New report out now! To read, click here.
New report out now! To read, click here.
Over the last decade, long-term forecasts of Dutch natural gas production in small fields have consistently over-estimated production. The main reason for this is not technical or geological but rather an underestimate of the speed at which the business climate for the Dutch gas industry has deteriorated. Fewer projects than expected materialized; the projects that did materialize took a longer time than expected. Permitting procedures are taking a long time, especially after the introduction of a new mining law. The tax regime is less favorable than in the UK southern North Sea. Local governments often use all the options that the new mining law offers them to delay projects as much as possible.
The current low gas prices make it more difficult for Dutch gas producers to obtain funding. A low case forecast, assuming a further deterioration of the investment climate predicts that by 2030 Dutch natural gas production will have virtually ceased.
With Dutch natural gas consumption expected to be relatively constant over the coming decade, gas imports will rise drastically. Within the EU Dutch gas is, and will be, replaced by Russian piped gas and LNG imports. The total emission of greenhouse gases for imported natural gas is about 30% higher compared to Dutch gas (due to methane leakages and the energy required to transport gas over long distances). On a global scale, this negates all progress that is currently being made by increasing the share of solar and wind in the Dutch power mix.
Authors: Jilles van den Beukel, independent energy analyst (formerly a principal geoscientist at Shell) & Lucia van Geuns
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New report out now! To read, click here.
Has the world become more free and secure, or is democracy under attack?
This report aims to answer the question “what is the state of the world today?”, through the provision of a dispassionate, empirically grounded, multi-dimensional overview of international developments. It analyzes dynamics within the socioeconomic, identitary, connectedness, judicial, political, and security domains to capture dynamics in a world in a state of flux.
For each domain the central question is assessed at the level of the individual, at the state, and at the system levels, on the basis of two indicators: whenever possible, one of these indicators is objective in nature and enquires into the actual state (of equality, freedom, security), while the other is subjective in nature and examines how this state is experienced or perceived by individuals.
Our conclusion? The world faces significant increases in, for instance, armed conflict, combat fatalities and illiberal states’ share of international influence. However, human welfare has improved, as well as interconnectivity and democracy. As always, the state of the world is in flux.
This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
New report out now! To read, click here.
This short paper outlines the indicators and methods used to establish whether the world has become more equitable and prosperous, more democratic, and more peaceful. It also outlines the indicators and methods used to establish whether identitary issues have become a larger force in the international system, whether lawlessness has increased, and whether the world has become more connected.
This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.
Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
New report out now! To read, click here.
Navigating the changing global environment requires first and foremost a keen understanding of changes in Dutch foreign relations. The Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI), developed by HCSS, captures the relationship between the Netherlands and other countries over time through a quantitative measurement of a limited set of important dimensions in international relations. This can subsequently help in identifying potential partners as well as potential adversaries in the pursuit of Dutch foreign policy objectives.
This report is part of our upcoming Strategic Monitor 2019-2020.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
New report out now! To read, click here.
New report out now! To read, click here.
This method piece outlines HCSS’ approach to measuring the Netherlands’ position in the world on the basis of other countries’ relevance and compatibility. Relevance considers how much the Netherlands trades with another country, how militarily advanced it is, and how much influence it wields internationally. Compatibility is a reflection of a country’s similarity to the Netherlands when it comes to policy and values. It looks at whether the country has a similar legal system to the Netherlands, enacts comparable trade policies, cooperates with it militarily, and converges with its voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, among others.
Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
New snapshot out now! To read, click here.
The number of terrorist attacks from the far-right spectrum has increased considerably in the US and Europe over the last decade. Even though awareness on this phenomenon is now gradually rising, scholars, policy makers and security forces have long focused predominantly - and perhaps disproportionately - on Islamist terrorism. This negligence towards other types of terrorist threat is now proving to have vital consequences and obstacles in adequately addressing the current threat stemming from the far-right.
