In collaboration with TNO, we present this booklet on trends and developments in hybrid conflicts set to shape 2020 and beyond. To read, click here. 

Hybrid threats are one of the main security challenges Western democracies currently struggle with. Hybrid threats are in the news, mostly framed or wrapped in specific ‘hybrid’ phenomena such as disinformation, foreign meddling in elections and cyber hacks. Meanwhile, instruments and technologies that drive these threats develop with ever increasing speed.

This horizon scan, based on literature and media scanning, expert sessions and information exchanges with international peer institutes, captures important current and emerging trends and developments in hybrid conflicts and threats. It highlights the evolution of hybrid campaigns with novel examples and explores how current and new technologies may or will impact the hybrid ‘battlefield’.

This booklet complements our Strategic Monitor study that utilized horizon scanning to analyze trends in hybrid conflict. 

This booklet is a product of the TNO research program “Resilience to Hybrid Threats (V1925)”.

Download the booklet by clicking on the PDF button on the right.

New paper by Arlinda Rrustemi out now! To read, click here.

Far-right violent extremism is thriving in several parts of South East Europe (SEE), but despite its widespread influence, relatively little research has been done on its alarming reach. Therefore, this paper assesses the origin and perpetuation of far-right violent extremism in SEE and finds that the situation there uniquely facilitates the spread of far-right ideology, particularly in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Understanding this trend is extremely important for global security as SEE is a bridge between the East and West, and the politics there can affect the rest of Europe and its unifying institutions like the EU and NATO.

Both external and internal factors play a role in promoting far-right extremism in SEE. The biggest external source of destabilization in the region is due to the interference of Russia. Seeking to reduce SEE’s loyalty to the rest of Europe, Russia is using numerous strategies to stoke ethnonationalist passions and sow discord among neighboring nations. Russia benefits from a soft-power approach by appealing to common cultural aspects it shares with SEE. For instance, Russia takes advantage of a sense of shared Slavic identity to gain support among different peoples, particularly Serbians. Russia also uses the authority of the Orthodox church to appeal to the traditional values that are held in Serbia.

In addition to aligning itself with some SEE countries, Russia is also attempting to intensify internal divisions within SEE in order to weaken certain nations, which greatly increases the risk that there will be a resurgence of political instability in the region. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia is attempting to cast Muslims as dangerous fundamentalists, thus encouraging Islamophobia and intensifying ethnic tensions in the country, leading to reciprocal radicalization that popularizes far-right attitudes. Similar claims are made against Muslims in Kosovo in an effort to undermine the state’s efforts to be internationally recognized as a sovereign nation. Anti-Western disinformation campaigns and propaganda disseminated in the media contribute to Russia’s influence, and these messages are also spread by political elites in SEE who are sympathetic to the Russian cause. Meanwhile, government officials who oppose the far right are hesitant to speak out against it. Thus, state institutions in countries like Serbia and Croatia tacitly accept far-right attitudes, in part because ethnonationalism is already entangled with government policies. 

There are also numerous paramilitary organizations that contribute to the rise of the far right. Russia has a presence in SEE in the form of the Night Wolves motorcycle gang as well as by supporting the Serbian/Balkan Cossacks Army and so-called patriotic military training camps for youths. SEE soldiers are also sometimes invited to train in Russia. This support goes both ways, as numerous Serbians went to Ukraine to assist Russian paramilitary forces there. Overall, Russia is employing both soft- and hard-power efforts in SEE in order to reawaken ethnic tensions, weaken loyalty to the rest of Europe, and foster traditional and far-right attitudes that push SEE away from Western Europe and towards Russia. The rise of the far right in SEE is therefore a matter of great concern for global security, particularly for how it may affect the strength of European institutions.

Download the paper by clicking on the PDF button on the right.

New paper out now! To read, click here.

The international community has been vividly discussing ways to control the use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) by military forces. Throughout the process, both legal and non-legal solutions have been proposed aiming to improve accountability, ethical and legal standards, and verifiability of the autonomous systems.

HCSS surveyed the landscape of proposed solutions in order to identify potential gaps in the regulatory regime and additionally conducted an interactive session with experts from various related fields to identify the practical shortcomings of the regime.

