The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

DESIGNING FUTURE STABILIZATION EFFORTS



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DESIGNING FUTURE STABILISATION EFFORTS

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)

HCSS Research Project for the Dutch Ministry of Defense, 2013-2014

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"All military action should be assessed by its contribution toward achieving stabilization objectives, thus creating a platform for political, economic, and human security."

William E. Gortney

"While we may not have an interest in stabilization missions now, they may have an interest in us."

Michael O'Hanlon

"Engineering, medicine, business, architecture and painting are concerned not with the necessary but with the contingent - not with how things are but with how they might be - in short, with design. Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones."

Herbert Simon

"[Lieutenant General] Wayland - Leigh sat in his chair and writhed his bulk about, grinning like an ogre as the suggestions assumed more and more concrete form, while [Brigadier General, Chief of Staff] Norton beside him took industrious notes to form the skeleton of the long reports he would have to send to Army Headquarters and to G.H.Q. [General Headquarters]. In some ways it was like the debate of a group of savages as to how to extract a screw from a piece of wood. Accustomed only to nails, they had made one effort to pull out the screw by main force, and now that it had failed they were devising methods of applying more force still, of obtaining more efficient pincers, of using levers and fulcrum so that more men could bring their strength to bear. They could hardly be blamed for not guessing that by rotating the screw it would come out after the exertion of far less effort; it would be so different that they would laugh at the man who suggested it."

C.S. Forester[1]

"[I]n the context of today's wars in complex social settings, the commander by himself is unlikely to know enough about the political context, operational environment, and opponents to make fully informed judgements, and a poorly appraised concept of operations is likely to go straight to the school of hard knocks. What seemed to be required was a more collaborative planning process that drew on a broader base of knowledge to better understand the complexity and the conceptual options available."

Simon Murden[2]

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[1] Forester, *The General*, 195. As quoted in Zweibelson, Martin, and Paparone, "Frame Reflection. A Critical Review of US Military Approaches to Complex Situations," 2.
[2] Murden, "Purpose in Mission Design."

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite many encouraging global security trends, the demand for stabilization in an increasingly complex and interdependent world is unlikely to disappear – including (and even especially) in Europe's immediate neighborhood. From the Western Sahara all the way to Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus, Europe's neighbors are undergoing profound and tumultuous processes of social and political transformation, with some states being torn apart by internal and external forces. History shows that such transformation processes are painful and do typically take years if not decades to unfold. In an increasingly interconnected world such ferments of instability leave nobody unaffected – no individual, no group, no company, no society, no country, no alliance. Leaving the demand for stabilization unmet is no longer an option.

At the same time the **supply** of (cost-)effective stabilization will remain distinctly suboptimal for quite some time to come. The international community has so far proved unable to design a global governance architecture with reliably enforceable stabilization mechanisms. Past stabilization missions have met both with great success and with considerable failure. When successful, as in the case of Central Europe, they produced tremendous gains in human, economic, societal *and* security respects. But when unsuccessful, as in many sections of the Greater Middle East and Africa, they were at times followed by dramatic outcomes, at great human cost and with disastrous national, regional and international security ramifications. These cases also triggered a backlash on the domestic front of stabilizing nations, further decreasing support for stabilization missions.

This combination of strong and high-payoff demand and weak and high-cost supply offers great **opportunities** for even modest-sized stabilization providers to design a new and improved capability portfolio that can add real value to a coalition effort. The current political and financial-economic climate is hardly conducive to discussions about future stabilization efforts. Even the very term seems to have fallen into disrepute. This report proposes taking advantage of the current post-Afghanistan time juncture to take a step back and take a broader and harder look at how we could (re)design future stabilization efforts.

As a first step, we must move away from a traditional definition of what stabilization is. Whether explicitly or implicitly, most schools-of-thought amalgamate the term 'stabilization', with long term, open ended missions in post-high intensity conflict situations. This conventional notion is not only factually mistaken but is also counterproductive because it thwarts the design, development and deployment of alternative ´instruments of influence´ that might offer greater promise in contributing to stabilization. In order to improve their portfolios of stabilization capabilities, this report

calls on Western nations to rethink the *design*, not just of stabilization *operations* or *missions* but rather of stabilization *efforts*. (Re-) Designing future stabilization efforts is a daunting task, especially in light of the aforementioned contextual constraints. It requires a fundamental rethink of what stabilization is and how to achieve it; it requires problem framing from a variety of viewpoints rather than problem solving within one viewpoint; and above all it requires a willingness to venture off untraveled roads in order to explore novel options that were previously not on the table.

