The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies are pleased to invite you to its IGF session "The Protection of the Public Core of the Internet: from formulation to implementation.”

REGISTER NOW

German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed the need to protect the public core of the Internet in her opening speech at the 2019 Internet Governance Forum in Berlin. While the idea of protecting the core Internet functions has a longer history, the notion only recently became the subject of a norm proposal by the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC). This norm has since been accepted and adopted by many institutions, including its inclusion in the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and its adoption into European Union legislation through the EU Cybersecurity Act.

Recent breaches of the DNS, such as ‘DNSpionage’ and the Netnod attack, highlight the vulnerabilities within and the international repercussions of exploiting critical Internet infrastructure. Meanwhile, the global open Internet and its underlying core principles increasingly face the threat of digital authoritarianism in which certain governments assert more control over the governance of the Internet. Responses to threats against the core Internet protocols and functions have required the cooperation of states, the private sector and civil society groups, as the infrastructure, services, and products underpinning it are privately-owned and governed and maintained by a community made up of civil society groups.

This session will give an overview of recent developments and explore ways in which to advance a concerted multistakeholder approach that embeds the protection of the public core of the Internet. It will first examine the need to further define the concept, building on the definition of the GCSC, and explore the preferred end-goal of this norm and avenues for calling out norm violations, as well as what contributions civil society can make towards defining, monitoring and protecting the public core of the Internet.

Speakers

Vint Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist at Google.

Jeff Moss, Founder and Creator of Black Hat and DEF CON

Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Professor Emeritus, University of Aarhus, former member on the ICANN Board of Directors, and former Special Ambassador of the NETMundial Initiative

Marietje Schaake, International Director of Policy at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center, President of the CyberPeace institute. Former member of European Parliament.

Anriette Esterhuysen, Director of Global Policy and Strategy, Association for Progressive Communications.

Samir Saran, President of the Observer Research Foundation and Chair of CyFy.

Nathalie Jaarsma, Ambassador at-Large for Security Policy and Cyber, Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Serge Droz, Chair, Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

Sheetal Kumar, Senior Programme Lead, Global Partners Digital.

Moderated by Alexander Klimburg, Director of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace Initiative and Secretariat

REGISTER NOW

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) and The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) are pleased to invite you to their IGF session “2020 Cyberstability Stocktaking of Norms and Institutional Dialogues".

REGISTER NOW

During this session, GCSC members will engage with the respective chairs and champions to reflect back at the main outcomes of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), the implementation of the UNSG High Level Panel on Digital Cooperation and Working Groups 4 and 5, and the ongoing work of the UN GGE, the Paris Call, and similar initiatives working on norms of responsible behavior.

Commissioners of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) will present the findings and developments of their report "Advancing Cyberstability" and engage with government actors to reflect back at the main outcomes and ongoing work of the UN OEWG and GGE, the UNSG High Level Panel, the Paris Call and similar initiatives working on cyber norms. It will explore ways in which to advance a concerted multistakeholder approach that advances the development, implementation and adherence to norms.

Speakers:

Latha Reddy, Co-Chair of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, Former Deputy National Security Advisor of India

Christopher Painter, President of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise Foundation, Former Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. State Department

Abdul-Hakeem Ajijola, Chair of the African Union Cyber Security Expert Group (AUCSEG), Chair of GFCE Working Group on Cyber Incident Management & Critical Information Protection, Executive Chairman Consultancy Support Services Ltd.

Khoo Boon Hui, President of INTERPOL 2008-2012, Senior Fellow Civil Service College and the Home Team Academy.

Frederick Douzet, Professor at the French Institute of Geopolitics at Paris 8 University, chairwoman of the Castex Chair of Cyber Strategy

Jürg Lauber, Chair of the UN Open-Ended Working Group

Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota, Chair of the UN Group of Governmental Experts

Heli Tiirmaa Klaar, Ambassador at Large for Cyber Diplomacy, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Regine Grienberger, Cyber Ambassador, Federal Foreign Office of Germany

Paul Zajac, Head of Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Department, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France

Gaurav Keerthi, Deputy Chief Executive of the Cyber Security Agency (CSA) of Singapore

The discussion will be moderated by Alexander Klimburg, Director of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace Initiative and Secretariat

REGISTER NOW

Amerika kiest 3 november een nieuwe president. De keuze valt op de huidige president Donald Trump of op zijn Democratische tegenstander Joe Biden. Ook China zal benieuwd zijn naar de uitslag. Maar de grote vraag is of de uitslag iets uitmaakt voor China. Rob de Wijk, oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies gaat erover in gesprek met Ties Dams en Li'ao Wang. 

Luister de podcast.

Deze tekst verscheen oorspronkelijk op 28 oktober 2020 op de website van BNR Nieuwsradio.

Abonneer je op deze podcast via bnr.nl/china. Heb je een vraag of tip voor de redactie, mail dan naar podcast@bnr.nl.

Out now: the Water Peace & Security Global Early Warning Tool quarterly update reflects our latest projections and accompanies our updated map, allowing us to flag some of the conflict hotspots that we are tracking in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia.

