New paper out now! Download here.

Robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) upend the traditional relationship between the military and the private sector. While cooperation remains necessary between these stakeholders, the forms it takes must be adapted to fit the RAS development process. 

This paper explores stakeholder relations at various stages of the non-linear RAS life cycle: development, integration, and use. In this framework, development and integration and use are all interconnected, as repeated rounds of testing are used to refine the initial concept in order to produce improved versions. This requires the developer and end user to work together and form consistent feedback loops. Further challenges include the fact that the private sector tends to drive RAS innovation rather than the military, that the life cycle is often fast-paced, and that ethical and legal considerations complicate the demands placed on the system.

In order to address these challenges, the paper offers recommendations for how to manage the RAS life cycle and balance the needs of different stakeholders. These include calling for close communication between stakeholders from the outset of the process, clear delineation of the tasks and duties of each stakeholder, effective testing of RAS in appropriate environments as well as relevant training, integration of new stakeholders internally and externally, and oversight of technological as well as legal and ethical aspects of RAS deployment by end users. These and other suggestions offer developers a path to navigate the new types of cooperative relations that are needed to effectively manage these novel and complex systems.

Download the paper here.

New report out now! Download here. 

As the current coronavirus pandemic proceeds, several governments have already utilized digital epidemiological tools to combat the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, with some early successes. The role of user-based and provider-based data collection, and in particular location data, has characterized the mitigation strategies of some of the most effective national responses. These measures may impact individual privacy rights and therefore threaten to accentuate existing cognitive dissonance within public perceptions of trust in the use of surveillance tools by companies and governments alike in liberal democracies. The danger is that the public debate on the employment of these technologies may not only become excessively one-sided but will also not accurately reflect the existing technical capabilities and data-use realities of some governments, even in Europe. But an informed public debate is urgently needed.

This report recommends specific digital contact tracing and quarantine measures (CTQ) that are in accordance with existing EU legislation, and offers a way forward to consider a principle towards “data for the common good” to help combat the current coronavirus pandemic. If additional emergency legal provisions are needed to deploy further digital epidemiological measures, these should be predicated upon multistakeholder consultations, strict time limitations, and post-hoc auditability. Overall, at both national and European levels it will be necessary to engage in a wider “digital agenda for pandemic response” to deal with a threat that is not likely to be short lived, and the ramifications of which are not yet apparent.

Among the reviewed cases (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, China, and Israel) studied, one conclusion stands out: the more democratic nations are openly deploying existing national security means, especially in location tracking and the merging of databases. The technical recommendations proposed in this report may not be sufficient, and Europe may need to consider further-reaching measures as well. Europe has significant latent digital epidemiological capabilities within businesses and government that are often not easily apparent to the wider public, and whose technical details and relationship with personal data are often not clear. But Europe is also the single largest collection of democracies and the EU represents a historic democracy project. Not only can the state and non-state institutions of democracy handle emergency provisions, but the public at large can be expected to support them – if an informed discussion is had with the openness and accuracy it requires.

Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right. 

This report was written in cooperation with The Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. 

Nieuwe Strategic Alert door Rob de Wijk over de coronacrisis. Download hier. 

Het coronavirus luidt vermoedelijk niet het einde van de mondialisering in. Daarvoor zijn de interdependenties te groot en de mondiale bevoorradingsketens te complex. Bovendien is Europa, dus ook Nederland, voor zijn overleven grotendeels afhankelijk van wat er in het buitenland wordt geproduceerd en aan grondstoffen wordt gedolven.

Wel kan de crisis het proces van slowbalisation versnellen als het besef ontstaat dat mondiale voedselketens risico’s opleveren en dat landbouw en veeteelt lokaal moet worden ingericht. Ook kan er een herbezinning komen op wat nationaal geproduceerd moet kunnen worden, zoals mondkapjes.

Geopolitiek en coronacrisis zijn in hoog tempo nauw met elkaar verweven geraakt. China heeft zich al vroeg als mondiale leider geprofileerd en neemt daarmee de traditionele taak van de Verenigde Staten over. Rusland heeft zijn activiteiten opgeschroefd om de NAVO en de EU te ondermijnen.

