The Maritime War in Ukraine: The Limits of Russian Sea Control?

At the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov were under firm Russian control. Over the preceding decade, Moscow had bolstered its dominance in these waters through investments in port and naval infrastructure and assertive territorial claims. The 2014 annexation of Crimea further solidified this position, enabling an expanded naval presence. Early in the invasion, Russia’s capture of Snake Island in the western Black Sea seemed to end Ukraine’s access to vital maritime spaces.

This narrative, however, quickly shifted. On April 13, 2022, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, the cruiser Moskva, was sunk by Ukrainian Neptune missiles. By June, Ukraine had retaken Snake Island, launched strikes on Russian-controlled gas platforms, and sunk additional vessels, including the Vasiliy Bekh. By November 2024, Ukrainian forces estimated that Russia had lost 28 warships, small boats, and a submarine. These outcomes raised critical questions: How did Russia lose its maritime edge against a country with virtually no navy? How did Ukraine achieve such significant naval successes?

This paper by guest author Prof. Alessio Patalano of King’s College London explores these questions, presenting a three-fold argument. First, it examines the geographic challenges limiting Russia’s ability to secure sea control, despite its numerical superiority. Second, it highlights Ukraine’s focus on a sea denial strategy, leveraging technological solutions and clear objectives to counter Russian ambitions. Finally, it underscores the enduring strategic importance of Black Sea grain shipments, a key maritime theatre’s centre of gravity. This analysis reveals how Ukraine turned the tide in the naval dimension of the conflict.

This paper is part of a series of guest contributions on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, applicable to Taiwan. The research was made possible through a grant from the Taipei Representative Office in the Netherlands to the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).

Author: Prof. Alessio Patalano, Centre for Grand Strategy, King’s College London.

Edited by Davis Ellison, Benedetta Girardi and Tim Sweijs.

• Paper 1 | Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine Applicable to Taiwan: The Land Domain
• Paper 2 | Lessons for Taiwan from the Russo-Ukrainian War
• Paper 3 | The Maritime War in Ukraine: The Limits of Russian Sea Control?
• Paper 4 | Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine Applicable to Taiwan: Airpower