Critical Materials Minerals and Metals

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Starting period: Earliest mid February – latest beginning of March 2026 

Deadline application: Sunday January 4, 2026 at 12pm 

HCSS is looking for new interns to start in February 2026! The HCSS internship offers an excellent springboard for future careers in a wide range of fields, interns are involved as full-fledged team members in research-projects. Activities can range from conducting background research, data collection and analysis, co-writing reports and papers, administrative support, to being involved in the organisation of workshops and conferences. This way, interns gain valuable work experience in a professional environment, which helps them in their future development and careers in both the public and private sector. Also, the HCSS internship offers the opportunity to build and expand your professional network. 

Want to know more about the experience of HCSS general interns? Look out for the HCSS Internship Blogs entries from our current and previous interns!

Requirements

Candidates should have a first rate academic background, strong transferable skills, and a keen interest in the topics covered by HCSS research.

Further requirements include:

• A strong basis of analytical, writing and synthesising skills
• Ability to think creatively and out-of-the-box
• Very good communication skills in English, both orally and in writing
• Knowledge of advanced internet search strategies
• Ability to work independently in a fast-paced environment
• Flexibility and ability to multi-task
• Positive professional attitude
• Strong work ethic and willingness to learn
• Some quantitative research skills (preferable)

The following attributes are considered a strong asset:

• Prior work or internship experience
• Proficiency in Dutch, Arabic or other languages
• Being a native English speaker
• Quantitative research skills. If you have a background in data science (specifically R or Python) you may also be interested in our Data Internship.

Eligibility  

• Candidates must be enrolled as a student at a university during the whole internship period.
• An internship period of six months is highly preferred, although shorter periods can be discussed (minimum is 5 months). Please indicate your availability in your cover letter. Interns should be able to commit to working 40 hours a week, in person at our office in The Hague.
• If successful in obtaining a position, candidates are asked to provide a certificate of good conduct (‘Verklaring Omtrent het Gedrag’), available from the Dutch Ministry of Justice. Candidates residing outside of the Netherlands should provide a certificate from their country of residence.

You are not eligible for HCSS internships when

• You are not a registered student at the time of the intership’s start and for the entire duration of the internship
• You are not eligible if you have more than 8 hours of class per week to attend during the internship

Frequently asked questions:

Can I apply if I am no longer a student (recently graduated)? HCSS internships are for enrolled students. Without a proof of enrollment, valid for the entire duration of the internship, you are not eligible. Your application will not be considered.

Is it possible to do a part-time internship? HCSS does not offer part–time internships within the General Internship Program for a work week under 32 hours.

Can HCSS provide me with a permit/visa? HCSS does not offer the option to sponsor your Dutch permit or visa. The applicant needs to already be in possession of a valid permit/visa.

Application Procedure

To apply, send the following items to internship@hcss.nl, using ‘General Internship /2026’ as the subject line.

• A curriculum vitae, including a list of references
• A cover letter
• Proof of university enrollment, valid for the entire duration of the internship
• Copy of official transcript of academic grades
• A one-page writing sample (excluding bibliography if relevant) answering one of the following questions:

1. Consider a trend which could affect the security of the Netherlands in the next decade. What is being done to address the issue? What more could be done?
2. Consider a way in which the Netherlands could exercise more effective foreign policy without increasing military expenditure. What are the advantages and limitations of this approach?
3. Consider a policy which could help the eurozone improve its competitiveness. What are the advantages and limitations of this policy?

Notes regarding the application procedure:

• Please ensure that your application is complete before sending it in. Providing a list of references with contact details as part of your CV (at least two) is a mandatory requirement- we will not request them at a later stage.
• The whole application should be written in English, including the writing sample and CV.
• Please apply only if you are available for the above-mentioned start date. HCSS recruits interns on a bi-annual basis; later start dates will be announced in due time.
• All the documents should be submitted in one single PDF file, titled Name Surname_HCSS General Internship Application. 

Practical Information

The HCSS internship is paid: € 675,- per month. Our internships take place in person at our office in The Hague.

HCSS only considers candidates that submit a complete application and fulfill all eligibility requirements. Successful applicants will be invited for an interview. The interviews will take place 2-3 weeks after the closing of the vacancy. Applications are NOT reviewed on a rolling basis, but all together after the vacancy has closed. 

At HCSS, we firmly believe in prioritising qualifications and skills when making hiring decisions, without any discrimination based on personal characteristics such as race, religion, gender, age, disability, and sexual orientation.     

One year after Mario Draghi’s landmark report on Europe’s economic future, HCSS launches the second edition of its Draghi Report Series – Draghi Revisited.

Despite political attention, Europe still struggles with dependencies in defence, raw materials, cleantech, and digital domains. Global tensions with both China and the US are mounting, and Europe’s trade model faces unprecedented pressure. Progress has been uneven and often too slow due to coordination, financing and other internal barriers.

Last year, Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak examined the long-term implications of Draghi’s recommendations. Their work earned them an invitation to the European Commission’s high-level conference marking the report’s anniversary, where they now return to assess how far Europe has come in addressing Draghi’s urgent call to secure industrial, technological and economic sovereignty.

Many of the sectors mentioned in Mario Draghi’s “The future of European competitiveness” touch directly on research areas of HCSS. In this new series, HCSS experts revisit Draghi’s warnings sector by sector, looking back at the concrete steps the EU has taken.

Since the publication of the Draghi Report, what concrete steps have been taken at the EU and member state level in this sector, and how effective have they been so far? Where do the biggest gaps lie between political ambition and practical implementation, and why do they exist? Looking ahead, what should be the EU’s top two or three priorities to stay competitive, and where might it make sense to scale back? If we meet again in a year, what single measurable outcome would convince you that Europe is on the right track in this sector?

The individual expert commentaries can also be read online:

• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Semiconductors – by Benedetta Girardi
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Automotive – by Ron Stoop
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Critical Raw Materials – by Irina Patrahau and Michel Rademaker
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Defence – by Davis Ellison
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Energy – by Lucia van Geuns and Jilles van den Beukel
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Artificial Intelligence – by Sofia Romansky and Jesse Kommandeur
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Clean Technologies – by Irina Patrahau, Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Energy-Intensive Industries by Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Conclusion – by Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak

The HCSS Draghi Revisited Report Series interviews were conducted and edited throughout September 2025 by Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak.

One year after Mario Draghi’s landmark report on Europe’s economic future, HCSS launches the second edition of its Draghi Report Series – Draghi Revisited.

Despite political attention, Europe still struggles with dependencies in defence, raw materials, cleantech, and digital domains. Global tensions with both China and the US are mounting, and Europe’s trade model faces unprecedented pressure. Progress has been uneven and often too slow due to coordination, financing and other internal barriers.

Last year, Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak examined the long-term implications of Draghi’s recommendations. Their work earned them an invitation to the European Commission’s high-level conference marking the report’s anniversary, where they now return to assess how far Europe has come in addressing Draghi’s urgent call to secure industrial, technological and economic sovereignty.

Many of the sectors mentioned in Mario Draghi’s “The future of European competitiveness” touch directly on research areas of HCSS. In this new series, HCSS experts revisit Draghi’s warnings sector by sector, looking back at the concrete steps the EU has taken.

Since the publication of the Draghi Report, what concrete steps have been taken at the EU and member state level in this sector, and how effective have they been so far? Where do the biggest gaps lie between political ambition and practical implementation, and why do they exist? Looking ahead, what should be the EU’s top two or three priorities to stay competitive, and where might it make sense to scale back? If we meet again in a year, what single measurable outcome would convince you that Europe is on the right track in this sector?

The individual expert commentaries can also be read online:

• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Semiconductors – by Benedetta Girardi
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Automotive – by Ron Stoop
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Critical Raw Materials – by Irina Patrahau and Michel Rademaker
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Defence – by Davis Ellison
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Energy – by Lucia van Geuns and Jilles van den Beukel
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Artificial Intelligence – by Sofia Romansky and Jesse Kommandeur
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Clean Technologies – by Irina Patrahau, Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Energy-Intensive Industries by Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak
• Draghi Revisited Report Series | Conclusion – by Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak

The HCSS Draghi Revisited Report Series interviews were conducted and edited throughout September 2025 by Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak.

Last year, strategic analysts Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak examined the long-term implications of the recommendations from the much anticipated “Draghi Report” on Europe’s economic future, in a series of interviews with our experts.

Now, one year later, we return to assess how far Europe has come in addressing Mario Draghi’s urgent call to secure its industrial, technological and economic sovereignty. Over the past few weeks, a range of experts and analysts working at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) have provided deep dives into Draghi’s warnings, sector by sector.

For this final Draghi Revisited instalment, series editors Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak recap these new sectorial deep dives, to assess how far Europe has come in addressing the urgent call to secure its industrial, technological and economic sovereignty — and how far it still has to go.

One year after the publication of the Draghi report, progress on EU competitiveness remains uneven across sectors as well as limited overall. While significant new policy initiatives have been launched, such as the Competitiveness Compass and the Clean Industrial Deal, and the implementation of the CHIPS Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act are ongoing, Europe faces persistent problems with slow and fragmented implementation. Our HCSS experts have identified the developments and shortfalls of EU competitiveness on a sectoral level as they stand a year after Draghi’s publication.

