maar levert niets op als je naar een land gaat dat effectief de banden met de Unie heeft verbroken, en dat het een zorg zal zijn wat we hier denken.

Gemiste kans

Rusland heeft zijn aandacht verschoven naar China, het Midden-Oosten en Afrika, ondanks dat Europa de belangrijkste handelspartner is. Wat Lavrov deed, was pure machtspolitiek die niets van doen heeft met de verheven doelstellingen van Borrell. Als deze reis iets heeft bevestigd, dan is het wel dat je tegenover machtspolitiek, machtspolitiek moet zetten.

Wat dat betreft was het bezoek een gemiste kans. Rusland bood 100 miljoen Spoetnik V-vaccins aan. Daar kun je wat mee. Bijvoorbeeld de vrijlating van Navalny eisen in ruil voor de aankoop van die vaccins. Rusland kan met die vaccins de eenheid in Europa ondermijnen. Het Kremlin weet heel goed dat burgers dat vaccin willen hebben en dat politieke leiders om geopolitieke redenen afhoudend zijn. Borrells bezoek toonde aan dat het terecht is dat burgers dit denken.

Als Rusland met ‘mijn’ voorstel akkoord was gegaan, was dat een opening voor betere relaties. Zo niet, dan was Rusland de publicitaire verliezer. Kortom, ik was gegaan, maar niet met een opgeheven vingertje. 

Rob de Wijk, Trouw, 12 februari 2021

Rob de Wijk is hoogleraar internationale relaties en veiligheid aan de Universiteit Leiden en oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Hij schrijft wekelijks over internationale verhoudingen. Lees zijn columns hier terug. 

On February 9-10, the OSCE will hold the High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar (HLMDS), with 200 high-level military officials and experts. The event will explore the impact of security challenges in the OSCE area on military doctrines and armed forces. Commander of U.S. European Command United States Air Force General Tod D. Wolters will keynote. Speakers include OSCE Secretary General Helga Schmid.

HCSS Director of Research Tim Sweijs will participate in a panel on Competition, moderated by Lieutenant General Keith W. Dayton (ret.) (Director of the George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies), together with Major-General Etienne Patry (Head of the Joint Center for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations at the École Militaire, France) and Major-General Henning-A. Frantzen (Commandant and Principal, Norwegian Defence University College).

The aim of the seminar is to enable dialogue and information exchange among military representatives to foster greater mutual understanding and transparency as well as build trust and confidence. The seminar takes place once every five years.

For more information: OSCE High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar

From the geopolitics of the Sputnik vaccine to Putin’s risky dependency on oil and gas, from Dutch space ambitions to China’s power politics – just in time for the weekend, here’s the new HCSS Digest!

What does Russia’s dependency on gas and oil mean for the Netherlands and the EU? Is the Dutch interest in this area the same as that of other European countries? And how should we position ourselves towards Russia? Listen to the new episode of De Strateeg, with HCSS energy experts Lucia van Geuns and Jilles van den Beukel, authors of the recent HCSS paper “Russia's Unsustainable Business Model”.

The Russian Sputnik vaccine is not currently part of the vaccination strategy in the European Union, but it appears to be safe and effective. Should the EU negotiate for the vaccine with Putin? In podcast Dit Is De Dag, Tijs van den Brink discusses the pros and cons with Rob de Wijk.

Does buying the Sputnik vaccine make us too dependent on Moscow? “It's not so much that we shouldn't do it, but we should be aware of what Russia can demand from us,” HCSS analyst Patrick Bolder commented on BNR’s Spitsuur this morning. “There’s always an ulterior motive. But on the other hand, as the paying party, we can also come up with our own conditions.”

What those conditions could be? You could think of real cooperation in the MH17 investigation, or the release of Navalny, Bolder told ANP News.

Concerns are rising about the security risks of using scanners of Chinese company Nuctech, which are located at ports and airports worldwide – including in Rotterdam. "Isn't it strange to partner with a Chinese state-owned company for your vital infrastructure, when those essential services can also be performed by European competitors?", Rob de Wijk wonders in het Financieele Dagblad. “China is engaged in power politics. But our security awareness is poorly developed and our geopolitical thinking even less so.”

