Germany blames Russia for the drone incident at Leipzig airport last August. What now? The German government’s “tough” measures consist of closing the diplomatic mission in Bonn and a cultural centre in Berlin, imposing travel restrictions on Russians, increasing pressure on Russia’s shadow fleet, and introducing a 22nd EU sanctions package.
I don’t think the Kremlin will be deeply impressed.
Russian government spokesman Peskov immediately declared that there was not a shred of evidence and that Germany was merely escalating the situation. It fits the narrative: America is not the main enemy; Germany, France and Britain are. After all, they are supplying most of the weapons to Ukraine.
That leads to threats, as British Prime Minister Burnham discovered when he recently allowed Ukraine to manufacture the French-British Storm Shadow missiles. Earlier, a list had already circulated naming companies, including Dutch ones, that produce weapons for Ukraine and should expect Russia’s wrath.
What is certain is that Russia’s disruptive hybrid operations are increasing rapidly. The number of examples runs into the hundreds. This week, drones again entered the airspace of Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania. These are deliberate provocations, because technically it is possible to make the drones turn away before reaching the border. Improvised explosive devices were also found near a German coal-fired power plant.
How to respond to these hybrid operations has been the subject of endless debate. The German research institute DGAP produced a study containing concrete examples. First and foremost, the public needs to be better informed about the threat. But it took the Germans a month to prove that the Russians were behind the drone attack on the airport. It would be better to immediately disclose all incidents, including those that have not yet been verified. At least then the public would get a sense of the scale of the problem.
Secondly, DGAP wants to deter hybrid operations, for example through cyberattacks and covert operations.
Finally, the resilience of the population needs to be strengthened so that hybrid operations, including disinformation campaigns, cannot gain a foothold in society.
It all sounds good, but it is unlikely to genuinely deter the Russians. They will continue and keep denying their involvement. If intelligence services can prevent attacks, however, that could work. Look at the sabotage of cables in the Baltic Sea. Russian vessels are being monitored and crews are being detained, even though legally that may not be permissible. Necessity knows no law. But it works.
The real problem is that our open societies are vulnerable, and the Russians are resourceful. For a few euros, young people are recruited through social media to carry out jobs for Russian intelligence services. Criminal networks are also willing to lend themselves to this. So are pro-Russian Ukrainians among the millions of refugees. That makes it extremely difficult to get a real grip on the threat.
On top of that, pro-Russian politicians have no qualms about it. In Saxony-Anhalt, Alternative für Deutschland could soon come to power and use that position to support Putin.
Because the enemy is already among us, defending ourselves and deterring further attacks is difficult. That is why I believe the best option is to target recruitment networks, and pro-Russian political parties.
The ignorance and naivety surrounding the threat are staggering. That must change. Because we have been in conflict with the Russians for a long time already.
Source: Trouw, Rob de Wijk, 3 september 2026
Experts
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