The Changing Character of Command

Why are large HQs and lengthy orders a problem in modern land force command? How can individual planning methods improve efficiency in land force operations?

In the realm of western land force command, a fundamental issue plagues the system: oversized land force headquarters (HQs) producing lengthy, complex orders at a snail’s pace. Dr. Jim Storr delves into this pressing concern, emphasising the vulnerabilities of large HQs and the impracticality of protracted orders in modern warfare.

This paper underscores the necessity for change. Some armies are aware of this. In the last year every battlegroup and every formation in the Australian Army has ‘culled’ its organization and its processes. Dr. Storr dissects the core problem – how real human beings do, or should best, make decisions and plan.

According to the paper, the way forward lies in adopting individual planning and decision-making methodologies. After the initial campaign or operation orders, brevity and delegation become paramount. Smaller staffs and HQs are a natural outcome of these changes, as planning processes seek to enhance individual expertise at all levels. The execution of operations follows suit, with an emphasis on faster order generation, reduced bureaucracy, and involving fewer individuals in planning and execution. It’s a bold shift towards agility and efficiency in land force command.

Author: Dr Jim Storr was an infantry officer in the British Army for 25 years. He served in the British Army of the Rhine for five years in the 1980s. A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, he also worked in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and wrote high-level doctrine. He was Professor of War Studies at the Norwegian Military Academy and has honorary appointments with Birmingham and Cranfield Universities.

On 27 September, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and NATO HQ Supreme Allied Command Transformation co-hosted a symposium on “rethinking fire and manoeuvre”, an event focused on what the future of warfighting means for the alliance. This paper is part of a series written for the event and relates to the panel on: The Future of Command in NATO.