Research
Europe’s security environment is increasingly shaped by “whole-of-society” shocks in which military threats intersect with climatic, economic and technological disruptions. This new reality demands that preparedness and resilience be treated as mutually reinforcing strategic imperatives for both the EU and NATO. Yet Europe’s baseline levels of resilience remain highly uneven.
This new report, co-authored with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance, evaluates ten EU and NATO member states—Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden—through the seven domains of the EU’s Preparedness Union Strategy. The study finds that resilience is often situational rather than systemic: countries tend to strengthen domains recently stress-tested while leaving others exposed. The absence of minimum foresight and anticipation requirements leads to widely varying national approaches and persistent structural gaps.
A core finding is that civil–military cooperation is the decisive connector between preparedness ambitions and operational delivery. Where institutionalised, it acts as a force multiplier; where ad hoc, it becomes a bottleneck during crises. These dynamics are illustrated through the report’s focus on military mobility, which depends heavily on the resilience of civilian energy, transport and digital systems.
The report highlights key vulnerabilities—fuel and distribution constraints, transport chokepoints, rail-gauge discontinuities, and exposure in 5G and undersea cable networks. These weaknesses accumulate into collective exposure across the EU and NATO, as the weakest links can impede deterrence, crisis response, and the deployment of forces.
To strengthen Europe’s strategic resilience architecture, the report offers clear policy recommendations in three categories:
EU–NATO-wide:
- Powering the military: Establish an EU–NATO Fuel Assurance Compact, create EU-wide fuel storage redundancy, and develop joint supply-chain due diligence for energy systems.
- Transporting the military: Greatly expand EU funding for dual-use infrastructure, coordinate rail-gauge transitions, and integrate lessons learned from Finland and Spain.
- Digitisation: Form an undersea cable intelligence task force and unify EU–NATO due diligence for 5G and other dual-use technologies.
Netherlands-specific:
- Powering: Position the Netherlands as a leader in green-defence resilience.
- Transporting: Build redundancy around the Port of Rotterdam, expand alternatives, secure civilian carrier partnerships, and institutionalise joint civil-military exercises.
- Digitisation: Expand Dutch critical-infrastructure protection programmes to include EU and NATO partners.
Ultimately, the report concludes that resilience is not a secondary concern but a core strategic capability fundamental to deterrence, crisis response and democratic stability.
Lead author Hans Horan notes:
“Europe has the political will and institutional tools to build a genuine Preparedness Union. But unless we close the gap between ambition and delivery, the weakest links in our resilience systems will continue to jeopardise the collective security of the EU and NATO.”
Partner institution: Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance
Authors: Hans Horan, Pieter-Jan Vandoren, Dr Daniel Fiott, Jan Feldhusen
Contributor: Dr Davis Ellison
Editor: Frank Bekkers
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