Space: the final frontier? In March, the first Dutch military satellite will be launched. The Defensiekrant asked HCSS Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder five questions about the space ambitions of the Dutch armed forces.

Deterrence is an essential building block of NATO’s Strategic Concept and one of the vital strategic functions of the Dutch defense organization. But what does effective deterrence look like, both now and in the future? In ‘Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice’, Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs bring together valuable insights from renowned experts not just from Europe and the US, but also from China, Iran, Israel, Japan and Russia.

Asia faces multiple converging risks, from natural disasters to disputes over borders, minerals & water to terrorism. Climate change exacerbates them all, two new reports from the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) warn: read Climate Security and the Strategic Energy Pathway in South Asia here and Climate Security and the Strategic Energy Pathway in Southeast Asia here.

To counter the growing power of China, relations with America will have to be normalized, Rob de Wijk wrote in his weekly column for Trouw. But many European countries have already joined forces with Chinese companies and are particularly keen on the short-term gains that cooperation with China can bring.

Turkey struggles with repeated droughts and pressure on water resources grows, while measures to keep up with increasing challenges are lagging behind. Find out more in the latest Water, Peace and Security (WPS) blog.

We are hiring! Are you a master of statistics, mathematics, or computer science? Then the PhD/Analyst vacancy might just be what you’re looking for.

HCSS is honored to be featured in the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report for the sixth consecutive time. The Index is derived from a database of over  8,000 think tanks worldwide, and HCSS is ranked in 5 categories: Top Defense and National Security Think Tanks, Top Energy and Resource Policy Think Tanks, Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks, Best Independent Think Tanks and Top Think tanks with annual operating budgets of less than $5 Million USD.

And more congratulations are in order: Senior Strategic Analyst Jack Thompson, we wish you a fantastic birthday this Sunday!

HCSS is also very happy to welcome new Assistant Analysts Benedetta Girardi and Juliette Eijkelkamp this week!

Unfortunately, it’s a sad week of goodbyes as well: not only did we have to say farewell to Paul Verhagen’s wisdom tooth, but our brilliant PR intern Jelle van der Weerd is also leaving us. Thanks for everything Jelle, you’re an amazing colleague, and a terrific person as well. You will be missed!

Wie heeft het Longer Telegram geschreven? Geen idee. Wel weten we dat dit vorige week gepubliceerde stuk bedoeld is om de wereld wakker te schudden. Dat blijkt al uit de titel die verwijst naar het beroemde Long Telegram uit 1946 van X. Dit bleek later de Amerikaanse diplomaat George Kennan te zijn. Hij beschreef hoe de Sovjet-Unie opkwam, het Westen wilde overvleugelen en hoe de Amerikanen daarop moesten reageren.

Het nieuwe ‘telegram’ waarschuwt niet voor Rusland, maar voor China. Volgens de auteur, een topfunctionaris met een diepe kennis van dat land, heeft president Xi zijn land veranderd in een totalitaire politiestaat die de wereld naar eigen inzichten wil verbouwen.

De nieuwe zijderoute of het Belt and Road Initiative is daarbij het belangrijkste instrument. De oplossing die de anonieme schrijver kiest, verrast niet: Amerika moet technologisch, economisch en militair nummer 1 blijven. Toch accepteert hij of zij dat China opkomt en niet zal instorten. Daarom moet de aanval op Xi zelf worden ingezet. Omdat Xi’s koers in eigen land omstreden is, biedt dit de beste hoop op verandering.

Gemakkelijker gezegd dan gedaan

Een land met 1,4 miljard inwoners kan alleen door samenwerking met bondgenoten onder de duim worden gehouden. Ook president Biden begrijpt dit. Maar het is gemakkelijker gezegd dan gedaan. Zo moet worden samengewerkt om de westerse wereldorde met zijn nadruk op democratie, mensenrechten, burgerlijke vrijheden en vrijhandel te beschermen en samen economisch sterk te blijven. 

Amerika moet zich daarom aansluiten bij het nieuwe Trans Pacific Partnerschip waarmee Aziatische landen een gezamenlijke dam tegen China willen opwerpen. Ook moet het Trans-Atlantische Handels- en Investeringspact (TTIP) dat Amerika en Europa in de mottenballen hebben gestopt worden gereanimeerd. Dan zal het niet meer moeten gaan over chloorkippen en handelsvoordelen, maar om geopolitiek. Een nieuw handelsverdrag moet de nadruk leggen op gezamenlijke standaarden voor de bescherming van consumenten, bedrijven en het milieu.