Automotive

Europe’s automotive sector has undergone a turbulent year since the Draghi Report. While EV sales continue to rise and some European carmakers, notably Volkswagen and BMW, are advancing their electric transition, the pressure from Chinese automakers is mounting. According to our expert Ron Stoop, the EU’s tariff response to the influx of Chinese EVs has had mixed effects, partly because Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles (PHEV) were excluded, enabling continued growth of Chinese imports. At the same time, lobbying efforts to weaken emission targets and the 2035 combustion-engine ban threatens to slow Europe’s shift toward electric mobility. Looking ahead, the EU must hold firm on emissions policy, accelerate charging-infrastructure rollout and prioritise decarbonisation of corporate fleets with “buy European” provisions to secure industrial benefits. Real progress over the next year will depend on whether European carmakers truly pivot away from internal combustion engines and prove competitive in global EV markets.

Semiconductors

The EU invested in strengthening its semiconductor industry by installing the Chips Act and creating a Semiconductor Coalition to improve coordination between the Member States. These initiatives increased coordination and alignment of research and aimed to support public-private cooperation to boost Europe’s semiconductor economy. However, real measurable progress remains limited. Major projects have had to be cancelled or suspended due to cost pressures and regulatory constraints. Examples are semiconductor fabs in Germany and Poland planned by Intel. As our expert Benedetta Girardi noted, funding gaps and labour shortages also continue to undermine Europe’s ability to compete on a global scale. Private investment remains inadequate and permitting processes are too slow to attract sizeable new manufacturing capacity. The EU should prioritise streamlining its regulatory systems and improving labour availability. In addition, it should find ways to mobilise joint funding mechanisms with national and private partners to improve the business environment for high-tech manufacturing companies.

Critical Raw Materials

The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) set out ambitious targets for European self-sufficiency and trade diversification. However, as our experts Irina Patrahau and Michel Rademaker pointed out, the level of implementation of these targets remains largely dependent on national level action, lacking concrete EU-wide steps. Individual Member States such as France and Germany host specific strategic CRM projects, but EU-level financing and coordination mechanisms remain insufficient. High costs and slow permitting processes, as well as local opposition, continue to impede progress. Recycling capacity and other circular economy investments show some growth, but still far below what Europe needs. The EU should focus on further accelerating strategic projects that it already identified under the CRMA, as well as introduce financial incentives to attract more developers. This should be combined with the development of shared stockpiling and refining capacities at the European level. Without these measures, the EU risks deepening its dependence on external suppliers.

Energy

While the EU has made some progress on energy diversification and reducing its import dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the fundamental challenges highlighted in Draghi’s report remain. As our experts Lucia van Geuns and Jilles van den Beukel observed, the combination of high energy costs with fragmented state-aid limit European competitiveness. A lack of market integration across the EU plays a major role. Several important initiatives such as collective procurement have been slow to materialise. Desired reforms in the electricity market and investments in the power grid lag behind as well. With the upcoming electricity market reform in 2026, the EU must focus on improved integration of the power grid and stabilising energy prices for industrial use. Additionally, it could promote incentives for long-term purchase-power agreements (PPAs). Ultimately, Europe’s competitiveness and decarbonisation goals are interdependent. Both require an integrated approach rather than competing national schemes, which is why Europe-wide coordination is specifically important for these sectors.

Clean Technologies

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) and Clean Industrial Deal represent the EU’s most ambitious attempts so far to improve the conditions for a competitive cleantech ecosystem. However, as our experts Irina Patrahau, Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak noted, the transition from planning to measurable results has continued to progress slowly. Europe remains heavily dependent on imports for solar panels, batteries and electrolysers. Domestic production capacity upscaling is met by high costs and regulatory complexity. Permitting processes have improved, but in practice the development of new capabilities still lack speed. Moreover, grid congestion has grown into one of the main bottlenecks for industrial electrification, hampering the rollout of cleantech manufacturing. To stay competitive, Europe must focus on improving such infrastructure for the cleantech industry and shift its focus onto (sub)sectors where it still has capabilities to act. These sectors include wind power, grid infrastructure and possibly next-generation batteries. In addition, implementation of the NZIA should be done in a way that includes better guarantees for grid access and fast-track permitting. It should also focus on a coordinated state-aid framework to translate these plans into actual investments.

Energy-Intensive Industries (EII)

Energy-intensive industries, such as steel, chemicals, cement and plastics are at the core of any industrial base, including for Europe. Decarbonisation is essential for these industries to remain their license to operate and become fit for the future. However, despite the Clean Industrial Deal and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), progress on decarbonisation is still lacklustre. As our experts Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak argued, high industrial energy prices and a lack of consistent demand for low-carbon EII-products are the main problem, continuing to delay the necessary investment decisions. Projects in green steel and sustainable chemicals have been postponed, and national subsidy schemes remain uncoordinated across the EU. This complicates levelling the playing field for industrial companies within the EU. The top priority for the EU should therefore be to lower and stabilise industrial power prices and improve the investment climate for energy infrastructure companies.

Artificial Intelligence

Europe has shifted from a purely regulatory approach to more investment-driven steps on AI through the AI Continent Action Plan and InvestAI initiative. As our experts Sofia Romansky and Jesse Kommandeur noted, the new framework represents meaningful progress with plans to mobilise up to €200 billion in AI investment. In addition, the goal is to establish 15 AI Factories across Member States. As it is still in its early phases, adoption for now remains low: only around 13.5% of European enterprises have actively integrated AI into operations. Fragmented regulation as well as skills shortages and limited access to the necessary infrastructure and computing power create practical obstacles for the uptake of AI. The EU should now focus on applied AI within sectors that grant it a comparative advantage, such as manufacturing and healthcare. At the same time, simplifying regulatory standards for SMEs and investing in education can help improve the entrepreneurial climate and close the skills gap.

Defence

Since the Draghi Report, EU defence efforts have mostly advanced earlier reforms rather than breaking new ground. The exception was the ReArm/Readiness 2030 plan, but in terms of substance it was more of a continuation of the 2022 ‘big bang’ defence reforms after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to our defence expert Davis Ellison, despite these developments, fragmentation and nationally driven procurement persist. These bottlenecks have pushed EU states toward fast U.S. purchases that in the long run can weaken Europe’s industrial base. EU-wide ambition currently outstrips EU competences because defence remains largely national and exempt from EU single-market rules. Priorities now should include deeper cross-border capability development, streamlined governance between DG DEFIS and the EDA and closer NATO coordination. One of the key objectives of EU defence policy rationalisation would be the unifying of defence agencies and initiatives such as PESCO, EDF and ReArm into one coherent pan-European framework. This would increase coordination, effective decision-making and would prevent conflicts of interest and the doubling of efforts between EU bodies.

Conclusion

Europe’s central competitiveness challenge remains effective implementation. Policy frameworks are being developed, which is a good step and part of the answer to Draghi’s report. The next step is to overcome the constraints on progress caused by fragmented national execution, lack of funds and slow decision-making. The EU has set ambitious targets and is rolling out the policies to make those happen but struggles to translate them into industrial outcomes. As Draghi’s report emphasised, European competitiveness requires more scale, speed and coordination.

To move forward, the EU and its Member States must accelerate permitting and scale up funding to improve the delivery speed of strategic projects, particularly for clean energy, infrastructure and strategic industries such as semiconductors. In addition, they should expand financing models that allow the EU to leverage private funding to enable large-scale investment projects and ensure more stability for the industrial players. More finance needs to be directed towards priority sectors where Europe has potential for technological leadership.

One year after the Draghi Report, Draghi’s diagnosis still largely stands. Europe knows what to do but has failed to set the market conditions to realise its ambitions. Without addressing these problems, the EU risks staying a regulatory power instead of than an industrial one; capable of setting rules, but not of competing in the global economy.

Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak, November 19, 2025

For the full sector instalments of the Draghi Revisited Series please check out the Landing Page, where the entire series can also be downloaded as a PDF:

In an article for Les Annales des Mines, HCSS strategic advisor Peter Handley examines how the EU’s efforts to reduce strategic dependencies — from energy to defence — have paradoxically coincided with rising import reliance. As China tightens export controls and the US races ahead with industrial policy, Handley argues that Europe must urgently shift from awareness to action to secure critical raw materials — and with them, its strategic autonomy.

In Les Annales des Mines’ latest edition, Réalités Industrielles: Les métaux stratégiques, nouveau défi de la transition énergétique et de la réindustrialisation, HCSS strategic advisor Peter Handley analyses the evolution of the European Union’s strategic dependencies — and its growing urgency to address them.

Since Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission first championed “strategic autonomy” in 2019, the EU has made important strides to secure its access to critical raw materials (CRMs), launching the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in 2024 and a series of major defence and industrial initiatives in 2025. Yet, as Handley argues, Europe’s dependency has not fallen — it has deepened. The EU remains nearly 90% import-dependent for critical materials, many of which are refined almost entirely in China.

This dependency is no longer theoretical. Recent Chinese export controls on gallium, graphite, and rare earths have exposed how fragile Europe’s supply chains truly are — with direct implications not only for the green and digital transitions, but also for defence and security.

