The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on hybrid conflict. Our research suggests that the international security environment is increasingly characterized by hybrid strategies that fall under military, political, economic, information, and cyber domains. Hybrid threats are characterized by their complexity, ambiguity, multidimensional nature, and gradual impact, making them difficult for states to effectively respond to and posing a significant challenge to the international order. Whilst hybrid tactics in and of themselves are not entirely new, the availability of diverse and sophisticated (technological) tools is enhancing the impact, reach, and congruence of these strategies. This aspect, paired with states’ unprecedented aversion to engage in conventional war due to nuclear, economic and political deterrence, and recent shifts in global power means that hybrid conflict constitutes an increasingly desirable strategy to achieve political goals.

The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Bianca Torossian, Tara Görder, Lucas Fagliano (HCSS). Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Hugo van Manen, Dylan Browne-Wilkinson (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael)

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or Click Here.

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

As NATO celebrates the 70th anniversary of its Founding Treaty this year, many fundamental aspects of its future are widely debated within the Alliance itself. Western views on NATO’s future have, throughout the seven decades of its existence, ranged from those who predicted NATO’s imminent demise to those who claimed that the many ties that bind the two sides of the Northern Atlantic are so deep and enduring that they are bound to last for decades to come. Throughout this period, the center of gravity in this debate has always tended to lean towards the latter view. More recently, however, the Western outlook on NATO’s future is increasingly being painted in decidedly more somber hues.

But what do other key players in the international system think about NATO’s future(s)? To answer this question, the Dutch ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs asked HCSS to take a closer and more systematic look at how Chinese and Russian experts have been analyzing NATO’s future in their languages over the past three years – basically since the beginning of the Trump presidency. Many of the key Chinese and Russian scholars working on these issues also publish in English. Given the nature of these countries’ regimes, however, it is often unclear to what extent they are signaling to the broader Western or international community as opposed to reflecting their own opinions or views. This may differ from publications in their own language primarily targeted at domestic audiences, which also clearly include part of their countries’ elites whose knowledge of the English language might preclude them from being exposed to their projections and ideas.

This document is structured in four sections. After a succinct overview of the method used in Chapter 2, the Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the main findings for the Chinese and the Russian language domains respectively. The final Chapter 5 gives the conclusions as well as some broader reflections on the promise and peril of this type of foresight work for improving the government’s strategic anticipation capacity.

DISCLAIMER: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Based on our recent report by the same name, this Policy Brief by Dr. LLM Arlinda Rrustemi & Professor Rob de Wijk sheds a light on the consequences of foreign influences in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Policy Brief highlights challenges and opportunities for Western actors in the region, including setting out a coherent accession plan to the EU and NATO for these states. 

This report examines how and to what extent multiple external actors are increasing their influence over the political elites and peoples of Western Balkans countries. It considers economic, political, religious cultural and security-related factors, and their impact on the future of peace and state-building processes. Increasingly, Eastern actors have been using hybrid threats (disinformation warfare, covert operations to win the hearts and minds of the population by Russia), spreading violent extremism (Gulf countries), potentially debt-trapping some Western Balkans countries (China), violating the EU laws on arms trade (Gulf countries) and implementing identity reengineering (Gulf countries, Iran, Russia, Turkey) in order to advance their geopolitical interests. Indeed, the Eastern actors often adopt a holistic approach in focusing on winning hearts and minds of the Western Balkans population. 

These security risks can derail the stability of the region in the long term with negative ramifications towards the EU and NATO integration processes as well as EU regional policies. For instance, it has been found that for political reasons, the West is now less attractive to the Western Balkans. Local elites may be less willing to engage with the West because they are reticent to promote the rule of law, or because of a lack of personal ties between the Western Balkans elites and Western counterparts. Moreover, there is fatigue to engage with the West because interaction is very time-consuming and complicated, for instance with regard to obtaining grants. Most importantly, factors such as the lack of coherent strategy from the West, the failed post conflict reconstruction due to the prioritization of stability over democracy, the lack of a realistic EU enlargement agenda, and the lack of engagement with the local population has disillusioned both elites and common people across the Western Balkans region. This is why engagement with Eastern partners often seems more appealing: it is easier to obtain grants for projects, leadership styles are more similar, and local elites feel more secure about their own positions and the maintenance of the status quo, effectively perpetuating the grip on power by illiberal elites.    

