The decline in domestic gas production has resulted in the Netherlands, once a self-sufficient country, becoming increasingly dependent on imports of natural gas from Russia and of LNG from the US and Qatar, among others. While the economic consequences of Dutch import dependency have been widely discussed, this paper gives particular attention to geopolitical and environmental concerns from the perspective of the Netherlands.
The decline in domestic gas production has resulted in the Netherlands, once a self-sufficient country, becoming increasingly dependent on imports of natural gas from Russia and of LNG from the US and Qatar, among others. While the economic consequences of Dutch import dependency have been widely discussed, this paper gives particular attention to geopolitical and environmental concerns from the perspective of the Netherlands.
Growing dependence on Russia weakens the geopolitical position of the Netherlands and, by extension, of the EU as a whole. A country that the EU and the Netherlands have repeatedly condemned and opposed, has the permanent ability to interfere with the energy provision of member states and of the EU’s neighboring countries. At the same time, the import of foreign gas is associated with increased greenhouse gas emissions and methane leakages, undermining the Netherlands’ capacity to reach its ambitious climate goals. These risks are exacerbated by the fragmentation in EU member states’ energy policies, allowing centralized and geopolitically-motivated actors like Russia to turn countries against each other.
A purely economic approach fails to take into account a significant array of risks associated with gas dependence, necessitating a multi-vector approach to analysing gas security in the Netherlands.
Geopolitical and environmental dilemmas of Dutch gas supply security can be found in our latest paper by Irina Patrahau and Lucia van Geuns.
De Europese afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse technologie heeft tot een discussie over soevereiniteit en digitale autonomie geleid, waarin meerdere invalshoeken aan bod komen: rechtsbescherming, veiligheid, onderwijs en economie.
De Europese afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse technologie heeft tot een discussie over soevereiniteit en digitale autonomie geleid, waarin meerdere invalshoeken aan bod komen: rechtsbescherming, veiligheid, onderwijs en economie.
Terwijl deze discussie enthousiast in Brussel werd gevoerd, leek het debat in Nederland te ontbreken. Daarom hebben het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) en TNO in januari 2021 een workshop georganiseerd met experts uit het bedrijfsleven, academici en de overheid om deze discussie aan te gaan. De bevindingen en aanbevelingen van die workshop worden in dit rapport uitgebreid uitgelegd.
Auteurs: Louk Faesen (HCSS), Tom van Schie (TNO), Michel Rademaker (HCSS), en Paul Timmers (European University Cyprus) en Matthijs Veenendaal (TNO).
As the US retreats from its leadership role in Europe, Turkey has pursued an increasingly independent defense policy, attempting to position itself as a regional power and producing tensions with fellow NATO allies.
As the US retreats from its leadership role in Europe, Turkey has pursued an increasingly independent defense policy, attempting to position itself as a regional power and producing tensions with fellow NATO allies.
While strong interdependencies remain, conflict, not just of values, but of interests, has made the relationship between Turkey and NATO a tenuous one. The absence of European defense on the Biden agenda means that even in a post-Trump era, frictions between Turkey and NATO are set to remain.
What does this mean for the future of NATO-Turkey relations?
Find out in this new HCSS snapshot by Dorith Kool (HCSS), Patrick Bolder (HCSS) and Colonel (ret.) Murat Dogan (Turkish Army).
Geopolitieke verhoudingen verharden en dreigingen nemen toe in aantal, variëteit en complexiteit. De Defensievisie 2035 stelt dat het groeiende beroep dat in de komende jaren op Defensie wordt gedaan en de beschikbare middelen nu niet op elkaar aansluiten. Defensie kampt met een structureel tekort aan personeel, zowel wat betreft de kwantitatieve personele vulling, als de kwalitatieve vulling; dit vormt een van de belangrijkste risico’s voor Defensie. De integratie van mens en technologie biedt hier een mogelijke oplossing.