Handley highlights the EU’s response: from the Readiness 2030 and ReArm Europe defence initiatives, to the establishment of an EU Critical Raw Material Centre and the proposed European Competitiveness Fund. Together, these measures represent Europe’s most ambitious attempt yet to build resilience and secure supply.

But ambition must be matched by urgency. As the United States and China move decisively to dominate global supply chains, the EU risks falling behind unless it acts with equal boldness.

Handley concludes with a warning — and a call to action: Europe must move from strategy to execution, pooling public and private power to secure its industrial future. Strategic autonomy, he writes, is no longer a vision. It is a necessity.

📖 Read the full edition of Les Annales des Mines here:

In an article for Les Annales des Mines, HCSS strategic advisor Peter Handley examines how the EU’s efforts to reduce strategic dependencies — from energy to defence — have paradoxically coincided with rising import reliance. As China tightens export controls and the US races ahead with industrial policy, Handley argues that Europe must urgently shift from awareness to action to secure critical raw materials — and with them, its strategic autonomy.

In Les Annales des Mines’ latest edition, Réalités Industrielles: Les métaux stratégiques, nouveau défi de la transition énergétique et de la réindustrialisation, HCSS strategic advisor Peter Handley analyses the evolution of the European Union’s strategic dependencies — and its growing urgency to address them.

Since Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission first championed “strategic autonomy” in 2019, the EU has made important strides to secure its access to critical raw materials (CRMs), launching the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in 2024 and a series of major defence and industrial initiatives in 2025. Yet, as Handley argues, Europe’s dependency has not fallen — it has deepened. The EU remains nearly 90% import-dependent for critical materials, many of which are refined almost entirely in China.

This dependency is no longer theoretical. Recent Chinese export controls on gallium, graphite, and rare earths have exposed how fragile Europe’s supply chains truly are — with direct implications not only for the green and digital transitions, but also for defence and security.

Handley highlights the EU’s response: from the Readiness 2030 and ReArm Europe defence initiatives, to the establishment of an EU Critical Raw Material Centre and the proposed European Competitiveness Fund. Together, these measures represent Europe’s most ambitious attempt yet to build resilience and secure supply.

But ambition must be matched by urgency. As the United States and China move decisively to dominate global supply chains, the EU risks falling behind unless it acts with equal boldness.

Handley concludes with a warning — and a call to action: Europe must move from strategy to execution, pooling public and private power to secure its industrial future. Strategic autonomy, he writes, is no longer a vision. It is a necessity.

📖 Read the full edition of Les Annales des Mines here:

Building resilience through voluntary mineral stockpiles: Supporting the clean tech sector through public-private collaboration

The Netherlands and Europe’s clean tech industries depend on a stable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) such as cobalt, nickel, lithium, and rare earth elements. These materials are increasingly exposed to geopolitical risks and market disruptions.

This new HCSS report by Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop, commissioned by Invest-NL, explores how voluntary, public-private stockpiles could enhance business continuity, sustainability, and strategic autonomy in this vital sector.

Stockpiling — traditionally seen as a national security tool — can also serve economic resilience and sustainable sourcing. The report analyses how public instruments can support private actors in building CRM stockpiles, particularly in the clean tech sector, where companies face rising costs and supply uncertainty. Drawing on data from thirteen Dutch clean-tech companies and seven logistics and recycling stakeholders, it offers a practical framework for establishing voluntary stockpiles in four steps: planning, purchasing, managing, and deploying.

The findings show that while most Dutch clean tech companies currently lack CRM inventories, many see the strategic value of coordinated stockpiling to improve price stability and supply security. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are especially vulnerable to disruptions yet too small to establish individual reserves — making them ideal beneficiaries of co-financed public-private stockpiles.

The Netherlands, with its world-class logistics infrastructure and access to European markets, could serve as a key hub for a Northwestern European or EU-wide CRM stockpile. This would align with EU initiatives like the Preparedness Union Strategy and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), as well as national ambitions to strengthen clean tech manufacturing under the Dutch National Technology Strategy.

The report presents five recommendations for Invest-NL:

1. Support SME scale-up through co-financed voluntary stockpiles.
2. Link stockpiling support to ESG and sustainable sourcing goals.
3. Complement, not duplicate, national security stockpiling programs.
4. Explore regional cooperation with partners such as Germany, Belgium, and France.
5. Expand the approach beyond clean tech to other strategic sectors.

By combining public funding and private flexibility, voluntary stockpiles can strengthen Europe’s industrial resilience, enable sustainable growth, and reduce dependency on volatile global supply chains.

Authors: Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop

Contributors: Michel Rademaker, Lucia van Geuns, Ciaran Cassidy

Review by: Peter Handley

*An updated version of the report was published on Nov. 12^th to reflect more accurate measurement units.

The research was made possible through a grant from Invest-NL to The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).

Invest-NL is the National Promotional Institution of the Netherlands, committed to driving a sustainable and innovative future. We accelerate and finance major societal transitions in the fields of Agrifood, Biobased & Circular Economy, Deep Tech, Energy, and Life Sciences & Health. As a system player, we connect innovative entrepreneurs, financiers, knowledge institutions, and governments—both in the Netherlands and abroad. We remove barriers, mobilise capital, and help develop emerging sectors. Through capital, expertise, and new financial instruments, we invest in tomorrow’s solutions. Where the market hesitates, we take the first step. That is how we create impact.

The authors of the report want to extend their gratitude to Invest-NL team members Xandra Weinbeck and Eva Käller for their feedback.

Building resilience through voluntary mineral stockpiles: Supporting the clean tech sector through public-private collaboration

The Netherlands and Europe’s clean tech industries depend on a stable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) such as cobalt, nickel, lithium, and rare earth elements. These materials are increasingly exposed to geopolitical risks and market disruptions.

A new HCSS report by Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop, commissioned by Invest-NL, explores how voluntary, public-private stockpiles could enhance business continuity, sustainability, and strategic autonomy in this vital sector.

Stockpiling — traditionally seen as a national security tool — can also serve economic resilience and sustainable sourcing. The report analyses how public instruments can support private actors in building CRM stockpiles, particularly in the clean tech sector, where companies face rising costs and supply uncertainty. Drawing on data from thirteen Dutch clean-tech companies and seven logistics and recycling stakeholders, it offers a practical framework for establishing voluntary stockpiles in four steps: planning, purchasing, managing, and deploying.

The findings show that while most Dutch clean tech companies currently lack CRM inventories, many see the strategic value of coordinated stockpiling to improve price stability and supply security. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are especially vulnerable to disruptions yet too small to establish individual reserves — making them ideal beneficiaries of co-financed public-private stockpiles.

The Netherlands, with its world-class logistics infrastructure and access to European markets, could serve as a key hub for a Northwestern European or EU-wide CRM stockpile. This would align with EU initiatives like the Preparedness Union Strategy and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), as well as national ambitions to strengthen clean tech manufacturing under the Dutch National Technology Strategy.

The report presents five recommendations for Invest-NL:

1. Support SME scale-up through co-financed voluntary stockpiles.
2. Link stockpiling support to ESG and sustainable sourcing goals.
3. Complement, not duplicate, national security stockpiling programs.
4. Explore regional cooperation with partners such as Germany, Belgium, and France.
5. Expand the approach beyond clean tech to other strategic sectors.

By combining public funding and private flexibility, voluntary stockpiles can strengthen Europe’s industrial resilience, enable sustainable growth, and reduce dependency on volatile global supply chains.

Authors: Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop

Contributors: Michel Rademaker, Lucia van Geuns, Ciaran Cassidy

Review by: Peter Handley

The research was made possible through a grant from Invest-NL to The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).

Invest-NL is the National Promotional Institution of the Netherlands, committed to driving a sustainable and innovative future. We accelerate and finance major societal transitions in the fields of Agrifood, Biobased & Circular Economy, Deep Tech, Energy, and Life Sciences & Health. As a system player, we connect innovative entrepreneurs, financiers, knowledge institutions, and governments—both in the Netherlands and abroad. We remove barriers, mobilise capital, and help develop emerging sectors. Through capital, expertise, and new financial instruments, we invest in tomorrow’s solutions. Where the market hesitates, we take the first step. That is how we create impact.

The authors of the report want to extend their gratitude to Invest-NL team members Xandra Weinbeck and Eva Käller for their feedback.

A HCSS delegation was present at the 8th edition of the Paris Peace Forum consisting of Deputy Director Michel Rademaker and Strategic Analysts Sofia Romansky and Irina Patrahau. The 2025 forum took place from 29-30 October.

Michel Rademaker at the Paris Peace Forum 2025

The Paris Peace Forum took place with active participation from HCSS – The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Michel Rademaker joined colleagues Sofia Romansky and Irina Patrahau in discussions on the The Global Commission on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (GC REAIM) and Critical Raw Materials.

Sofia Romansky at the Paris Peace Forum 2025 

Last week, the Global Commission on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (GC REAIM), represented by Commissioner Saeed Aldhaheri, Commissioner Bruce Watson, Expert Nayat Sanchez-Pi, and Project Coordinator Sofia Romansky shared the findings and recommendations of the GC REAIM Strategic Guidance Report at the Paris Peace Forum Day 0 Seminar “From disruptive code to restrained conflict: Governing the war-to-peace continuum of emerging technologies“. The GC REAIM members were joined by Ernst Noorman, Ambassador at Large for Cyber Affairs of the Netherlands. 