Indien de Chinese aanpak de standaard zet, kan Beijing zijn soft power versterken en uiteindelijk grote invloed op een nieuwe wereldorde hebben.

Om maatschappelijke ontwrichting tegen te gaan vereist crisisbeheersing sterk leiderschap, een heldere, breed gedeelde strategie en duidelijke communicatie naar de bevolking. Als blijkt dat autocratieën beter presenteren zal dit de voorstanders van autoritair bestuur sterken. Daarom is de coronacrisis tevens een crisis van het democratische politieke systeem. Het tegengaan van erosie van het democratische systeem is een bijzondere opgave van Westerse politici, ook die in Nederland.

Een gefragmenteerde aanpak en een onduidelijke rol voor de Europese instellingen kan tot ontwrichting van de Europese Unie leiden. Dit tegengaan vereist samenwerking en coördinatie van de bestrijding van het Covid-19 virus. Hier ligt een belangrijke opgave voor Nederland dat groot belang heeft bij effectief multilateralisme.

Download de Strategic Alert via de PDF knop aan de rechterkant. 

Disclaimer

Deze Strategic Alert verschijnt binnen het werkpakket Strategic Monitoring & Foresight, onderdeel van Progress 2.0, een meerjarig beleidsondersteunend onderzoeksprogramma over internationaal beleid en veiligheid in opdracht van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en het Ministerie van Defensie. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud ligt bij de auteurs. Publicatie betekent niet dat de Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie instemmen met de inhoud.

New paper out now! To read, click here.

This paper is a collaboration with Clingendael authors Hugo Klijn and Maaike Okano-Heijmans, with contributions from Bianca Torossian. 

Against a backdrop of geopolitical tensions and rapid technological developments, the debate on governing autonomous weapons is gaining momentum – both in the Netherlands as well as in other countries. Discussions are complicated, however, because of wide variations in the positions of countries, compounded by a tendency of some politicians and non-governmental organizations to frame the discussion in alarmist terms. The regulation of controversial categories of robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) requires new approaches and new instruments.

Building on theories of transnational governance, this paper highlights so-called trusted communities as a potentially valuable instrument to engage relevant stakeholders, particularly those from the private sector. Apart from continuing its efforts in formal frameworks – such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), where Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are discussed – the Netherlands government may consider reaching out to businesses and relevant experts at home as well as in like-minded states through trusted communities.

Such networks have the ability to bring together key actors to provide input for developing principles and norms for further regulation and export control regimes that are based on mutual trust and respect.

Download the paper here.

Photo credit: UN/Jean-Marc Ferré

New paper out now! To read, click here.

The strengthening of strategic communication capabilities in the states of the Western Balkans is of crucial importance for the strengthening of regional and European security. The Western Balkans StratCom Game, executed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, with the support of the Austrian Ministry of Defence, has sought to identify the course of action and provide recommendations for the further strengthening of capabilities in the states of the Western Balkans1, vis a vis regional and international stability and security.

This paper describes the results of the Western Balkans StratCom Game.
In this context, experts from the states of the Western Balkans, the European External Action Service and the Austrian Ministry of Defence convened in Skopje, the Republic of North Macedonia on the occasion of the expert workshop the Western Balkans StratCom Game, in October 2019.

The Western Balkans StratCom Game was utilized in the process of conducting an in- depth analysis of the political, economic, religious, vulnerabilities, cultural and security vulnerabilities that the states of the Western Balkans are facing, identified the types of action as well as the level on which the actions are to be taken.

This HCSS paper describes the how the Western Balkans StratCom Game was executed, and it elaborates on the processes of decision making and prioritization in the game. It shows that the states of the Western Balkans have the capacity to recognize the vulnerabilities they are facing, foster regional discussion and potentially cooperate with international and multinational actors in the processes of tailoring a course of action to prevent, counter or react to said vulnerabilities. It additionally provides a set of concrete conclusions and recommendations focussing on a concrete course for further action.

Download the paper here.

New report out now! To read, click here.