Geopolitieke verhoudingen verharden en dreigingen nemen toe in aantal, variëteit en complexiteit. De Defensievisie 2035 stelt dat het groeiende beroep dat in de komende jaren op Defensie wordt gedaan en de beschikbare middelen nu niet op elkaar aansluiten. Defensie kampt met een structureel tekort aan personeel, zowel wat betreft de kwantitatieve personele vulling, als de kwalitatieve vulling; dit vormt een van de belangrijkste risico’s voor Defensie. De integratie van mens en technologie biedt hier een mogelijke oplossing.
Het verder ontwikkelen van een technologisch hoogwaardige defensieorganisatie moet erop gericht zijn om de arbeidsproductiviteit en daarmee de effectiviteit te verhogen. Technologie kan worden ingezet om defensiepersoneel te ondersteunen juist in die rollen waar een tekort is, zoals vliegers of technische en geneeskundige rollen. Automatisering, digitalisering en robotisering bieden kansen om een deel van het routineuze, vieze en gevaarlijke werk over te nemen. Tegelijkertijd kunnen mensen worden ingezet daar waar zij de meeste meerwaarde hebben: waar interactie, inlevingsvermogen en ethische afwegingen van belang zijn.
De integratie tussen mens en technologie kan dus leiden tot meer effectief inzet van beperkte middelen om de arbeidsproductiviteit van defensiepersoneel te verhogen. Dit betekent echter niet dat Defensie een organisatie van hoogopgeleide of technische mensen moet gaan worden. Juist de integratie met technologie maakt het mogelijk om laag of andersopgeleide mensen meer effectief in te zetten, en vergroot daarmee de wervingspool voor Defensie.
Om deze voordelen te realiseren, is het nodig om de kansrijke gebieden te identificeren waar technologische modernisering het meest de arbeidsproductiviteit kan vergroten.
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Dit document vormt de eindrapportage van het Beleidsonderzoek Arbeidsextensieve Technologische Oplossingen dat in opdracht van de DG Beleid van het Ministerie van Defensie in de periode september-december 2020 door het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) en PricewaterhouseCoopers Nederland (PwC) is uitgevoerd.
Auteurs: Frank Bekkers (HCSS) en Sanne Maas (PwC), met bijdragen van Naveen Srivatsav (PwC) en Dorith Kool (HCSS).
Militaries around the world are developing, integrating and using robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) in line with the evolution of warfare. Further thinking needs to be done regarding the conditions under which this process takes place within the Netherlands and what challenges and implications are likely to arise as a consequence. The HCSS project ‘RAS in a Military Context’ sought to contribute to this discussion.
Militaries around the world are developing, integrating and using robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) in line with the evolution of warfare. Further thinking needs to be done regarding the conditions under which this process takes place within the Netherlands and what challenges and implications are likely to arise as a consequence. The HCSS project ‘RAS in a Military Context’ sought to contribute to this discussion.
Over a two year period, the project yielded five public research papers covering a range of topics relevant to the implementation of RAS in a military context. These research papers cover military applicability, ethical considerations, legal discourse, requirements for cooperation and the implementation of RAS in a military context. All papers are combined in this Capstone document, including a Synthesis, which briefly summarizes the analyses, and a series of six factsheets.
Download the RAS Capstone report here.
Our approach was focused on acquiring the expertise of practitioners, researchers, ethicists, legal specialists, industry professionals, technicians, civil society organizations, military personnel and other members of the defense community. Doing so enabled us, not only to gather a multi-faceted understanding of the subject matter, but also to uniquely connect these stakeholders together and foster challenging discussions between them. Over the course of the project we held five meetings with a diverse group of Sounding Board members who steered our research trajectory and provided valuable input into our position papers and draft research papers. We also gathered expertise from over 200 stakeholders who joined our six expert sessions, which involved various methodologies including scenario based discussions, design sessions, serious gaming exercises and interviews.
