In this paper Assistant Analyst Liam van de Ven and Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder examine the opportunities, challenges and urgency of Dutch activity in space. They offer a two-track approach, involving both tailor-made nanosatellites and international constellations. 

Cyberspace represents one of the greatest inventions of mankind, reshaping personal, social, business, and political relationships. Unfortunately, due to attacks on and through cyberspace, urgent action is needed to ensure its stability. This concept of cyberspace stability—like its close cousin, international stability—requires a shared vision, one in which all parties recognize that geopolitical disagreements and changes which affect cyberspace must be managed in relative peace, and that cyberspace stability must be assured.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace began its work convinced that an issue traditionally reserved to states—international peace and security—could no longer be addressed without engaging other stakeholders. Cyberspace is a multistakeholder environment: those who build and manage cyberspace, and those who respond to attacks on and through cyberspace, are as likely to be non-state actors as government officials. Our Commissioners were selected to reflect this characteristic. Besides former senior government officials with experience in international security issues, our ranks included acknowledged leaders from the fields of Internet governance, the human rights and development communities, and technology and industry. Together, our 28 Commissioners from 16 countries provided a wide range of experience and views, and they were aided by public comments in response to Commission outreach.

The Commission’s final report represents three years of hard work. We gratefully recognize those who made this possible: our Commissioners, our advisors and researchers (many of them also volunteers), our financial supporters, and our management board. Finally, our appreciation goes to the Secretariat, which not only ably managed the process but was instrumental in the Commission’s creation as a civil society initiative.

Throughout its work, the Commission remained cognizant of other cyberspace initiatives, both past and present. Our report—Advancing Cyberstability—complements and reinforces the work of others, while providing new ideas for advancing the stability of cyberspace.

Read the full report here or download the PDF on the right. 

About the Commission

Launched at the 2017 Munich Security Conference, the mission of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) is to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace. The Commission helps to promote mutual awareness and understanding among the various cyberspace communities working on issues related to international cybersecurity.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace was initiated by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), which, together with the EastWest Institute constitute the GCSC Secretariat. In addition to the Commission body itself, the GCSC is supported by a number of partners, including the governments of the Netherlands, Singapore and France, as well as Microsoft, the Internet Society, Afilias, other sponsors and supporters, and a Research Advisory Group that connects the GCSC to the academic community.

For more information, please visit www.cyberstability.org or contact loukfaesen@hcss.nl

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on hybrid conflict. Our research suggests that the international security environment is increasingly characterized by hybrid strategies that fall under military, political, economic, information, and cyber domains. Hybrid threats are characterized by their complexity, ambiguity, multidimensional nature, and gradual impact, making them difficult for states to effectively respond to and posing a significant challenge to the international order. Whilst hybrid tactics in and of themselves are not entirely new, the availability of diverse and sophisticated (technological) tools is enhancing the impact, reach, and congruence of these strategies. This aspect, paired with states’ unprecedented aversion to engage in conventional war due to nuclear, economic and political deterrence, and recent shifts in global power means that hybrid conflict constitutes an increasingly desirable strategy to achieve political goals.

The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Bianca Torossian, Tara Görder, Lucas Fagliano (HCSS). Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Hugo van Manen, Dylan Browne-Wilkinson (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael)

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or Click Here.

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

As NATO celebrates the 70th anniversary of its Founding Treaty this year, many fundamental aspects of its future are widely debated within the Alliance itself. Western views on NATO’s future have, throughout the seven decades of its existence, ranged from those who predicted NATO’s imminent demise to those who claimed that the many ties that bind the two sides of the Northern Atlantic are so deep and enduring that they are bound to last for decades to come. Throughout this period, the center of gravity in this debate has always tended to lean towards the latter view. More recently, however, the Western outlook on NATO’s future is increasingly being painted in decidedly more somber hues.

