Cyberspace is managed by stakeholders from civil society, the private sector, and, to a lesser degree, by governments. The latter, however, is increasingly asserting its role in cyberspace, leading to a redistribution of power in which States are not only competing with other stakeholders, but also amongst each other. All cyberspace users thus face a power struggle between States that stands to affect the private sector and civil society, the multi-stakeholder approach to managing Internet resources, and therefore cyberspace writ large.

This article appropriates a realist model in international relations– the balance of power theory (BOP) – and adjusts it with neoliberal concepts of power to help better understand the challenge of stability between States in and on cyberspace. It specifically enables the “cybered” international relations of governments to be analysed against the backdrop of the complex ecosystem of stakeholders. This does not presuppose that States are or should be the most important or influential actors in cyberspace. Instead, this article focuses on State interests. It identifies two conditions of the BOP theory and applies them to cyberspace in three different scenarios previously suggested by States, and offers one suggestion on the way forward.

Downdload the PDF via the button on the right or click here.

This article was published in the European Cybersecurity Journal Volume 3 (2018) Issue 4.

The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide. This month we focus on Security and Migration, identifying new tensions in Europe and challenges to the international order.

The Global Security Pulse (GSP) makes use of an advanced horizon-scanning methodology that relies on the manual monitoring of hundreds of validated foresight resources, the structured coding of signals, and expert assessment. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Programme, which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Authors: Kars de Bruijne, Kay de Jonge, Willemijn Tiekstra. Contributions: Fransje Molenaar, Ana Uzelac, Anca-Elena Ursu, Louise van Schaik (Clingendael), Reiner Bergema (HCSS).

Use the button on the right to download the Pulse.

DISCLAIMER
The Global Security Pulse is part of the PROGRESS Program, Lot 5, commissioned by the Netherlands’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors; publication does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Defense.

Het aantal politieke ambtsdragers dat op jaarlijkse basis te maken krijgt met agressie en geweld is toegenomen ten opzichte van voorgaande jaren. Om deze problematiek effectief het hoofd te bieden is er in de afgelopen jaren een breed instrumentarium ontwikkeld, variërend van leidraden en campagnes tot bestuurlijke en strafrechtelijke maatregelen. Echter, waar geweld tegen overheidsmedewerkers in brede zin afneemt, blijft eenzelfde effect bij politieke ambtsdragers tot nu toe uit. De vraag of lokale overheden voldoende zijn toegerust om adequaat met deze ontwikkelingen om te gaan wint aan belang. In deze studie is het huidige instrumentarium ter bescherming van lokale politieke ambtsdragers op hoofdlijnen getoetst en biedt het een aantal aanknopingspunten en invalshoeken om het huidige beleid nader aan te scherpen, dan wel richting te geven aan verdiepend onderzoek.

Download het rapport via de knop aan de rechterkant van de pagina.

By 2050, the UN estimates that 70 percent of the global population will be living in urban areas. Therefore, understanding and anticipating the ability of cities to manage and avoid the negative effects of climate-related changes and events – for example, hurricanes, overpopulation or supply chain disruption – is of utmost importance. This paper presents a conceptual framework to empirically quantify the climate resilience of cities to guide policymakers and community leaders in identifying challenges and opportunities.  

This paper tests the framework for data analysis in three cities in conflict-prone territories: Bamako (Mali), Maiduguri (Nigeria, Lake Chad Region) and Baghdad (Iraq). The analysis of the three cases suggested that city resilience in those areas cannot be developed without addressing the root causes of conflict in the entire area, as city-level resilience in conflict areas is closely related to the national level.  

On the basis of the research, some important observations and recommendations are made. When tested, the analysis revealed that the level of resilience did not necessarily correspond to economic development; it also found that conflict significantly lowered overall urban resilience to climate-related impacts. Large sprawling cities typically score poorly on maintaining resilience. While recovery and learning capacities are usually present in urban areas, very dense urban areas are particularly vulnerable to climate disasters. Cities in the global north have built learning capacity; they have made efforts to share best practices (e.g., the Rockefeller Foundation’s Resilience initiative, efforts by UN CPI and CRI, etc); and they have considered the lessons learned and implemented guidance. 

