The lessons learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine offer valuable insights for Taiwan in preparing against a potential invasion by China. This HCSS analysis by Davis Ellison, Benedetta Girardi and Tim Sweijs emphasizes strategies and military adaptations that could be transposed to Taiwan’s context, particularly focusing on denial strategies, asymmetry, and sustained defence.
Two overarching conclusions emerge:
- A denial strategy is crucial for Taiwan’s defence. Ukraine’s resistance shows that Taiwan must prevent China’s military from exploiting its strengths in land, air, and sea. This involves adopting an asymmetric defence approach, leveraging advantages that offset China’s numerical and technological superiority. The goal is to delay China’s victory, raise invasion costs, and sustain resistance until external support arrives. Taiwan should focus on operational paralysis, tactical degradation, and strategic effect reduction through cost-effective, disposable, and locally produced assets.
- Quality can overcome quantity, but only to a point. While advanced systems play a role, sustained defence depends on resilience, production, and logistics. Taiwan must prepare for prolonged conflict by ensuring an industrial base that can sustain combat operations, especially given its island geography and distance from allies.
The report focuses on four main areas—C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and the land, air, and maritime domains—analysing different phases of the Ukraine conflict to extract insights relevant to Taiwan’s defence.
- C4ISR: Taiwan should enhance joint command structures, invest in resilient communications, strengthen intelligence coordination, and expand drone and sensor networks.
- Land Warfare: Layered fortifications, battlefield transparency through drone deployment, and robust logistical chains are key to resisting invasion.
- Air Warfare: Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) must be reinforced with cost-effective drones and counter-drone technologies.
- Naval Warfare: Investments in naval strike capabilities, unmanned surface and underwater drones, and mine warfare will be crucial in preventing an amphibious landing.
By adopting these strategies and implementing these lessons, Taiwan can strengthen its deterrence and defence, making a potential Chinese invasion more costly and difficult, delay any swift victory, and create conditions for international support.
This report is part of a series of publications on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, applicable to Taiwan. The research was made possible through a grant from the Taipei Representative Office in the Netherlands to the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).
- Authors: Davis Ellison, Benedetta Girardi and Tim Sweijs.
- Contributors: Giulio Damiani, Julie Ebrard, Alisa Hoenig, Paul van Hooft.
- Quality Assurance: Frank Bekkers and Viktoriya Fedorchak.
Additionally, 4 papers were written by renowned guest authors, edited by Davis Ellison, Benedetta Girardi and Tim Sweijs.
- Paper 1 | Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine Applicable to Taiwan: The Land Domain
- Paper 2 | Lessons for Taiwan from the Russo-Ukrainian War
- Paper 3 | The Maritime War in Ukraine: The Limits of Russian Sea Control?
- Paper 4 | Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine Applicable to Taiwan: Airpower
The series is a follow-up of a thought-provoking symposium on the military lessons learned from the ongoing war in Ukraine and their relevance to potential conflict scenarios, particularly regarding Taiwan’s delicate position, hosted by HCSS on October 17. This event brought together policymakers, academics, and defence experts to explore key insights on warfare, strategy, and international security dynamics.
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