The report argues that such a fundamental rethink is unlikely to take place within the current structures and processes. Instead it recommends an approach that has become quite popular (and effective) in a number of different (mostly but not exclusively) non-defense contexts: 'design thinking' or 'human-centered design'. Chapter 0 explains the main tenets of this new approach to purposive action and provides a number of recent examples from the private sector, the public sector and the few military communities (Israel and the US Army) where it has been introduced. While there are differences between these different approaches and applications, they all share an increased focus on the 'framing' of the issue, on broader multi-stakeholder involvement, on more creative thinking and processes and on the need for iteration and a more 'modest', iterative, 'learning', emergent approach to purposive action.

The fundamental recommendation of this report is therefore to include a new multi-stakeholder 'design' stage in the typical decision-making sequence for dealing with stabilization challenges.



Figure 1. Stabilization decision-making – at present

In the current decision-making sequence (for a stylized representation, see Figure 1), stabilization challenges usually appear on politicians' radar screen when it is already very late in the game. At that point, the particular challenge is thrown into a domestic political cauldron where it is analyzed from the point of view of the key political players' views of their country's national interests and – sometimes – values. It then immediately becomes the subject of a number of political bargains between these players. At the same time, this domestic bargaining process is also thrown in a number of multilateral consultations where similar political horse-trading takes place between different countries. The political games that ensue in the best case yield a political 'decision' that specifies a set of fairly vague political objectives. In case a military contribution is requested, the military is tasked to come up with an operational plan based on this political guidance.



Figure 2. Stabilization decision-making - proposed

This report proposes inserting a new 'design' stage in this sequence (see Figure 2). A stabilization challenge would still be viewed and framed from the point of view of a country's interests and values, but it would then be subjected to a 'design' exercise in which the key stakeholders from the public and the private sector would design a number of stabilization options and would assess their attractiveness based on a number of collaboratively developed criteria. As part of the Netherlands' increased focus on the strategic function 'anticipation',[3] this report recommends engaging in such 'design sessions' precisely in moments where no concrete decisions have to be made. This might lead to some innovative design options along the lines of the few examples that are presented in this report. Such more 'generic' design sessions might also facilitate, and expedite, the more 'applied' design sessions that might take place in a concrete case in which a time-critical decision has to be made. This design session could then inform the political decision-making process , which would in turn lead to a comprehensive operational planning process that would yield a comprehensive operational plan – of which the military operational plan would be a subset.

"In order to cope with the uncertainty of dealing with ill-defined problems, a designer has to have the self-confidence to define, redefine and change the problem as given, in the light of solutions that emerge in the very process of designing."[4]

[3] Ministerie van Defensie, *Verkenningen Houvast Voor de Krijgsmacht van de Toekomst*; Bekkers et al., *Anticipatie*.
[4] Cross, *Design Thinking*.



Figure 3. Solving problems with design thinking[5]

[5] Liedtka, *Solving Problems with Design Thinking*, 2013. Image design inspiration: Stephanie Walter (CC BY-SA 3.0) http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adaptive-iceberg-1024.jpg

INTRODUCTION[6]

In the 'post-Afghanistan' era popular support and political appetite for large-scale, open-ended stabilization missions have waned.[7] In popular discourse, the very term 'stabilization mission' seems to be contaminated – if only by sheer force of association with the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that popular wisdom now considers a waste of effort and resources.[8] In the aftermath of the financial crisis and against the background of this backlash, Western nations are currently pondering the ways in which to supply stability outside their homelands, if at all.

Amongst the pundits and practitioners in our strategic communities there are basically two main schools-of-thought with two sub-schools each, representing different views on the desirability and/or feasibility of future stabilization missions.

Figure 4 visualizes these differences along 2 dimensions:

- Whether stabilization is desirable (yes or no); and
- Whether stabilization is feasible (yes – in which case also: how? – or no).