The central objective of this report is to outline policy recommendations which can holistically deal with the challenges posed by Western and Eastern actors in the Western Balkans region. In aiming to bolster peace and security in the Western Balkans region, the policy recommendations are grouped from general to specific, focusing on aspects of law, economic, security and social affairs.

Generally, the region may be at a turning point where populations that are generally torn between the West and the East may begin gravitating more towards the latter. The West, therefore, needs to craft a response soon in order to avert further instability in the region. For this purpose, it would be crucial to re-establish legitimacy while strengthening the moral authority of the West, speaking with one voice in the region, and, crucially, maintain a realistic EU Enlargement Agenda, such as opening the membership negotiations for North Macedonia and Albania. It would also be beneficial to award Bosnia and Herzegovina a candidate status, and to agree to visa liberalization for Kosovo. The agenda needs to remain proactive and to be implemented thoroughly. Existing instruments need to be employed and more exposure needs to be generated to show and explain Western engagement with the region, not only aimed at the elites but also at the local population.

It is therefore crucial that Western actors respond swiftly and reinforce their efforts to promote democracy. This in turn would help in winning the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, it is important to provide alternatives to local governments to prevent them from getting caught in the debt trap diplomacy of China, to counter Turkish authoritarian propaganda, to prevent violent extremism, supported by the Gulf countries and Iran, as well as to counter disinformation warfare conducted by Russia, as well as the rising far right violent extremism identified in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. 

In the legal sphere, our recommendations call for implementing laws on transparency and strengthening of the judiciary, regulating housing prices and building new mosques. In the security sphere, it is crucial to harmonize security policies of Western Balkans countries with those of the EU and its member states; consider sanctions for arms exports if in violation with the EU laws; promote individual responsibility; strengthen the border control; and to limit the appointment of foreign imams. Regarding economic measures, it is suggested to open the EU Cohesion Fund to Western Balkans countries and to encourage further investment in rural areas. In terms of societal measures, it is important to increase the prominence of public awareness campaigns, and to promote civil society engagement. It is also proposed to challenge the attractiveness of Eastern actors by informing the local public about these countries’ strategies to sow social divisions. It is also important to increase cultural exchanges and language courses. Finally, it is essential to monitor the changes in societal values and beliefs. A combination of these types of measures may assist in strengthening democracy in the region as well as countering external influences. However, this necessitates tailored implementation tracks for each country which requires further in-depth research on how to implement such strategies through a governmental and societal approach. 
 

On 17 September a report about Quantum Computing was published by HSD Office: Understanding the strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security, Implications of Quantum Computing within the Cybersecurity Domain. This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).The report was launched during the HSD Café about Quantum Technology. 

For more information, please see the HSD website. 

The objective of the Quantum Technology initiative within the Hague Security Delta (HSD) is to create the practical facilities for cyber security companies to experiment with Quantum Key Exchange technology. These companies can improve practical skills and knowledge and realise innovative solutions for their (encryption) products. In this way we will get prepared for the post-quantum era.

Quantum computers are widely seen as a breakthrough technology, especially when employed in disciplines like artificial intelligence, cryptography, and big data analytics. Yet, with the undeniable promise of quantum computing come vast amounts of hype and confusion, ranging from what a quantum computer precisely entails, to when one can expect a quantum computer, to what sort of applications it might offer. We need to be prepared for this in future.

To download the report, click on the button to the right or visit the HSD website. 

The accelerating arms race in Artificial Intelligence and the diffusion of cheap, technologically advanced military systems among state and non-state actors, compel countries to adopt robotic and autonomous systems (RAS). This is due to not only the prospect of lagging behind allies, but the notion that adversaries use RAS to gain a significant military advantage and escalation dominance. How can countries stay competitive, without violating core national and international ethical principles?