Data analysis can help to bolster the learning capacity of cities to cope with climate impacts that could increase tensions in large urban areas. However, there is a significant difference in the availability of data between the developed and the developing world. Data collection in developing countries (and cities) should be strengthened to better estimate climate-related security risks in urban areas and bolster their capacity to maintain key functions and recover and learn from climate events in their own and comparable cities.  

Authors: Michel Rademaker, Karlijn Jans, Paul Verhagen, Aster Boeschoten, Hannes Rõõs & Stephan Slingerland

This study on cybersecurity, commissioned by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), examines the impact of cyber-related threats and challenges on corporate Europe and the degree of engagement of European businesses in tackling issues at stake. Although the new digitization era offers huge economic and social opportunities, it also changes the nature and magnitude of cyber risks and creates new vulnerabilities cyber attackers seek to exploit. European countries and businesses are targeted with growing frequency. Many companies, however, remain unaware or seem to underestimate, and even neglect the vulnerabilities they are facing through and in cyberspace. An open, safe and secure cyberspace is indispensable for the reliable functioning of European economies. 

Recognizing the importance of corporate cybersecurity for the economic wellbeing of Europe, this study presents the challenges European companies face in implementing good cybersecurity practices and offers recommendations on how to overcome them. The study first looks into the current cyber threat environment, and assesses its impact on the private sector. The second part addresses the level of awareness, preparedness and resilience against mounting cyber threats at the European, national and corporate level. Third, key challenges and bottlenecks that inhibit implementation of good cybersecurity practices are presented and analyzed. The final part outlines good practices and inspiring examples observed across the EU that could help overcome the aforementioned bottlenecks.

Authors: Katarina Kertysova, Erik Frinking, Koen van den Dool, Aleksandar Maričić, Kumar Bhattacharyya

The study can be accessed here or click on the download button on the right.

The Global Security Pulse enables you to spot new security developments ahead of the curve. This month we present novel and must-read developments on interstate military competition. With the resurgence of geopolitical competition and the proliferation of technological advancements, interstate military competition is rapidly changing with the emergence of new arms races and contests. Much of the international order has had a hard time coping with these changes - is your organisation prepared? Download the PDF via the button on the right or click here.

The Global Security Pulse allows our readers to spot new security developments ahead of the curve. The Pulse covers a wide range of security topics from environmental stress to military competition, focussing every month on one distinct theme. The Global Security Pulse is a collaborative product between the Clingendael Institute and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies - based on a jointly expanded versions of Clingendael’s horizon-scan methodology ranging from  manual scanning, Twitter analysis to validated expert input. The product is part of the Strategic Monitor Programme and stimulates foresight at the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Authors: Kars de Bruijne (Clingendael), Karlijn Jans, Tim Sweijs, Mischa Sibbel, Kay de Jonge (Clingendael), Paul Verhagen, Lucie Kattenbroek.

With contributions from: Rob de Rave, Dick Zandee (Clingendael) Peter van Ham (Clingendael).

DISCLAIMER
The Global Security Pulse is part of the PROGRESS Program, Lot 5, commissioned by the Netherlands’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors; publication does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Defense.

In de monitor 2017-2018 hebben HCSS en Instituut Clingendael wederom door middel van verscheidene methodes de ontwikkelingen in de internationale orde gemonitord en geduid. Deze orde blijkt weerbaarder voor spanningen dan vaak wordt gedacht, en Nederland blijft goed gepositioneerd in dit internationale krachtenveld. De afgelopen vijf jaar gedroegen de grote mogendheden zich assertiever, echter in 2017 was een meer afwachtende houding waar te nemen. Dit is wellicht te verklaren door de onvoorspelbare houding van de regering Trump. Ondanks spanningen leek er in 2017 sprake van een relatieve luwte in de internationale betrekkingen.

Hoe snel de situatie kan veranderen, blijkt op het moment uit de gebeurtenissen rondom het conflict in Syrië. Ook migratiestromen, terrorisme en Russische beïnvloeding tonen aan dat externe en interne dreigingen nauw met elkaar verbonden zijn. Deze al vaak benoemde ‘nexus’ tussen binnen- en buitenland zal dan nu ook echt zijn beslag moeten vinden in een geïntegreerd buitenland- en veiligheidsbeleid. 