But what do other key players in the international system think about NATO’s future(s)? To answer this question, the Dutch ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs asked HCSS to take a closer and more systematic look at how Chinese and Russian experts have been analyzing NATO’s future in their languages over the past three years – basically since the beginning of the Trump presidency. Many of the key Chinese and Russian scholars working on these issues also publish in English. Given the nature of these countries’ regimes, however, it is often unclear to what extent they are signaling to the broader Western or international community as opposed to reflecting their own opinions or views. This may differ from publications in their own language primarily targeted at domestic audiences, which also clearly include part of their countries’ elites whose knowledge of the English language might preclude them from being exposed to their projections and ideas.

This document is structured in four sections. After a succinct overview of the method used in Chapter 2, the Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the main findings for the Chinese and the Russian language domains respectively. The final Chapter 5 gives the conclusions as well as some broader reflections on the promise and peril of this type of foresight work for improving the government’s strategic anticipation capacity.

DISCLAIMER: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Based on our recent report by the same name, this Policy Brief by Dr. LLM Arlinda Rrustemi & Professor Rob de Wijk sheds a light on the consequences of foreign influences in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Policy Brief highlights challenges and opportunities for Western actors in the region, including setting out a coherent accession plan to the EU and NATO for these states. 

This report examines how and to what extent multiple external actors are increasing their influence over the political elites and peoples of Western Balkans countries. It considers economic, political, religious cultural and security-related factors, and their impact on the future of peace and state-building processes. Increasingly, Eastern actors have been using hybrid threats (disinformation warfare, covert operations to win the hearts and minds of the population by Russia), spreading violent extremism (Gulf countries), potentially debt-trapping some Western Balkans countries (China), violating the EU laws on arms trade (Gulf countries) and implementing identity reengineering (Gulf countries, Iran, Russia, Turkey) in order to advance their geopolitical interests. Indeed, the Eastern actors often adopt a holistic approach in focusing on winning hearts and minds of the Western Balkans population. 

These security risks can derail the stability of the region in the long term with negative ramifications towards the EU and NATO integration processes as well as EU regional policies. For instance, it has been found that for political reasons, the West is now less attractive to the Western Balkans. Local elites may be less willing to engage with the West because they are reticent to promote the rule of law, or because of a lack of personal ties between the Western Balkans elites and Western counterparts. Moreover, there is fatigue to engage with the West because interaction is very time-consuming and complicated, for instance with regard to obtaining grants. Most importantly, factors such as the lack of coherent strategy from the West, the failed post conflict reconstruction due to the prioritization of stability over democracy, the lack of a realistic EU enlargement agenda, and the lack of engagement with the local population has disillusioned both elites and common people across the Western Balkans region. This is why engagement with Eastern partners often seems more appealing: it is easier to obtain grants for projects, leadership styles are more similar, and local elites feel more secure about their own positions and the maintenance of the status quo, effectively perpetuating the grip on power by illiberal elites.    

The central objective of this report is to outline policy recommendations which can holistically deal with the challenges posed by Western and Eastern actors in the Western Balkans region. In aiming to bolster peace and security in the Western Balkans region, the policy recommendations are grouped from general to specific, focusing on aspects of law, economic, security and social affairs.

Generally, the region may be at a turning point where populations that are generally torn between the West and the East may begin gravitating more towards the latter. The West, therefore, needs to craft a response soon in order to avert further instability in the region. For this purpose, it would be crucial to re-establish legitimacy while strengthening the moral authority of the West, speaking with one voice in the region, and, crucially, maintain a realistic EU Enlargement Agenda, such as opening the membership negotiations for North Macedonia and Albania. It would also be beneficial to award Bosnia and Herzegovina a candidate status, and to agree to visa liberalization for Kosovo. The agenda needs to remain proactive and to be implemented thoroughly. Existing instruments need to be employed and more exposure needs to be generated to show and explain Western engagement with the region, not only aimed at the elites but also at the local population.