This paper discusses the key ethical challenges spanning human agency, human dignity and responsibility in the operation of RAS. It presents a three-part framework for how to view human control over RAS in an ethical manner:

• Life cycle perspective
• Sub-system functionality perspective
• Observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop perspective

Based on the framework above, the paper presents the following concrete recommendations for actors engaging in the design, development, testing, operation and decommissioning of RAS at the strategic and operational levels:

• The fundamental principle is to work with ‘ethics by design’: ethical considerations are incorporated in not just the operating of RAS, but all throughout a system’s life cycle;
• Create an institutional culture of shared accountability concerning all actors involved throughout the RAS life cycle;
• Build a wider understanding of system behavior by involving end users as early as in the design and testing stages. This way, the users within the military can trace, understand and predict a system’s decision-making process;
• Develop best practice guidelines for (1) outsourcing to external contractors; and (2) interoperability with technologically advanced allied armed forces that co-deploy RAS;
• Identify within what sub-system functions of RAS increasing automation and autonomy will present benefits to the military without eliciting major ethical concerns, such as movement controls and computer vision;
• Embed core rules of engagement (ROEs), along with an open architecture that allows for mission-specific ROEs by mission command;
• Improve transparency on the uses and contexts of use of RAS in the military domain with the general public and inform policymakers of realistic opportunities and limitations of complex system design.

Dowload the report here.

Disclaimer: Responsibility for the content and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors. Publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.

Dit rapport is in februari 2019 verschenen in het Engels onder de titel: Groningen gas: a loss of a social license to operate.

Dit artikel is gepubliceerd door Jilles van den Beukel, geofysicus en energieanalist & Lucia van Geuns, adviseur energie HCSS.

In Maart 2018 besloot de Nederlandse regering om, zo snel als de vraag naar Groningen gas het toelaat, te stoppen met de gasproductie in Groningen. Dit impliceert dat de gasproductie waarschijnlijk rond 2025, en op zijn laatst in 2030, zal stoppen en dat ongeveer 500 miljard kubieke meter gas zal achterblijven in de bodem. In dit artikel geven wij een overzicht van wat er gebeurd is rond Groningen gas, vanuit een geologisch, financieel, politiek en maatschappelijk oogpunt. Daarbij ligt de focus vooral op de periode van 2012 tot 2018. Het is het verlies van de license to operate, in combinatie met de geleidelijke toename in seismiciteit per eenheid geproduceerd gas, die aan de basis stonden van de beslissing om met de gaswinning in Groningen te stoppen.

Tegen een achtergrond van een verlies aan maatschappelijke acceptatie brachten een omkering van de bewijslast en de toepassing van een relatief strikte norm voor veiligheid (ongeacht het grote economische belang van Groningen gas) een grote toename van de kosten met zich mee (die voor een groot deel door operator NAM werden gedragen). Electoraal viel een lange termijn voortzetting van de Groningen gas productie niet meer te verdedigen; met name niet in combinatie met de herverdeling van kosten en baten tussen staat en NAM die noodzakelijk was om de NAM te bewegen tot een voortzetting van de productie.

Vanuit maatschappelijk oogpunt was het verlies van de license to operate (de achtergrond waartegen politieke en juridische maatregelen tussen 2012 en 2018 genomen werden) de meest in het oog springende ontwikkeling.

Voor de Engelse versie/for the English version: https://hcss.nl/report/groningen-gas-loss-social-license-operate.

The cyber policy field is defined by a wide range of institutions and dynamics. Within this context, siloed approaches and fragmentation are among the most cited reasons for the slow process of creating cyber policy and norms. The fact that cyberspace is fragmented is well known, yet the how it is fragmented has not been adequately mapped. 

 It is precisely this question that drove the development of the prototype HCSS Cyber Norms Observatory: "How is the cyber regime complex fragmented?”. HCSS has developed a model that creates a network of over 900 norms in cyberspace to answer the question posed by the Observatory, and clusters these norms according to their similarity.

Any strategy requires situational understanding, and a first step towards this goal is mapping what space you and your enterprise inhabit. HCSS aims is to provide its clients with analytical insights to allow them to make more informed decision using data analytics.

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).

