Research
Life in Estonia is marked by the Russian threat. The NATO member state shares a long border with its Russian neighbour, which regularly attempts to destabilise the country through hybrid threats. In Estonia’s National Security Concept 2026, Russian hybrid operations are identified as a persistent form of pressure aimed, amongst other things, at weakening social cohesion and trust in the state. From drone incursions to spreading disinformation: Russian tension is palpable everywhere. How is Estonia dealing with this?
In ‘Estonia’s Preparedness to Counter Russian Hybrid Threats’, guest author Marek Kohv examines how Estonia has developed an integrated approach to detecting, responding to and recovering from Russian hybrid pressure. This approach is based on the connection between government institutions and society. An integrated approach is essential, the author emphasises, because Russian influence operations, sabotage and cyber attacks can simultaneously undermine public order, digital services, critical infrastructure and public trust.
Conscription, reserve training and civil defence structures all play an important role in this regard. The importance of defence is felt on both sides: the government and the public. Since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, public participation has risen sharply. Following the invasion of Ukraine, around 5,000 volunteers joined the Estonian Defence League.
This state of readiness depends on the interplay between various, mutually reinforcing elements: public awareness, security communication, research capacity, the continuity of essential services and cyber defence.
Education and training help citizens and institutions, for example, to understand threats and build relationships before a crisis arises. Public communication by security agencies, the media and voluntary initiatives can expose and counter influence operations. Internal security arrangements link early detection to criminal investigations, whilst cyber defence and continuity planning mitigate the impact of attacks on public services and society at large.
In short, the security situation in Estonia illustrates why resilience to hybrid threats cannot be reduced to a single institution, capability or technical security measure.
‘Estonia’s experience indicates that countering hybrid threats is an ongoing societal and institutional activity.’
The key conclusion of the article is that hybrid resilience is a society-wide endeavour. This requires government institutions to collaborate across organisational boundaries and a well-informed public capable of recognising and resisting attempts to undermine trust and cohesion.
Key takeaways:
- Hybrid threats can strike public order, essential services, infrastructure and public trust at the same time.
- Preparedness relies on cooperation between government, civil society, media and voluntary organisations.
- Cyber defence and continuity planning are essential to limiting disruption.
- Public communication and awareness strengthen detection and societal resilience.
Author: Marek Kohv, International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS).
Quality assurance: Davis Ellison and Hans Horan.
This guest paper is part of a series that looks at how countries that face hybrid threats navigate through the grey zone, the twilight area between peace and war. Each guest paper looks at a different case (South Korea, Taiwan or Estonia) and offers suggestions for other small to middle powers facing similar threats.
Paper 1 | Estonia’s Preparedness to Counter Russian Hybrid Threats
Paper 2 | Denying Strategic Gains: South Korea’s Conditional Proactive Response to North Korean Grey-Zone Coercion
Paper 3 | Grey Zone Activities against Taiwan at Sea: China Coast Guard Operational Pattern Analysis and Strategic Lessons for Small and Middle Powers
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, not should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.