This snapshot by assistant analyst Tara Görder examines these consequences and obstacles by outlining the US’ and Europe’s bias in framing the issue of terrorism in diverging ways, securitizing one (Islamist terrorism) but neglecting the other (far-right terrorism). Legislative differences amongst both types and ambiguous definitions complicate the process of designating terrorism for what it is, conflating far-right terrorism with petty or hate crimes and thereby diminishing their gravity for the public perception. Likewise, prosecution and conviction rates relating to Islamist terrorism are proportionally shown to be much higher than for far-right terrorism.
Weighing the little attention it receives against the current pace at which far-right terrorism is rising, underpins how both the US and Europe seem to lack effective and adequate (legal) tools for holding perpetrators from the far-right (as well as potentially arising terrorist groups/ideologies in the future) accountable.
Download the snapshot by Tara Görder here, or click on the PDF button on the right.
New report out now! To read, click here.
How does the Dutch perception of its security threats compare to the outlook of other states? It’s all in the eye of the beholder…
All countries have procedures and – in some cases – methodologies to identify, analyze and prioritize threats to their national security. The outcome of these efforts is typically one or more high-level documents in which the responsible national security bodies provide authoritative statements on threats facing the country. As part of the Dutch Strategic Monitor effort, HCSS was asked to take a closer look at how other actors perceive their threat environments and to what extent they might differ from their Dutch equivalents.
This study sets out to address the following research questions:
1. What similarities and differences exist between the Netherlands’ and other actors’ perceptions of interstate military competition (IMC), conflict in cyberspace, hybrid conflict and economic security, CBRN weapons, and terrorism – all central threats in the Dutch Geïntegreerde Buitenland -en Veiligheidsstrategie (GBVS) and National Security Strategy (NSS) 2019?
2. How do other actors interpret trends relating to the rules-based (liberal) international order?
3. What threats do other actors afford central positions which the Netherlands does not?
4. Do other actors identify opportunities for the future?
We have analyzed a long-list of identified threats – and countries’ perceptions thereof – in order to provide insights with the potential of challenging preconceptions underpinning the Dutch threat perception framework.
Follow this link to read the report by Hugo van Manen.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
New report out now! To read, click here.
What do Chinese naval intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters have in common with Russian bots that spread and amplify disinformation?
This Global Security Pulse examines trends within hybrid conflicts, understood as "conflicts between states, largely below the legal level of armed conflict, with integrated use of civilian and military means and actors, with the aim of achieving certain strategic objectives."
States have ample reason to be concerned about hybrid threats and hybrid conflict. Although at their core hybrid tactics are tactics old as time (military posturing, spreading propaganda and the use of economic measures are well established military strategies), the availability of a diverse and sophisticated set of (technological) tools enhances the impact, reach and congruence of hybrid threats. Paired with the reluctance of states to engage in conventional war due to nuclear, economic and political deterrence, this means that hybrid conflict constitutes an increasingly desirable strategy for states to achieve their political goals.
The principal conclusion of this Pulse is that the international security environment is increasingly subject to hybrid threats, often in a subtle and pervasive way that impedes fast detection, accountability and retaliation. Hybrid threats and hybrid conflict are typified by their complexity, ambiguity, multidimensional nature and gradual impact. These characteristics pose a challenge to effective response measures and therefore to the international order.
Read the new report by Bianca Torossian.
The authors would like to thank Jovana Perovska for her contribution to the international order section of this report.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Dr. Tim Sweijs contributed an article on information warfare at the dawn of the information age, in the Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2020, the annual national security foresight of the Austrian Ministry of Defense.
Dr. Tim Sweijs contributed an article on information warfare at the dawn of the information age, in the Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2020, the annual national security foresight of the Austrian Ministry of Defense.
Read the article by Dr. Sweijs here or download the PDF on the right.
At the dawn of the Information Age, all signs point towards the proliferation and maturation of tools and the sophistication of tactics used in disinformation campaigns. 5G will supercharge the velocity of information flows, drive the widespread adoption of augmented and virtual reality applications, and fundamentally change the way in which humans ingest information and experience social and physical reality. This will unlock a range of new opportunities for information war. A comprehensive agenda to deal with measures should focus on three aspects: increasing the resilience of our societies through more investment in Humboldtisches forms of education; strengthening the protections that shield against the deliberate manipulation of information through private sector regulation; and designing a strategic deterrence posture which includes the ability to reciprocate in kind and hit opponents where it hurts.