Ik ben er sterk voor, maar vrees dat politici er nog niet aan toe zijn. Ook Biden maakt nog geen haast met handelsverdragen, maar kiest voorlopig voor een protectionistische koers van ‘koop Amerikaanse waar’. Voorts wil de anonieme auteur ‘rode lijnen’ voor het gedrag van China vaststellen. Dat moet een korte lijst met afdwingbare punten zijn. Daaronder vallen het afschrikken van een aanval met massavernietigingswapens, van een aanval op Japan, en van de annexatie van Taiwan en de Zuid-Chinese Zee. 

Rusland moet van China worden losgeweekt

Ik denk niet dat Europeanen staan te trappelen hieraan mee te werken. Even lastig is de aanbeveling om Chinese bedrijven te weren bij de aanleg van 5G en het internet of things. Biden zal dit zeker willen. Maar veel Europese landen zijn al in zee gegaan met Chinese bedrijven als Huawei. Tot slot moet Rusland van China worden losgeweekt. Dit vereist normalisering van de verhoudingen tussen het Westen en Rusland, maar ook dat lijken Europeanen niet te willen.

Willen de aanbevelingen uit het Longer Telegram werkelijkheid worden, dan zal de relatie met Amerika moeten worden genormaliseerd en zullen Europese leiders een andere koers moeten inslaan. Helaas kijken die vooral verlekkerd naar de kortetermijnwinst die samenwerking met China kan opleveren.

Rob de Wijk, Trouw, 5 februari 2021

Rob de Wijk is hoogleraar internationale relaties en veiligheid aan de Universiteit Leiden en oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Hij schrijft wekelijks over internationale verhoudingen. Lees zijn columns hier terug. 

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) is developing advanced real-world policy applications to help solve urgent societal challenges. With our team of interdisciplinary analysts from the world’s leading universities, we develop a portfolio of top-notch, data-intensive, quantitative, and causal political risk models. Our data lab hosts and hones our capability for the analysis, modelling, and computation of relevant political, security and conflict risk metrics, as well as our competencies for formulating and implementing appropriate risk measures.

In collaboration with the Leiden Institute of Advanced Computer Science (LIACS), HCSS is offering a paid PhD position. As part of his/her PhD research, the PhD candidate will work on the development, validation and deployment of a set of predictive models of violent conflict that enable the optimization of the efficacy of causal interventions under a range of causal, strategic, and political constraints using real world data. Alongside the PhD research, the PhD candidate will apply these models to help solve real world problems confronted by Dutch foreign and security policymakers, including climate security. Following the successful completion of the four-year project, the candidate will have earned a PhD and gained valuable professional experience in solving urgent public policy challenges.

The PhD candidate will be supervised by Professor Dr. Thomas Bäck, head of the Natural Computing Research Group at LIACS, Assistant Professor Dr. Anna Kononova (LIACS), and Dr. Ninoslav Malekovic, Chief Data Scientist at HCSS.

Requirements

Candidates should have a MSc Degree in computer science, mathematics or statistics and demonstrated affinity for solving quantitative problems. He/she should also demonstrate strong transferable, programming skills, as well as a keen interest in public policy research.

Our candidate meets the following criteria:

• MSc degree in one of the following disciplines: computer science, mathematics, statistics.
• Strong experience in data science, machine learning, artificial intelligence and/or optimization
• Fluency in at least two of the languages: R, Python, Scala, Julia, Java, C#, and/or C++
• Prior experience with dashboarding, visualization, and/or web design and development
• Prior experience in software development and engineering is a strong plus
• Data management and engineering skills
• Very good communication skills in English, both orally and in writing
• Ability to work independently in a fast-paced environment
• Strong work ethic and willingness to learn
• An affinity for international policy research
• The ability to interpret data
• First-principles thinking

Successful applicants will be asked to provide a certificate of good conduct (‘Verklaring Omtrent het Gedrag’), which is available from The Netherlands Ministry of Justice.