The WPS Global Early Warning Tool provides the initial step in a multi-step process, employing machine learning to predict conflict over the coming 12 months in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This quarterly update reflects some of our latest projections and accompanies our updated map, allowing us to highlight some of the conflict hotspot that we are tracking in these regions:

• East Africa: Six million East Africans have been impacted by floods in 2020. We are predicting emerging or ongoing conflict throughout much of Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan. A few highlights:
  • Kenya: In May 2020, Kenyan officials estimated that massive flooding had impacted about 800,000 people throughout the country. The WPS Global Early Warning Tool predicts emerging conflict in many areas throughout the country over the next 12 months.
  • South Sudan: About 400,000 people have been killed and over 4 million more have been displaced through years of civil war (2013-2020) in South Sudan .This year’s torrential rains and flooding have displaced over 600,000 people and threaten “catastrophic” hunger across the country. “In total, 240,000 people have been displaced in Jonglei and 221,000 in Lakes. The WPS Global Early Warning Tool predicts emerging or ongoing conflict throughout most of the country over the next 12 months.
  • Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe’s drought-related woes continue, with about 7 million people in urban and rural areas (nearly half the country) requiring humanitarian assistance. Poor economic and political conditions, together with COVID-19 are compounding drought-driven food insecurity. The WPS Global Early Warning Tool is currently predicting emerging conflict in the Harare region over the next 12 months.

• Iraq: Protests across southern and Central Iraq that culminated in the resignation of Iraq’s prime minister in late 2019 were also due to lack of access to basic services, including clean water and electricity. A number of factors are driving declining river flows in the Tigris-Euphrates, ruining productive land and rendering freshwater sources undrinkable throughout much of southern Iraq. The WPS Global Early Warning Tool predicts emerging or ongoing conflict throughout much of southern and central Iraq over the next 12 months.

• Iran-Afghanistan Border Regions: relations between Iran and Afghanistan – where a significant share of Iran’s water resources originates – have deteriorated as Afghanistan’s Kamal Khan Dam along the Helmand River nears completion this year. Tensions in the Harirud river basin are running equally high, as the Pashdan Dam moves towards completion near the end of 2021. The WPS Global Early Warning Tool predicts emerging conflict in the Helmand River border region over the next 12 months.

• Bangladesh: One third of the country had been inundated by monsoon rains as of August 2020, and more than 1.5 million Bangladeshis are displaced. More severe and more frequent flooding happened along the Brahmaputra River as a result of more intense rainfall, which is projected to continue worsening as a result of climate change. Sea level rise will also gradually submerge large swaths of this low-lying country.

Read the full Global Early Warning Tool quarterly update here. 

Read more about the WPS Partnership here. 

De Verenigde Naties bestaat 75 jaar: het ideale moment voor het doorvoeren van broodnodige hervormingen, pleiten meerdere experts. Zo ook directeur Politieke Zaken bij The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies en voormalig Kamerlid Han ten Broeke. 

“Er zijn ontzettend veel conflicten in de wereld. Van Somalië tot Sudan, van Myanmar tot Libië. Maar nu ook in bijvoorbeeld Syrië en Jemen. Allemaal conflicten waar de VN niet of nauwelijks invloed op kan uitoefenen, omdat de VN verdeeld is. Dat wordt nog moeilijker op het moment dat de overwinnaars van de Tweede Wereldoorlog hun vetorecht gebruiken in de veiligheidsraad.”

Toch blijft de VN, die zaterdag 75 jaar bestaat, ontzettend belangrijk, zegt Ten Broeke. “Het vervelende is dat er geen alternatief is voor de VN. Als je hem niet zou hebben, zou je hem het liefst vandaag weer willen oprichten. Beter zou zijn om de VN te moderniseren en te verbeteren.” Rosenthal is het met hem eens.

Deze tekst verscheen oorspronkelijk op 23 oktober 2020 op de website van WNL. 

Ask not what you’re Digest can do for you, but what you can do for your Digest. Here’s your weekly dose of bitesize HCSS chunks, telling you all you need to know about geopolitics, global challenges and international security issues worldwide.

“The outcome of the military competition between the U.S. and China in the Asia-Pacific will decide the future of the transatlantic relationship.”

Mark your calendars: HCSS is pleased to host the webinar to launch the Security Studies special issue on the Sino-American maritime competition. Join us November 16th 15:30-17:30 CET for the first event of the Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relations, as an awesome collection of security scholars will discuss how the maritime outcomes in the Asia-Pacific will impact European security. The webinar will take place on Zoom: click here to register. 

Space as a military domain is becoming increasingly important. In a new HCSS Space Snapshot, Patrick Bolder and Esther Chavannes shed light on the opportunities and challenges for defense ánd industry these military space developments go hand in hand with.

He’s still regarded as the most powerful person on earth: the President of the United States. But how great is that power really? What are other major power factors are at play in Washington, D.C.? What has Donald Trump done in recent years with the power of the POTUS? And how should a country like the Netherlands act towards the US President to get things done? Listen to a very special episode of our podcast De Strateeg on BNR Nieuwsradio, featuring the father and son duo of Frans Verhagen en Paul Verhagen.

The Navalny assassination attempt, the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the recent fire in a Russian biological lab – although unlikely, such incidents could potentially have a massive impact. How prepared is the Netherlands for this? In a new report, Paul Sinning, Stephan de Spiegeleire and Frank Bekkers analyze current biological and chemical threats, and whether the Dutch B / C knowledge infrastructure is adequate in the light of these hazards.

