HCSS
  • News
    • BNR | De Strateeg
    • Columns
    • Draghi Report Series
    • Events
    • Podcasts
  • Publications
    • Publications
      • All Publications
    • Defence & Security
      • Behavioural Influencing in the Military Domain
      • (Nuclear) Deterrence and Arms Control
      • Hybrid Threats
      • Rethinking Fire and Manoeuvre
      • Robotic and Autonomous Systems
      • Strategic Monitor Dutch Police
      • Transnational Organised Crime
    • Geopolitics & Geo-economics
      • China in a Changing World Order
      • Europe in a Changing World Order
      • Europe in the Indo-Pacific
      • Knowledge base on Russia (RuBase)
      • PROGRESS / Strategic Monitor
      • Transatlantic Relations
    • Climate, Energy, Materials & Food
      • Climate and Security
        • International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS)
        • Water, Peace & Security (WPS)
      • Critical Minerals
      • Energy Security
        • Tank Storage in Transition
      • Food Security
    • Strategic Technologies
      • Cyber Policy & Resilience
        • Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC)
      • Emerging Technologies
      • Global Commission on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (GC REAIM)
      • Semiconductors
      • Space
  • Dashboards
    • Dashboards
      • All Dashboards
        • GINA
    • Defence & Security
      • DAMON | Disturbances and Aggression Monitor
      • GINA | Military
      • Nuclear Timeline
    • Geopolitics & Geo-economics
      • Dutch Foreign Relations Index
      • GINA | Diplomatic
      • GINA | Economic
      • GINA | Information
    • Climate, Energy, Materials & Food
      • Agrifood Monitor
      • CRM Dashboard
    • Strategic Technologies
      • Cyber Arms Watch
      • Cyber Comparator
      • Cyber Norms Observatory
      • Cyber Transparency
  • Services
    • HCSS Boardroom
    • HCSS Datalab
    • HCSS Socio-Political Instability Survey
    • Strategic Capability Gaming
    • Studio HCSS
    • Indo-Dutch Cyber Security School 2024
    • Southern Africa-Netherlands Cyber Security School 2025
  • NATO Summit
  • GC REAIM
    • GC REAIM | Members
    • GC REAIM | Conferences
    • GC REAIM | Partners, Sponsors, Supporters
  • About HCSS
    • Contact Us
    • Our People
    • Funding & Transparency
    • Partners & Clients
    • HCSS Newsletter
    • HCSS Internship Programme
    • Press & Media Inquiries
    • Working at HCSS
    • Global Futures Foundation
  • Click to open the search input field Click to open the search input field Search
  • Menu Menu

News

Independent Panel Urges Changes to NATO’s Core Tasks and Future Missions

February 17, 2022
Alliance faces “most complex strategic environment” in its history – Experts say NATO must be retooled for a new “Age of Disruption”

A panel of independent experts, including former senior U.S. and European government and military officials, argues that the NATO Alliance must urgently adjust to a more volatile “Age of Disruption” that threatens allies’ security in serious and often unpredictable ways. They warn that this age of disruption will take a dramatic turn for the worse if NATO fails to deter Russia from further invasion of Ukraine.

The panel, including HCSS Director of Research Tim Sweijs, contends that the Alliance’s strategic competition with Russia is magnified by challenges posed by a militarily powerful and technologically advanced China, as well as terrorism and the disruptive security implications of emerging technologies, disturbances to critical societal functions, climate change and threats to the global commons.

The panel urges allies to retool NATO through an approach they call “One Plus Four.” The One is allied cohesion and more effective decision-making, which they contend must be the central strategic underpinning of a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. NATO must then update and upgrade its three core tasks — collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security – and add a fourth core task: building comprehensive resilience to disruptive threats to allied societies. Collective defense should be declared the premier core task.

These four tasks require NATO allies to integrate their capacities across all domains: land, sea, air, space, and the digital domain. New Deterrence Initiatives should be launched with Ukraine and Georgia. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific and North Atlantic theaters are increasingly linked. NATO’s ability to address traditional and unconventional threats in Europe is becoming intertwined with its ability to address related challenges to Alliance security interests posed by China. And as the United States focuses greater military attention on the Indo-Pacific, NATO must thus transform itself into a more balanced transatlantic partnership in which Europe assumes greater strategic responsibility while reinforcing the transatlantic link.

The panel has met under the auspices of the Transatlantic Leadership Network, a non-partisan, not-for-profit grouping of experts from across the North Atlantic space. Participants included experienced experts from a variety of U.S. and European institutions.

Executive Summary

Full Report

  • Share on Facebook
  • Share on X
  • Share on WhatsApp
  • Share on LinkedIn
  • Share by Mail

Experts

Tim Sweijs

Related News

Related Content

Online Seminar: Charting NATO’s Future in an Age of Disruption
Jack Thompson on “The US role in NATO: past, present, and future”
Tim Sweijs contributes to RUSI Whitehall Paper “Future NATO”

Office Address

  • The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
  • Lange Voorhout 1
  • 2514 EA The Hague
  • The Netherlands

Contact Us

  • Telephone: +31(70) 318 48 40
  • E-mail: info@hcss.nl
  • IBAN NL10INGB0666328730
  • BIC INGBNL2A
  • VAT NL.8101.32.436.B01
  • Contact

Legal & Privacy

  • Disclaimer & Privacy
  • Algemene Voorwaarden (NL) 
  • Terms & Conditions (ENG) 
  • Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
  • Ethical Standards
  • Manual for Responsible Use of AI

Follow us

© The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
    Link to: Welke opties heeft Poetin met Oekraïne? Link to: Welke opties heeft Poetin met Oekraïne? Welke opties heeft Poetin met Oekraïne? Link to: Is een Russische inval in Oekraïne nu van de baan? ‘Poetin wil het conflict gaande houden, maar wil geen oorlog’ Link to: Is een Russische inval in Oekraïne nu van de baan? ‘Poetin wil het conflict gaande houden, maar wil geen oorlog’ Is een Russische inval in Oekraïne nu van de baan? ‘Poetin wil het conflict...
    Scroll to top Scroll to top Scroll to top

    GDPR Consent

    Your privacy is important to us. Here you can set which consent you are allowing us with regards to the collection of general information, the placing of cookies of the collection of personal information. You can click 'Forget my settings' at the bottom of this form to revoke all given consents.

    Privacy policy | Close
    Settings

    GDPR Consent Settings

    Your privacy is important to us. Here you can set which consent you are allowing us with regards to the collection of general information, the placing of cookies of the collection of personal information. You can click 'Forget my settings' at the bottom of this form to revoke all given consents.

    Website statistics collect anonymized information about how the site is used. This information is used to optimize the website and to ensure an optimal user experience.

    View details

    Functional cookies are used to ensure the website works properly and are neccessary to make the site function. These cookies do not collect any personal data.  

    View details
    Forget my settings Deleted!