New Report: Cross Domain Deterrence and Hybrid Conflict
Liberal Western democracies have been too complacent when it comes to dealing with contemporary hybrid adversaries. We have been following rather than leading. It’s time to seize back the strategic initiative, but how do we do that?
In this new joint HCSS/TNO paper, Tim Sweijs and Samo Zilincik argue that Western democracies can and should develop a strategic deterrent posture in an age of hybrid conflict. Based on an extensive review of cross domain deterrence theory and practice, they offer four recommendations to policymakers:
• maintain strong monitoring capabilities to expose hybrid actions in a timely fashion;
• develop options for proportionate responses to inappropriate behavior;
• showcase intent and capabilities to adversaries with clear guidelines when transgressions will be punished;
• review and refine the legal framework for hybrid deterrence options;
Would you like to know more? Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right.
New report out now! To read, click here.
As Russian and Chinese defense expenditures pivot towards the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons systems, can Europe keep up on innovation? Hugo van Manen and Tim Sweijs present the latest report on Interstate Military Competition.
As geopolitical rivalry is regaining prominence and technology is advancing, states are more actively engaging in interstate military competition (IMC). This is evident in activities such as the ramping up of military investments in dual-use AI technologies and the growing militarization of space. Even though instances of direct military confrontation remain limited, internationalized intrastate conflicts have grown in both their prevalence and intensity. The adversity fostered by these dynamics, combined with the proliferation of new technologies, is placing considerable stress on the international order. This can clearly be seen in, for example, the erosion of existing arms control regimes, as well as in states’ use of proxy actors to circumvent regulations. This results in a significant increase in the threat posed by IMC to the Netherlands. In concrete terms, this threat may manifest in an increased chance of armed conflict on NATO’s territory. The threat level is further raised by the fact that IMC increasingly manifest itself in non-traditional forms, which are associated with a host of negative externalities and effects for economic security and societal cohesion.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on IMC was published in February 2019. This research report examines the underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the GSP’s two trend tables. It covers trends in interstate military competition and international regime developments over the past ten years. It builds on the previously published Strategic Monitor Report (2018-2019) and updates its empirical analysis of contemporary trends in IMC. It does so by gauging states’ intention and capacity to engage in such competition, and their actual activity in this realm. This report continues with an analysis of trends within the international order through an assessment of five interstate military competition-related norms and rules.
Read the report here.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on Conflict in Cyberspace was published in June 2019 and tracked emerging trends in relation to peace and security in cyberspace. This complementary research report delves into the two trend tables presented in the GSP by examining their underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on Conflict in Cyberspace was published in June 2019 and tracked emerging trends in relation to peace and security in cyberspace. This complementary research report delves into the two trend tables presented in the GSP by examining their underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence.
First, the ‘Threats in Cyberspace’ trend table, which measures a variety of indicators over a period of ten years, is examined. These indicators measure the seriousness of conflict in cyberspace by gauging the intention and capacity of states to engage in cyber conflict, as well as the level of malicious activity reported in cyberspace. The report continues with an analysis of the second trend table, ‘International Order in Cyberspace’, which measures the acceptance of norms and rules in this contentious field. Lastly, the conclusion illuminates how states can forge norm coherence and adoption in this complex, multi-stakeholder environment in order to enhance stability and peace in cyberspace.
Read the report here.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
The three main tasks for Defence can be found in the Constitution, Article 97, which states that a defence force exists to defend the Kingdom and the territory of the alliances (NATO and EU), to maintain and promote the international rule of law and to support the government in upkeeping the law, fighting disasters and delivering humanitarian support. Another way to look at these tasks is in the terms of so-called Strategic Challenges that the Netherlands Armed Forces want to achieve: “to Remain Safe, to Foste
The three main tasks for Defence can be found in the Constitution, Article 97, which states that a defence force exists to defend the Kingdom and the territory of the alliances (NATO and EU), to maintain and promote the international rule of law and to support the government in upkeeping the law, fighting disasters and delivering humanitarian support. Another way to look at these tasks is in the terms of so-called Strategic Challenges that the Netherlands Armed Forces want to achieve: “to Remain Safe, to Foster Security and to Secure Connections”. In this recent report more background and insights to this approach can be found.