It is therefore crucial that Western actors respond swiftly and reinforce their efforts to promote democracy. This in turn would help in winning the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, it is important to provide alternatives to local governments to prevent them from getting caught in the debt trap diplomacy of China, to counter Turkish authoritarian propaganda, to prevent violent extremism, supported by the Gulf countries and Iran, as well as to counter disinformation warfare conducted by Russia, as well as the rising far right violent extremism identified in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. 

In the legal sphere, our recommendations call for implementing laws on transparency and strengthening of the judiciary, regulating housing prices and building new mosques. In the security sphere, it is crucial to harmonize security policies of Western Balkans countries with those of the EU and its member states; consider sanctions for arms exports if in violation with the EU laws; promote individual responsibility; strengthen the border control; and to limit the appointment of foreign imams. Regarding economic measures, it is suggested to open the EU Cohesion Fund to Western Balkans countries and to encourage further investment in rural areas. In terms of societal measures, it is important to increase the prominence of public awareness campaigns, and to promote civil society engagement. It is also proposed to challenge the attractiveness of Eastern actors by informing the local public about these countries’ strategies to sow social divisions. It is also important to increase cultural exchanges and language courses. Finally, it is essential to monitor the changes in societal values and beliefs. A combination of these types of measures may assist in strengthening democracy in the region as well as countering external influences. However, this necessitates tailored implementation tracks for each country which requires further in-depth research on how to implement such strategies through a governmental and societal approach. 
 

On 17 September a report about Quantum Computing was published by HSD Office: Understanding the strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security, Implications of Quantum Computing within the Cybersecurity Domain. This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).The report was launched during the HSD Café about Quantum Technology. 

For more information, please see the HSD website. 

The objective of the Quantum Technology initiative within the Hague Security Delta (HSD) is to create the practical facilities for cyber security companies to experiment with Quantum Key Exchange technology. These companies can improve practical skills and knowledge and realise innovative solutions for their (encryption) products. In this way we will get prepared for the post-quantum era.

Quantum computers are widely seen as a breakthrough technology, especially when employed in disciplines like artificial intelligence, cryptography, and big data analytics. Yet, with the undeniable promise of quantum computing come vast amounts of hype and confusion, ranging from what a quantum computer precisely entails, to when one can expect a quantum computer, to what sort of applications it might offer. We need to be prepared for this in future.

To download the report, click on the button to the right or visit the HSD website. 

The accelerating arms race in Artificial Intelligence and the diffusion of cheap, technologically advanced military systems among state and non-state actors, compel countries to adopt robotic and autonomous systems (RAS). This is due to not only the prospect of lagging behind allies, but the notion that adversaries use RAS to gain a significant military advantage and escalation dominance. How can countries stay competitive, without violating core national and international ethical principles?

This paper discusses the key ethical challenges spanning human agency, human dignity and responsibility in the operation of RAS. It presents a three-part framework for how to view human control over RAS in an ethical manner:

• Life cycle perspective
• Sub-system functionality perspective
• Observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop perspective

Based on the framework above, the paper presents the following concrete recommendations for actors engaging in the design, development, testing, operation and decommissioning of RAS at the strategic and operational levels:

• The fundamental principle is to work with ‘ethics by design’: ethical considerations are incorporated in not just the operating of RAS, but all throughout a system’s life cycle;
• Create an institutional culture of shared accountability concerning all actors involved throughout the RAS life cycle;
• Build a wider understanding of system behavior by involving end users as early as in the design and testing stages. This way, the users within the military can trace, understand and predict a system’s decision-making process;
• Develop best practice guidelines for (1) outsourcing to external contractors; and (2) interoperability with technologically advanced allied armed forces that co-deploy RAS;
• Identify within what sub-system functions of RAS increasing automation and autonomy will present benefits to the military without eliciting major ethical concerns, such as movement controls and computer vision;
• Embed core rules of engagement (ROEs), along with an open architecture that allows for mission-specific ROEs by mission command;
• Improve transparency on the uses and contexts of use of RAS in the military domain with the general public and inform policymakers of realistic opportunities and limitations of complex system design.

Dowload the report here.

Disclaimer: Responsibility for the content and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors. Publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.