Starting to feel the election anxiety? Then watch a data scientist’s guide to the US elections on YouTube! During this webinar for Studium Generale, dataguy Paul Verhagen will take you through the latest insights from polling and other data points.

The worldwide hunt for raw materials focuses on rare metals to realize green revolutions. China has already taken a big lead, with Africa appearing to pay the price again. HCSS’s Rob de Wijk and Michel Rademaker analyze this controversial topic in an article by the Volkskrant.

The Dutch Ministry of Defense's new DefenseVision2035 focuses on a stronger, more self-reliant Europe. And it's about time, writes Rob de Wijk in Trouw – the world has changed drastically and Europe must take responsibility, stand on its own two feet and become a geopolitical player.

Iran can buy and sell weapons again, now that a long-running United Nations arms embargo expired. Apart from a few violations, Iran has acted according to the agreement, and attempts by the US to continue the embargo have been nipped in the bud. But this doesn’t mean that Iran will start buying weapons again, explains defense specialist Peter Wijninga on BNR Nieuwsradio.

Heads up: only a few more days to register for the webinar “The Future of War” by Dr. Frank G. Hoffman, strategic analyst and retired lieutenant colonel of the US Marine Corps, taking place next week, on October 29th. Don’t miss out!

And finally: congratulations to Remy Darricarrère, our financial administrator, who celebrated his birthday yesterday! Happy birthday!  

22 oktober 2020, Trouw

De nieuwe Defensievisie 2035 is het testament van defensieminister Bijleveld. Jammer is dat zij daarin niet aangeeft hoe de krijgsmacht moet worden verbouwd. Het blijft bij een aantal richtlijnen voor die ­verbouwing, zoals optreden met minder mensen en ­innovatie. Maar wat dat betekent blijft onduidelijk.

Dat er een nieuwe krijgsmacht moet komen is zeker. Door de nieuwe assertiviteit van Rusland krijgt de traditionele verdedigingsfunctie weer prioriteit.

Meer prioriteit krijgt ook de nationale taak van de krijgsmacht. Want in de nieuwe veiligheidssituatie begint de collectieve verdediging van de Navo in de lidstaten zelf.

De afgelopen jaren zijn we immers veelvuldig opgeschrikt door cyberaanvallen, spionage, beïnvloeding van verkiezingen, en aanslagen, zelfs met gifgas, die door Rusland werden uitgevoerd.

Het doel is de ondermijning van de lidstaten en daarmee van de Navo zelf. De Defensievisie 2035 start het debat hierover, maar laat de uitwerking aan het volgende kabinet over.

De visie reikt dat nieuwe kabinet ook de financiële speelruimte aan, want die wordt in verschillende scenario’s aangegeven. Wil Nederland zijn internationale verplichtingen nakomen, dan moet het budget voor defensie over een aantal jaren verdubbelen. Omdat de nieuwe dreigingen een andere krijgsmacht eisen, lijkt die verdubbeling inderdaad noodzakelijk.

De grote verbouwing wordt ook afgedwongen door de geopolitiek. Ook als Joe Biden de Amerikaanse verkiezingen wint, wordt het niet meer zoals het was.

Vergeet niet dat Biden de stuwende kracht was achter de heroriëntatie van de Verenigde Staten op Azië. Toen dat in 2011 gebeurde, vreesden veel Europeanen dat dit ten koste van de Navo zou gaan. Dat was ook zo. Die trend werd versterkt door Trump.

Als Biden president wordt, dan zal dat geen grote koerswijziging betekenen. Natuurlijk verschilt de toon, maar ook hij zal aan China prioriteit geven. Het zou mij niet verbazen als hij in ruil voor Amerikaanse steun aan de Navo van de Europeanen verlangt dat ze bijvoorbeeld Amerika met marineschepen assisteren in de Zuid-Chinese Zee, die door China geheel wordt geclaimd. Deze grote geopolitieke verschuivingen worden door de ­Defensievisie 2035 erkend.

Voor mij is het document van Bijleveld vooral opmerkelijk omdat wordt ingezet op een ‘sterker, zelfredzamer Europa’. Volgens de visie moet de EU een echte geopolitieke speler worden. Het zal tijd worden.

Bijleveld is het eens met de Europese Unie die vindt dat de Europeanen los van Amerika ook zware gevechtsoperaties moeten kunnen uitvoeren: ‘We zetten nadrukkelijk in op een Europa, en dus ook een EU die verantwoordelijkheid neemt, ook op het militaire vlak’.

Ik hoor nu al het gekrakeel in de Kamer: dit mag niet ten koste gaan van de Navo en de trans-Atlantische ­relatie. Precies daarom wordt die Europese defensie verkocht als de versterking van de Europese pijler binnen de Navo. Het zal wel.

Feit is dat de wereld drastisch is veranderd en dat ­Europa op eigen benen moet gaan staan. Uit een van de recente opiniepeilingen van het Europees Parlement blijkt dat 72 procent van de Nederlanders vindt dat de EU goed voor het land is. Niet iedereen omarmt de EU. 

Rob de Wijk is hoogleraar internationale relaties en veiligheid aan de Universiteit Leiden en oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). Hij schrijft wekelijks over internationale verhoudingen. Lees zijn columns hier terug. 

“The outcome of the military competition between the U.S. and China in the Asia-Pacific will decide the future of the transatlantic relationship.”

