Can arms control survive when giving up nukes seems to invite risk and keeping them feels like the only reliable hedge? In this new HCSS snapshot, Assistant Analyst Elton Högklint traces this dilemma through four case studies and proposes a revised framework to answer the central question: how do we make disarmament rational, credible and sustainable?
Through the experiences of Ukraine, Libya, North Korea, and Iran, the paper identifies four systemic failures of the current nuclear governance regime:
- The absence of credible security guarantees for states relinquishing nuclear capabilities;
- The erosion of good-faith negotiation through maximalist demands, broken framing, and unreliable follow-through;
- The lack of cross-administration policy consistency needed for predictable diplomacy or sustained pressure;
- The denial of legitimate civilian nuclear interests, which conflates peaceful energy development with proliferation risk.
These failures have produced perverse dynamics: states perceive nuclear armament as the only dependable security hedge, distrust diplomatic offers, and respond to uncertainty with covert development or kinetic pre-emption. The paper demonstrates how the Budapest Memorandum’s non-binding assurances undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty, how Libya’s disarmament was delegitimised by humiliating narratives and delayed rewards, how erratic U.S. strategies enabled North Korea to entrench its programme, and how maximalist and inconsistent handling of Iran dismantled a functioning agreement and precipitated escalation.
In response, the paper proposes the exploration of a reoriented framework built on:
- Robust and binding security arrangements (including nuclear umbrellas, regional phased disarmament, or conventional military support);
- Institutionalised mechanisms to signal and enforce good faith;
- Structural safeguards to ensure inter-administration continuity;
- The decoupling of civilian nuclear energy from disarmament penalties, supported by strengthened IAEA oversight and alternative technologies.
The paper argues that the renewed risk of a nuclear arms race is rooted not only in contemporary geopolitical tensions and expiring treaties, but in a deeply flawed incentive structure that rewards proliferation and penalises disarmament. Reflecting on these historical failures is essential to reduce proliferation incentives and stabilise a fracturing strategic environment.
Author: Elton Högklint; Editor: Dr. Davis Ellison
Cover photo: Unsplash
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