This study identified that the current regime is sufficient to address the risks and threats of autonomous weapon systems. At the same time, further efforts are necessary to strengthen the regime.

Accordingly, the following recommendations are presented to policymakers:

•             promote domestic and international legal compliance;

•             increase technical literacy in order to streamline technological solutions in policymaking;

•             implement legal and ethical standards in the relations with contractors; 

•             strengthen cooperation of epistemic communities to improve the exchange of knowledge;

•             take the lead in the process of translating domestic standards into international principles.

Would you like to know more? Download the paper here, or click on the PDF button on the right.

Photo credit: Naval Surface Warriors

Read our Strategic Monitor 2019-2020 now! Click here to download the PDF. 

In order to remain on top of the rapid changes in the international environment, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence have tasked The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the Clingendael Institute to conduct research within the framework of the Strategic Monitor, which monitors trends and developments in the international order and presents a risk analysis on the national security of the Netherlands.

The yearly report was presented today to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stef Blok. 

The Strategic Monitor 2019-2020 consists of the summary report “Between Order & Chaos: The Writing on the Wall”, and ten individual research papers. The executive summary of the report is available in English and Dutch. The individual research papers are available in English. 

The title of this year’s report “The Writing on the Wall” is a reference to the warning of impending disaster in the biblical tale of Belshazzar, King of Babylon, described in the book of Daniel. In it, Daniel reads the writing on the wall as a warning to Belshazzar that his days as king were numbered. Sudden, structural change such as the end of Belshazzar’s kingdom is emblematic of discontinuity, a central feature of today’s world. Power is shifting, technological progress is accelerating, rules are changing. The Strategic Monitor seeks to decipher the writing on the wall, describe the key trends as they unfold, and understand how they shape our future.

Please find an overview of the Strategic Monitor 2019-2020 research papers below:

• Conflict in Cyberspace
• Economic Security with Chinese Characteristics
• CBRN Weapons
• Perceptions of Security
• Terrorism in the age of digital technology
• Military Competition in Perspective
• Hybrid Conflict
• In the Eye of the Beholder?
• What World do we live in?
• The Netherlands in the world

The reports can also be accessed through the website of the Clingendael Institute. 

New report out now! To read, click here.

Over the last decade, long-term forecasts of Dutch natural gas production in small fields have consistently over-estimated production. The main reason for this is not technical or geological but rather an underestimate of the speed at which the business climate for the Dutch gas industry has deteriorated. Fewer projects than expected materialized; the projects that did materialize took a longer time than expected. Permitting procedures are taking a long time, especially after the introduction of a new mining law. The tax regime is less favorable than in the UK southern North Sea. Local governments often use all the options that the new mining law offers them to delay projects as much as possible.

The current low gas prices make it more difficult for Dutch gas producers to obtain funding. A low case forecast, assuming a further deterioration of the investment climate predicts that by 2030 Dutch natural gas production will have virtually ceased.

With Dutch natural gas consumption expected to be relatively constant over the coming decade, gas imports will rise drastically. Within the EU Dutch gas is, and will be, replaced by Russian piped gas and LNG imports. The total emission of greenhouse gases for imported natural gas is about 30% higher compared to Dutch gas (due to methane leakages and the energy required to transport gas over long distances). On a global scale, this negates all progress that is currently being made by increasing the share of solar and wind in the Dutch power mix.

Authors: Jilles van den Beukel, independent energy analyst (formerly a principal geoscientist at Shell) & Lucia van Geuns

Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right.

New report out now! To read, click here.

Has the world become more free and secure, or is democracy under attack? 

This report aims to answer the question “what is the state of the world today?”, through the provision of a dispassionate, empirically grounded, multi-dimensional overview of international developments. It analyzes dynamics within the socioeconomic, identitary, connectedness, judicial, political, and security domains to capture dynamics in a world in a state of flux.

For each domain the central question is assessed at the level of the individual, at the state, and at the system levels, on the basis of two indicators: whenever possible, one of these indicators is objective in nature and enquires into the actual state (of equality, freedom, security), while the other is subjective in nature and examines how this state is experienced or perceived by individuals.

Our conclusion? The world faces significant increases in, for instance, armed conflict, combat fatalities and illiberal states’ share of international influence. However, human welfare has improved, as well as interconnectivity and democracy. As always, the state of the world is in flux. 