Applying the lens of the Strategic Challenges to look at the security environment and the role of the Netherlands therein, has consequences for the types of missions and tasks the Armed Forces must be capable of, and thus for the (future) military capability portfolio. The objective of this Study is to add (1) future-oriented elements to further substantiate the narrative for each of the Strategic Challenges; and thereby (2) to link (the dynamics within) the Strategic Challenges to (future) missions for the Armed Forces and associated defence capability portfolio choices. These results can be used within the context of the next Defence White Paper (presumably labelled as a ‘vision’ with a 10-15-year time horizon), scheduled for publication in the first half of 2020.
In this paper Assistant Analyst Liam van de Ven and Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder examine the opportunities, challenges and urgency of Dutch activity in space. They offer a two-track approach, involving both tailor-made nanosatellites and international constellations.
In this paper Assistant Analyst Liam van de Ven and Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder examine the opportunities, challenges and urgency of Dutch activity in space. They offer a two-track approach, involving both tailor-made nanosatellites and international constellations.
Cyberspace represents one of the greatest inventions of mankind, reshaping personal, social, business, and political relationships. Unfortunately, due to attacks on and through cyberspace, urgent action is needed to ensure its stability. This concept of cyberspace stability—like its close cousin, international stability—requires a shared vision, one in which all parties recognize that geopolitical disagreements and changes which affect cyberspace must be managed in relative peace, and that cyberspace stability must be assured.
Cyberspace represents one of the greatest inventions of mankind, reshaping personal, social, business, and political relationships. Unfortunately, due to attacks on and through cyberspace, urgent action is needed to ensure its stability. This concept of cyberspace stability—like its close cousin, international stability—requires a shared vision, one in which all parties recognize that geopolitical disagreements and changes which affect cyberspace must be managed in relative peace, and that cyberspace stability must be assured.
The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace began its work convinced that an issue traditionally reserved to states—international peace and security—could no longer be addressed without engaging other stakeholders. Cyberspace is a multistakeholder environment: those who build and manage cyberspace, and those who respond to attacks on and through cyberspace, are as likely to be non-state actors as government officials. Our Commissioners were selected to reflect this characteristic. Besides former senior government officials with experience in international security issues, our ranks included acknowledged leaders from the fields of Internet governance, the human rights and development communities, and technology and industry. Together, our 28 Commissioners from 16 countries provided a wide range of experience and views, and they were aided by public comments in response to Commission outreach.
The Commission’s final report represents three years of hard work. We gratefully recognize those who made this possible: our Commissioners, our advisors and researchers (many of them also volunteers), our financial supporters, and our management board. Finally, our appreciation goes to the Secretariat, which not only ably managed the process but was instrumental in the Commission’s creation as a civil society initiative.
Throughout its work, the Commission remained cognizant of other cyberspace initiatives, both past and present. Our report—Advancing Cyberstability—complements and reinforces the work of others, while providing new ideas for advancing the stability of cyberspace.
Read the full report here or download the PDF on the right.
About the Commission
Launched at the 2017 Munich Security Conference, the mission of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) is to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace. The Commission helps to promote mutual awareness and understanding among the various cyberspace communities working on issues related to international cybersecurity.
The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace was initiated by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), which, together with the EastWest Institute constitute the GCSC Secretariat. In addition to the Commission body itself, the GCSC is supported by a number of partners, including the governments of the Netherlands, Singapore and France, as well as Microsoft, the Internet Society, Afilias, other sponsors and supporters, and a Research Advisory Group that connects the GCSC to the academic community.
For more information, please visit www.cyberstability.org or contact loukfaesen@hcss.nl