Kicking off the event with an engaging panel, the discussion that unfolded touched on the many aspects that contribute to the complexity of not only governing AI in the military domain, but also reaping the full range of benefits of this potential technology. Not only does responsible governance involve the balancing of various disciplinary perspectives but also the interests of diver stakeholders. The audience members, consisting of government representatives, members of civil society, and industry asked difficult questions, highlighting the perceived tension between the pace of innovation, especially in contexts of crisis, and how governance seemingly lags behind. However, what the GC REAIM panelists emphasised was that this is exactly why a Responsibility by Design framework is necessary: responsibility must be built into the system before the crisis arises for the reliable and legally compliant deployment of these systems. 

A enormous thank you to Pablo Rice for convening this Seminar, featuring other key initiatives and contributions by the ICRC and Access Now. The Paris Peace Forum is an ideal venue for these urgent conversations.

“Minerals, Governance, and Conflicts” | Irina Patrahau at the Paris Peace Forum 2025 

On the eve of the 8th edition of the Paris Peace Forum, HCSS strategic analyst Irina Patrahau spoke at a pre-event on responsible mineral investment and supply chain resilience.  

Part of a series of partner-led panels, organised by the OECD, Global Witness, and the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, these sessions explore how global and local actors can ensure that the accelerating demand for minerals drives justice, peace, and sustainability rather than conflict or exploitation, convening leading public, private and civil society actors from around the globe under the theme “New Coalitions for Peace, People and the Planet”.  

As global competition for critical minerals intensifies, responsible investment and supply chain resilience are becoming central to both sustainability and security.  

During the panel “Exploring the link between responsible mineral investment in an evolving security landscape and mineral supply chain resilience,” Irina Patrahau joined renowned experts to discuss how investors can strengthen mineral supply chains and stability.  

Panelists: 

• James Megoran, Director of the Global Centre for Peacebuilding and Business 

• Irina Patrahau, Strategic Analyst, HCSS 

• Alan Bryden, Head of Business and Security, DCAF 

• Emmanuel Mali Makumba, Director of Peace and Security, ICGLR 

• Moderation by Louis Maréchal, Senior Advisor, OECD 

Responsible mineral sourcing in conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAs) requires coordinated multistakeholder action, including investor engagement. This session explored the role that investors can have to promote responsible mineral investment in evolving security landscapes. The discussion considered practical instruments or tools that investors can use to support their decision-making process, as well as ongoing initiatives which seek to provide investors with information to manage conflict risks in producing countries.  

Patrahau shared insights from HCSS research on how geopolitical shifts, ESG factors, and data-driven early warning systems can help identify and manage risks in mineral supply chains — ensuring that mining in conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAs) becomes a driver of stability, growth, and resilience, rather than conflict.  

For resource-rich countries, heightened demand offers a strategic opportunity for value creation through increased revenues, job creation, and progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Yet, as demand surges, Energy Transition Minerals (ETMs) have become a key geopolitical asset, exposing supply chains to fragmentation, resource nationalism, and conflicts, as seen with the energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in the DRC, and the profusion of bi-lateral strategic partnerships and agreements to secure mineral supplies. At the same time, the extraction and processing of these minerals remain associated with widespread environmental degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, and persistent human rights abuses. 

At HCSS, Irina chairs the Energy Security and Critical Minerals initiatives within the broader Geoeconomics research pillar. 

🔗 Since 2022, the Paris Peace Forum has played a leading role in advancing international and multistakeholder dialogue on this issue, notably through the establishment of the Global Council for Responsible Transition Minerals. 

Today, the HCSS Datalab proudly presents the Critical Raw Materials Early Navigation (CARMEN) dashboard, a tool developed to help organisations navigate the volatile world of critical raw materials. It brings together near real-time financial, and market data to secure essential materials while minimising exposure to risk.

Watch the explainer video below, or go directly to the CARMEN landing page.

CARMEN is built for policymakers and analysts navigating rising instability, price shocks and sourcing risks by providing an early action dashboard that is based on financial critical raw materials (CRM) data. Today CRMs aren’t just a supply chain issue, they’re central to geopolitics, geo-economics, national resilience and defence.

The tool consists of three components, the Country Risk, Financial Risk, and Secure Supply modules.

In total, CARMEN contains financial data relating to 87 materials from various sourcing countries such as Australia, Brazil and China, which are updated daily.

We invite organisations and governments to discover how CARMEN can enhance strategic CRM planning and decision-making. If you’re interested in our methodological notes, accessing the tool or contributing to its development, please reach out at datalab@hcss.nl.

Discover how CARMEN can strengthen your organisation’s approach to critical raw materials and supply-chain security.

In September, Strategic Analyst Fiona De Cuyper attended the 2025 Arctic Security Conference in Oslo, Norway. The event brought together a diverse group of global participants, including academics, government and business representatives, Indigenous peoples, and locals from northern communities.

This year, the central theme of the conference was “Managing Polarisation and Fragmentation”, with sessions focused on great power competition in the High North, the relevance of Arctic cooperative institutions, the state of conflict in the region, the local aspect of security considerations, and the role of non-Arctic states.

HCSS Analyst Fiona De Cuyper reflects on the discussions and shares her insights from the Arctic Security Conference 2025.

Author: Fiona de Cuyper

Cover photo: Canva

One year after Mario Draghi’s landmark report on Europe’s economic future, HCSS launches the second edition of its Draghi Report Series, where our analysts revisit Draghi’s warnings sector by sector.

Despite political attention, Europe still struggles with dependencies in defence, raw materials, cleantech, and digital domains. Global tensions with both China and the US are mounting, and Europe’s trade model faces unprecedented pressure. Progress has been uneven and often too slow due to coordination, financing and other internal barriers.

Last year, Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak examined the long-term implications of Draghi’s recommendations in a series of interviews with our experts. Now, they return to assess how far Europe has come in addressing his urgent call to secure industrial, technological and economic sovereignty.

For the third article of our Draghi Report Revisited series, strategic analyst Benedetta Girardi takes a closer look at Europe’s semiconductor ambitions.

Since the publication of the Draghi Report, what concrete steps have been taken at the EU and member state level in the semicon sector, and how effective have they been so far?

Benedetta Girardi: Over the past year, the EU has attempted to take concrete measures to advance the Chips Act and boost the Chips Joint Undertaking, especially with the aim of mobilising public-private funding frameworks.  A notable Member States’ initiative is the creation of the Semiconductor Coalition to push coordination on semiconductor matters. These steps have strengthened R&D pilots and improved alignment, but gains have overall been marginal. In 2025, we actually witnessed some harsh setbacks in the semiconductor sector, such as Intel pulling the plug on its planned chip fabs in Germany and Poland. Securing private co-investments has also proven more difficult than what the Draghi report let on last year, as we saw with the suspension of STMicroelectronics and GlobalFoundries’ €5.7 billion plan to build a semiconductor fab in France. Overall I would thus say that despite the push given by the EU to implementation of the Chips Act, the results have been mixed.

Where do the biggest gaps lie between political ambition and practical implementation, and why do they exist?

Benedetta Girardi: I think the examples I mentioned above stress the fundamental gap between ambition and implementation: funding is still scarce and Europe still lags behind in manufacturing with respect to other global giants. In particular, I think the difficulties in securing private funding are evident, and drag the overall efforts down. There is thus a disconnect between the political ambitions of advancing manufacturing in Europe and the actual availability of funds to do so. Labour costs and slow regulatory processes make investment in Europe not as attractive as elsewhere in the world, and this contributes to the overall gap in capabilities.

Looking ahead, what should be the EU’s top two or three priorities to stay competitive, and where might it make sense to scale back?

Benedetta Girardi: First, the EU should focus on boosting investment in the sector by promoting greater alignment between EU, national governments, and the private sector. This might mean having some harsh conversation and making uncomfortable decisions, but it needs to happen to patch up the disconnect between private and public sectors and thus encourage public-private funding. Second, it should invest in creating a skilled workforce with sufficient numbers to actually respond to demand needs on the production processes side. Lastly, the EU should further invest in partnerships with other small and middle powers who are drivers of the sector, such as the ROK and Taiwan. With growing uncertainty related to ‘America First’ policies, the EU needs to look elsewhere than the US to advance its semiconductor industry.

If we meet again in a year, what single measurable outcome would convince you that Europe is on the right track in this sector?

Benedetta Girardi: I will be happy if I see a confirmed final investment decision for a major capital project in Europe (>€10bn) derived by public-private funding and accompanied by an EU-level fast-track coordination mechanism in operation. This would tell me that investments are finally coming in, and that EU bureaucracy and regulations are managed appropriately for such a strategic sector.

Stay tuned for the next issue of our Draghi Revisited Series, where we invite HCSS experts to discuss what Europe has done to clean up its economic and industrial act since the report’s publication one year ago.

Greenland’s critical raw materials (CRM) are attracting global attention. With both a high variety and quantity of CRM, the island holds significant strategic leverage. To capitalise on its current potential and navigate operational, regulatory, and social hurdles, Greenland has launched concrete initiatives to foster sustainable development.  

