Research

Grey Zone Guest Paper Series | Denying Strategic Gains: South Korea’s Conditional Proactive Response to North Korean Grey-Zone Coercion

12.30 pm, Wonsan, North Korea. A short-range missile was first fired from the coastal town. This was followed by nine more, which flew towards the sea off the country’s east coast. 

Tests of this kind are nothing new for the neighbouring countries. However, the fact that these exercises form part of North Korea’s increasingly aggressive stance towards South Korea is a cause for concern. They are part of a bigger picture, in which Kim Jong-un, according to the North Korean news agency, aims to create ‘absolute military superiority’. 

South Korea is being pushed ever further into a grey zone, the twilight area between peace and war, which is turning an increasingly dark shade of grey. How is South Korea dealing with this pressure, and what can other countries learn from this? 

In Denying Strategic Gains, Professor Jaechun Kim examines South Korea’s conditional, proactive response to North Korea’s coercive measures in the grey zone. The article explores how Seoul has addressed repeated sub-threshold challenges whilst operating in the shadow of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. 

The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is a particularly significant example of maritime competition in this grey zone. Since the 1970s, North Korea has challenged the status quo at sea through naval incidents, fishing disputes, infiltration operations and local military confrontations. The First and Second Battles of Yeonpyeong, the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island illustrate the ongoing challenge of responding forcefully without triggering a full-scale war. 

‘Effective grey-zone strategies depend less on matching every provocation than on building the institutional, military, and political capacity to respond consistently, credibly, and sustainably over time.’ 

The Korean case offers important lessons for European small and middle powers facing Russian coercion. It demonstrates that nuclear capabilities create a delicate balance between deterrence and escalation control. South Korea also demonstrates that states must show that sub-threshold aggression yields no strategic advantages, without themselves opening the door to a wider conflict.

Key takeaways:

  • Grey-zone coercion aims to achieve political objectives without crossing into major conventional war. 
  • The NLL demonstrates how maritime pressure can persist over decades through repeated, calibrated challenges. 
  • South Korea’s experience highlights the importance of conditional, credible and proportionate responses. 
  • Nuclear asymmetry makes escalation management central to any strategy of deterrence or denial.

Author: Professor Jaechun Kim, Sogang University.

Quality assurance: Hans Horan and Davis Ellison.

This guest paper is part of a series that looks at how countries that face hybrid threats navigate through the grey zone, the twilight area between peace and war. Each guest paper looks at a different case (South Korea, Taiwan or Estonia) and offers suggestions for other small to middle powers facing similar threats.

Paper 1 | Estonia’s Preparedness to Counter Russian Hybrid Threats

Paper 2 | Denying Strategic Gains: South Korea’s Conditional Proactive Response to North Korean Grey-Zone Coercion

Paper 3 | Grey Zone Activities against Taiwan at Sea: China Coast Guard Operational Pattern Analysis and Strategic Lessons for Small and Middle Powers

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, not should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

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