Given the increasingly tense posturing of world powers like the U.S., Russia, and China, as well as political volatility across the globe, deterrence has once again become a popular feature of many governments’ strategies. However, the old framework of deterrence that was developed during the Cold War has become outdated in an age of more and more complex international relations. Therefore, new approaches are needed for effective security policies.

To that end, this report argues that rather than framing the strategy of negative influence as deterrence, it is more useful to reconceptualize it as dissuasion, which offers a much more sophisticated perspective from which to consider new tactics. Thus, after surveying historical and current understandings of deterrence, this report offers a new framework of deterrence strategies, better described as compliance-seeking efforts, that includes both dissuasive and persuasive methods.

The report’s main finding is that while deterrence is a popular topic among security experts, their approach to it is growing increasingly obsolete. The traditional deterrent of the nuclear age, fear, is no longer the most effective way to influence behavior. The use of fear and punishment or even just discouragement is not the only way. Thinking through what can be done to dissuade other actors from pursuing undesired courses of action through positive incentives may deserve more attention that it currently receives.

Above all, what is needed is a new dialogue among the security community that focuses on reconceptualizing deterrence for the current global situation, a dialogue that must include input from many avenues such as psychologists, educators, and criminologists to offer varied insights for a more creative, flexible, and better designed approach that produces optimal strategic results in today’s fraught geopolitical climate.

Download the report by clicking on the PDF button on the right.

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the feedback and inputs from Dr. Paul Davis from the RAND Corporation and from Dr. Ben Taylor from Defence Research and Development Canada. They also thank Frank Bekkers from HCSS for his final editing touches.

New paper out now! To read, click here.

This paper looks into the state of robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) and their current implementation in the military context, as well as their potential applications.

RAS presents numerous, significant and far-reaching opportunities, including creating better and faster situational awareness and understanding, reducing the physical and cognitive loads of soldiers, sustaining and protecting the force, extending the reach and persistence of operations, increasing the pace of the OODA loop, and allowing the simultaneous execution of tasks for efficient action.

In addition to examining the state of RAS today, this paper considers what new RAS will be created and how they can be incorporated into military operations. Practical as well as ethical challenges are examined, such as RAS’ vulnerability to cyberattacks as well as negative public perceptions of RAS. It puts forth suggestions for the future of RAS that range from technical advice about developing them,to guidance about managing the image of RAS. 

Across all domains, the current human-centric boundaries to speed, knowledge, endurance, scale, accuracy and flexibility will be pushed forward to new, ever-expanding limits. However, with these opportunities come significant challenges, both in terms of practical issues within the military and also in terms of conditional, external issues.

Download the paper here or by clicking on the PDF button on the right.

In collaboration with TNO, we present this booklet on trends and developments in hybrid conflicts set to shape 2020 and beyond. To read, click here. 

Hybrid threats are one of the main security challenges Western democracies currently struggle with. Hybrid threats are in the news, mostly framed or wrapped in specific ‘hybrid’ phenomena such as disinformation, foreign meddling in elections and cyber hacks. Meanwhile, instruments and technologies that drive these threats develop with ever increasing speed.

This horizon scan, based on literature and media scanning, expert sessions and information exchanges with international peer institutes, captures important current and emerging trends and developments in hybrid conflicts and threats. It highlights the evolution of hybrid campaigns with novel examples and explores how current and new technologies may or will impact the hybrid ‘battlefield’.

This booklet complements our Strategic Monitor study that utilized horizon scanning to analyze trends in hybrid conflict. 

This booklet is a product of the TNO research program “Resilience to Hybrid Threats (V1925)”.

Download the booklet by clicking on the PDF button on the right.

New paper by Arlinda Rrustemi out now! To read, click here.

Far-right violent extremism is thriving in several parts of South East Europe (SEE), but despite its widespread influence, relatively little research has been done on its alarming reach. Therefore, this paper assesses the origin and perpetuation of far-right violent extremism in SEE and finds that the situation there uniquely facilitates the spread of far-right ideology, particularly in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Understanding this trend is extremely important for global security as SEE is a bridge between the East and West, and the politics there can affect the rest of Europe and its unifying institutions like the EU and NATO.