These initiatives demonstrate an openness to international partnerships, particularly with the EU and the US, which have both deepened ties with Greenland over the past years.  

Assistant Analyst Julie Jeuken and Strategic Analyst Irina Patrahau investigate EU and US bilateral relations with Greenland regarding CRM, comparing policy, commitments, financing tools, and other aspects. The analysis finds that, despite diametrically opposed political and public framing of their engagements, the two actors share similar goals. Both actors aim to reduce their CRM dependency on third countries, such as China, while promoting responsible and ESG-aligned practices in the mining sector.  

However, it also identifies a critical gap; Neither the EU nor the US is currently meeting Greenland’s expectations. So far, both actors have been struggling to move from political promises to concrete investments. Furthermore, contrary to the UK and Canada, neither the EU nor the US has a strong corporate presence within the island’s mining sector. The absence of coordinated transatlantic engagement thus carries a strategic cost. 

This Snapshot proposes a Greenland-centered framework for transatlantic cooperation, aligning EU and US efforts with the island’s ambitions, leveraging renewable energy in mining, and coordinating with countries already active in the sector. The urgency to act is clear, as Greenland has signalled it may turn to alternative partners, such as China, should nothing change.  

Author: Julie Jeuken; Editor: Irina Patrahau

Cover photo: Annie Spratt on Unsplash

One year after Mario Draghi’s landmark report on Europe’s economic future, HCSS launches the second edition of its Draghi Report Series.

Despite political attention, Europe still struggles with dependencies in defence, raw materials, cleantech, and digital domains. Global tensions with both China and the US are mounting, and Europe’s trade model faces unprecedented pressure. Progress has been uneven and often too slow due to coordination, financing and other internal barriers.

Last year, analysts Ron Stoop and Berend Kwak examined the long-term implications of Draghi’s recommendations. Now, they return to assess how far Europe has come in addressing his urgent call to secure industrial, technological and economic sovereignty.

In this new series, HCSS experts revisit Draghi’s warnings sector by sector.

For the second article, strategic analyst Irina Patrahau and deputy director Michel Rademaker take a closer look at the feasibility of the EU’s plans for the Critical Raw Materials (CRM) sector.

Since the publication of the Draghi Report, what concrete steps have been taken at the EU and member state level in the Automotive sector, and how effective have they been so far?

Irina Patrahau: The EU has been working to deliver the ambitions under the Critical Raw Materials Act – negotiating trade agreements with resource rich countries, selecting and promoting strategic projects, and trying to boost stockpiling. The European Commission is creating an enabling framework for companies to make investments and build new supply chains.

The biggest challenge remains cost. So far, the key determinant of whether this enabling framework has led to concrete outcomes is the commitment of national governments to projects. National governments have more leeway than the EU to offer direct investments or indirect financing support to companies, overcoming the initial cost challenge. France is emerging as a rare earths hub within the EU. The first European lithium refinery opened in Germany. It is no coincidence that France and Germany are seeing significant progress. They are also two of the European governments most committed to strengthening mineral supply security, supporting companies both legislatively and with funding.

Unfortunately, this is a short-term solution to a systemic issue. As of now, the effectiveness of the EU’s actions, especially considering the lack of EU funding for mining, processing and recycling, is strongly dependent on member states’ ability to provide credible long-term guarantees to their industry. Moving forward, it is essential for the EU and members to reduce energy costs, introduce non-price criteria for ‘Made in Europe’, and find innovative ways to develop offtake agreements, for instance through stockpiling.

Michel Rademaker: Since the Draghi Report, some CRM projects have been announced, but the progress is modest compared to the scale of Europe’s needs. The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) set ambitious targets, which are unlikely to be met. On paper, there is momentum: 47 strategic projects have been announced in Europe. However, so far it has not resulted in a functioning ‘de-risked’ supply chain, and there is no indication that this will change in the near future. The main critique on the CRMA is that it lacks financial incentives to actually push these projects forward. A few local projects are coming through, but they are modest in scale and more the result of national imperatives than successful EU-level coordination.

A slew of EU legislation and requirements have been announced to buttress the CRM (processing) and downstream industries in Europe. Nevertheless, a lot of basic industries in the EU are seriously struggling because of high energy prices and foreign dumping on the internal market. These developments do not support the development of robust CRM supply chains but will rather depress demand for CRM in Europe, further deteriorating the business case for additional recycling and processing.

Where do the biggest gaps lie between political ambition and practical implementation, and why do they exist?

Irina Patrahau: Progress in building a robust European industry after a long period of neglect is inherently slow – not just when it comes to reopening a mine or building a recycling facility, but also, and especially when it comes to changing mindsets. In Brussels and some major European capitals, the geopolitical risks to economic security are easily translated into the need to invest in the CRM industry. But the urgency is not equally felt in all European countries. Nor is it felt at all the provincial and municipal levels, where many decisions on industrial operations are made. There is still a major gap in understanding the challenge and matching it with the right solution, because geopolitical and geoeconomic risks were not something industry and policymakers had to deal with for a long time. Investing in awareness, education and up-skilling is essential to make the EU future-proof.

Michel Rademaker: The main problems in the European mining industry remain the same. Firstly, permitting remains too slow. We don’t have decades to wait for the first mines to reopen. These frustrations are exacerbated by local opposition and lengthy procedures, stalling key projects. Recycling is still underdeveloped, and downstream demand is lacking. The lack of effective EU coordination for permitting fragmented financing and weak incentives for private investors to provide capital have frustrated progress in the EU. As it stands, Europe is still almost entirely dependent on China for refining rare earths and most other CRM.

Looking ahead, what should be the EU’s top two or three priorities to stay competitive, and where might it make sense to scale back?

Irina Patrahau: Apart from finding systemic solutions to reduce costs and investing in education, which I mentioned above, having a European approach to supply chains is essential for the coming years. There is no need to have 27 lithium refineries or 27 mineral stockpiling systems. Considering the challenge ahead – building resilient supply chains for 34 CRM – the best choice is to combine efforts, taking advantage of each other’s strengths and minimizing relative weaknesses. The Netherlands is a hub for scrap metal, but a lot of it is exported. The answer is not just to build more recycling facilities in the Netherlands. Rather, it is to collaborate with existing and emerging recycling facilities in other countries. This would not just bring more secondary materials for consumption in the EU but also create a business case for emerging recycling plants that may struggle with competitiveness. I cannot overstate the importance of thinking European to enhance supply chain security.

Michel Rademaker: The top priority should be to accelerate projects already in development. The EU-identified strategic projects should receive more support to regain momentum. The second priority should be to strengthen the circular economy. Mandating the use of recycled critical raw materials in batteries and magnets would create significant local demand and scale up urban mining. The third priority is to build strategic stockpiles, as recommended in the Draghi and Letta reports, so that supply shocks cannot paralyze Europe’s industries. Several countries are researching the possibilities, and the EU is preparing plans to do the same, but the speed at which it happens is not fast enough. Strategic stockpiles could be a relatively cheap life insurance in case more strategic raw materials will experience supply disruptions, severely impacting key downstream sectors within the EU.

If we meet again in a year, what single measurable outcome would convince you that Europe is on the right track in this sector?

Irina Patrahau: At least one cross-European mining-refining-production-recycling supply chain with a clear long-term plan to overcome cost challenges and reach commercial operations would be quite convincing to me.

Michel Rademaker: A key indicator for success is the development of projects in the EU itself. There are a few projects set to come online in 2026 in Finland, Germany and France. If these projects become operational, that would provide much needed momentum for the EU.

Stay tuned for the next issue of our Draghi Revisited Series, where we invite HCSS experts to discuss what Europe has done to clean up its economic and industrial act since the report’s publication one year ago.

De energietransitie, digitale technologie en defensie zijn afhankelijk van kritieke grondstoffen (CRM). In een nieuw HCSS-rapport analyseren Irina Patrahau, Lucia van Geuns, Ron Stoop en Julie Jeuken hoe Noord-Holland en Flevoland hun rol kunnen versterken binnen mondiale CRM-toeleveringsketens. De studie schetst kwetsbaarheden, kansen en beleidsopties om de regio veerkrachtiger en duurzamer te maken.

Digitale technologie, gezondheidszorg, defensie en de energietransitie zijn sterk afhankelijk van kritieke grondstoffen (CRM) zoals kobalt, nikkel en zeldzame aardmetalen. Deze mineralen en metalen zijn essentieel voor de Nederlandse en Europese economie, maar de productie ervan is geconcentreerd buiten de EU – vaak in geopolitiek gevoelige landen. Dat maakt de toeleveringsketens kwetsbaar voor verstoringen, zoals zichtbaar werd tijdens de oorlog in Oekraïne en door handelsbeperkingen tussen China en de VS.

In Noord-Holland en Flevoland speelt dit vraagstuk nadrukkelijk. De regio kent een hoog gebruik van CRM via auto’s, machines, windturbines, datacenters en zonneparken. Auto’s bevatten tientallen soorten CRM en de autosector kampt met toeleveringsproblemen door halfgeleider- en magneettekorten. Tegelijkertijd huisvest de regio de meeste windturbines en datacenters van Nederland, beide CRM-intensieve sectoren. Dit vergroot de kwetsbaarheid, maar biedt ook kansen voor circulaire oplossingen.

