Research
The war in Ukraine has underlined the importance of airpower in a contemporary conflict like never before. Initially, this emphasis was not a result of airpower’s omnipresence and effects, but rather of its absence, that is, the lack of offensive airpower on both sides.
The question arises, what lessons, if any, can be deduced from the war in Ukraine in general or in potential future conflicts. Ever since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion, discussion has focused on what this war would mean for the position of Taiwan vis-a-vis the Chinese intention to include the island-nation in the People’s Republic of China, either by diplomatic, economic or military force. As the Taiwanese people have as of yet not expressed a desire to become part of the PRC, Chinese military action is expected to play a decisive role in trying to acquire the island by force. Like in many other parts of the world, the military establishment in China is watching closely how events unfold in the war in Ukraine. The same goes for Taiwan. What lessons from the war in Ukraine can be learned and applied to a possible future conflict in and around the island of Taiwan?
This paper by HCSS strategic advisor Peter Wijninga will focus on the lessons for airpower, be it crewed or uncrewed, and ground-based air defence.
This paper is part of a series of guest contributions on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, applicable to Taiwan. The research was made possible through a grant from the Taipei Representative Office in the Netherlands to the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).
Author: Peter Wijninga
Edited by Davis Ellison, Benedetta Girardi and Tim Sweijs.
- Paper 1 | Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine Applicable to Taiwan: The Land Domain
- Paper 2 | Lessons for Taiwan from the Russo-Ukrainian War
- Paper 3 | The Maritime War in Ukraine: The Limits of Russian Sea Control?
- Paper 4 | Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine Applicable to Taiwan: Airpower
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