Our secondary objective was to inform public debate and create a more nuanced conversation about RAS in a military context that resisted prevailing ideas of ‘killer robots’. To this end, we held public symposiums on the ethical dilemmas RAS pose, released five De Strateeg podcasts in cooperation with BNR Nieuwsradio, organized conferences and roundtables and in February 2021, we released an 18-minute documentary, available on YouTube.
The RAS Project Team would like to thank all who have been involved in this project for generously offering their time and expertise, particularly our Sounding Board members. Our hope is that readers find our research and practical recommendations helpful in structuring their thinking and that the discussion on this important topic will continue to develop and thrive.
Michel Rademaker, Project Leader
Over the last two years, HCSS has conducted research on Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) in a military context concerning several aspects and dilemmas. Throughout this paper on the implementation of RAS, we hope to inspire thinking and stimulate the reader to reflect on the future use of RAS, draw recommendations towards the year 2035 that fit within the ‘Operationeel Kader voor het Landoptreden’ (and align these recommendations with the foreseen ‘Defensievisie 2035’) and consider recommendations for the implementation of RAS towards the year 2045.
Over the last two years, HCSS has conducted research on Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) in a military context concerning several aspects and dilemmas. Throughout this paper on the implementation of RAS, we hope to inspire thinking and stimulate the reader to reflect on the future use of RAS, draw recommendations towards the year 2035 that fit within the ‘Operationeel Kader voor het Landoptreden’ (and align these recommendations with the foreseen ‘Defensievisie 2035’) and consider recommendations for the implementation of RAS towards the year 2045.
The rationale behind looking far into the future is twofold. First, significant questions must be addressed early in the development and implementation of RAS. Many technologies are still in their infancy and similarly, our understanding of the political, strategic, tactical and, operational application of RAS is in its early stages. The second reason stems from the idea that people tend to overestimate the maturation of technologies in the short term and underestimate the speed of technological developments in the long term. Thus, by using both shorter- and long-term time horizons, room is created to think out-of-the-box whilst simultaneously lending opportunity to plan against a plausible, but—not yet ready—future.
This paper assesses some relevant elements for the implementation of RAS into the armed forces and especially the Army. It raises questions regarding the formulation of concepts and doctrines, how command & control over RAS is organized, and the consequences of these changes for personnel (including their training), logistics, infrastructure, organizational processes, and leadership. Against this background, this paper develops recommendations regarding which lines of development or policies must be developed, the timeframe by which this should occur, and the prerequisites for these policies.
Climate Change is widely being recognized as a matter of national and international security. Climate-related disasters such as floods, tropical storms, landslides and other extreme weather events are likely to occur more often as well as increase in scope. Natural hazards can and will pose substantial risks to overall societal stability and security. This report by Femke Remmits, Elisabeth Dick and HCSS Deputy Director Michel Rademaker presents a unique and innovative methodology for assessing climate hazards and security of nations and regions: the Climate Security Risk Index.
Climate Change is widely being recognized as a matter of national and international security. Climate-related disasters such as floods, tropical storms, landslides and other extreme weather events are likely to occur more often as well as increase in scope. Natural hazards can and will pose substantial risks to overall societal stability and security. This report by Femke Remmits, Elisabeth Dick and HCSS Deputy Director Michel Rademaker presents a unique and innovative methodology for assessing climate hazards and security of nations and regions: the Climate Security Risk Index.
Climate change acts as a threat multiplier by triggering or aggravating existing cleavages within societies. More specifically, when climate change overburdens a countries' governmental capacity, societies become more vulnerable to social or political instability.
The Climate Security Risk Index focuses on the risks to national security generated by climate-related disasters and comprises of elements such as territorial integrity, ecological security, economic security, physical security, and social and political stability. This unique methodology supports the combination of multiple indicators and plots both the probability of a climate-related disaster to occur and the potential impact of said natural hazard.
Using this new risk assessment tool, decision-makers on the global, national and regional level can identify specific targets to prevent, mitigate and/or avert the security impact of climate-related extreme weather events. Additionally, this methodology can be utilized for tracking the progress and effectiveness of disaster-risk reduction measures or strategies.