Practical Information

The PhD/analyst position is paid. The PhD/analyst position is for four years. Alongside the PhD research, the PhD candidate will contribute to the application of the models to real world policy problems in the context of HCSS work for clients.

Application Procedure

Your application should be in English. We will only consider complete applications. To apply, send the following items to info@hcss.nl, using ‘PhD Role 1/2021’ as the subject line:

• A cover letter, succinctly explaining why you are the best candidate for the PhD role
• A portfolio of previous data projects, including the code (or a GitHub address)
• A summary of the initial research proposal (1 page maximum)
• A resume, including a list of references
• Official academic transcripts
• One writing sample

Eligible applicants will be invited for an interview.

Applicants are invited to submit their application before 1 March 2021 or until the vacancy is filled.

Download: Annex to the HCSS-LIACS PhD Vacancy

About HCSS

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies is an independent think tank that provides strategic advice to governments, non-governmental organizations and corporations. We provide practical solutions for challenges in a fast-changing world. Our multidisciplinary research agenda covers international and national security, defense planning, cybersecurity, resource and energy issues, and broader geopolitical and geo-economic developments. We conduct our research guided through innovative and data-driven approaches. HCSS works independently and in collaboration with its network of affiliated experts. HCSS is based in The Hague, the Netherlands, the international city of peace and justice, where the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are located. The Hague has a large expat community, as the city is home to many international organizations, NGOs, and academic institutes. It is also the seat of the Dutch government and Ministries of Justice and Security, Foreign Affairs, and Defense, which are important clients of HCSS.

About LIACS

The Leiden Institute of Advanced Computer Science is the Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science Institute in the Faculty of Science of Leiden University. We offer courses at the Bachelor and Master of Science level in Artificial Intelligence, Computer Science, ICT in Business, Media Technology, and Bioinformatics. According to an independent research visitation, we are one of the foremost computer science departments of the Netherlands. We strive for excellence in a caring institute, where excellence, fun, and diversity go hand in hand. We offer a clear and inviting career path to young and talented scientists with the ambition to grow. For more information about LIACS, see http://liacs.leidenuniv.nl.

Annex to the HCSS-LIACS PhD Vacancy (January 2021): An outline of the problems to be solved in the PhD project in application domain terms

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) develops conflict and security policy modeling applications. We use causal modeling to identify and estimate causes of violent political conflicts. For example, in our ongoing award-winning, “Water, Peace, and Security” project, we identify and estimate causal effects of water, food, energy, and climate risks on violent political conflicts. Our effort to casually model violent conflict is also intended to generate a taxonomy of different pathways to violent conflict. Moreover, we use causal modeling to specify and optimize efficacy of causal interventions into such conflicts. Hence, our objective is dual: First, we want to get a better grip on causality in complex social systems. Second, we want to assess how policymakers can optimally intervene into causes of distinct types of violent conflicts.

Along these lines, we want to develop, validate, and deploy causal models that identify and estimate different natural conflict pathways using existing domain knowledge. At the same time, we want to optimize the efficacy of interventions into causes of violent conflicts under a host of causally relevant constraints. Some of these constraints are natural while others are derived from policy.

In this latter context, we assess how to inoculate a causal intervention into a violent conflict against attacks that are intended to deprive the intervention of its efficacy. Our objective is to optimally trade the intervention’s efficacy for its resilience to being strategically contested. We are subjecting the optimization of the intervention’s efficacy to strategic interaction among adversarial policymakers.

Furthermore, we analyze how to inoculate a causal intervention into a violent conflict against voting and agenda attacks that are intended to deprive the intervention of its efficacy. Our objective is to optimally trade the intervention’s efficacy for its political feasibility. Not only are we subjecting the optimization of the intervention’s efficacy to the policymakers’ strategic interaction, but also to the intervention’s dependence on the tally of policymakers’ votes. Specifically, by formulating the intervention as one of several interventions on a governing body’s voting agenda, we are embedding the strategic interaction-related constraints into the governing body.

Finally, solutions to the above problems apply optimization to causal modeling of conflict. Validation of such solutions requires causal models of several conflict pathways to be identified and estimated, before the efficacy of a causal intervention into each of these conflict pathways can be respectively specified and optimized.