De Strategische Monitor bevat naast de uitgebreide analyse van internationale trends in conflict en coöperatie, hoofdstukken gewijd aan:

• Dutch Foreign Relations Index: welke landen zijn partners van Nederland, op basis van gedeelde belangen en waarden?
• Dreigingen en kansen voor Nederland en Europa (o.a. migratie, terrorisme, klimaatverandering, cyberveiligheid)
• Politiek geweld
• De toekomst van Syrië
• Populistisch soevereinisme

Gezamenlijke publicatie met Instituut Clingendael. Auteurs: Stephan De Spiegeleire, Kars de Bruijne, Frank Bekkers, Minke Meijnders, Tim Sweijs.

In his well-known book The End of Power, Moises Naim argues that urbanization – which he regards as “the most aggressively power-transforming aspect of the mobility revolution” – will have “intense” consequences for the distribution of power within a country. The emerging role of cities in world politics makes governance of cities not just a local or national issue, but an international - or, if you will, a transnational - issue.

More people living in cities will inevitably have consequences for the nature of conflict. In response, cities are stepping up cooperation between them, which is now giving rise “to new power relations altogether” according to sociologist Saskia Sassen. However, it is not a given that cities working together will themselves be able to tackle conflict and violence, let alone take the lead in combating global violence and conflict, especially in the developing world.

For authorities at multiple levels, this prompts the need to rethink existing governance structures so as to ensure not only that different forms of violence and conflict in urban areas can be combated in the most effective ways, but also that appropriate preventative policies that tackle root causes be implemented. The result of such an exercise can be to create an ecosystem of stakeholders, from citizens to international organizations, suitable to address these very issues from a broad-based human security perspective.

The present study examines the relationships between urbanization and conflict from multiple angles, based on data-driven research. Subsequently, it considers the consequences for urban governance, and provides suggestions on how cities and national governments can improve cooperation on urban security together with other relevant stakeholders.

Download the report via the button on the right.

In a world of complex supply chains, global flows are critical to the welfare of societies at large. They yield enormous economic, social, and cultural value, whether through trade, foreign investment, tourism or the exchange of knowledge and ideas. Mounting interconnectedness, however, also facilitates the growth of negative flows such as human trafficking, the trade in illicit goods including arms and drugs, international terrorism, and cybercrime, which have the potential to disrupt and undermine the resilience of societies. While fundamentally dependent on global flows, modern societies are also critically vulnerable to flow insecurity.

Although many different state and non-state actors have a stake in flow security, they do not necessarily have or feel the responsibility to provide and maintain that security. Clearly, governments have a responsibility in facilitating positive flows while keeping negative flows in check. But what should or could be left to the, often private, owners of flow particles, flow channels and flow hubs? What about the global commons, those parts of the global flow chains where no national authority resides? How to protect the flows themselves, other than the channels - trade routes, digital networks - and hubs - harbors, airports, internet exchange centers - through which they flow? Are security and defense organizations sufficiently prepared to deal with the challenges at hand?

Acknowledging that contemporary security and defense is as much about ensuring uninterrupted access to global flows - both physical and virtual - as it is about safeguarding territorial integrity and global stability, this new HCSS report analyzes flow security as a distinct strategic challenge for the Netherlands. The study defines what flow security entails, describes its relevance to the Netherlands, analyzes its implications for security and defense policies, and outlines a set of policy recommendations concerning the implications of flow security for Dutch security and defense policies and the role, tasks and capabilities of the Dutch defense organization. The report also provides a valuable empirical analysis of the five critical flows, namely flows of goods and services, information, ideas and technology, capital, people and environmental agents, on which Dutch prosperity and stability depends.

Download the report via the button on the right.

Joint publication of the Atlantic Council, the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures and HCSS.

Authors: Jonathan D. Moyer, Tim Sweijs, Mathew J. Burrows, Hugo van Manen.

Today the ability to get other states to act in the international system may be characterized more by formal networks of influence than by traditional measures of coercive material capabilities. Yet, the concept of coercive power, rather than influence, continues to be central both in scholarly and political discourses about international order and the ability of nation states to promote and protect critical national interests. The lack of a clear but also measurable concept of what influence is and what tangible benefits accrue from it may be partly to blame for this. In filling that void, this report presents the highlights of our analysis of the newly compiled Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) Index. The FBIC Index contains bilateral measures of the formal economic, political, and security influence capacity of states worldwide from 1963 to 2016. Our analysis maps the changing dynamics of state influence over time.