This Climate Security Risk Methodology and Assessment was coordinated with the International Military Committee on Climate and Security, sponsored by HCSS and co-sponsored by the Luxembourg Government, and shouldered by the Water, Peace & Security (WPS) partnership and Progress WP6.
“Climate Change is widely being recognized as also a matter of national and international security. The COVID-crisis shows us the importance of being prepared and of being able to anticipate. Militaries around the world have learned the importance of early warning based on clear defined warners and indicators. They also learned what the consequences are of NOT being prepared. There currently is no adequate forecasting tool for assessing the security impact of climate change. This Climate Security Risk Methodology and Assessment fills that gap and provides a unique forecasting tool based on a very innovative big data analysis of related global databases." - Tom Middendorp
“Climate change is a threat multiplier disrupting society and threatening global security and stability. To combat the climate crisis and begin to “climate-proof” our societies, we need predictive tools that allow us to reliably assess risk and make responsible decisions based on well understood warnings and indicators. This important Climate Security Risk Methodology Report does just that. It allows readers to assess the specific climate perils – wildfire, drought, flooding, etc – in the context of probability and impact on countries and regions. This tool should be an essential component of national security planners in forecasting levels of risk from climate perils and acting today to build resilience and reduce emissions.“ - Sherri Goodman, Secretary General, International Military Council on Climate & Security and Senior Strategist and Advisory Board Member, Center for Climate & Security
Digitalisering is de afgelopen decennia de drijvende kracht geweest achter economische groei en wereldwijde integratie. De toenemende geopolitieke instabiliteit in de wereld, de snelgroeiende macht van China en de afnemende bereidheid tot samenwerking vanuit de VS, hebben er toe geleid dat Europa zich ook bewust is geworden van zijn afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse grondstoffen, producten en diensten.
Digitalisering is de afgelopen decennia de drijvende kracht geweest achter economische groei en wereldwijde integratie. De toenemende geopolitieke instabiliteit in de wereld, de snelgroeiende macht van China en de afnemende bereidheid tot samenwerking vanuit de VS, hebben er toe geleid dat Europa zich ook bewust is geworden van zijn afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse grondstoffen, producten en diensten.
Vooral op het terrein van digitale technologieën dreigt de EU achterop te raken. Deze toenemende afhankelijkheid heeft ertoe geleid dat, vooral vanuit de EU, vele initiatieven zijn ontplooid om de strategische autonomie te versterken.
De mogelijkheid voor Nederland om haar economische en veiligheidsbelangen te beschermen en te bevorderen hangt in belangrijke mate af van de (innovatie)kracht van de technologiesector en de digitale weerbaarheid van de samenleving. Achterblijvende investeringen bedreigen echter de strategische positie van Nederland en de EU doordat de toekomst van het digitale domein voor een groot deel wordt vormgeven en beheerd door niet EU-partijen.
Digitale weerbaarheid is echter geen zero-sum game waarbij alles wat niet in eigen hand of door de meest vertrouwde partners is ontwikkeld of kan worden gecontroleerd, onveilig is.
Om de strategische autonomie voor de lange termijn te kunnen blijven waarborgen moet Nederland fors investeren in de eigen innovatie- en concurrentiekracht. Dit moet zoveel mogelijk in EU-verband worden uitgewerkt. Alleen zo kan voldoende massa worden gecreëerd om wereldwijd relevant te blijven ten aanzien van de hoogtechnologische ontwikkelingen die noodzakelijk zijn om de digitale weerbaarheid te waarborgen.
Dit whitepaper is in samenwerking tussen TNO en The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) tot stand gekomen.
Auteurs: Matthijs Veenendaal (TNO), Tom van Schie (TNO), Michel Rademaker (HCSS) Louk Faesen (HCSS)
Russia’s dependence on revenues from oil and gas production is now higher than that of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. The prospects for fossil fuels however, have deteriorated in recent years.