Both external and internal factors play a role in promoting far-right extremism in SEE. The biggest external source of destabilization in the region is due to the interference of Russia. Seeking to reduce SEE’s loyalty to the rest of Europe, Russia is using numerous strategies to stoke ethnonationalist passions and sow discord among neighboring nations. Russia benefits from a soft-power approach by appealing to common cultural aspects it shares with SEE. For instance, Russia takes advantage of a sense of shared Slavic identity to gain support among different peoples, particularly Serbians. Russia also uses the authority of the Orthodox church to appeal to the traditional values that are held in Serbia.

In addition to aligning itself with some SEE countries, Russia is also attempting to intensify internal divisions within SEE in order to weaken certain nations, which greatly increases the risk that there will be a resurgence of political instability in the region. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia is attempting to cast Muslims as dangerous fundamentalists, thus encouraging Islamophobia and intensifying ethnic tensions in the country, leading to reciprocal radicalization that popularizes far-right attitudes. Similar claims are made against Muslims in Kosovo in an effort to undermine the state’s efforts to be internationally recognized as a sovereign nation. Anti-Western disinformation campaigns and propaganda disseminated in the media contribute to Russia’s influence, and these messages are also spread by political elites in SEE who are sympathetic to the Russian cause. Meanwhile, government officials who oppose the far right are hesitant to speak out against it. Thus, state institutions in countries like Serbia and Croatia tacitly accept far-right attitudes, in part because ethnonationalism is already entangled with government policies. 

There are also numerous paramilitary organizations that contribute to the rise of the far right. Russia has a presence in SEE in the form of the Night Wolves motorcycle gang as well as by supporting the Serbian/Balkan Cossacks Army and so-called patriotic military training camps for youths. SEE soldiers are also sometimes invited to train in Russia. This support goes both ways, as numerous Serbians went to Ukraine to assist Russian paramilitary forces there. Overall, Russia is employing both soft- and hard-power efforts in SEE in order to reawaken ethnic tensions, weaken loyalty to the rest of Europe, and foster traditional and far-right attitudes that push SEE away from Western Europe and towards Russia. The rise of the far right in SEE is therefore a matter of great concern for global security, particularly for how it may affect the strength of European institutions.

Download the paper by clicking on the PDF button on the right.

The author would like to thank Dylan Browne-Wilkinson, Jovana Petrovska, Lirije Palushi, Hugo van Manen, Prof. Shinasi Rama, Prof. Rob de Wijk and the United States Institute of Peace for their contribution to the development of this paper. A special thanks is dedicated to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their contribution to the “Countering Radicalisation through Lifestories” project, which made the usage of primary data possible for this paper. Please note that some parts of this report have also been incorporated into a report on Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans due to similarities between the themes. See https://hcss.nl/report/geopolitical-influences-external-powers-western-balkans 

New paper out now! To read, click here.

The international community has been vividly discussing ways to control the use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) by military forces. Throughout the process, both legal and non-legal solutions have been proposed aiming to improve accountability, ethical and legal standards, and verifiability of the autonomous systems.

HCSS surveyed the landscape of proposed solutions in order to identify potential gaps in the regulatory regime and additionally conducted an interactive session with experts from various related fields to identify the practical shortcomings of the regime.

This study identified that the current regime is sufficient to address the risks and threats of autonomous weapon systems. At the same time, further efforts are necessary to strengthen the regime.

Accordingly, the following recommendations are presented to policymakers:

•             promote domestic and international legal compliance;

•             increase technical literacy in order to streamline technological solutions in policymaking;

•             implement legal and ethical standards in the relations with contractors; 

•             strengthen cooperation of epistemic communities to improve the exchange of knowledge;

•             take the lead in the process of translating domestic standards into international principles.

Would you like to know more? Download the paper here, or click on the PDF button on the right.

Photo credit: Naval Surface Warriors

Read our Strategic Monitor 2019-2020 now! Click here to download the PDF. 

In order to remain on top of the rapid changes in the international environment, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence have tasked The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the Clingendael Institute to conduct research within the framework of the Strategic Monitor, which monitors trends and developments in the international order and presents a risk analysis on the national security of the Netherlands.

The yearly report was presented today to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stef Blok. 