Therefore, the doctoral research should result in detection of causal pathways that lead to a violent conflict in complex social systems, optimization of causal interventions into such pathways, as well as their optimization in the light of adversarial strategies. Thus, the scientific contribution to be made requires expertise in causality, optimization, and conflict modeling.

Today, the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) released two new reports, one on South Asia and the other on Southeast Asia, warning that climate change is threatening stability and security in the region, and calling for urgent action to both drastically reduce carbon emissions and prevent climate security risks. 

The IMCCS is a group of senior military leaders, security experts, and security institutions across the globe – currently hailing from 38 countries in every hemisphere – dedicated to anticipating, analyzing, and addressing the security risks of a changing climate. The IMCCS is administered by the Center for Climate and Security, an institute of the Council on Strategic Risks, with the participation of a consortium of international partners. The two new reports complement two previously released documents, The World Climate and Security Report 2020 and Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific, with an added emphasis on the energy-climate-security nexus. 

Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, U.S. Navy (retired), former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and Member, Advisory Board to the Center for Climate and Security, noted: 

“We have entered an age in which multiple, converging risks define our security environment. In the Indo-Pacific region, climate change is the biggest long-term security threat.  I testified to this effect to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2013, and it’s even more true now. Climate impacts are getting more potent, dialing up the threats from existing conflict patterns and resource scarcities. At the same time climate projections are getting more precise. This combination of potency and precision translates into an obligation for militaries to anticipate, train, equip and prepare for increasingly dangerous climate security scenarios.” 

Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn, U.S. Navy (retired), former Commander, U.S. Navy Third Fleet, Member of the Advisory Board to the Center for Climate and Security and Member of the Executive Committee of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), agreed, stating:

“The future security and stability of the Indo-Pacific depends on how multiple, converging threats are handled in the context of climate and energy decisions. The more the region spends on coal, the more they will have to spend on disaster preparedness, disaster response and increased regional instability.” 

Shiloh Fetzek, Senior Fellow for International Affairs at the Center for Climate and Security, and lead author of the Southeast Asia report, said:

“The security environment and physical environment around Southeast Asia are getting increasingly strained, and climate change will make these challenges more complex as it picks up pace over the coming decades. To preserve stability and prosperity, regional governments must recognize that climate change impacts will reverberate across the security spectrum, from geostrategic competition and domestic insurgencies to food security and urban challenges. Preventing the worst outcomes will require dealing with the problem at its source, and taking national security into account when considering energy policies, pathways and investments.”

Rachel Fleishman, Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific at the Center for Climate and Security, and co-author of both reports, commented:

“South and Southeast Asian militaries are increasingly adept at responding to climate-induced disasters. But reactive strategies are not sufficient.  Climate change threatens the very systems that support modern life, from food, water and energy to governance and security. And the devastation it brings can empower those who seek societal disruption. Much more can and should be done to map and mitigate climate security threats before they escalate. The benefits of doing so will be measurable in terms of health, economic growth, and peace and stability.”

Sarang Shidore, Senior Fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks and lead author of the South Asia report, said:

“The Indo-Pacific region is among the most vital to American and global security. It is a region roiled by conflict and tension. But the biggest risk to its stability may be climate change. Joint action to meet this common emergency is essential to save lives and livelihoods, but can also serve as a pathway for regional cooperation between nations. There is not a moment to lose.”

While COVID-19 has understandably commandeered the globe’s attention for the past year, global greenhouse gas emissions have continued their rise unabated. This poses particular threats to Asia, one of the regions most vulnerable to natural disasters. With 2020 tied for warmest year on record, it’s clear that climate change risks are here now, and are accelerating. The situation could not be more urgent. 

The new reports find that climate change is a threat multiplier for security in South and Southeast Asia. Climate impacts can induce or exacerbate physical and socio-economic stressors, leading to resource competition, health impacts, societal tensions and migration and displacement -- which in turn can amplify existing security challenges or create new ones. Climate-related migration can stress densely-packed urban areas and increase intercommunal conflict and grievances with governments. It can also compromise scarce or shared resources such as river waters and fish, amplifying tensions between states or domestic provinces and ethnic groups. 

Such scenarios are already playing out domestically in the Philippines, in the South China Sea, and in the context of the India-Pakistan and China-India security rivalries,  among other locations. In the India-Pakistan and China-India cases, contestations over transboundary rivers subject to climate-induced floods and droughts are worsening the already intense adversarial relationships between nuclear weapons states.