HCSS is pleased to host the webinar to launch the Security Studies special issue on the Sino-American maritime competition. Join us November 16th 15:30-17:30 CET as we discuss how the maritime outcomes in the Asia-Pacific will impact European security.

REGISTER HERE

The Sino-American relationship has become increasingly fraught, and not only over issues of trade and 5G technology. Tensions are mounting in the South China Sea as China continues to build and expand its presence via artificial islands and their militarization. The U.S. Navy is in the process of modernizing its fleet. Technological developments are undermining the military superiority that the United States has long depended on.

What will the consequences be?

The webinar will feature:

• Fiona Cunningham, Elliott School at George Washington
• Jon Lindsay, Munk School University of Toronto & Erik Gartzke Center for Peace and Security Studies UC San Diego
• Sara Mitchell, University of Iowa Political Science Department
• Evan Braden Montgomery, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
• Paul van Hooft, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
• Peter Dombrowksi, Naval War College & Jon Caverley, Naval War College & MIT SSP
• with Tim Sweijs, HCSS Director of Research, acting as moderator.

The contributors will answer questions such as:

• What are the diplomatic options for settling maritime claims in the South China Sea?
• Will advances in missile technology and targeting dampen the chance of conflict or escalate it?
• Is a blockade of China an alternative to escalation?
• Are maritime states more prone to conflict?
• How does insularity complicate U.S. grand strategy?
• What naval options are there to manage US decline and retrenchment?
• For Europeans, what will the U.S. strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific mean?
• What role could and should they play?
• Is maritime power now more decisive than land power?

Join us on November 16th 15:30 -17:30 CET for the first event of the Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relations to hear the latest insights into these questions.

The webinar will take place on Zoom: click here to register. 

Space as a military domain is becoming increasingly important. Global powers are investing huge amounts of money into the development and construction of new (military) space assets and it seems as though we’re on the eve of a new ‘space race’. In a new HCSS snapshot, Patrick Bolder and Esther Chavannes shed light on the opportunities and challenges these military space developments go hand in hand with.  

Read the snapshot.

From observation and communication applications to weapon delivery, space will become indispensable to military operations. While major global powers are investing heavily in military space infrastructure and assets, societies’ dependency on space is also increasing rapidly.    

Societies’ dependency on space and the prospect of space as the military domain of the future, raises questions which require answers. To be able to answer these, it is imperative to define how the military can use and protect space assets. At the same time, protection of our daily life on Earth – already highly dependent on accurate and unincumbered functioning of many space assets – requires careful consideration as well. 

Download the complete snapshot here.

De wereldwijde jacht op grondstoffen spitst zich toe op zeldzame metalen om groene revoluties mee te realiseren. China start met een forse voorsprong, Afrika lijkt weer kind van de rekening te worden. Rob de Wijk en Michel Rademaker geven uitleg over dit beladen onderwerp in een analyse van de Volkskrant, geschreven door Carlijne Vos en Mirza Čengić.

Lees het complete artikel hier. 

De soms meedogenloze en verwoestende speurtocht naar grondstoffen gaat hand in hand met modernisering. Zonder kolen was er nooit een industriële revolutie geweest, zonder ijzer geen spoorwegen, zonder hout geen schepen om koloniën te vestigen, zonder olie en gas geen wereldwijde welvaart en vooruitgang. ‘Het patroon herhaalt zich’, zegt Rob de Wijk, hoogleraar internationale betrekkingen in Leiden en directeur van het Haags Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS). ‘Alleen het type grondstof verandert. Nu is de jacht gericht op de zeldzame metalen voor onze groene revolutie.’

De annexatie van de Krim in 2014 door Rusland was een gamechanger, zegt Rob de Wijk van HCSS. ‘Dat opende de ogen van de wereld. We riepen als internationale gemeenschap wel dat het niet mocht en we dreigden met gevolgen, maar in praktijk hadden we geen middelen in handen om Rusland tot de orde te roepen.’

Anno 2020 spitst de jacht zich dus toe op de onzichtbare metalen voor nieuwe technologische hoogstandjes en de ambitie onze economie te vergroenen. We moeten af van fossiele brandstoffen en de broeikasuitstoot moet in 2050 tot nul zijn gereduceerd. De tijd dringt. Op dit moment worden nog niet genoeg kritieke metalen geproduceerd om zelfs maar een kwart van de klimaatambities waar te maken. Voordat alle auto’s elektrisch kunnen rijden en we zijn overgestapt op wind- en zonne-energie, moeten nog heel wat accu’s worden geproduceerd en dus heel wat mijnen operationeel gemaakt – hetgeen gemiddeld tien tot twintig jaar duurt. Degene met de langste adem en de diepste financiële zakken gaat deze race winnen. ‘En dat is China’, zegt Michel Rademaker, eveneens verbonden aan het HCSS als adjunct-directeur, stellig.

China begint het grondstoffenspel al met een forse voorsprong. 80 procent van de zeldzame aardmetalen zoals cerium, lanthanium en neodymium komt uit China. ‘China toont zich een absolute meester in de inzet van zijn machtspositie’, zegt Rademaker. Concurrerende mijnen elders in de wereld, vooral in Australië, zijn met prijsbeleid uitgeschakeld, voor ‘vijanden’ gaat de export in de ban. In de handelsoorlog met de VS zet China regelmatig de troefkaart in van het ‘grondstoffennationalisme’. En met succes: de VS is voor zijn defensie bijvoorbeeld paradoxaal genoeg volledig afhankelijk van China’s aardmetalen.