We point out that there is currently no real constituency for the status quo (bottom right rectangle) and that most of the discussion – at least in the national security elite – is taking place in the 'yes/yes' quadrant.



Figure 4. Schools-of-thought on Stabilization

[6] This research was supported by the Dutch Ministry of Defence. The authors gratefully acknowledge the substantive feedback and inputs provided by various colleagues, especially Erik Claessen, Michael van Dijk, Anne-Marie Grisogono, Chris Holloway, Geert Leeman, Roger Housen, Ben Taylor, Mark Tocher, Robert Worley and Ben Zwiebelson.

[7] As illustrated by the public debate in various European countries as well as the US regarding ISAF operations in Afghanistan and possible courses of action vis-à-vis Syria. See Stelzenmüller et al., *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013*, 31–36.

[8] Pachachi, "The Road to Failure in Iraq."; Ahmad, "This Number Proves the Afghanistan War Is an Epic Failure." ; Freedberg JR., "After 10 Years Of Abject Failure, Army, SOCOM, Marine Leaders Focus On Strategic Landpower.".

The first "**never again**" school-of-thought is opposed to future stabilization efforts. One sub-school could be dubbed the "**us first**" school. Proponents of this school want to focus on domestic problems first and foremost and are opposed to diverting any resources from that overriding task. They can be found back in the West's increasingly important neo-isolationist political parties, including the ascendant populist parties in Western Europe[9] and in the 'Tea Party' as well as in the increasingly popular (especially among today's young Americans) libertarians in the US[10]. A second sub-school (**"it just can't be done"**) takes a slightly greater interest in developments in the rest of the world and how these affect their own societies, economies and polities. But adherents of this school view recent experiences with externally imposed stabilization from the Balkans to the Hindu Kush as pre-ordained failures resulting from (particularly Western) hubris and/or ignorance. Stabilization efforts, so this group claims, are intrinsically doomed to fail. Contrary to what is commonly believed, or at least asserted, across different government departments and military headquarters, they contend that there is little hard evidence that improved service delivery and short-term reconstruction necessarily lead to greater security, stability and legitimacy of the central government.[11] They claim that these interventions actually may have done "more harm than good" and should therefore be stopped. It is time to focus, they say, on different threats and develop different strategic concepts and concomitant force structures.

The second "**yes we can**" school-of-thought also sees pros and cons, but is on balance more supportive of stabilization efforts. One sub-school here could be labeled ''**same but better**." It asserts that stabilization missions have in fact made vital contributions to peace and security.[12] If Afghanistan is a failure, they argue, it is not because the medicine did not work, but simply because we need a different and/or more potent mix of it. They point to a body of evidence supporting the view that the great majority of post-conflict nation-building operations over the past two decades have resulted in improvements in the overall security situation, progress on the democratization front, significant economic growth gains, and advances in human development. Operations that met with local consent and regional support have almost always achieved peace, even if some degree of coercion had to be (initially) employed to secure both. [13] So these proponents call for more and better, rather than less engagement. Stressing the need to take advantages of lessons learned, they argue for the further refinement and development of the comprehensive approach.[14] Stabilization missions are not a matter of choice, but spring from strategic necessity, so they contend, since many of the security challenges which materialized from failed, failing or fragile states over previous decades are still with us and will not disappear simply because we wish them to.[15] In the words of US defense specialist Michael O'Hanlon: "While we may not have an interest in stabilization missions now, they may have an interest in us."16 So this sub-school thinks that while some

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[9] "Turning Right."
[10] "The Tide Is Rising for America's Libertarians." See e.g. Paul, "Rand Paul Speech Full Text."
[11] Stepputat and Greenwood, "Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States and Situations," 6.
[12] Goldstein, *Winning the War on War*.
[13] Dobbins et al., *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Natin-Building*, xxxvi.
[14] Hunter, Gnehm, and Joulwan, *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*; Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Planning Toolkit*. see also Keohane and Grant, "From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Action: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the EU's Contribution to Peace and Security.".
[15] Petraeus, "Reflections on the Counter-Insurgency Era."
[16] O'Hanlon, "How Big an Army Does the United States Need?." (last visited 7 January 2014)

mistakes were made, past stabilization efforts did (partially) work, that we have learned many lessons in the process and that we can do even better if we heed those lessons. In a recent strategic review of its policies vis-à-vis fragile states, also the Dutch government seemed to take this line, but it also emphasized the need to be realistic, pointing out that ambitious and optimistic plans are rarely in sync with the complexity and risks associated with operations in fragile states.[17]

