Wars aren’t always fought with missiles and guns. Sometimes, the weapon is water. India demonstrated just how potent that weapon can be this month when it reduced the flow of a tributary to the Indus River, a lifeline for Pakistan’s food security.
“The likelihood of water becoming a driver of conflict is increasing,” Laura Birkman, director of the climate, water and food security programme at the The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, told This Week in Asia.
Regions with rapid population growth, desertification and poor water governance face the greatest risk, she said. “While the link is complex, a lack of water can harm health, jobs and food, especially in weak states, add to tensions and trigger violence.”
The plight of farmers in Pakistan’s Indus River Basin has worsened under the weight of a persistent drought that began after last year’s monsoon. In Sindh, Pakistan’s second-largest agricultural producer, the outlook is especially grim. Even before India suspended water-sharing with its neighbour, crop yields were 20 to 40 per cent lower in the southern province than they were in upstream Punjab. This disparity is caused by geography: the Punjab region, named for the five rivers flowing through it – the Indus and its tributaries – has better water levels and weather conditions.
Under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan has the rights to the waters of the Indus and its westernmost tributaries, the Jhelum and Chenab, while India is entitled to flows from the eastern Ravi, Sutlej and Beas rivers.
For the subsistence farmers who depend on these rivers, any disruption to water flow can have “devastating” consequences, Birkman said, threatening crop yields, food insecurity and loss of income.
Many of these farmers, she said, “often lack access” to alternative water sources or financial means to invest in adaptive technologies, leaving them “highly susceptible to the impacts of water scarcity”.
Without significant policy shifts – both in climate adaptation for vulnerable regions like Pakistan and northwest India, and in global strategies to manage climate-induced migration – the ripple effects will be severe, Birkman warned.
These effects could include “increased regional instability, humanitarian crises and heightened geopolitical tensions”, she said, adding that South Asia could see “upwards of 40 million climate migrants” by 2050, citing the World Bank’s Groundswell reports from 2018 and 2021.
Most climate-related migration is currently internal, according to Birkman, but it is likely to “develop a cross-border dimension as pressures within states rise”, requiring countries like India and Pakistan to develop joint frameworks for managing both internal and cross-border displacement.
The challenge is not limited to South Asia, either. Similar cooperation will be needed between Europe and Africa, and the US and Central America, to address migration driven by climate stress.
“Ultimately, states will only succeed if they work together on these challenges,” Birkman said.
Read the full article by Tom Hussain in the South China Morning Post (May 10th, 2025)
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