Inmiddels reikt China’s macht verder dan de eigen bodemschatten. Meer dan de helft van de kobalt uit Congo gaat naar China, waarvandaan het verwerkt in chips en andere halffabricaten de westerse markten bereikt. ‘China beheerst nu grote delen van de wereldwijde productieketens’, zegt Rademaker. Het begon met het opkopen van mijnconcessies, handelsplatforms, het controleren van de logistiek met het wereldwijde ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (de nieuwe zijderoute), het overnemen van de productie, en nu neemt China ook het voortouw in research & development.’ Vooral dat laatste noemt Rademaker zorgelijk. ‘Dit was het laatste wapen dat het Westen in handen had om nog waarde in de keten toe te voegen. Maar dit laten we ons nu ook uit handen slaan door er onvoldoende in te investeren en Chinese studenten hier kennis te laten opdoen.’

Hoe feller de competitieslag om de grondstoffen, hoe lastiger het voor het Westen wordt om normen overeind te houden, zegt ook Rob de Wijk van HCSS. ‘Normen en macht zijn twee kanten van dezelfde medaille. Het Westen heeft de macht verloren, dus denk je dat China zich iets laat vertellen door ons? In de wereld buiten de EU gelden de wetten van rauwe macht: heersen of overheerst worden. Als je zaken wil doen in Congo zul je concessies moeten doen op het gebied van mensenrechten en milieu. Je kunt weigeren om aan tafel te zitten met rebellenleiders, maar dan heb je dus geen mobieltje en doet een andere partij het.’

Deze tekst is oorspronkelijk geschreven door Carlijne Vos en Mirza Čengić en gepubliceerd in De Volkskrant. 
 

Iran kan weer wapens gaan kopen en verkopen. Vannacht verliep een langlopend wapenembargo van de Verenigde Naties tegen het land. Iran heeft zich op een paar overtredingen na volgens de afspraak gedragen. Pogingen van de Verenigde Staten om het embargo voort te zetten zijn in de kiem gesmoord.

Internationaal kregen de Amerikanen nul op het rekest, zegt Peter Wijninga, defensie-expert bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies. En dat is logisch, aangezien ze zelf uit het verdrag stapten. 'Dus wat doe je dan met het weer inroepen van het embargo? Daar hebben ze ook nul steun voor in de Veiligheidsraad gekregen. Dat was toch wel een blamage, gezichtsverlies en een duidelijke klap voor de Amerikaanse diplomatie. Die heeft hier absoluut gefaald.'

De grote vraag is of de Iraniërs nu ruim baan hebben om op grote schaal conventionele wapens in te slaan. Het lijkt erop dat het geld simpelweg ontbreekt, zegt Wijninga. 'Je kunt hooguit verwachten dat ze dat in ruil voor olie doen, maar de landen die die wapens zouden kúnnen leveren, lijken ook niet erg happig: Rusland heeft zelf genoeg olie en China lijkt toch te streven naar normalisatie van relaties met de Verenigde Staten.'

Luister het complete fragment hier. 

Dit artikel verscheen oorspronkelijk op 19 oktober 2020 op de website van BNR Nieuwsradio. 

Was NATO enlargement good for security?  The answer depends on who, where, and when. Enlargement considerably benefitted European security in the short-term.  However, I argue that the long-term legacy for European security, for the organization itself, and for American grand strategy and security is less positive, because of how enlargement was implemented.

This essay was originally published on October 19th 2020 and is part of the H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Roundtable XII-1 on NATO Expansion in Retrospect.

Enlargement did a lot of good.  Underpinned by the continued presence of American forces, it facilitated the successful unification of Germany, strengthened the stability and security of Central and Eastern Europe, and settled relations with Russia to the advantage of NATO and former Warsaw Pact members.[3]  In particular, the prospect and process of NATO enlargement in the 1990s and the 2000s, together with the parallel enlargement of the European Union, offered the Central and Eastern European states better options than they would otherwise have had.  As U.S. officials put it, the continuation of NATO and its enlargement allowed the U.S. to consolidate its Cold War gains and ensure (in President George H.W. Bush’s words) a Europe “whole and free.”[4]

Yet NATO enlargement was only one element of post-1989 American grand strategy, even when it came to American plans for Europe, and cannot be considered in isolation.  The U.S. also pursued a shift in NATO’s strategic concept towards crisis management and stability operations outside of the NATO treaty area.[5]  It wanted to use NATO as an all-purpose tool to spread stability, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. To be sure, most European allies supported the change, though the French government was significantly less enthusiastic.  Consequently, European armed forces began an open-ended process of transformation away from the heavier forces needed for collective defense and deterrence towards lighter, expeditionary forces that were more suitable for the proposed ‘out of area’ operations.