The **"back to the drawing board"** sub-school also believes in the feasibility of stabilization, but is more skeptical of recent operations. It suggests that two decades of stabilization operations have demonstrated extremely poor value for money. Especially with reference to the large-scale US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it claims that these have been extremely costly in lives and money and have yielded unacceptably poor results. Advocates of this school of thought therefore propose new and different approaches to stabilization which, in their assessment, portend greater chances of success. Some such alternative approaches will be proposed in section 0.

These four schools currently dominate the discussions whenever a concrete crisis situation emerges in which often time-critical and politically highly charged decisions have to be made. One of the tragedies of our current decision-making system is that under such circumstances the political debate does not have the benefit of falling back on a deeper, broader and more dispassionate analysis of the various available options and their respective strengths and weaknesses. On top of this, these schools-of-thought are guilty of lumping together very different types of stabilization. After all, the challenges posed by the security environment in the Balkans in the 1990s were quite different from the ones that present themselves in the Sahel Region in the 2010s. And the dynamics in Middle Eastern countries are fundamentally different from those in Sub Sahara Africa.[18] It is therefore imperative to move the strategic debate beyond the `stabilization yes or stabilization no´ juxtaposition. Different problems require different solutions, solutions which sometimes work and sometimes not. And if one thing is certain, it is that we may have found effective solutions to some problems, but have certainly left plenty of other solutions unexplored.

This report is intended as a clarion call for a broader strategic reflection about how we might deal with future stabilization challenges in the remaining fragile parts of the world. It departs from the assumption that in some situations externally imposed stabilization efforts may be both desirable and feasible. But it also submits that there is an urgent need for all of the stakeholders in this debate to move beyond dramatic discussions about the *crise du jour* towards a more fundamental as well as more dispassionate, pre-political and creative discussion about the various options that are conceivable.

To facilitate such reflection, this report is structured in 5 chapters. After this introduction (Chapter 1), Chapter 2 critically reflects on what stabilization means in both a non-military and a military context. 19 It deconstructs the official definitions of stabilization used by an

[17] Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken,Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie, *Investeren in Stabiliteit: Het Nederlandse Fragiele Statenbeleid Doorgelicht*, 26.

[18] There are off course plenty of differences within these regions themselves. For an assessment of the Middle East, see the forthcoming HCSS study "Instability in the Arab World".

[19] This includes a succinct analysis of how stabilization is defined in the official doctrines of a selection of Western countries and the UN, the EU and NATO. Concise write-ups of prevailing perspectives on stabilisation within the three inter/trans/multinational organizations are provided in Annex A.

3 Designing Stabilization Efforts

assortment of countries and goes on to propose three different definitional layers – operations, missions and efforts – which can be used to meaningfully consider various forms of stabilization. Chapter 3 introduces a possible new approach to stabilization efforts based on design thinking, a promising and increasingly popular approach for tackling complex endeavors in the private and the public sectors, including – albeit with some interesting differences – in some prominent defense organizations. Chapter 4 then moves back to the issue at hand: how to plan for future stabilization efforts by applying design thinking. The concluding Chapter 5 recapitulates, concludes and recommends.

WHAT IS STABILIZATION?

The term stabilization is widely used in Western political debates and military doctrines, but its meaning remains ambiguous as it is often applied to widely diverging activities. To pursue some more conceptual clarity, we start out by exploring the etymological roots and the current usage of the term. We then turn our attention to the way in which military organizations across the globe are currently using the term *stabilization* in various doctrinal publications. We do so by deconstructing its usage into constitutive elements and comparing how different countries put those building blocks together. Finally, we suggest a new three-tiered lexicon for different types of security stabilization.