Read the report here.

This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

New report out now! To read, click here. 

This short paper outlines the indicators and methods used to establish whether the world has become more equitable and prosperous, more democratic, and more peaceful. It also outlines the indicators and methods used to establish whether identitary issues have become a larger force in the international system, whether lawlessness has increased, and whether the world has become more connected.

This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.

Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right. 

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

New report out now! To read, click here.

Navigating the changing global environment requires first and foremost a keen understanding of changes in Dutch foreign relations. The Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI), developed by HCSS, captures the relationship between the Netherlands and other countries over time through a quantitative measurement of a limited set of important dimensions in international relations. This can subsequently help in identifying potential partners as well as potential adversaries in the pursuit of Dutch foreign policy objectives.

Read the report here.

This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

New report out now! To read, click here.

This method piece outlines HCSS’ approach to measuring the Netherlands’ position in the world on the basis of other countries’ relevance and compatibility. Relevance considers how much the Netherlands trades with another country, how militarily advanced it is, and how much influence it wields internationally. Compatibility is a reflection of a country’s similarity to the Netherlands when it comes to policy and values. It looks at whether the country has a similar legal system to the Netherlands, enacts comparable trade policies, cooperates with it militarily, and converges with its voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, among others. 

Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right. 

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

New snapshot out now! To read, click here.

The number of terrorist attacks from the far-right spectrum has increased considerably in the US and Europe over the last decade. Even though awareness on this phenomenon is now gradually rising, scholars, policy makers and security forces have long focused predominantly - and perhaps disproportionately - on Islamist terrorism. This negligence towards other types of terrorist threat is now proving to have vital consequences and obstacles in adequately addressing the current threat stemming from the far-right.

This snapshot by assistant analyst Tara Görder examines these consequences and obstacles by outlining the US’ and Europe’s bias in framing the issue of terrorism in diverging ways, securitizing one (Islamist terrorism) but neglecting the other (far-right terrorism). Legislative differences amongst both types and ambiguous definitions complicate the process of designating terrorism for what it is, conflating far-right terrorism with petty or hate crimes and thereby diminishing their gravity for the public perception. Likewise, prosecution and conviction rates relating to Islamist terrorism are proportionally shown to be much higher than for far-right terrorism.

Weighing the little attention it receives against the current pace at which far-right terrorism is rising, underpins how both the US and Europe seem to lack effective and adequate (legal) tools for holding perpetrators from the far-right (as well as potentially arising terrorist groups/ideologies in the future) accountable.

Download the snapshot by Tara Görder here, or click on the PDF button on the right.

New report out now! To read, click here.

How does the Dutch perception of its security threats compare to the outlook of other states? It’s all in the eye of the beholder…

All countries have procedures and – in some cases – methodologies to identify, analyze and prioritize threats to their national security. The outcome of these efforts is typically one or more high-level documents in which the responsible national security bodies provide authoritative statements on threats facing the country. As part of the Dutch Strategic Monitor effort, HCSS was asked to take a closer look at how other actors perceive their threat environments and to what extent they might differ from their Dutch equivalents.

This study sets out to address the following research questions:

1.            What similarities and differences exist between the Netherlands’ and other actors’ perceptions of interstate military competition (IMC), conflict in cyberspace, hybrid conflict and economic security, CBRN weapons, and terrorism – all central threats in the Dutch Geïntegreerde Buitenland -en Veiligheidsstrategie (GBVS) and National Security Strategy (NSS) 2019?

2.            How do other actors interpret trends relating to the rules-based (liberal) international order?

3.            What threats do other actors afford central positions which the Netherlands does not?

4.            Do other actors identify opportunities for the future?

We have analyzed a long-list of identified threats – and countries’ perceptions thereof – in order to provide insights with the potential of challenging preconceptions underpinning the Dutch threat perception framework.

Follow this link to read the report by Hugo van Manen.

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. 

New report out now! To read, click here. 

What do Chinese naval intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters have in common with Russian bots that spread and amplify disinformation?

This Global Security Pulse examines trends within hybrid conflicts, understood as "conflicts between states, largely below the legal level of armed conflict, with integrated use of civilian and military means and actors, with the aim of achieving certain strategic objectives."

