The recent assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh in Dubai represents a next step in the escalation between Hamas and Israel since the end of the Gaza War twelve months ago. An analysis of the dynamic makes clear that another large-scale military confrontation in the coming year is likely. The primary reason is that not much has changed since January 2009. Rockets still fall on Israel, Hamas remains committed to Israel’s destruction, the humanitarian hardship in Gaza endures, Palestinian disunity persists, and Gilad Shalit remains captive. Among the most explicit indicators is that commentators close to the Israeli military have hinted at its inevitability. Why is a new military offensive on the horizon?
Since the end of operation Cast Lead the Israeli strategy towards Hamas has been based on containment and conflict management. The government is acquiescing in the fact that the attitudes of the Hamas leadership cannot be changed. Instead Israel is committed to denying Hamas the capabilities to harm Israeli citizens. While rocket and missile attacks trigger retaliatory air-strikes, the range of the missiles is increasing. In November Israel’s Chief of Military Intelligence announced that Hamas had missiles that could reach Tel Aviv. The illegal tunnel systems thereby represent a strategic threat to Israel and closing them becomes a national security issue.
Egypt’s recent decision to build a steel underground barrier along its border with Gaza fits within the Israeli objective. Closing this final loophole of the blockade will however further antagonize the Hamas leadership. Without structural openings of the border, for Hamas, escalation becomes the only option.
In addition, the closure will increase the hardship for the population of Gaza. Fuel and gas in Gaza are almost exclusively imported through the tunnels. Once they are closed, life will literally come to a standstill. As cooking fuel runs out, a humanitarian catastrophe becomes imminent. It will increase calls within Israel to end the Hamas regime once and for all, while in Gaza it will further increase the radicalization of the population, including those that feel Hamas is not doing enough to resist Israel.
A classic catch-22 dilemma appears. If the Egyptian closure is successful it may reduce the flow of arms and explosives in the short term, yet trigger a violent response from Gaza’s militant bowels. If the Egyptian closure is not successful, the smuggling will persist and it will strengthen the IDF’s call for a new offensive.
An alternative to closing the tunnels is to develop technology to counter Hamas’ missiles. In five months the Iron Dome missile defense shield is to be deployed. It is heralded by Defense Minister Ehud Barak as a ‘gamechanger’ and the response to terrorism-by-Qassam. The defensive technology shifts the offense-defense balance in Israel’s favor and would make a military intervention less costly for Israeli civilians. Rather than lead to peace, the missile shield thereby reduces inhibitions to start a military offensive.
Commentators have however questioned the Dome’s effectiveness since it may be prohibitively expensive to use. At $1 million per countermissile, Hamas could defeat it by simply testing it. If Hamas fires a salvo of missiles or mortars, this could not only overwhelm Iron Dome but would also run up the Israeli bill. If the system is ineffective or too expensive to protect Ashkelon and Sderot, it would make a military offensive more probable. Israel could also decide to preempt Hamas and launch a new offensive to deplete Hamas’ stocks of missiles before the system becomes operational.
Then there is Gilad Shalit. While his kidnapping was a pretext for the Gaza War in late 2008, a pending prisoner exchange which would set him free can now reduce inhibitions to start a military offensive. For both parties, the prisoner deal serves specific interests. Achieving Shalit’s release has been a central objective of Israel’s public posturing towards Gaza. Starting a war while leaving him in harm’s way is unthinkable now that a release agreement is near. For Hamas, securing the release of several hundred prisoners would strengthen its position within the Palestinian and Arab world without moderating its views. If a war is indeed in the books, then the release of Gilad Shalit removes a primary obstacle to war rather than that it leads to de-escalation.
Finally, the shift to a multipolar system and the relative decline of Western influence in the region is hampering the international community to reach a consensus view on the situation of Gaza. While Washington is critical of Israel’s settlement policies, it supports Netanyahu in its confrontation with Hamas. President Abbas is weak while the major Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, are unable to resolve their differences. A recent diplomatic spat between Turkey and Israel has disabled Turkish mediation. Egypt and Saudi Arabia both support Fatah but both vie for the same central position in the Arab World. And then of course there is Iran, which strongly supports Hamas, not because it is pro-Sunni, but because it is fervently anti-Israeli. As Western attention remains focused on Afghanistan and the financial crisis, Gaza is low on the list of priorities. This stacks the odds against effective international mediation.
In a new Gaza war, plans would call for a partial occupation of the Southern Gaza Strip to destroy the tunnel systems. The question is then what? A war may be approaching, yet it is unlikely to lead to a solution.
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