US shale oil gives a downward pressure on oil prices and the ever-increasing determination to actively combat climate change is expected to result in decreased oil demand. In addition, it is becoming increasingly challenging to maintain Russia’s oil production at its current level. Although Russia’s gas reserves are plentiful, making money from them is getting more and more difficult, partially because LNG has become the dominant way for long distance gas transport.
How does the Russian oil and gas industry, and the Putin regime in general, deal with these challenges and what are its prospects?
Find out in this new HCSS paper by Jilles van den Beukel and Lucia van Geuns.
Download the Factsheet here.
Moderne conflictvoering neemt steeds vaker hybride vormen aan, waarbij het onderscheid tussen oorlog en politiek, conflict en vrede, soldaat en burger en gevechtsveld en veilig gebied vervaagd. Hierbinnen zijn militaire organisaties permanent actief, in een bredere omgeving en vanuit een breder palet aan te bereiken effecten. Militaire cyberoperaties vormen daarom een belangrijke spil in het takenpakket van een moderne krijgsmacht.
Moderne conflictvoering neemt steeds vaker hybride vormen aan, waarbij het onderscheid tussen oorlog en politiek, conflict en vrede, soldaat en burger en gevechtsveld en veilig gebied vervaagd. Hierbinnen zijn militaire organisaties permanent actief, in een bredere omgeving en vanuit een breder palet aan te bereiken effecten. Militaire cyberoperaties vormen daarom een belangrijke spil in het takenpakket van een moderne krijgsmacht.
In dit nieuwe rapport identificeren Louk Faesen, Tim Sweijs, Frank Bekkers en Timon Domela Nieuwenhuis Nyegaard wat de mogelijke rol van de Koninklijke Landmacht in het cyberdomein kan of moet zijn en welke capaciteiten de Landmacht dient te ontwikkelen.
Drie tactische effecten staan centraal:
- het beschermen van netwerken, individuen en platformen
- het vergroten van situational awareness & understanding
- het vermeerderen van de slagkracht
De auteurs doen concrete aanbevelingen op het gebied van doctrine, organisatie en commandovoering, opleiding en training, personeel, materieel en faciliteiten, beleid, en interoperabiliteit.
Hybrid threats are increasing, and the Netherlands, together with partners in its network of alliances, requires a new strategic posture to counter these threats. This report by TNO & HCSS serves as a background document in preparation of a hybrid conflict game organised by TNO in collaboration with HCSS.
Hybrid threats are increasing, and the Netherlands, together with partners in its network of alliances, requires a new strategic posture to counter these threats. This report by TNO & HCSS serves as a background document in preparation of a hybrid conflict game organised by TNO in collaboration with HCSS.
Authors Tim Sweijs, Samuel Zilincik, Frank Bekkers and Rick Meessen present a strategic framework that describes and explains relations between strategies and counter-strategies in dealing with hybrid threats and offer considerations to select those dominant strategies that are to be part of the Dutch strategic posture.
The framework presented in the report consists of two escalation axes. The vertical axis consists of five general strategies: (1) cooperation, (2) persuasion, (3) protection, (4) coercion, and (5) control. The horizontal escalation is comprised of the well-know DIMEL categorization of instruments and measures of state power.
The above-mentioned five strategies can be employed simultaneously or sequentially in order to counter hybrid threats. Additionality, these strategies can be exercised through and across the six DIMEL-domains of diplomacy, information, cyber, economy, military, and legal.
These theoretical propositions however, need to be further developed and tested. In light of this, these insights will be refined in a simulation environment in the form of a table-top game. By doing this, further light will be shed on how the strategies presented in this report function in a (simulated) competitive setting and subsequently help refine and inform the crafting of effective cross-domain strategies in real world scenarios.
Environmental resources and related infrastructure have long been used as both an instrument and strategy of military conflict and terrorism. However, due to global trends, the unlawful use of environmental resources or systems to function as both a target and an instrument of armed conflict is growing in frequency and efficiency.