States have ample reason to be concerned about hybrid threats and hybrid conflict. Although at their core hybrid tactics are tactics old as time (military posturing, spreading propaganda and the use of economic measures are well established military strategies), the availability of a diverse and sophisticated set of (technological) tools enhances the impact, reach and congruence of hybrid threats. Paired with the reluctance of states to engage in conventional war due to nuclear, economic and political deterrence, this means that hybrid conflict constitutes an increasingly desirable strategy for states to achieve their political goals.

The principal conclusion of this Pulse is that the international security environment is increasingly subject to hybrid threats, often in a subtle and pervasive way that impedes fast detection, accountability and retaliation. Hybrid threats and hybrid conflict are typified by their complexity, ambiguity, multidimensional nature and gradual impact. These characteristics pose a challenge to effective response measures and therefore to the international order.

Read the new report by Bianca Torossian.

The authors would like to thank Jovana Perovska for her contribution to the international order section of this report.

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Dr. Tim Sweijs contributed an article on information warfare at the dawn of the information age, in the Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2020, the annual national security foresight of the Austrian Ministry of Defense.

Read the article by Dr. Sweijs here or download the PDF on the right.

At the dawn of the Information Age, all signs point towards the proliferation and maturation of tools and the sophistication of tactics used in disinformation campaigns. 5G will supercharge the velocity of information flows, drive the widespread adoption of augmented and virtual reality applications, and fundamentally change the way in which humans ingest information and experience social and physical reality. This will unlock a range of new opportunities for information war. A comprehensive agenda to deal with measures should focus on three aspects: increasing the resilience of our societies through more investment in Humboldtisches forms of education; strengthening the protections that shield against the deliberate manipulation of information through private sector regulation; and designing a strategic deterrence posture which includes the ability to reciprocate in kind and hit opponents where it hurts.

New Report: Cross Domain Deterrence and Hybrid Conflict

Liberal Western democracies have been too complacent when it comes to dealing with contemporary hybrid adversaries. We have been following rather than leading. It’s time to seize back the strategic initiative, but how do we do that?

In this new joint HCSS/TNO paper, Tim Sweijs and Samo Zilincik argue that Western democracies can and should develop a strategic deterrent posture in an age of hybrid conflict. Based on an extensive review of cross domain deterrence theory and practice, they offer four recommendations to policymakers:

 •             maintain strong monitoring capabilities to expose hybrid actions in a timely fashion;

 •             develop options for proportionate responses to inappropriate behavior;

 •             showcase intent and capabilities to adversaries with clear guidelines when transgressions will be punished;

 •             review and refine the legal framework for hybrid deterrence options; 

 Would you like to know more? Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right.

New report out now! To read, click here. 

As Russian and Chinese defense expenditures pivot towards the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons systems, can Europe keep up on innovation? Hugo van Manen and Tim Sweijs present the latest report on Interstate Military Competition. 

As geopolitical rivalry is regaining prominence and technology is advancing, states are more actively engaging in interstate military competition (IMC). This is evident in activities such as the ramping up of military investments in dual-use AI technologies and the growing militarization of space. Even though instances of direct military confrontation remain limited, internationalized intrastate conflicts have grown in both their prevalence and intensity. The adversity fostered by these dynamics, combined with the proliferation of new technologies, is placing considerable stress on the international order. This can clearly be seen in, for example, the erosion of existing arms control regimes, as well as in states’ use of proxy actors to circumvent regulations. This results in a significant increase in the threat posed by IMC to the Netherlands. In concrete terms, this threat may manifest in an increased chance of armed conflict on NATO’s territory. The threat level is further raised by the fact that IMC increasingly manifest itself in non-traditional forms, which are associated with a host of negative externalities and effects for economic security and societal cohesion.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on IMC was published in February 2019. This research report examines the underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the GSP’s two trend tables. It covers trends in interstate military competition and international regime developments over the past ten years. It builds on the previously published Strategic Monitor Report (2018-2019) and updates its empirical analysis of contemporary trends in IMC. It does so by gauging states’ intention and capacity to engage in such competition, and their actual activity in this realm. This report continues with an analysis of trends within the international order through an assessment of five interstate military competition-related norms and rules.

Read the report here. 

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.