Our society is undergoing a digital transformation. The characteristics of this transformation are determined by the convergence of technologies and social activities that blur the boundaries between physical, digital, and biological systems. Moreover, the speed of this transformation is dizzying. Developments such as ‘big data’, ‘cyber crime’, ‘blockchain’, ‘autonomous systems’, artificial intelligence (AI), and ‘smart cities and societies’ will soon be replaced by another pantheon of terms and themes. These technological breakthroughs result in major societal, social and economic changes, leading to considerable challenges, not least in relation to security.

This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has made exponential progress in recent years, especially in terms of Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) and machine learning. As the amount of data breaches and cybersecurity incidents grow, AI is increasingly being hailed for its new way to automatically spot any malware on a network, guide incident response, and detect intrusions before they even occur. The 2018 Ponemon Institute’s “Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Cyber-Security” study, for example, shows that AI is able to detect 63% of previously undetectable zero-day exploits.1 However, despite the potential benefits of AI being touted as a game-changer, estimates on its impact on cybersecurity still vary widely. Cybersecurity is a field where absolute security is impossible. Instead its objective is to reduce the attack surface to a minimum. The rosy view of what AI can deliver is not entirely wrong, but what next-generation techniques actually do is more muddled and incremental than marketers would want to admit. Fortunately, researchers developing new defense techniques at companies and in academia largely agree on both the potential benefits and challenges. This study explores how machine learning, in particular unsupervised learning, can play a role in cybersecurity.2 Chapter 2 introduces the body of AI and the different forms of machine learning. Chapter 3 looks at the possible application and weaknesses of machine learning to improve cybersecurity, while chapter 4 identifies the macro bottlenecks for the technology. Overall, the study uses recent literature on the subject in light of contextual examples, and presents some suggestions and recommendations for Dutch stakeholders seeking to understand how to best profit from the development from a socio-economic context.

The threats and opportunities associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies force liberal societies to grapple with a range of fundamental issues, many of which directly affect the existing economic, social, political, and even the security fabrics that underpin the domestic and global orders.

From automated production lines to networked drone swarms on to automated mass surveillance, the combination of ever-more-sophisticated sensory arrays, never-before-seen computing power, and coding know-how is driving paradigm shifts in the creation of wealth, the governance of polities, and the functioning of societies.

This HCSS study seeks to attain a better understanding of threats and opportunities associated with this rapidly evolving technology by conducting an in-depth analysis of Chinese, European, Russian, and American AI programs, and to advise Dutch and European policymakers on optimal correction courses.

The report outlines mitigation options to address challenges within the economic, sociopolitical, and military-security domains. In addition, it formulates five overarching (non-domain-specific) recommendations for addressing shortcomings in the EU’s current AI ecosystem:

1. Support small and medium e-tech companies.

2. Formulate balanced privacy standards.

3. Facilitate academic sector R&D.

4. Ensure shared understanding of AI among Member States.

5. Leverage the EU’s economic weight in international norm-setting.

Download the report via the button on the right.

DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

At the fourth annual Planetary Security Conference (PSC 2019), participants had the opportunity to enrol in the Climate & Security Strategic Capability Game, a serious board game developed jointly by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) with support from the Clingendael Institute.

This briefing note summarises key takeaways coming out of the game. This is of interest, as the participants represented a good mix of policy makers, diplomats, military personnel, development professionals, local and regional leaders, scientists and private sector representatives from across the globe.

The game was designed with the aim to increase awareness about relevant capabilities and capacities that are needed for conflict prevention in the context of climate change; to address what climate change will mean for the planning of policies, activities and operations of different ministries; and to discuss the role of militaries in climate change prevention, response and after-care.

The Climate & Security Capability game is based on serious gaming methodology. Serious gaming introduces game participants to strategic capability thinking, facilitates strategic discussions on what organisations are and/or are not capable of; makes it possible to assess existing capabilities and to identify capabilities that are lacking; and supports the transfer of knowledge on capability building as well as network development. In addition to helping identify promising new capabilities, exercises using serious gaming methodology help raise awareness and understanding of issues at stake.

The game was built around five climate change scenarios: 1) Deltas under pressure scenario; 2) increasing temperatures and heat waves in cities scenario; 3) long-term droughts scenario; 4) disappearance of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) scenario; and 5) the Arctic warming scenario.