Hoewel de regio beperkte primaire productiecapaciteit heeft, spelen recycling en circulaire initiatieven een groeiende rol. Bedrijven als TATA Steel en innovatieve recyclingbedrijven dragen bij aan verwerkingscapaciteit. Ook kennisinstellingen en havens versterken dit ecosysteem.

Het rapport Kritieke grondstoffen in Noord-Holland en Flevoland: Op weg naar veerkrachtige toeleveringsketens door Irina Patrahau, Lucia van Geuns, Ron Stoop en Julie Jeuken identificeert vijf mogelijkheden om de regionale veerkracht te vergroten:

1. Ontwerp wind- en zonneparken, datacenters en elektriciteitsnetwerken circulair.
2. Verbeter de circulariteit van auto’s in samenwerking met Europese partners.
3. Ondersteun recyclingbedrijven bij uitbreiding.
4. Verleng de levensduur van machines en elektrische apparaten.
5. Investeer in kennisontwikkeling en innovatie.

Daarnaast benadrukt de studie tien beleidsaanbevelingen, waaronder dialoog met bedrijven, steun aan kennisecosystemen, matchmaking binnen de EU en ruimtelijke ordening voor recyclingfaciliteiten. Omdat CRM-toeleveringsketens mondiaal zijn, moeten regionale inspanningen altijd in een Europese context worden geplaatst.

De provincies Noord-Holland en Flevoland vormen slechts één schakel in de mondiale keten, maar door hun sterke concentratie van CRM-intensieve sectoren en innovatieve ecosystemen kunnen zij een voortrekkersrol spelen in de ontwikkeling van circulaire en veerkrachtige grondstoffenketens. Daarmee dragen ze bij aan leveringszekerheid en duurzaamheid, niet alleen lokaal, maar ook nationaal en Europees.

***

Dit rapport is opgesteld in opdracht van de provincies Noord-Holland, Flevoland en de Metropoolregio Amsterdam. Deze rapportage is het resultaat van onafhankelijk onderzoek. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud ligt volledig bij de auteurs.

Een werkgroep met medewerkers van deze organisaties en van de Amsterdam Economic Board, het Noordzeekanaalgebied en de gemeente Amsterdam fungeerde daarbij als aanspreekpunt voor de onderzoekers. Dat betekent echter niet dat de inhoud van dit rapport per definitie volledig wordt onderschreven door deze organisaties.

Het rapport van HCSS wordt op 24 september 2025 besproken tijdens een workshop met relevante stakeholders. Tijdens die workshop zullen de bevindingen worden besproken en zal worden getracht de aanbevelingen uit het rapport nader te concretiseren. Een verslag met de belangrijkste punten uit deze workshop zal tzt worden gepubliceerd.

The report is also available in English:

Digital technologies, clean energy, healthcare, and defence all depend on critical raw materials (CRM) such as rare earths, cobalt, and gallium. These materials are essential to the Dutch and European economies but face supply risks due to global concentration of production, particularly in China. The energy transition is the main driver of rising CRM demand, while geopolitical tensions—like the war in Ukraine and U.S.-China rivalry—have further exposed vulnerabilities.

The EU and the Netherlands are responding with policies such as the European Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) and the Dutch National Raw Materials Strategy (2022). Regionally, Noord-Holland and Flevoland play a crucial role. The Metropolitan Region Amsterdam (MRA), Port of Amsterdam, and North Sea Canal Area are major industrial and logistical hubs. Amsterdam’s ambition to become fully circular by 2050 underscores the importance of regional contributions to secure resilient supply chains.

The provinces’ CRM use is concentrated in two areas:

1. Automotive and machinery, which use smaller CRM volumes but are widespread.
2. Wind turbines, data centres, and solar parks, which consume large volumes of CRM and are highly concentrated in the region.

China’s export restrictions and dominance in permanent magnets threaten both automotive and renewable energy ambitions. Although the Netherlands cannot be self-sufficient, regional actions can bolster resilience within a European framework.

Recycling is already a strength in Noord-Holland and Flevoland, with numerous companies engaged in urban mining, scrap collection, and processing. The region also benefits from strong infrastructure, large-scale industrial actors like Tata Steel, and an innovative ecosystem of start-ups and research institutes.

The study by Irina Patrahau, Lucia van Geuns, Ron Stoop, and Julie Jeuken identifies five key opportunities for strengthening resilience and sustainability:

1. Ensure new wind parks, solar parks, data centres, and grid infrastructure have circular lifecycles.
2. Enhance automotive circularity in collaboration with EU partners.
3. Support recycling companies to scale and diversify activities.
4. Extend the lifecycle of machinery and electrical appliances.
5. Invest in knowledge, innovation, and skills development.

Policy recommendations include fostering trust-based dialogue between companies and policymakers, streamlining permitting for innovative recycling projects, supporting collaboration between large industry and start-ups, raising public awareness on circularity, and protecting high-environmental-category industrial zones. The report also calls for EU-wide cooperation, matchmaking between recycling firms and downstream industries, and attracting start-ups to the region’s high-tech ecosystem.

In conclusion, Noord-Holland and Flevoland are well positioned to play a leading role in Europe’s transition towards resilient and sustainable CRM supply chains. By leveraging existing industrial strengths, boosting recycling and innovation, and embedding circularity into regional strategies, the provinces can help safeguard Europe’s access to the raw materials needed for the future economy.

***

This report was commissioned by the Dutch provinces of Noord-Holland, Flevoland, and the Metropoolregio Amsterdam. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors.

A working group consisting of staff from these organizations, as well as from the Amsterdam Economic Board, the Noordzeekanaalgebied, and the Municipality of Amsterdam, served as the primary point of contact for the researchers. It should be noted, however, that this does not imply that the contents of the report are necessarily endorsed in full by these organizations.

The HCSS report will be discussed on September 24, 2025, during a workshop with relevant stakeholders. At this workshop, the findings will be examined and efforts will be undertaken to further elaborate the report’s recommendations. A summary of the key outcomes of this workshop will be published in due course.

The Dutch version of the report can be downloaded here:

De energietransitie, digitale technologie en defensie zijn afhankelijk van kritieke grondstoffen (CRM). In een nieuw HCSS-rapport analyseren Irina Patrahau, Lucia van Geuns, Ron Stoop en Julie Jeuken hoe Noord-Holland en Flevoland hun rol kunnen versterken binnen mondiale CRM-toeleveringsketens. De studie schetst kwetsbaarheden, kansen en beleidsopties om de regio veerkrachtiger en duurzamer te maken.

Digitale technologie, gezondheidszorg, defensie en de energietransitie zijn sterk afhankelijk van kritieke grondstoffen (CRM) zoals kobalt, nikkel en zeldzame aardmetalen. Deze mineralen en metalen zijn essentieel voor de Nederlandse en Europese economie, maar de productie ervan is geconcentreerd buiten de EU – vaak in geopolitiek gevoelige landen. Dat maakt de toeleveringsketens kwetsbaar voor verstoringen, zoals zichtbaar werd tijdens de oorlog in Oekraïne en door handelsbeperkingen tussen China en de VS.

In Noord-Holland en Flevoland speelt dit vraagstuk nadrukkelijk. De regio kent een hoog gebruik van CRM via auto’s, machines, windturbines, datacenters en zonneparken. Auto’s bevatten tientallen soorten CRM en de autosector kampt met toeleveringsproblemen door halfgeleider- en magneettekorten. Tegelijkertijd huisvest de regio de meeste windturbines en datacenters van Nederland, beide CRM-intensieve sectoren. Dit vergroot de kwetsbaarheid, maar biedt ook kansen voor circulaire oplossingen.

Hoewel de regio beperkte primaire productiecapaciteit heeft, spelen recycling en circulaire initiatieven een groeiende rol. Bedrijven als TATA Steel en innovatieve recyclingbedrijven dragen bij aan verwerkingscapaciteit. Ook kennisinstellingen en havens versterken dit ecosysteem.

Het rapport Kritieke grondstoffen in Noord-Holland en Flevoland: Op weg naar veerkrachtige toeleveringsketens door Irina Patrahau, Lucia van Geuns, Ron Stoop en Julie Jeuken identificeert vijf mogelijkheden om de regionale veerkracht te vergroten:

1. Ontwerp wind- en zonneparken, datacenters en elektriciteitsnetwerken circulair.
2. Verbeter de circulariteit van auto’s in samenwerking met Europese partners.
3. Ondersteun recyclingbedrijven bij uitbreiding.
4. Verleng de levensduur van machines en elektrische apparaten.
5. Investeer in kennisontwikkeling en innovatie.

Daarnaast benadrukt de studie tien beleidsaanbevelingen, waaronder dialoog met bedrijven, steun aan kennisecosystemen, matchmaking binnen de EU en ruimtelijke ordening voor recyclingfaciliteiten. Omdat CRM-toeleveringsketens mondiaal zijn, moeten regionale inspanningen altijd in een Europese context worden geplaatst.

De provincies Noord-Holland en Flevoland vormen slechts één schakel in de mondiale keten, maar door hun sterke concentratie van CRM-intensieve sectoren en innovatieve ecosystemen kunnen zij een voortrekkersrol spelen in de ontwikkeling van circulaire en veerkrachtige grondstoffenketens. Daarmee dragen ze bij aan leveringszekerheid en duurzaamheid, niet alleen lokaal, maar ook nationaal en Europees.