The Strategic Monitor 2019-2020 consists of the summary report “Between Order & Chaos: The Writing on the Wall”, and ten individual research papers. The executive summary of the report is available in English and Dutch. The individual research papers are available in English. 

The title of this year’s report “The Writing on the Wall” is a reference to the warning of impending disaster in the biblical tale of Belshazzar, King of Babylon, described in the book of Daniel. In it, Daniel reads the writing on the wall as a warning to Belshazzar that his days as king were numbered. Sudden, structural change such as the end of Belshazzar’s kingdom is emblematic of discontinuity, a central feature of today’s world. Power is shifting, technological progress is accelerating, rules are changing. The Strategic Monitor seeks to decipher the writing on the wall, describe the key trends as they unfold, and understand how they shape our future.

Please find an overview of the Strategic Monitor 2019-2020 research papers below:

• Conflict in Cyberspace
• Economic Security with Chinese Characteristics
• CBRN Weapons
• Perceptions of Security
• Terrorism in the age of digital technology
• Military Competition in Perspective
• Hybrid Conflict
• In the Eye of the Beholder?
• What World do we live in?
• The Netherlands in the world

The reports can also be accessed through the website of the Clingendael Institute. 

New report out now! To read, click here.

Over the last decade, long-term forecasts of Dutch natural gas production in small fields have consistently over-estimated production. The main reason for this is not technical or geological but rather an underestimate of the speed at which the business climate for the Dutch gas industry has deteriorated. Fewer projects than expected materialized; the projects that did materialize took a longer time than expected. Permitting procedures are taking a long time, especially after the introduction of a new mining law. The tax regime is less favorable than in the UK southern North Sea. Local governments often use all the options that the new mining law offers them to delay projects as much as possible.

The current low gas prices make it more difficult for Dutch gas producers to obtain funding. A low case forecast, assuming a further deterioration of the investment climate predicts that by 2030 Dutch natural gas production will have virtually ceased.

With Dutch natural gas consumption expected to be relatively constant over the coming decade, gas imports will rise drastically. Within the EU Dutch gas is, and will be, replaced by Russian piped gas and LNG imports. The total emission of greenhouse gases for imported natural gas is about 30% higher compared to Dutch gas (due to methane leakages and the energy required to transport gas over long distances). On a global scale, this negates all progress that is currently being made by increasing the share of solar and wind in the Dutch power mix.

Authors: Jilles van den Beukel, independent energy analyst (formerly a principal geoscientist at Shell) & Lucia van Geuns

Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right.

New report out now! To read, click here.

Has the world become more free and secure, or is democracy under attack? 

This report aims to answer the question “what is the state of the world today?”, through the provision of a dispassionate, empirically grounded, multi-dimensional overview of international developments. It analyzes dynamics within the socioeconomic, identitary, connectedness, judicial, political, and security domains to capture dynamics in a world in a state of flux.

For each domain the central question is assessed at the level of the individual, at the state, and at the system levels, on the basis of two indicators: whenever possible, one of these indicators is objective in nature and enquires into the actual state (of equality, freedom, security), while the other is subjective in nature and examines how this state is experienced or perceived by individuals.

Our conclusion? The world faces significant increases in, for instance, armed conflict, combat fatalities and illiberal states’ share of international influence. However, human welfare has improved, as well as interconnectivity and democracy. As always, the state of the world is in flux. 

Read the report here.

This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

New report out now! To read, click here. 

This short paper outlines the indicators and methods used to establish whether the world has become more equitable and prosperous, more democratic, and more peaceful. It also outlines the indicators and methods used to establish whether identitary issues have become a larger force in the international system, whether lawlessness has increased, and whether the world has become more connected.

This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.

Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right. 

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

New report out now! To read, click here.

Navigating the changing global environment requires first and foremost a keen understanding of changes in Dutch foreign relations. The Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI), developed by HCSS, captures the relationship between the Netherlands and other countries over time through a quantitative measurement of a limited set of important dimensions in international relations. This can subsequently help in identifying potential partners as well as potential adversaries in the pursuit of Dutch foreign policy objectives.

Read the report here.

This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.

Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.