HCSS
  • News
    • BNR | De Strateeg
    • Columns
    • Draghi Report Series
    • Events
    • Podcasts
  • Publications
    • Publications
      • All Publications
    • Defence & Security
      • Behavioural Influencing in the Military Domain
      • (Nuclear) Deterrence and Arms Control
      • Hybrid Threats
      • Rethinking Fire and Manoeuvre
      • Robotic and Autonomous Systems
      • Strategic Monitor Dutch Police
      • Transnational Organised Crime
    • Geopolitics & Geo-economics
      • China in a Changing World Order
      • Europe in a Changing World Order
      • Europe in the Indo-Pacific
      • Knowledge base on Russia (RuBase)
      • PROGRESS / Strategic Monitor
      • Transatlantic Relations
    • Climate, Energy, Materials & Food
      • Climate and Security
        • International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS)
        • Water, Peace & Security (WPS)
      • Critical Minerals
      • Energy Security
        • Tank Storage in Transition
      • Food Security
    • Strategic Technologies
      • Cyber Policy & Resilience
        • Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC)
      • Emerging Technologies
      • Global Commission on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (GC REAIM)
      • Semiconductors
      • Space
  • Dashboards
    • Dashboards
      • All Dashboards
        • GINA
    • Defence & Security
      • DAMON | Disturbances and Aggression Monitor
      • GINA | Military
      • Nuclear Timeline
    • Geopolitics & Geo-economics
      • Dutch Foreign Relations Index
      • GINA | Diplomatic
      • GINA | Economic
      • GINA | Information
    • Climate, Energy, Materials & Food
      • Agrifood Monitor
      • CRM Dashboard
    • Strategic Technologies
      • Cyber Arms Watch
      • Cyber Comparator
      • Cyber Norms Observatory
      • Cyber Transparency
  • Services
    • HCSS Boardroom
    • HCSS Datalab
    • HCSS Socio-Political Instability Survey
    • Strategic Capability Gaming
    • Studio HCSS
    • Indo-Dutch Cyber Security School 2024
    • Southern Africa-Netherlands Cyber Security School 2025
  • NATO Summit
  • GC REAIM
    • GC REAIM | Members
    • GC REAIM | Conferences
    • GC REAIM | Partners, Sponsors, Supporters
  • About HCSS
    • Contact Us
    • Our People
    • Funding & Transparency
    • Partners & Clients
    • HCSS Newsletter
    • HCSS Internship Programme
    • Press & Media Inquiries
    • Working at HCSS
    • Global Futures Foundation
  • Click to open the search input field Click to open the search input field Search
  • Menu Menu

News

Do more with less money? Only possible with European defence

June 6, 2012

In 1989, just after the fall of the Berlin wall, I finished a dissertation on Nato. My conclusion was that the organisation was in crisis.

The threat from the East had decreased significantly. Nuclear deterrence had had its day and initiatives to do more with fewer funds had failed miserably. In May 1985 the most comprehensive improvement programme ever was launched. In order to pay for this modernisation drive Nato countries wanted to spend 3% of their GDP on defence.

Many initiatives were to follow. But Nato’s demise is still being predicted, the argument being that we are running out of enemies. Nato is still in crisis because every military operation, including the recent intervention in Libia, has been surrounded by political controversy while the military results have been doubtful. And initiatives to do more with less money have all came to nothing.

But not for lack of trying: at the recent Nato summit the smart-defense initiative was introduced. A list of 160 project proposals did the rounds of which some twenty were adopted. But experienced Nato watchers know that many of the projects also figured in the Defense Capabilities Initiative of 1999.

The reason is simple. From 2007, European countries have been cutting back an average 10% on defence, on top of another 10% cut between 1990 and 2007. Investment stopped, armed forces were whittled down and European dependence on the Americans, instead of diminishing, became greater.

The operation in Libia was presented as a European success but could only be launched because the Americans provided 75% of the critical support, which included tank planes and intelligence gathered by satellites and unmanned spy planes. Without this, the European planes would not have been able to perform long missions and throw bombs.

Now that the US itself is cutting spending, is focusing on Asia and complaining that Washington is coughing up 80% of Nato expenses, smart defence may very well be the last chance for a European defence.

The Netherlands is doing its best to help the initiative with its plans to share airfields with the Belgians, sharing the costs of the successor to the F-16 fighter plane with other countries and having Belgian paratroopers cooperate with the Dutch air manoeuvre brigade. Although it earned the Netherlands some much-needed goodwill from the Americans, it can hardly have saved a significant amount of money. But there is no other remedy. Or is there?

If Europe really wants to make strides it will have to follow the treaty of the European Union: strive for a European defence. Then there can be an end to all those small, hardly deployable European defence forces and their ever-expanding bureaucratic top layers.

Only then Europe can achieve what politicians and citizens alike want: do more with less money. But that means handing over sovereignty to Brussels.

Needless to say, the time is hardly ripe for such a move. So we muddle on, undermining organisations that we may badly need some time in the future, with Europe sinking more and more into a position of insignificance which will cost us our prosperity and safety. And nobody seems to care one bit.

The article was originally published in the Dutch newspaper Trouw.

  • Share on Facebook
  • Share on X
  • Share on WhatsApp
  • Share on LinkedIn
  • Share by Mail

Experts

Related News

Related Content

Strategic Raw Materials for Defence (HCSS, 2023)
Strategic Raw Materials for Defence (2023 HCSS)
Strategic Raw Materials for Defence (HCSS 2023, V2)

Office Address

  • The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
  • Lange Voorhout 1
  • 2514 EA The Hague
  • The Netherlands

Contact Us

  • Telephone: +31(70) 318 48 40
  • E-mail: info@hcss.nl
  • IBAN NL10INGB0666328730
  • BIC INGBNL2A
  • VAT NL.8101.32.436.B01
  • Contact

Legal & Privacy

  • Disclaimer & Privacy
  • Algemene Voorwaarden (NL) 
  • Terms & Conditions (ENG) 
  • Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
  • Ethical Standards
  • Manual for Responsible Use of AI

Follow us

© The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
    Link to: Grondstoffen mondiale schaarste te lijf (NL) Link to: Grondstoffen mondiale schaarste te lijf (NL) Grondstoffen mondiale schaarste te lijf (NL) Link to: Kenniskring Crisisbeheersing (NL) Link to: Kenniskring Crisisbeheersing (NL) Kenniskring Crisisbeheersing (NL)
    Scroll to top Scroll to top Scroll to top

    GDPR Consent

    Your privacy is important to us. Here you can set which consent you are allowing us with regards to the collection of general information, the placing of cookies of the collection of personal information. You can click 'Forget my settings' at the bottom of this form to revoke all given consents.

    Privacy policy | Close
    Settings

    GDPR Consent Settings

    Your privacy is important to us. Here you can set which consent you are allowing us with regards to the collection of general information, the placing of cookies of the collection of personal information. You can click 'Forget my settings' at the bottom of this form to revoke all given consents.

    Website statistics collect anonymized information about how the site is used. This information is used to optimize the website and to ensure an optimal user experience.

    View details

    Functional cookies are used to ensure the website works properly and are neccessary to make the site function. These cookies do not collect any personal data.  

    View details
    Forget my settings Deleted!