For militaries, climate change both impedes operational preparedness and expands military missions.  Military installations, like cities, are vulnerable to extreme weather which damages buildings, infrastructure and assets. Yet militaries must contend with such impacts even as they are called upon to perform additional humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions.  ASEAN has taken up coordinated disaster management and emergency response in its new Disaster Management Framework 2021-2025, and South Asia has the institutional framework to do the same in the broader regional organization, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation. Yet in both South and Southeast Asia, there is much more to be done. 

The negative feedback loop between climate change and energy consumption patterns is particularly alarming. Temperatures above levels tolerable by humans and greater prosperity are driving demand for air conditioning, which in turn has contributed to a surge in energy demand.  The International Energy Agency reports that life-saving air conditioning is available in only 20% of Southeast Asian households and at even lower levels in South Asia. Yet with coal continuing to be a dominant power source, the region is trapped in a dangerous cycle of growing carbon emissions contributing to the global stock of carbon dioxide,  thereby fuelling ever-more-harmful climate security  impacts. Thus, addressing fossil fuel use will positively impact climate security, while neglecting to address it will exacerbate the climate security challenges in the region for years to come.  

Read Climate Security and the Strategic Energy Pathway in South Asia here and Climate Security and the Strategic Energy Pathway in Southeast Asia here.

Read the online version of this press release here.

Direct inquiries to: Francesco Femia, ffemia@climateandsecurity.org, WhatsApp: +1-571-263-5691

More resources:

• The World Climate and Security Report 2020 by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security
• Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific, by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security

Deterrence is an essential building block of NATO's Strategic Concept. It is one of the vital strategic functions of the Dutch defense organization. A credible and robust deterrent capability helps to prevent war, especially when international relations are strongly polarized. But what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century?

In Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga and Dr. Tim Sweijs bring together insights from renowned experts from three continents – not only from Europe and the US, but also from countries such as China, Iran, Israel and Russia. This timely book offers food for thought for deterrence theorists but also provides concrete levers for professionals to help shape deterrence in the 21st century security environment.

The open access volume can be downloaded here. With contributions by Sir Lawrence Freedman, Michael Mazarr, Sten Rynning, Karl Mueller,  Alexey Arbatov, Paul van Hooft, Jörg Noll, Dmitry Adamsky, Dean Cheng, Nori Katagiri, Sander Ruben Aarten, Hassan Ahmadian, Eitan Shamir, Martijn Kitzen, Maarten Rothman, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Francesco Giumelli, Cees Doorn, Stefan Soesanto, Alex Wilner, Roy Lindelauf, Tom Bijlsma, Samuel Zilincik and Paul Ducheine.

Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice

Current military-strategic, technological, and socio-political developments pose a series of challenges to deterrence – as dangerous as they are diverse. Great powers are modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Long-range missile systems are proliferating rapidly. Offensive cyber capabilities pose a direct threat to the integrity of nuclear C2 structures. Sensor technology and algorithms are undermining old Cold War concepts such as Mutually Assured Destruction. Non-state groups are gaining ever greater clout. And new integrated deterrence concepts from countries like Iran, China and Russia make no distinction between war and peace, military and civil, and defensive and offensive. Globally, scholarly and strategic communities are updating, refining and further developing the analytical portfolio of deterrence concepts that take into account both actor-specific and domain-specific features to address these challenges.

The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of the deterrence literature in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world.

‘Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice’ is this year’s issue of the Annual Review of Military Studies (NL ARMS) of the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA).

The book is now available in open access or as hardcover.

Gas en olie zijn onmisbaar om Rusland draaiende te houden. De Russen hebben zich er zelfs bijna volledig van afhankelijk gemaakt. Een risicovol beleid, want dit businessmodel is niet eeuwig houdbaar. Zeker niet nu de landen aan wie de Russen hun gas en olie verkopen, bezig zijn met een energietransitie.

Wat betekent dat voor Rusland zelf en voor Vladimir Poetin en zijn entourage? En hoe zit het met Nederland en de EU? Is het Nederlandse belang op dit gebied hetzelfde als dat van andere Europese landen? En hoe zouden we ons richting Rusland op moeten stellen?