***

Dit rapport is opgesteld in opdracht van de provincies Noord-Holland, Flevoland en de Metropoolregio Amsterdam. Deze rapportage is het resultaat van onafhankelijk onderzoek. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud ligt volledig bij de auteurs.

Een werkgroep met medewerkers van deze organisaties en van de Amsterdam Economic Board, het Noordzeekanaalgebied en de gemeente Amsterdam fungeerde daarbij als aanspreekpunt voor de onderzoekers. Dat betekent echter niet dat de inhoud van dit rapport per definitie volledig wordt onderschreven door deze organisaties.

Het rapport van HCSS wordt op 24 september 2025 besproken tijdens een workshop met relevante stakeholders. Tijdens die workshop zullen de bevindingen worden besproken en zal worden getracht de aanbevelingen uit het rapport nader te concretiseren. Een verslag met de belangrijkste punten is hieronder gepubliceerd (PDF).

The report is also available in English:

Global Assessments and Strategies for Critical and Strategic Raw Materials: A 2025 Update

On October 24, from 14:00 to 18:00 PM (CET) HCSS Analyst Irina Patrahau and other experts will present the approach of their country or supranational entity on critical/strategic raw materials evaluation and policy developments for CSRM management. The presentations will be followed by a discussion with the panelists on commonalities and differences of the approaches.

Securing supply and strengthening strategic positions related to Critical and Strategic Raw Materials (CSRMs), as well as technologies dependent on them, are a top priority for many countries and are attracting political focus worldwide. At the same time, despite global geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions, safeguarding the raw material basis for a global clean transition is essential to support climate goals and ensure a sustainable future. Join this session online to learn about how different countries are juggling priorities.

The Round Table includes the following experts:

• Nedal Nassar (Chief, Materials Flow Analysis Section – USGS, USA)
• Min-Ha Lee (Principal Researcher/Metallurgist – KITECH, South Korea)
• Satoshi Hashimoto (JOGMEC, Japan)
• Milan Grohol (Policy Officer – DG GROW, EU)
• Gavin Mudd (Director – CMIC, UK)
• Irina Patrahau (Strategic Analyst – HCSS, Netherlands)
• Théo Arnaud (Mineral Intelligence Analyst – OFREMI, France)
• Braeton Smith (Economist and Critical Materials Researcher – Argonne National Laboratory, USA)

Batteries are central to the EU’s transition to a low-carbon economy. The effective and secure scale up of batteries in the EU hinges on de-risked supply chains, from the extraction and processing of critical raw materials (CRM), to the production and, later, recycling, of batteries. Each type of battery depends on different combinations of CRM, with different types of vulnerabilities associated with their supply chains. 

This paper written by Strategic Analysts Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop analyses the geopolitical vulnerabilities arising from the three most widespread battery chemistries – Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide (NMC); Lithium Ferro Phosphate (LFP); and Sodium Ion Batteries (SIB) – on two timelines, 2025 and 2030.  

It leads to three main takeaways and associated recommendations for EU-based policymakers and industry actors. 

• The NMC market brings opportunities to EU manufacturers post 2030, even though from both a material supply and a manufacturing perspective the 2025 situation remains vulnerable. To bring more certainty and trust in the EU market, policymakers and industry should ensure that the Critical Raw Materials Act strategic projects on the NMC supply chain move forward as soon as possible. 

• LFP batteries are emerging as a more affordable chemistry than the NMC, but current supply chain vulnerabilities and the limited efforts to address them point to continued geopolitical challenges for European manufacturers. Policymakers and industry actors should invest in risk mitigation measures for the LFP supply chain, including domestic EU projects and partnerships with other suppliers on both the supply chain resilience and circularity. 

• The SIB battery chemistry is a nascent and promising technology that brings notable opportunities for the EU, but significant investment is needed to reach full potential. Through investment in research and scale up SIB battery chemistries, the EU could gain a (co-)leadership position in this emerging market.

Authors: Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop

Cover photo: AI Generated

Batteries are central to the EU’s transition to a low-carbon economy. The effective and secure scale up of batteries in the EU hinges on de-risked supply chains, from the extraction and processing of critical raw materials (CRM), to the production and, later, recycling, of batteries. Each type of battery depends on different combinations of CRM, with different types of vulnerabilities associated with their supply chains. 

This paper written by Strategic Analysts Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop analyses the geopolitical vulnerabilities arising from the three most widespread battery chemistries – Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide (NMC); Lithium Ferro Phosphate (LFP); and Sodium Ion Batteries (SIB) – on two timelines, 2025 and 2030.  

It leads to three main takeaways and associated recommendations for EU-based policymakers and industry actors. 

• The NMC market brings opportunities to EU manufacturers post 2030, even though from both a material supply and a manufacturing perspective the 2025 situation remains vulnerable. To bring more certainty and trust in the EU market, policymakers and industry should ensure that the Critical Raw Materials Act strategic projects on the NMC supply chain move forward as soon as possible. 

• LFP batteries are emerging as a more affordable chemistry than the NMC, but current supply chain vulnerabilities and the limited efforts to address them point to continued geopolitical challenges for European manufacturers. Policymakers and industry actors should invest in risk mitigation measures for the LFP supply chain, including domestic EU projects and partnerships with other suppliers on both the supply chain resilience and circularity. 

• The SIB battery chemistry is a nascent and promising technology that brings notable opportunities for the EU, but significant investment is needed to reach full potential. Through investment in research and scale up SIB battery chemistries, the EU could gain a (co-)leadership position in this emerging market.

Authors: Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop

Cover photo: AI Generated

Door klimaatverandering smelt het ijs in het Arctisch gebied, waardoor nieuwe vaarroutes ontstaan en waardevolle grondstoffen beter toegankelijk worden. Dit maakt de regio strategisch en economisch steeds belangrijker voor veel landen, vertellen HCSS analist Fiona De Cuyper en Tom Middendorp in gesprek met Paul van Liempt bij BNR podcast De Strateeg. Tegelijkertijd brengt deze toenemende activiteit grote klimaatrisico’s met zich mee en neemt de druk op de inheemse bevolking toe.

De Noordpool is allang geen lege ijsvlakte meer. Het gebied is uitgegroeid tot een nieuw front van geopolitiek, klimaat en grondstoffen, stelt Tom Middendorp, voormalig Commandant der Strijdkrachten. Terwijl Donald Trump zijn pijlen richt op Canada en Groenland, versterkt Rusland zijn militaire aanwezigheid in Siberië. De aanleiding: door klimaatverandering smelt het ijs, komen nieuwe vaarroutes vrij te liggen en worden waardevolle grondstoffen beter bereikbaar. Dit maakt het Arctisch gebied steeds belangrijker voor de internationale veiligheid.

Het Arctisch gebied warmt vier keer sneller op dan de rest van de wereld. ‘Daar zie je eigenlijk als eerste de concrete gevolgen van klimaatverandering’, zegt Fiona De Cuyper, strategisch analist bij het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies en verbonden aan The Arctic Institute.

Nu het gebied economisch en strategisch aantrekkelijker wordt, tonen steeds meer landen interesse. Om daarop in te spelen, wordt de infrastructuur in de regio in hoog tempo uitgebreid. Rusland bouwt onder andere nieuwe havens en moderniseert militaire bases uit de Koude Oorlog om zijn aanwezigheid in het noorden te vergroten. ‘Dit geeft een kettingreactie door de hele wereld’, waarschuwt Middendorp.

Machtspositie

Er ontstaan nieuwe vaarroutes, bijvoorbeeld bovenlangs Rusland, die de afstand tussen China en Europa flink verkorten en dus ook goedkoper maken. ‘Dat geeft Rusland een nieuwe economische machtspositie’, legt Middendorp uit. Tegelijkertijd jaagt de toegang tot grondstoffen een wedloop aan tussen grootmachten als de VS, China, Rusland en Scandinavische landen. ‘Dat brengt automatisch ook geopolitieke spanningen met zich mee’, aldus de voormalig Commandant der Strijdkrachten.

‘Het wordt één van de nieuwe machtscentra van de wereld’

‘Wie controle heeft over de Noordpool, heeft ook controle over de nieuwe vaarroutes die daar ontstaan. En daarmee over een deel van de wereldhandel en toegang tot waardevolle grondstoffen’, stelt Middendorp. ‘In die zin bepaalt de controle over het Arctisch gebied straks ook voor een deel de mondiale stabiliteit. Het wordt één van de nieuwe machtscentra van de wereld.’

Dat speelt ook mee in de steeds heftiger wordende confrontatie tussen de NAVO en Rusland. Een belangrijk aspect daarvan is de militarisering van het gebied. Door het smeltende ijs zijn de noordelijke zeeroutes voor Rusland straks het hele jaar door bereikbaar, een grote strategische verandering. ‘Tot nu toe was Rusland voor toegang tot oceanen vooral aangewezen op de Zwarte Zee’, legt Middendorp uit. ‘Maar straks kunnen ze via het noorden direct zowel de Atlantische als de Stille Oceaan op. Daarom investeert Rusland nu fors in militaire aanwezigheid in het Arctisch gebied, om die nieuwe toegang maximaal te benutten.’