The conceptual shift interacted with enlargement, specifically in the post-9/11conflicts.  Western European allies, along with aspiring new NATO members from Central and Eastern Europe, participated in Afghanistan and Iraq —though the latter was not a NATO operation —in large part to show support for the United States.  In doing so, they sought to ensure the continued presence of U.S. forces in Europe, and, in the case of the potential new members, to shore up American support for their membership.  Successfully managing the growth of NATO as an institution would have presented a challenge under the best of circumstances.  As it turned out, the strains of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in parallel with the transformation of the alliance’s armed forces and the integration into the structure of so many new members, used all the bandwidth of the European defense establishments. The stress was particularly pronounced for smaller states, which most of European allies are, with fewer resources than their much larger American ally and thus more limited capacity for adaptation.  The long-term effect undermined the actual capabilities of the alliance and its political support within European capitals and among the wider public.[6]

The third element of U.S. policy was the inhibition of attempts by key Western European states to form security institutions outside of NATO during the 1990s and early 2000s.  These included the revitalized the Western European Union, the French-German initiated Eurocorps, the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO, and the European Union’s European Security and Defense Policy.  These initiatives, all of which were intended to deal with the long-term insecurity that followed European dependency on the U.S., were triggered by the European failures in the Balkan Wars and American inaction in the early years.  Despite the fact that these institutions were intended for military operations that were separate from American strategic interests, U.S. officials perceived alternative European arrangements as threats to NATO, and viewed institutional competition as “zero sum.”[7]  The simultaneous enlargement of NATO was therefore convenient, as it allowed the U.S. to increase the transatlantic caucus within NATO, but also to weaponize the dependency of the new NATO members states so they would resist these initiatives.[8]

Why did the U.S. pursue these ambitious policies concurrently?  As noted by various officials, the apparatus was fundamentally Eurocentric and Americans were used to “running the show.”[9]  In the more constrained circumstances of the Cold War, the rush to expand the institution and its geographic scope would not have been possible. Yet with a vastly weakened Russia, a not yet ascendant China, and a divided Europe, the U.S. had free reign in post-Cold War Europe.  NATO enlargement was particularly seen in terms of a “closing window,” which was only available as long as Russia was weak.[10]  After the 1990s, U.S. priorities began shifting away from Europe, not only due to the post-9/11 conflicts, but because U.S. officials largely considered the process of consolidation of a Europe “whole and free” as complete and self-sustaining.[11]

The consequences of these policies toward Europe have become apparent, as successive U.S. administrations have become increasingly preoccupied with other developments, specifically the rise of China.  While the U.S. retains forces in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region, in various ways it is signaling that it is no longer capable of upholding its commitments.  The 2018 National Defense Strategy reduced the defense planning assumptions from the objective in previous documents over the past twenty years to be able to fight in multiple regions simultaneously to the current ability to fight one war at a time against a great power.[12]  Given that China is increasingly being framed as the existential threat to U.S. interests,[13]  if the choice for US officials is between the Baltics and Taiwan, the outlook for Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius is unpromising.[14]  Nor does addressing deterrence gaps through increased nuclear flexibility, as proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Proliferation Review,[15] comfort European allies. In fact, at the time when decisions on enlargement were made, little thought seems to have been given to the military consequences of the expanded commitments.[16]

Europe’s options are limited.  Kimberley Marten argues that Russia’s turn away from the West was overdetermined, and cannot be reduced to primarily enlargement.[17]  In turn, Alexander Lanoszka believes that the defense problems in Europe are manageable.[18]  Yet, it is clear that while the geographic reach of the alliance were being expanded, the armed forces of its European member states were becoming less capable of providing the deterrence that appealed to former Warsaw Pact countries. At the very least, the current situation constrains U.S. freedom of action should it want to shift resources towards the Asia-Pacific.  U.S. criticism of uneven burden sharing and “cheap riding,” particularly by Western European allies, is partly justified.[19]  Still, the U.S. actively discourages European efforts to improve their autonomous capabilities, and the security benefits of NATO membership shifted east even though the costs remained ostensibly equal for all member states.[20]  The Western European states that can afford to bolster deterrence have less incentive to do so, while the Central and Eastern European states that want deterrence have limited resources.

Unless they rapidly build their own capabilities, the Europeans now face the risk that they will become entangled in U.S. policies in the Asia-Pacific, as they previously were in Afghanistan and Iraq, simply to ensure continued U.S. commitment to European security. The situation would arguably have been better for both Americans and Europeans had NATO remained focused on its core military costs while the Europeans were encouraged to take on additional crisis management tasks.  The painful truth is that rapid NATO enlargement, combined with other key post-Cold War American policies, stretched the formula that had made NATO so successful to or beyond its breaking point.

This essay was originally published on October 19th 2020 and is part of the H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Roundtable XII-1 on NATO Expansion in Retrospect.

References

[3] See for an elaborate discussion on these benefits of enlargement. Alexander Lanoszka, “Thank Goodness for  NATO Enlargement,” International Politics 57 (2020): 451–470. See also Joshua R. Shifrinson, “NATO Enlargement and US Foreign Policy: The Origins, Durability, and Impact of an Idea,” International Politics 57:3 (2020): 358–359.

[4] George H.W. Bush, “A Europe Whole and Free” (Mainz, May 1989), https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm.  In interviews with the author, officials repeatedly characterized the process as one of consolidation. Paul van Hooft, “Land Rush: American Grand Strategy, NATO Enlargement, and European Fragmentation,” International Politics 57:3 (2020): 530–553.

