Over the past years, China’s rapid military modernisation has caused alarm in the United States, Asia and Europe. China’s self-stated goals express its intent to leap to a position of leadership and self-sufficiency in artificial intelligence (AI)-based and enabled technologies, with major implications for the military domain. If the US-China military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific definitively tips in China’s favour, this could have far-reaching consequences for security in East Asia, as well as globally. After all, both East Asian democracies and Europe rely on US military power for their protection. In turn, Europe depends on East Asia as the world’s manufacturing hub. In this context, the US and its allies, partly because of US pressure, have resorted to unilateral and plurilateral controls on exports, foreign investment screening and more restrictive knowledge security policies.
While China’s technological and industrial development strategies explicitly articulate intentions of technological leadership, there is sparse understanding of the core technological components contributing to China’s AI-driven military modernisation and access to data on China’s vast and complex industrial landscape. To overcome this challenge a collaborative, multi-disciplinary research project was initiated, drawing on a qualitative investigation by The Hague Centre for Strategic Strategies (HCSS) coupled with a quantitative, data-driven analysis by Datenna, using its extensive open-source data on China. This paper constitutes a synthesis of key findings of earlier research and aims to provide actionable recommendations to European policymakers for the future of technology transfer regimes vis-à-vis China.*
* The research for the content of this report was finalised on 14 April 2024. Events or development that took place or were revealed after this date have not been taken into account.
Authors: Sofia Romansky, Joris Teer* and A. Plantenga
*Joris Teer is no longer an employee of HCSS as of April 2024
Contributors: Tim Sweijs (HCSS), Anna Sophie den Ouden (HCSS), Frank Bekkers (HCSS), A. Bauer (Datenna), Maria Antigone Rumpf (Datenna), and Datenna analysts who have chosen to remain anonymous
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. The research for and production of this report has been commissioned by the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Ministry. The research for the content of this report was finalised on 14 April 2024. Events or development that took place or were revealed after this date have not been taken into account.