Environmental resources and related infrastructure have long been used as both an instrument and strategy of military conflict and terrorism. However, due to global trends, the unlawful use of environmental resources or systems to function as both a target and an instrument of armed conflict is growing in frequency and efficiency.
In this snapshot, assistant analyst Femke Remmits and strategic analyst Bianca Torossian shed light on the risk environmental terrorism poses in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
The use of environmental resources and related infrastructure by terrorist actors as a strategy or instrument of conflict can be considered a hybrid tactic. The application of this tactic by terrorist groups in the MENA-regions is already evident and likely to increase considering that climate change is projected to intensify resource scarcity and livelihood insecurity globally.
How can environmental terrorism best be addressed?
The year 2020 is one to remember. The corona crisis changed the world at an unprecedented rate and many developments are still ongoing. Existing trends are accelerating, geopolitical relations are under pressure and the way we travel, work and spend our free time has changed radically.
The year 2020 is one to remember. The corona crisis changed the world at an unprecedented rate and many developments are still ongoing. Existing trends are accelerating, geopolitical relations are under pressure and the way we travel, work and spend our free time has changed radically.
This Annual Report contains food for thought, as we focus on some of the 2020 highlights and on future developments in the world. This can help us to look ahead to a brighter future beyond the gloom of the daily headlines.
At HCSS we do not pretend to know the future, to solve all highly complex problems with our analyses, or to instantaneously improve the relations between nations or mankind in an age of technology breakthroughs. But we expect that our fact-based analyses contribute to an increased understanding of the future path of the world and to provide ideas of how governments, businesses, individuals, and all of us can help to make this world a better and safer place to live in.
The HCSS team wishes you a Merry Christmas and a happy New Year!
Leidt persistent engagement tot meer stabiliteit in cyberspace, of tot misinterpretaties en escalatie? In een artikel voor Militaire Spectator beschrijven Louk Faesen (Strategisch Analist bij HCSS) en Deborah Lassche (onderzoeker bij TNO) de mogelijke gevolgen volgens voor- en tegenstanders en wat persistent engagement kan betekenen voor Nederland.
Leidt persistent engagement tot meer stabiliteit in cyberspace, of tot misinterpretaties en escalatie? In een artikel voor Militaire Spectator beschrijven Louk Faesen (Strategisch Analist bij HCSS) en Deborah Lassche (onderzoeker bij TNO) de mogelijke gevolgen volgens voor- en tegenstanders en wat persistent engagement kan betekenen voor Nederland.
In het najaar van 2018 haalde het Cybercommando van de Verenigde Staten (CYBERCOM) de Russische trollenfabriek Internet Research Agency offline. Deze offensieve cyberactie wordt gezien als een eerste test van CYBERCOM’s nieuwe strategie van persistent engagement. Volgens voorstanders zou het nieuwe optreden moeten leiden tot meer stabiliteit in cyberspace, geloofwaardigere afschrikking en het beter markeren van rode lijnen over wat wel en niet acceptabel is in cyberspace. Critici vrezen echter voor gebrek aan communicatie of overcommunicatie, misinterpretaties, escalatie en een ondermijning van de internationale rechtsorde. Als gevolg hiervan zou persistent engagement het algehele strategische landschap veranderen en de deterrence posture van kleine tot middelgrote landen zoals Nederland.
Lees het hele artikel hier bij Militaire Spectator of download hier de PDF.
To date, the current COVID-19 pandemic has infected over 45 million people worldwide and resulted in almost 1.2 million fatalities, with economic consequences that are already staggering.
What are the security implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for Europe? In this new article for Atlantisch Perspectief, HCSS Director of Research Tim Sweijs and Assistant Analyst Femke Remmits discuss how the COVID-19 pandemic is above all an accelerator, an exacerbator and a catalyst of prevailing security dynamics.
Download the PDF here.