Dat ga je horen in deze aflevering van de Strateeg. Te gast bij Paul van Liempt zijn Lucia van Geuns en Jilles van den Beukel, beiden energie-analist bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies. Zij schreven onlangs een paper over dit opdoemende probleem voor de Russen: Russia’s Unsustainable Business Model.

Luister de aflevering hier.

What is the security impact of climate change? Can we save the climate from behind a laptop? What does Russia’s dependence on revenues from oil and gas mean for its economic prospects? And will tanks be rolling down Dutch streets? Find out in the new HCSS Digest!

What is the security impact of climate change? HCSS authors Femke Remmits, Elisabeth Dick and Michel Rademaker presented a unique forecasting tool: the Climate Security Risk Index offers decision-makers a new tool to prevent, mitigate or avert the impacts of climate-related extreme weather events.

Riots broke out in several Dutch cities this week after the Netherlands introduced a night-time curfew. Some Dutch politicians called for the army to step in. Should tanks be rolling down the Sales Gutter (that’s the Rotterdam Koopgoot shopping street according to Google Translate…) in an effort to control the rioters? HCSS defense specialist Peter Wijninga thinks that's a bad idea, he commented on RTL Nieuws program EditieNL: bringing in the army will only escalate the situation, while now is the time to de-escalate.

Wijninga was subsequently interviewed for EenVandaag, where he once again stressed bringing in the army to do a police task was unwise, despite what some mayors alluded to. “We have to use our common sense right now," he added. Listen to the entire interview here.

What does effective deterrence look like in the 21st Century? In their new book, Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice, authors Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs bring together insights from renowned experts from three continents – not just Europe and the US, but also from countries such as China, Iran, Israel and Russia. Minister of Defense Ank Bijleveld received the first copy this week.

A failing vaccination strategy, high number of infections and social unrest. The Netherlands as a guiding country? Abroad they are looking at us with increasing amazement - and amusement, Rob de Wijk notes in his column for Trouw. Because the Dutch “poldering” only works on calm seas. In times of crisis a central, guiding role is required.

The Netherlands organized the first online climate event this week, the Climate Adaptation Summit. The symbolism of this large-scale online meeting is cause for hope, says HCSS expert Laura Birkman to ANP. But financing is an absolute precondition for climate adaptation, she added – which was also reported by newspaper Trouw.

In the new episode of podcast "Blik op Olie en Gas", host Remco de Boer talks to Energy Specialist Jilles van den Beukel  about the new HCSS report on the 'dark and opaque' Russian oil and gas industry, the gas price, our supply (in)security and more.

In Iraq, declining river flows have ruined productive land and left freshwater sources undrinkable. Read more in the Global Early Warning Tool December 2020 quarterly update by the Water, Peace & Security (WPS) partnership. It flags potential hotspots for water-related challenges in Mozambique, Chad, Iraq, Afghanistan, & South Sudan.

“The lack of investment in innovation is threatening Europe”, ANP quoted Deputy Director Michel Rademaker, reporting on the TNO/HCSS Whitepaper “Strategische Autonomie op Cybersecurity”: the EU is at risk of falling behind in the field of digital technologies. His warning was also picked up by security news site Beveiligingswereld.

Climate, water, peace & security are interlinked issues. At a side event of the Climate Adaptation Summit this week, Water, Peace, Security and Adaptation, the Water, Peace & Security (WPS) partnership presented its latest Conflict Forecast and how to best adapt to climate change while fostering sustainable water management.

The Netherlands has no eye for the strategic opportunities of the agri-food sector, Rob de Wijk muses in his first column for Nieuwe Oogst. It seems as if we are only interested in the amount of nitrogen emissions and the quantity of animals.

Former President Trump (yes, he’s still getting the occasional headline or two) caused the norms and standards of international politics to blur and fade, Han ten Broeke commented in podcast Europa Draait Door. Biden will partially restore these old relationships, but the world will not go back to the way it was.

Russia’s dependence on revenues from oil and gas production is now higher than that of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s, but prospects for fossil fuels have deteriorated in recent years. In a new article for Raam op Rusland, Jilles van den Beukel and Lucia van Geuns assess the prospects of Russia's economic model.