For more information, visit the PSI website.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on international peace and security in cyberspace. Conflict between states are taking new forms, with cyber operations taking a leading role. In recent years, the risk of a major cyber exchange between nation states, has often been described as a major threat in national security incidents. While this dire outlook is partially connected to the overall level of geopolitical tension, there is a significant concern that the ability of governments to successfully manage the threat of major conflict is hampered as they only make up one of three actor groups in the overall cyberspace regime complex.

The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Louk Faesen, Bianca Torossian, Carlo Zensus (HCSS) Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Hugo van Manen (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael)

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or Click Here.

 DISCLAIMER

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

This report contains the results from a research project aimed at identifying new capabilities for the future Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN).

With the type of naval operations and tasks for the period up to 2030-35 largely enduring, the current "regional power projection" profile of the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) must be strengthened and renewed. We envisage the core of the future naval force to remain a versatile mix of surface and sub-surface combatants, shipborne helicopters and unmanned systems for intelligence purposes and extended force projection, modern amphibious forces and long-range land attack capability to counter Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) threats. All main vessels should be ocean-going, able to navigate the main operating theaters in the European seas and the Carib under all conditions. But even while we expect that naval operations and tasks, as well as the overall force profile of the RNLN, will evolve rather than drastically change, the RNLN must substantially innovate — but not beyond recognition  — its personnel, materiel, doctrines and processes, organization and structures.

Some key lines of development for the naval capability portfolio for the period up to 2030-35 are:

• Unmanned systems in the air, space and on and below the sea, so-called UxVs, will increasingly take over the operational functionality of the manned ‘mother ships’ from which they are launched (and which, for the period up to 2030-35, remain the central command hubs at sea).
• Next to the flexibility offered by adaptive configurations of UxVs, modularity by design and provisions-for, e.g. multifunctional launch containers, will make it easier and less costly to introduce new technology on board of naval platforms.
• In warfighting scenarios, opponents will increasingly know the position of surface vessels in real time, making them vulnerable to long-range precision weapons. Submarines, which remain largely stealthy, will therefore play a growing role in forward offensive operations in disputed waters. The RNLN should continue to offer a highly valued contribution to allied capabilities within its niche of oceangoing, non-nuclear powered submarines.
• Naval land attack capabilities are required in a multi-domain approach to counter advanced A2AD capabilities. Amphibious and special operations (partially merging) launched from the sea also feature in this integrated approach.
• Space assets for communication, navigation and maritime situational awareness are increasingly vital to naval operations.
• For the next generation naval combatants, new weapon types such as energy weapons, railguns, hyper-velocity missiles and intelligent torpedoes should be contemplated, but quite possibly not initially acquired.
• (Counter-)mine capabilities will increasingly merge. Sea mines, as a cheap means for area denial, play an important role in e.g. various terrorist and escalating gray zone conflict scenarios. Continuous development capacity is required to keep ahead of the operational developments.
• In the period up to 2030-35, operations will increasingly be multi-domain and multi-level. High-quality and timely situational awareness and understanding is key, shared across domains and levels on the basis of 24/7 connectedness. Using AI and big data analysis techniques, better tools to produce actionable intelligence are vital.

HCSS CEO Paul Sinning will hand over the first copy of the printed report to vice-admiral Rob Kramer, commander of the RNLN, on July 4, 2019.

Download the report via the button on the right.

EU enlargement campaigns have historically been met with caution in the Netherlands at the policy level and by the Dutch society. Through a historical analysis of periods of EU enlargement, it becomes apparent that the Netherlands has often delayed expansion. Despite this, a balanced approach has tended to prevail in these instances, as processes were merely stalled, rather than spoiled. 

Though Dutch skepticism is rooted in legitimate concerns, the extent to which these concerns are invoked does not reflect the realities on the ground. Therefore, the Netherlands should take a balanced approach on EU enlargement, through greater collaboration between government entities, civil society, and media.

In doing so, the Netherlands could assist in ameliorating the image of the EU, and thereby promote its brand of liberal democracy to strengthen democratic processes in EU neighbor countries. With regard to South Eastern European countries, said efforts can serve to counterbalance the rising influence of China, Turkey, and Russia, among others, as well as to increase security and stability on the EU's border, and prevent relapse to conflict.

Read the policy brief here.