STABILIZATION: ROOTS AND CONTEMPORARY USAGE

Linguistically speaking, the word stabilization comes from a proto-Indo-European root **sta-*, which meant 'to stand, set down, make or be firm'.[20] We know many variants of this word such as the English verb '*to stand*' (or also Dutch words like '*staan*', '*stand* ', etc.) or even 'place or thing that is standing' (e.g. the Persian *-stan* 'country', literally 'where one stands'; or the Dutch word '*stad* ').[21] All of these cognates seem to refer to a condition in which an object or subject stands firm – in contrast to a condition in which it might fall or has fallen. Stability is generally seen as a desirable condition, although many scholars have also pointed out that a stable but undesirable condition is not something that should be pursued in its own right[22]. Stabilization, then, refers to the active pursuit of the condition of stability.



Figure 5. Different types of Stabilization

[20] The Proto-Indo-European language is the hypothetical reconstructed ancestral language of all current Indo-European languages (including the Germanic, Romance, Slavic, Indian, Iranian etc. language groups). It is thought to have been spoken until about the 5th millennium before Christ somewhere in the area between the Northern shores of the Black Sea over South Russia to the Northern shore of the Caspian Sea and to have started splitting up in different language groups by the 4th millennium BC. For more details, see Mallory and Adams, *The Oxford Introduction to Proto Indo European and the Proto Indo European World*.

[21] Etymology Online, "Stability."

[22] This is often known under the term 'stasis' (e.g. 'stasis' in evolutionary biology, 'policy stasis' in political science).

The term stabilization is a familiar term in many different walks of life today. As shown in Figure 5, *medics* stabilize a patient before transporting her to the nearest-by medical facility; *economists* talk about economic stabilization as with the bailout of the U.S. financial system after the subprime mortgage crisis; *photographers* stabilize their cameras to prevent the effect of shaking the image; *construction teams* often stabilize buildings when they are afraid of structural collapse; *airplanes* have both vertical and horizontal stabilizers to keep the planes steady in the air; in *chemistry*, stabilizers are chemicals that tend to inhibit the reaction between two or more chemicals; and in *electricity* stabilization refers to devices that automatically maintain a constant voltage. Already in these contexts, we find back a number of important differences in the way in which stabilization is defined that we will also find back when we turn our attention to stabilization in a security context. These include:

- When? In some cases, stabilization applies to the time *before* a crisis erupts (e.g. photography, airplanes), in others it only applies to the period *after* a crisis has erupted (e.g. medics, economy); and in still others stabilization can occur *at any given moment* in time (construction, electricity, chemistry).
- Who? In some instances of stabilization, stabilization is a *part of the subject or object itself*. Planes, for instance, have stabilizers built in to themselves. In the medical or economic cases, however, stabilization is *applied by external actors*.
- Why? Sometimes, as in the medical case, stabilization is seen as a *temporary* transitional measure that does not attempt any structural repair, but just intends to make sure that the situation does not get worse – in the case of the medics, until a patient can be transported to a medical facility where that more structural repair can be carried out. Other times, the stabilizer really tries to *remedy or remove the more structural causes* of instability (as in the photographers' case). And in yet some other cases, *instability is just accepted* as an inevitable state that requires constantly stabilization efforts.
- How? Another difference in these different types of stabilization lies in the mechanisms that are used to achieve stabilization. These can be imposed *top-down* (as in the medical or construction examples), or can emerge *bottom-up* as in chemistry. They can be applied *directly* by stabilizers (as again in the medical and construction examples), or *indirectly* by a variety of different actors as in the case of economic stabilization. They can also be *short-term* fixes (as in the medical case) or *longer-term* and more structural (as in the electrical or chemical examples).

STABILIZATION IN A DEFENSE CONTEXT

These same differences in what stabilization actually entails can also be found back in the discussions about stabilization in the security and defense realm. In common defense parlance today, stabilization is generally used to refer to the immediate post-conflict phase in a militarized conflict. This is typically thought to occur after military intervention in a period

when there may still be a considerable amount of violence, and before actual normalization[23]. Stabilization is thus said to be the phase in which basic order has to be/is being restored and preparations are made for long-term reconstruction (as illustrated in Figure 6).



