Research
In this new HCSS guest paper, Kenneth Payne, Professor of Strategy at King’s College London, delves into why Western attempts to deter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fell short, and offers insights into improving deterrence strategies. Payne highlights how regret and shifting preferences influenced the West’s actions, arguing that strategists often fail to anticipate how their priorities and attitudes will change over time.
Payne suggests that Western leaders sincerely sought to deter Russia but underestimated Ukraine’s importance before the invasion. This reflects a broader human tendency to imagine our future selves imperfectly, leading to actions misaligned with later reflections and regret.
The paper emphasises the need for a more dynamic approach to deterrence—one that incorporates self-awareness and creativity. While strategic theorists focus on understanding adversaries, Payne advocates for a “longitudinal” approach that examines how policymakers’ goals and risk appetites evolve.
To improve deterrence, Payne recommends practical measures, such as revisiting baseline judgments, questioning current preferences, and challenging assumptions. While biases may never be fully overcome, these strategies can foster greater imagination and adaptability in addressing future crises.
This paper, edited by HCSS director of research Tim Sweijs, provides valuable reflections for policymakers and strategists seeking to navigate the complexities of modern deterrence. Stay tuned for more in an extended upcoming HCSS report!
This guest paper is part of the HCSS programme on Strategic Stability: Deterrence and Arm Control.
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