Atlantisch Perspectief | Paul van Hooft: On Arms Control, Europe should get off the sidelines

Europe’s arms control regime inherited from the Cold War is crumbling, and according to HCSS senior strategic analyst Paul van Hooft sitting on the sidelines is not an option, he writes in an article for the magazine of the Netherlands Atlantic Association. He explores the urgency of engaging with rivals and adversaries, including China, competing with Russia by investing in advanced conventional weapons, and prioritize strategic stability through arms control.

The European arms control regime inherited from the Cold War is in dire straits. In 2023, Russia suspended cooperation with the United States on a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), whose renegotiation was already a tenuous process. This is the latest setback: the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty ended in 2019 due to mutual accusations by the United States and the Russian Federation, the United States and Russia withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty in 2020 and 2021 respectively, Russia stopped participating in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in 2015, and the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002.

This decline has paralleled the overall decline in relations between the West and Russia leading up to the complete breakdown after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which also underscored the volatility of a Russia led by Putin. The invasion was followed by extensive U.S. and European efforts to place pressure on Russia to desist through controls on exports of advanced technologies, ending Russian energy imports, and other efforts to cripple the Russian economy and thereby its war machine, coupled with Western arms transfers to Ukraine, intelligence sharing, financial, and humanitarian support. The heightening of Western-Russian tensions to levels not seen since the early 1980s – if not before – makes the prospects for the United States and Russia reaching agreement even less likely.[1] The hard-won progress of the 1970s and 1980s has been lost.

Reinvigorating the arms control regime therefore seems farther away than ever. It is questionable whether there is even any point in engaging in discussions with Russia as long as it is run by Putin. Negotiations might seem a reward and legitimation of the regime.

It is, in fact, the opposite: engagement on arms control is precisely something where the need to do so is greatest with rivals and adversaries, rather than with partners and allies. After all, Cold War arms control talks took place during wars and at the heights of competition due to a shared interest in avoiding actual nuclear war. It was the near-miss during the Cuban Missile Crisis that underlined the need for such cooperation. Limiting the quality and quantity of arsenals, as well as increasing transparency, is a shared interest between states that risk ending up in direct conflict.

In the rest of the essay, I make four points about what Europeans can do and what they should do. First, that the need to engage in arms control is only more pressing now that global competition has intensified and Russia is declining. Second, the increasingly global nature of competition means that Europe should also engage with China on precisely these issues. Third, Europeans should compete with Russia by investing in advanced conventional weapons to incentivize it to return to negotiations. Fourth, Europeans should understand that such engagement could set the stage for a subsequent relationship with a post-Putin Russia.

A NEW NUCLEAR AGE

First, the importance of arms control has only become greater. In parallel with the deterioration of the global arms control regime, geopolitical competition has intensified in multiple regions with an increased risk of overspill between those regions. It is not just Europe that has become unstable after the invasion of Ukraine or during the decade leading up to it; if anything, East Asia is even more unstable. The Sino-American competition carries within it several risks of conventional and nuclear escalation, particularly over the future of Taiwan. At the same time, North Korea increasingly resorts to nuclear blackmail. But the addition of other nuclear powers has amplified the complexity compared to the Cold War; the India-Pakistan rivalry carries the potential for escalation in South Asia.[2]

The increased competition within these different regions has not only directly multiplied the potential for nuclear escalation, but has also driven investments in emerging technologies and improvements in existing technologies, particularly missile technology.[3] Consequently, new avenues for escalation exist, whether through: artificial intelligence, with risks of increasing speed and data fusion; cyberweapons that can disrupt the command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) of nuclear infrastructure; the proliferation of missile technology; the (re)emerge of technologies like hypersonic weapons; and the interactions between these technologies and existing ones.[4]

Beyond those systemic pressures, Russia is likely to increasingly rely on nuclear coercion as a consequence of the war in Ukraine and is also likelier to misjudge conventional actions on the part of NATO. Before it invaded Ukraine, Russia could rely on three forms of influence and coercion: (1) its energy weapon towards Europe; (2) intimidating modernized conventional armed forces; and (3) the largest nuclear arsenal, which included tactical nuclear weapons suited for coercion. The first two are likely to decline due to the war. Russia has suffered heavy losses both in terms of equipment and people, and expended large numbers of precision weapons, including dual-capable missiles. Russia’s conventional threat is thus less credible, though more imminent, as a consequence. The Russian ability to rebound as it did after the collapse of the Soviet Union is limited as the Russian economy is shrinking due to losses in energy exports to Europe and the large-scale sanctions put in place by the EU, the United States, and their East Asian partners.[5]

