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News

The Times Of Israel | Tim Sweijs: “Multi-domain operations are old wine in new bottles — the tech has changed, but the core challenges of coordination remain.”

December 1, 2025
As machines boot up for war, IDF grapples with how to keep humans on combat’s bleeding edge. Integrating transformative innovations from drones and AI to multi-domain operations, modern militaries are learning how to balance technology with the enduring human cost of battle.
From the Israel Defense Forces navigating Hamas’s vast underground tunnel networks in Gaza, to Ukraine’s innovative use of drones against Russia, the future of warfare — a hybrid of automation and boots on the ground — is being written in real time.

Source: Stav Levaton, The Times Of Israel, 22 November 2025.

At its heart is a “multidimensional strike” concept, also known as multi-domain operations, or MDO, which seeks to strengthen three interconnected capabilities: real-time tactical intelligence to detect and engage targets; expanded aerial strike capacity to hit multiple high-value targets in rapid succession; and a sweeping digital transformation that linked sensors, strike units, and the air force through advanced information networks.

Together, these innovations aim to make operations faster, more precise and less reliant on prolonged, manpower-heavy campaigns.

Tim Sweijs, director of research at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, describes MDO as “old wine served in new bottles.”

The idea, he said, builds on century-old visions of coordination between land, air and sea forces, but now extends across entirely new dimensions, such as space and cyberspace.

He credits the conceptual shift to “the sensor revolution — the ability to see everything, everywhere, all at once — combined with the information and communication technology revolution.”

“These two technological advancements have made it so military organizations dust off older concepts,” Sweijs explained.

In practice, though, making it all work is far more challenging.

“Most of these militaries are still very much organized in a service base,” Sweijs noted — meaning they remain divided into traditional branches such as the army, air force and navy, each with its own hierarchy, culture and command structures. “So that whole idea of MDO is aspirational, but as it comes down to reality, it’s really hard to implement… also because the individual services aren’t trained to operate in such a context.”

Confusion also persists over where multi-domain integration should occur — at the unit level, as with Israel’s Ghost Unit, or at higher operational echelons. Sweijs pointed to the challenges of “commander overload,” warning that small-unit MDO often demands impossible levels of coordination and risks over-reliance on constant connectivity.

Yet, even non-state actors — who operate asymmetrically against well-established militaries — are learning to exploit the multi-domain approach.

Sweijs called Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel “horrific,” but noted that “you could argue that this was an MDO operation,” combining land, air and sea infiltration with rocket barrages and information warfare.

Israel’s own campaigns, he said, offer some of the most advanced examples of multidomain coordination. In its June 2025 offensive against Iran, the IDF fused kinetic strikes, intelligence and covert action into a single, synchronized effort. Israeli jets hit missile, nuclear and command sites deep inside Iran, guided by satellite intelligence that produced over 12,000 high-resolution images in real time.

On the ground, over 100 foreign agents — some reportedly operating a drone base inside Iran — helped neutralize air-defense systems to assist the Israeli military in its campaign. At the same time, Israeli cyber units infiltrated the phones of Iranian officials’ bodyguards and drivers, turning their devices into trackers that led strike teams to their targets.

Still, Sweijs cautions against viewing MDO as an end in itself.

“Even if we have smaller, dispersed and decentralized units operating with more capabilities,” he said, “you will still have a difference between the close fight and the deep fight… and the ways that you not only execute them, but command and control them.”

“Fighting a war on the ground with Hamas is different than fighting a war with Hezbollah, and is very much different than fighting a war with Iran,” he added.

Even as AI grows more capable, the essence of war remains human — emotional, moral and political. According to Sweijs, this paradox defines the modern battlefield.

“Ultimately in war, it’s about using violence to achieve political objectives, but also showing your enemy that you’re willing to spill blood to achieve your objectives,” he said. “If it’s only the machines that you are hitting, the fighting won’t stop.”

Read the full article by by Stav Levaton in The Times Of Israel, 22 November 2025.

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