[5] The shift began as early as the 1990 NATO summit in London, but culminated in a new strategic concept by the end of the decade.  NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.,” 24 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm.

[6] Van Hooft, “Land Rush,” 545–547; Sara Bjerg Moller, “Twenty Years after: Assessing the Consequences of Enlargement for the NATO Military Alliance,” International Politics 57:3 (2020): 515–516; Theo Farrell and Sten Rynning, “NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 33:5 (2010): 673–674; Kaija Schilde, “European Military Capabilities: Enablers and Constraints on EU Power?,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55:1 (2017): 37–353.

[7] Van Hooft, “Land Rush,” 539–540; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Eastbound and down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992,” Journal of Strategic Studies, online 1 April 2020; Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019): 234–35; Kori Schake, “NATO after the Cold War, 1991–1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative,” Contemporary European History 7:3 (1998): 379–407.

[8] The 2002-2003 transatlantic clash over the Iraq War. Van Hooft, “Land Rush,” 543.

[9] Van Hooft, 539–40; see also Shifrinson, “NATO Enlargement and US Foreign Policy,” 353–54.

[10] Van Hooft, “Land Rush,” 533–534.

[11] Van Hooft, “Land Rush,” 542.

[12] Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2018); https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

[13] Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy.  The Indo-Pacific is “the single most consequential region for America’s future.” Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (June 2019); https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

[14] See recent work on the possibility for opportunism by either Russia or China in case of escalation in either Europe or Asia. Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great Power Competition,” Texas National Security Review 2:3 (2020); Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Opportunistic Aggression in the Twenty-First Century,” Survival 62:4 (2020): 157–182.

[15] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (February 2018); https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx.

[16] Van Hooft, “Land Rush,” 543.

[17] Kimberly Marten, “NATO Enlargement: Evaluating Its Consequences in Russia,” International Politics 57:3 (2020): 1–26.

[18] Lanoszka, “Thank Goodness for NATO Enlargement,” 464–465.

[19] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior US Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95:4 (2016): 70; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014): 33, 35, 44.

[20] See an early critique of this problem. Joseph Lepgold, “NATO’s Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem,” International Security 23:1 (1998): 78-106.

“The world is badly under-prepared for even modest biological threats, leaving us vulnerable to potentially huge impacts on individual lives, societal well-being, economic activity and national security. Revolutionary new biotechnologies promise miraculous advances, but also create daunting challenges of oversight and control.” – World Economic Forum 

De moordaanslag op Navalny, het meervoudige gebruik van chemische wapens in Syrië, de recentelijke brand in een Russisch biologisch lab - dergelijke incidenten zijn weliswaar onwaarschijnlijk, maar in potentie hebben ze een gigantische impact. Hoe goed is Nederland hierop voorbereid? In dit rapport analyseren Paul Sinning, Stephan de Spiegeleire en Frank Bekkers actuele biologische en chemische dreigingen en of de Nederlandse B/C-kennisinfrastructuur in het licht van deze dreigingen voldoet.

Download het rapport.

Het verleden toont aan dat zowel de chemische als de biologische dreiging reëel is. Daarnaast is er momenteel sprake van een aanzienlijke drempelverlaging op dit gebied: de technische en praktische waarschijnlijkheid van B/C-aanslagen is de laatste jaren alleen maar toegenomen.  

De huidige kennis over B/C-strijdmiddelen en de organisatie hiervan kent diverse tekortkomingen. Gelukkig hebben er in Nederland nauwelijks noemenswaardige incidenten met B/C-middelen plaatsgevonden. De keerzijde hiervan is dat dit de Nederlandse casuïstiek weinig houvast biedt op de vraag of in Nederland sprake is van een acceptabel basisniveau van kennis en of deze kennis in de praktijk zijn waarde heeft bewezen.

Tegen deze achtergrond maakt het rapport de volgende aanbevelingen:

1. Neem het thema ‘CBRN’ op in de nationale risicobeoordeling;
2. Programmeer een nationale B/C-strategie;
3. Formuleer een gemeenschappelijk afwegingskader voor de prioritering van de kennisinfrastructuur;
4. Richt kennissturing op systeemniveau in;
5. Organiseer het overdragen en delen van kennis naar en tussen first responders
6. Investeer in een integrale kostenbewuste benadering van nationale risico’s

Download het rapport.

Het wordt nog altijd gezien als de machtigste persoon op aarde: De president van de Verenigde Staten. Maar hoe groot is die macht nu echt? Wat zijn andere belangrijke machtsfactoren in Washington D.C.? Wat heeft Donald Trump de afgelopen jaren gedaan om de macht zoveel mogelijk naar zich toe te trekken? En hoe moet een land als Nederland zich naar de president opstellen, om dingen gedaan te krijgen?

In deze extra lange aflevering van De Strateeg bespreekt Paul van Liempt dat met een vader en zijn zoon: Frans Verhagen houdt zich al veertig jaar met Amerika bezig en schreef er talloze boeken over. Zijn zoon Paul Verhagen is data-analist bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies en houdt zich daar ook bezig met Amerikaanse binnenlandse politiek. Samen schreven zij een onlangs gepubliceerd boek: Het Amerikaanse Presidentschap.

Over deze podcast:

De Strateeg verschijnt eens in de twee weken. Abonneer je via bnr.nl/destrateeg om geen enkele aflevering te missen.