HCSS is proud to welcome a new Subject Matter Expert to our impressive roster of specialists:  Jaap van den Herik will be joining us as Strategic Advisor. His expertise is in Data Science, Artificial Intelligence and Law.

Today, we sadly say our goodbyes to departing Strategic Analyst Bianca Torossian, Management Assistant Angelica Francisco and Assistant Analyst Niklas Hintermayer – we wish you all the best!

Tot ergernis van andere landen kwam het kabinet-Rutte vorig jaar met een ‘intelligente lockdown’. De boodschap was duidelijk: in de strijd tegen Covid-19 doen wij Nederlanders het goed en jullie doen het fout. Wat het aantal besmettingen betreft, scoorde Nederland in die tijd niet echt goed. Maar de economische klap was in dit land inderdaad minder dan in de rest van Europa.

Nu is het gebeurd met Nederland gidsland. Onze vaccinatiestrategie is een ramp. We zitten in de top van het aantal besmettingen en sociale onlusten. Een blik op de internationale berichtgeving is voldoende om te zien dat het buitenland met stijgende verbazing naar ons kijkt.

In de talloze videoconferenties waaraan ik deelneem komt Nederland naar mijn smaak te vaak aan de orde. Dat begon al in de aanloop naar de Europese top van juli vorig jaar. Toen verzette Nederland zich met hand en tand tegen gezamenlijke leningen en giften voor de zwaarst getroffen landen en werden vooral de Italianen ongehoord geschoffeerd. In Nederland is deze episode allang vergeten, maar dat geldt niet voor het buitenland. Dat verklaart waarom met verbazing en leedvermaak naar het huidige geworstel met Covid-19 wordt gekeken.

Het systeem wordt technocratisch en ingewikkeld

De verklaring van dit falen is dat het Nederlandse systeem van polderen alleen met mooi weer werkt. Polderen is in de loop van de tijd verworden tot het regelen van deelbelangen van politieke partijen, groepen in de samenleving en lobbyclubs. Om al die belangetjes een plek te geven wordt het systeem technocratisch en ingewikkeld en snapt niemand meer hoe we wat willen bereiken. In crisistijd loopt het dan van de rails. Dit wordt versterkt door de bewuste keuze van opeenvolgende kabinetten om te decentraliseren en af te zien van een sturende rol tijdens crises. Het voortouw ligt bij de veiligheidsregio’s, maar die zijn blijkens een recente evaluatie van de Wet op de veiligheidsregio’s niet ingericht op samenwerking, terwijl dat bij landelijke crises noodzakelijk is.

Je mist een beetje de centrale, militaire aansturing, verzuchtte Diederik Gommers, voorzitter van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Intensive Care, aan het begin van de crisis. Minister Hugo de Jonge beklaagde zich in NRC Handelsblad (27 november 2020) dat het beheersen van de crisis van improvisatie aan elkaar hangt en dat centrale regie bijna onmogelijk is.

Dat krijg je in een land waar regeren niet langer leiden is, maar het vooral gaat om het regisseren van deelbelangen. Kennis en ervaring spelen daarbij een steeds kleinere rol.

De lessen zijn genegeerd

Zo heeft de Kamer nooit behoorlijk over pandemieën gediscussieerd, terwijl die door de risicobeoordelingen van het kabinet als de grootste bedreiging werden gezien. Tussen 2011 en 2018 braken in 172 landen ongeveer 1500 pandemieën en epidemieën uit, maar de lessen zijn door beleidsmakers genegeerd. Economische chaos en toename van het aantal zelfmoorden zijn bekende fenomenen. De NCTV waarschuwde in oktober nog voor opstanden, aangejaagd door de sociale media.

Als het vervolgens fout gaat, begint het zwartepieten en berijdt iedereen zijn eigen stokpaardje. Links geeft het neoliberalisme en bezuinigingen de schuld, rechts de massa-immigratie en lage straffen. De echte reden is dat door politieke nalatigheid een bestuurlijk systeem is geschapen waarmee geen crisis kan worden opgelost. 

Rob de Wijk, Trouw, 28 januari 2021

Rob de Wijk is hoogleraar internationale relaties en veiligheid aan de Universiteit Leiden en oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Hij schrijft wekelijks over internationale verhoudingen. Lees zijn columns hier terug.