Samenwerking Rusland en China

Met zo’n 60 procent van het Arctisch gebied onder zijn vlag is Rusland al de dominante speler in de regio. Het land beschikt bovendien over de grootste vloot ijsbrekers ter wereld, waarmee het vaarroutes kan openhouden én controleren. ‘China investeert nu ook flink in ijsbrekers en zoekt samenwerking met Rusland om hun invloed in het noorden verder uit te breiden’, zegt Middendorp.

Volgens hem werkt Rusland systematisch aan een ‘ijzeren gordijn van het noorden’, via militaire opbouw, energiepolitiek en geopolitieke controle. Het heropent tientallen voormalige Sovjetbases, plaatst raketverdedigingssystemen en breidt de noordelijke vloot uit met onder meer nucleaire onderzeeërs. Ook economisch timmert het land aan de weg met grootschalige olie-, gas- en LNG-projecten in Siberië, waar China weer in investeert. ‘Voor Rusland is het cruciaal om controle te krijgen over de nieuwe zeeroutes. Dat versterkt hun strategische positie aanzienlijk.’

Langetermijndenken

China kijkt niet naar politieke termijnen van vier jaar, maar denkt in decennia. ‘Terwijl westerse politiek en media vooral reageren op kortetermijnbelangen en actualiteit, bouwt China stelselmatig invloed op in het Arctisch gebied – via wetenschappelijk onderzoek, investeringen en scheepvaart – zonder militair te interveniëren,’ legt Middendorp uit. Dit langetermijndenken geeft China volgens de voormalig Commandant der Strijdkrachten een strategisch voordeel in een steeds belangrijker wordende regio. ‘Wij moeten dat strategische vermogen ook weer meer ontwikkelen. Daar kunnen we zeker van China leren.’

NAVO-gebied

Tegelijkertijd ligt een groot deel van het Arctisch gebied ook binnen het NAVO-gebied, met landen als Canada, Noorwegen, Zweden en Finland. Middendorp noemt dit een nieuw strategisch front. ‘De NAVO richtte zich tot nu toe vooral op de zuid- en oostflank, maar moet nu ook de noordflank serieus nemen. Het Arctisch gebied wordt een cruciaal kruispunt.’ De alliantie werkt daarom aan versterking van de militaire paraatheid, defensielijnen en inlichtingen over Russische activiteiten.

Geopolitieke belangen van niet-Arctische landen

Ook landen zonder directe ligging aan de Noordpool tonen interesse in het Arctische gebied. ‘Zo is China een belangrijke speler’, zegt De Cuyper. Sinds 2018 noemt het zichzelf een ‘near-Arctic state’ en zet het sterk in op de economische kansen, vooral via de nieuwe vaarroutes. Na de inval in Oekraïne in 2022 is de samenwerking met Rusland sterk teruggelopen, waardoor Rusland min of meer alleen kwam te staan in het noorden, zonder nauwe partners. Dit machtsvacuüm biedt China extra kansen om zijn eigen belangen te vertegenwoordigen en uit te breiden. ‘Ze hebben hun eigen ‘Polar Silk Road’-strategie gepubliceerd, die deel uitmaakt van hun bredere plannen.’

Maar ook andere, minder voor de hand liggende landen zijn actief. India bijvoorbeeld kondigde in 2022 een Arctische strategie aan. Sinds 2008 heeft het een onderzoeksstation in het gebied, omdat het smelten van gletsjers invloed heeft op de moessonregens, die cruciaal zijn voor de Indiase voedselproductie, waaronder soja en rijst. Japan volgt het Arctische gebied om wetenschappelijk te onderzoeken hoe het smelten van zee-ijs hevige sneeuwval in Oost-Azië beïnvloedt. Veel landen richten daarom onderzoeksstations op, vooral op Spitsbergen, een uniek deel van het Arctische gebied.

Turkije trad in maart 2025 toe tot het Spitsbergenverdrag om ook wetenschappelijk onderzoek te kunnen doen. Zelfs Noord-Korea is ondertekenaar, al is hun activiteit beperkt. En ook Singapore heeft inmiddels de status van waarnemer bij de Arctische Raad. ‘Deze indrukwekkende lijst van landen van ver buiten de regio laat zien wat een enorme geopolitieke belangen hieraan hangen,’ voegt Middendorp toe.

Keerzijde van menselijke activiteit

Meer activiteit in het Arctisch gebied brengt grote risico’s met zich mee. ‘De zoektocht naar grondstoffen, energiezekerheid en nieuwe vaarroutes leidt soms tot de gedachte dat klimaatverandering misschien niet zo’n probleem is’, zegt Middendorp. ‘Maar het smelten van het ijs zorgt juist voor stijgende zeespiegels en veranderende weerspatronen, met enorme gevolgen voor honderden miljoenen mensen.’ Zij kampen met uitblijvende of juist extreem heftige regenseizoenen en overstromingen.

Voor de inheemse bevolking in het gebied is de situatie nijpend. ‘Besluiten worden vaak genomen zonder hun instemming’, zegt De Cuyper. In Groenland, een strategisch belangrijk gebied vanwege mineralen en ligging, leidt buitenlandse inmenging tot groeiende weerstand. Zo werd de vicepresident van Donald Trump JD Vance in maart grotendeels geboycot door lokale bewoners. Ook de Groenlandse premier Múte Egede uitte kritiek op het geplande bezoek van een hoge Amerikaanse delegatie: ‘We kunnen dit niet meer een onschuldig bezoek noemen,’ zei Egede tegen de lokale krant Sermitsiaq. ‘Het enige doel is machtsvertoon.’

Het bezoek van Vance sluit aan bij eerdere uitspraken van Trump over het annexeren van Groenland en Canada. Volgens Middendorp was dat geen impulsieve actie. ‘Vanuit een Europees perspectief kijken we vaak anders naar de wereldkaart, maar bekijk je de kaart van bovenaf, dan zie je een korte lijn tussen Rusland en de VS, met daartussen Canada en Groenland. Tijdens zijn vorige termijn sprak Trump al over het creëren van een soort Golden Dome van defensiesystemen. Daarvoor zijn sensoren en luchtverdediging nodig die strategisch gepositioneerd moeten worden, waarbij Groenland en Noord-Canada cruciaal zijn.’

Middendorp vreest dat de druk op het gebied alleen maar zal toenemen. ‘Vele landen willen er investeren, wat voor Groenland economisch aantrekkelijk is. Maar dat kan leiden tot een glijdende schaal waarin de invloed van buitenlandse machten steeds groter wordt.’

Bron: BNR, De Strateeg, 19 juli 2025 / BNR Nieuwsradio, De Strateeg, 20 juli 2025

Stockpiling is widely accepted as a strategy to strengthen mineral security of supply. From bipartisan consensus in the United States to a recent announcement of the European Union Stockpiling Strategy and a pilot for stockpiling materials and components for naval frigates in the Netherlands. Yet despite its appeal, “stockpiling” is often used as an umbrella term with undefined and blurry details, lacking clear definitions and actionable frameworks.

In a new report published by the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) at Columbia University, experts Dr. Tom Moerenhout, Cina Vazir, and Irina Patrahau identify five key decisions that must be made to revitalise the U.S. stockpiling system (The National Defense Stockpile, NDS) and to establish effective strategies for Europe and the Netherlands.

Irina Patrahau, a CGEP non-resident fellow, also serves as a strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), where she chairs the Energy Security and Critical Minerals initiatives within the Geoeconomics research pillar. Drawing on this expertise, the authors present a roadmap for policymakers—ranging from redefining the purpose and scope of national stockpiles to determining what materials should be included, how they should be managed, and by whom.

HCSS General Internship (start August 2025 / OPEN)  

Deadline: Sunday July 20th, 2025 at 12PM

Start date: Beginning of August 

The HCSS internship offers an excellent springboard for future careers in a wide range of fields, interns are involved as full-fledged team members in research-projects. Activities can range from conducting background research, data collection and analysis, co-writing reports and papers, administrative support, to being involved in the organisation of workshops and conferences. This way, interns gain valuable work experience in a professional environment, which helps them in their future development and careers in both the public and private sector. Also, the HCSS internship offers the opportunity to build and expand your professional network. 

Visit the vacancy for the internship requirements, eligibility, prospective tasks, application procedure, compensation and more.

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Water, Peace and Security (WPS) Internship

Deadline: Sunday July 20th, 2025 at 12PM

Start date: End of July/Beginning of August 

The Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership was founded in 2018 to pioneer the development of innovative tools and services that help identify and address water-related security risks. WPS is an award-winning initiative that tries to turn the current vicious water-conflict cycle into a more virtuous water-peace cycle. HCSS contributes to WPS engagement in Iraq. 

To support WPS work, we are looking for motivated candidates with a particular interest in water-related security issues. As HCSS is leading WPS work in Iraq, knowledge of the Arabic language would be an added bonus. Throughout the internship, successful candidates can contribute to cutting-edge research on various water-related topics; from raising awareness of potential water-related conflicts, and supporting dialogues with Iraqi stakeholders at the local, provincial, and national levels, to organising training modules and workshops that focus on the different elements of the water-security nexus. 

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