Host: Paul van Liempt

Redactie: Diederik de Groot

Tips, vragen of andere opmerkingen over De Strateeg? Stuur dan een mailtje naar diederik.de.groot@bnr.nl

• Luister aflevering 1 hier terug: “Ethisch zijn, of blijven leven?”
• Luister aflevering 2 hier terug: “Oorlog in de toekomst, doet de mens nog mee?”
• Luister aflevering 3 hier terug: “Je gezondheid, of je rechten?”
• Luister aflevering 4 hier terug: “Een crisis in een crisis”.
• Luister aflevering 5 hier terug: "De coronacrisis in het groot"
• Luister aflevering 6 hier terug: “Killerrobots, feit of fictie”
• Luister aflevering 7 hier terug: "Een cyberramp: voorkomen in plaats van genezen"
• Luister aflevering 8 hier terug: "Mag Vladimir Poetin komen shoppen in Hengelo?"
• Luister aflevering 9 hier terug: "Een pandemie van desinformatie"
• Luister aflevering 10 hier terug: "Zorgt corona straks voor natte voeten"
• Luister aflevering 11 hier terug: "Beslist corona de strijd om wereldheerschappij?"
• Luister aflevering 12 hier terug: "Hoe cyberdreiging ons leven kan ontwrichten"
• Luister aflevering 13 hier terug: "De Zuid-Chinese Zee" niet goedschiks, dus kwaadschiks"
• Luister aflevering 14 hier terug: "Als Bangkok onder water loopt"
• Luister aflevering 15 hier terug: "Covid-19, een gouden kans voor dictators"
• Luister aflevering 16 hier terug: "Verpest China de Amerikaans-Europese vriendschap?"
• Luister aflevering 17 hier terug: "De catastrofe die 'op eigen houtje' heet"

Welcome to your Weekly HCSS Digest, informing you of everything our Strategic Analysts and Subject Matter Experts have to say this week on geopolitics, global challenges and international security issues worldwide.

The strategic threats of the future are increasingly hybrid: military assets and cyber operations, influencing strategies and economic sanctions are deployed in an orchestrated manner – pioneered by Russia. How can the Royal Netherlands Army best respond to this? Read the recommendations by Rob de Wijk, Frank Bekkers and Tim Sweijs in our latest report on hybrid threats and hybrid war.

The Dutch Ministry of Defense presented the new Defense Vision 2035 this week, in which they look ahead 15 years to prepare for the fight of the future. What are the threats to our peace and security? And how should our armed forces respond to this, now and in the coming years? In a short preview, Tim Sweijs, HCSS Director of Research, stressed the importance of the new vision: “The security of the Netherlands and its allies is at stake. The Dutch Defense organization faces a major challenge to continue to protect Dutch interests and values in the years to come.”

The battle is on between Biden and Trump, but why aren't there more parties in USofA? Compared to the Netherlands, where there is a political party in every flavor, the choice between two extremes in the States seems rather limited. NPO Radio 1 show “Fris!” thought it was time for some clarification on how this came to be, and HCSS data scientist and expert on US politics Paul Verhagen is just the man to do so.

And if you’re thirsty for more, on this weekend’s episode of De Strateeg, our podcast with BNR, we’re offering a double dose of Verhagen: you can hear the dynamic duo of Frans ánd Paul Verhagen discussing US politics and the upcoming elections.

Meet the Verhagens, this Sunday morning on BNR Nieuwsradio, the BNR app, Spotify and/or Apple Podcasts!

Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh: these are all conflicts involving Russia and Turkey. But Erdogan and Putin respect each other and avoid escalation. The reason? Shared anti-Western feelings, says Rob de Wijk in his new column for Trouw.

HCSS Subject Matter Expert Friso Stevens wrote a peer-reviewed article in Asian Perspective, published by Johns Hopkins University Press: “The Great War Analogy and the Sino-American Security Dilemma: Foreboding or Fallacious?” 

In other news…. How can we try to solve water-related conflicts? Kitty van der Heijden, the head of international cooperation at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, adds her voice in explaining why the Netherlands is the main supporter of the WPS partnership. Listen to the World Resources podcast series 'Big Ideas Into Action’ on Soundcloud.

HCSS is hiring, part 1: the HCSS Data lab offers an exciting internship to aspiring data scientists. Our data internship is an opportunity for hands-on experience in developing production-grade, early warning, causal discovery, and policy recommender system – check out the details here.

HCSS is hiring, part 2: Solving complex policy challenges, HCSS is developing some of the most advanced real-world policy applications. In collaboration with the leading universities in the Netherlands, we are further strengthening our Data lab’s capability and competencies. To this end, we are inviting ambitious hopefuls to apply for a PhD role in applied data science. Our PhD role is intended to bridge the gap between the data science and conflict modeling communities.

With the second lockdown in effect in the Netherlands, we don’t expect to see many of you in person soon, as working from home is once again the norm. However, should you take a walk in the centre of The Hague, you shouldn’t skip the beautiful Lange Voorhout, the most beautiful lane in Holland: from the 17th of October til the 9th of November, there will be a free (outside) exposition right in front of our building, celebrating 75 Years of the United Nations.

And finally: Birthday Time! Congratulations to Assistant Analyst Jens Emmer, who will be celebrating his birthday tomorrow – have a great day, all within the current Covid guidelines, of course!