Consequently, Russia’s nuclear arsenal is the most convincing coercive tool left, which can compensate for its conventional military and economic losses as well as its loss of status. Moreover, since the start of the war, but even before, Russia has been frequently making implicit or explicit nuclear threats and Putin has taken a personal interest in both capabilities and doctrine.[6] Russian resentment and revanchism are only likely to increase the longer the war drags on with limited results or even reversals, especially if Russia becomes more reliant on China. Its nuclear status allows Russia to deal with the United States as an equal. The combination of systemic pressures and Russia’s incentive to rely on nuclear coercion to a greater extent underlines the dangers of the new nuclear age in Europe.

ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA

Second, though this seems counterintuitive, Europeans should look for engagement with China on arms control to advance security in Europe. The intensification of geopolitical competition in multiple regions has made it more difficult to accomplish anything on an exclusively European basis. The aforementioned collapse of the INF Treaty was driven both by Russian missile developments that went against the criteria of the Treaty and by the U.S. desire to not be constrained in the Western Pacific in its competition with China. China had invested in anti-access, area-denial capabilities to push back against U.S. power projection; as part of these capabilities, China heavily depends on medium-range ballistic missiles – which are dual-capable – that the United States could not invest in due to the constraints of the INF Treaty. The linkages between regions thus necessitate more complex arrangements than those of the Cold War. However, China has been reticent to engage in talks with the United States as long as the latter retains a massive advantage in the size of its nuclear arsenal. Simply put, the European security situation is thus, in part, directly declining as a consequence of events on the other side of the planet. Yet Europe is not directly part of the Sino-American competition, at least the conventional military aspects of that competition, and thus could potentially be a credible interlocutor for Chinese arms control officials.[7] If not, Europeans risk being side-lined while they wait for the United States to find common ground with both Russia and China.

COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA

Third, Europeans should incentivize Russia to negotiate by building up their own capabilities. This may seem counterintuitive given the shared interest in preventing escalatory arms races; however, historically, competition is part of successful arms control. In fact, states have little reason to engage in arms control if they are confident that they possess enduring superiority with their existing capabilities. During the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union sought to maintain relative advantages while discussing arms control. For the United States, Russian conventional and nuclear preponderance incentivized it to engage, while for Russia that incentive came from American qualitative innovations, specifically the nascent information revolution in which it looked like the United States would take a lead. During the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) discussions in the 1970s, U.S. negotiators counted on their qualitative edge in precision war to overcome Soviet quantitative advantages. A decade later, NATO’s Doubletrack approach counted on the placement of American short-range missiles in Western Europe to underline the need for the Soviet Union to withdraw missiles.[8]

In the current environment, with growing defense budgets, Europe is in a position to pursue a competitive approach in its defense investments. Given the limited nuclear arsenals of the UK and France, and the undesirability of adding new nuclear powers in Europe, Europeans should rely on advanced conventional weapons that unsettle Russian confidence in its nuclear arsenal. However, these European investments should avoid placing Russia in use-it-or-lose-it mindset; while avoiding weapons that could target Russian C3I, whether anti-satellite weapons or cyberweapons, Europeans could invest in advanced air power, long-range precision weapons, and limited missile defense.[9] These investments could motivate Russia to lock in as many of its existing advantages through agreements, specifically because it is likely to rely more and more on its nuclear arsenal, while accepting certain ceilings on delivery systems, warheads, and the need for transparency and access. While making these significant investments in advanced conventional weapons, Europeans must keep the lines of communication with their Russian counterparts open to underline their objectives with regards to Russian policy.

Taking such a course requires a significant mindset shift in European capitals. However, it is obvious that Europeans risk being pushed to the margins of the settlement of the future security architecture of Europe. They cannot afford to wait for the United States to come to terms with China – an unlikely proposition at present – in order for it to engage with Russia again. As long as the United States remains focused on China and the Indo-Pacific, greater European assertiveness is necessary. European investments can fit in with European promises to meet their conventional collective defense requirements for NATO as well as strengthen European policy sovereignty and autonomy.

A FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Fourth, given current geopolitical turmoil, engagement on arms control seems an untenable luxury. It is, in fact, the reverse. Given the growing risks of deliberate, but also inadvertent and accidental escalation, great and middle powers alike share an interest in strengthening strategic stability. Deterrence is part of this, but so is arms control. By looking for these shared interests, finding broader consensus becomes more likely in turn. The largely peaceful end of the Cold War was enabled by the decades of engagement that preceded it: not because U.S. and Soviet policymakers became particularly fond of each other, but because they better understood each other and their respective interests. At some point, Europe will find itself with a post-Putin Russia. A future European security architecture must inevitability be based on such understanding; the alternative is likely to be very dangerous over an undefined period.

Arms control negotiations with Russia will be controversial in the near- to mid-term, certainly as long as Russian pursues its brutal invasion and occupation of Ukraine. Engagement could be seen as a reward for Russia and its regime, with the risk of further legitimating them. Yet, greater understanding of respective interests and red lines does not mean agreement or acceptance of them. More importantly, the combination of measures above is in line with support for Ukraine. Talks with Russia can and should be combined with continued arms transfers and other assistance to Ukraine which ensures that Russia continues to feel pressure. The prospective of a changing conventional European balance of power through competitive investments would give the current Russian regime and its successors further reasons to come to acceptable terms sooner rather than later, especially as its material position further deteriorates. Likewise, engagement with China would suggest Russia is further marginalized in the great power game. Arms control negotiations are not a reward for Russia; if done correctly, they help to constrain Russia’s nuclear capabilities and reduce risks. Discussions should focus on limits in the numbers of nuclear warheads, but specifically dual-capable delivery systems. Unlike the American-Russian talks, Europeans should focus on Russia’s so-called tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, low-profile inspections to increase transparency could strengthen overall stability.

Of course, managing these pressures requires great European diplomatic acumen as well as coordination with the United States. European willingness to consider arms control remains high, though, as the continued interest in the Nuclear Ban Treaty shows, it is often confused with disarmament. Yet explicitly matching arms control to robust and credible deterrence and defense is not widely obvious in European capitals. The central point remains that arms control, in order to achieve greater strategic stability and systemic security within Europe, represents an overwhelming strategic interest for Europeans – as well as for Russia, whether it accepts it right now or not.

Dr. Paul van Hooft is a Senior Strategic Analyst at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and Chair of the HCSS Europe in the Indo-Pacific Hub as well as of the HCSS Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relationship.

Source: Atlantisch Perspectief, Juni 2023

Image: Wikimedia Commons

[1] Steven Pifer, “How the War in Ukraine Hinders US-Russian Nuclear Arms Control,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (blog), January 17, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/01/how-the-war-in-ukraine hinders-us-russian-nuclear-arms-control/; Heather Williams and Nicholas Adamopoulos, “Arms Control after Ukraine: Integrated Arms Control and Deterring Two Peer Competitors,” December 16, 2022, https://www.csis. org/analysis/arms-control-after-ukraine-integrated-arms-control-and deterring-two-peer-competitors

[2] Paul Van Hooft, Lotje Boswinkel, and Tim Sweijs, “Shifting Sands of Strategic Stability: Towards a New Arms Control Agenda” (The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2022).

[3] Steven Miller, “Hard Times For Arms Control: What Can Be Done?,” (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 2022).

[4] Lotje Boswinkel and Paul Van Hooft, “Not One without the Other: Realigning Deterrence and Arms Control in a European Quest for Strategic Stability” (The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2022).

[5] Paul Van Hooft, Davis Ellison, and Tim Sweijs, “Pathways to Disaster: Russia’s War against Ukraine and the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation” (The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2023).

[6] Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how[6]russia-decides-go-nuclear; Dmitry Adamsky, “Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy,” in Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy (Stanford University Press, 2019).

[7] Tong Zhao, “Europe’s Role in Promoting US-China Arms Control Cooperation” (The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 2022), https://hcss.nl/report/europes-role-in-promoting-us[7]china-arms-control-cooperation/.

[8] Susan Colbourn, “Arms Control and Deterrence: The Euromissiles, Then and Now” (The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2023); John Maurer, “Future European Contributions to Arms Control: Compete to Negotiate” (The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2023); Susan Colbourn, “Euromissiles,” in Euromissiles (Cornell University Press, 2022); John D. Maurer, Competitive Arms Control: Nixon, Kissinger, and SALT, 1969-1972 (Yale University Press, 2022).

[9] Paul Van Hooft and Davis Ellison, “Good Fear, Bad Fear: How European Defence Investments Could Be Leveraged to Restart Arms Control Negotiations with Russia” (The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2023).