Key findings from this report include the following:

• Global influence is concentrated in the hands of the few. Only ten countries possess about half of the world’s influence.

• Similar to trends in the global distribution of power, global influence has been dispersing. A growing number of states wield greater amounts of influence over larger geographical distances.

• The United States still retains a global lead in terms of its share of global influence capacity, but its share has been decreasing and is considerably smaller than its share of the world’s coercive capabilities.

• China’s upward trajectory has been impressive. It has vastly expanded its influence, not only in its own region but also outside of it, including in NATO member states and in Africa at large, where it has surpassed the United States.

• Russia’s trajectory has been similarly sizeable, but in the opposite direction: it has lost considerable amounts of influence, including in countries in the former Soviet space.

• European states, including some small ones such as the Netherlands, significantly punch above their weight in comparison to the size of their economies.

• Great powers continue to vie over spheres of influence for a variety of military-strategic, economic, and ideological reasons. Pivot states are located in the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and West Africa.

• The past two decades saw the emergence of new networks of influence and the reconfiguration of others around dominant hubs including in the Middle East and China.

Download the report via the button on the top right.

For the methodological annex which reviews the rationale for including the individual dimensions, and provides a discussion of the data-sets we use, see here.

European defence cooperation appears to have gained momentum. Particularly in the EU, new cooperation initiatives, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Fund and a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, address a number of weaknesses that defence cooperation was suffering from. It is clear that a number of external incentives have spurred on recent quick developments: an increasing critical and disengaged White House, a deteriorating security situation around Europe and an assertive Russia. However, it was perhaps the EU’s internal upheavals, such as Brexit, that really turned the tide. The Commission under Juncker’s leadership broke a number of taboos by becoming involved in defence cooperation and the French and German tandem chose defence as the policy area where they wanted to excel.

Amidst these new developments, this report wants to take a step back and look at the broader landscape of European defence cooperation. How do these new initiatives and existing cooperation formats fit together in a logical framework? What kind of patterns are developing and how can the recent developments be connected to the many already existing cooperation initiatives, both operational and in capability development? As new ideas seem to fall over each other, can we still make sense of European defence?

This report is a collaboration between the Clingendael Institute and HCSS. 

Authors: Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee and Eric Wilms. 

Download the report via the button on the right. 

Russia’s disinformation campaigns have targeted liberal democracies in Europe and North America with the goal to undermine societal coherence and distort the democratic process. The methods employed by the Kremlin include the dissemination of false, misleading and manipulative information and bear resemblance to the techniques, tactics and procedures used by the Soviet Union.

The past few years Western governments have been struggling with the question of how to appropriately respond to counter Russian subversive activities. Appropriate responses have been fiercely debated and are increasingly implemented. This new HCSS report considers lessons for liberal democracies based on an analysis of the postures, strategies, organizational setups, programs, products, and capabilities that the following five actors have developed in recent years: the European Union, NATO, Finland, Latvia and Ukraine.

This study is based on extensive desk research and in-depth personal interviews with relevant high level representatives of these five actors. It offers recommendations for liberal democracies on how to deal with Russia’s disinformation operations. The point of departure is the appropriate role and competence of government, as well as the constraints placed thereon in the context of a liberal democratic order. Of particular interest is how overall (top-down) visions, strategies and capabilities can help provide the best circumstances for societal resilience such as through (bottom-up) societal initiatives.

Download the report via the button on the right.

In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.

Deze folder is de derde in een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Aan de hand van praktijkvoorbeelden word geïllustreerd hoe AO toegevoegde waarde levert met betrekking tot maritieme surveillance, grensbewaking, non-profilatie, militaire operaties en de openbare orde.Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.

In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.

Deze folder is de tweede in een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Aan de hand van praktijkvoorbeelden word geïllustreerd hoe AO toegevoegde waarde levert met betrekking tot voedselzekerheid, klimaatverandering, natuurrampen en de biodiversiteit.Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.

In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.

Deze folder is de eerste van een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Het illustreert de verschillende AO technieken, legt uit waar AO data te verkrijgen is en schetst de belangrijkste trends en ontwikkelingen. Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.