Figure 6. General notion of place of stabilization efforts in the conflict cycle[24]

A closer look at Western military doctrinal writings on stabilization, however, reveals that stabilization has a much broader meaning than the general notion that is conveyed in Figure 6. The US started using the term in the early 2000s to refer to a wide range of activities which were previously called peace support operations.[25] Most Western states have since included the term stabilization in their military doctrines. But the term still has clearly has different meanings and refers to all sorts of different activities and definitions of stabilization. Some states use it to denote a grand strategy for the establishment of sustainable peace, whereas others only focus on the military contribution to so-called stability operations. States have different views on the short-term and long-term objectives, the actors, the level of violence or the duration and the timing of stabilization efforts. To get a better insight in these differences HCSS deconstructed the definitions used in key military strategic and military operational documents of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and NATO (see Table 1).

[23] See for instance Mac Ginty, "Against Stabilization.".
[24] See also Swanström and Weissmann, *Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration*., from which this mock up in Figure 1 derives inspiration.
[25] Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and Other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, 2.

	Definition of Stabilization
 CAN	Stability operations: "tactical operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved."[26]
 FRA	"Stabilization is a process of crisis management aimed at restoring the conditions for minimal viability of a state (or a region), which puts an end to violence as a means of contestation and lays the foundation for a return to normal life by launching a civilian reconstruction process. The stabilization phase is the period of crisis management in which this process in dominant."[27]
 GER	"Stabilization forces are intended for multinational, joint military operations of low and medium intensity lasting for an extended period of time and spanning the broad spectrum of peace stabilization missions."[28]
 NL	"Operations in the stabilization phase are geared towards the normalization of the security situation and thus create conditions for lasting development and peace."[29]
 NZL	"Stability and support operations impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. Stability and support operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive combat operations, or as the primary objective of a campaign. Stability and support operations provide an environment in which the other instruments of power — diplomatic, and economic — can predominate, in cooperation with a lawful government. Stability and support operations may include combat as part of the overall stabilization."[30]
 UK	Stabilization: "the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalizes non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development."[31]
 US	"Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief."[32]
 NATO	Stabilization: "the process by which support is given to places descending into or emerging from violent conflict. This is achieved by: preventing or reducing violence; protecting people and key institutions; promoting political processes, which lead to greater stability and preparing for longer-term development; and non-violent politics."[33]

[26] Canada, Department of National Defence, and Depository Services Program (Canada), *CFJP 101, Canadian Military Doctrine*.

[27] Ministère de la Défense, *Contribution Des Forces Armées À La Stabilisation*.

[28] "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr."

[29] *"In the stabilisation phase, the accent shifts increasingly from predominantly military action to the deployment of other means to achieve the mission objectives. Operations in the stabilisation phase are geared towards the normalization of the security situation and thus create conditions for lasting development and peace. Operations in the stabilisation phase of conflicts are complicated by the diversity of tasks, changing levels of force and the large number of actors with different interests. Although it is mainly rebuilding capacity that is needed in this phase, there may be various reasons to use force or to demonstrate the willingness to use it. The circumstances are often such that the peace is fragile and the level of force can suddenly increase dramatically. If the military force is unable to contain this escalating violence, stabilisation is doomed to fail. The possession of means and capabilities to enable escalation dominance is, therefore, vital in this phase."* *Netherlands Defence Doctrine*..

[30] New Zealand Defence Force and R.R. Jones, *The New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication Doctrine, (3rdedition) (NZDDP-D)*.

[31] Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*.

[32] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations," 3–0.

[33] NATO, "NATO Standard ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks."

Table 1. Overview of definitions of stabilization

Element	Options								
Focus of the definition	Process		x		x		x		X
	Operations	x				x		x	
	Role armed forces			x					
Actor	Only military			x					
	Primarily military				x		x	x	
	Military-civilian	x	x			x			
	Civilian-military					x			
	Primarily civilian								
Action	Support				x	x	x		x
	Maintain	x						x	
	Restore	x	x			x		x	
	Establish	x			x				
	Impose					x			
Short-term objectives	End to violence		x				x		x
	Security and control					x		x	
	Start reconstruction		x						
	Minimal state viability	x	x						
	Basic government services					x		x	
	Protection population						x		x
	Protection infrastructure						x	x	x
	Humanitarian relief							x	
Long-term objectives	Progress	x							
	Order	x							
	Normal life		x						
	Non-violent politics						x		
	Rule of law				x				x
	Socioeconomic development						x		
	None							x	
Referent object	State		x				x		
	Society								
	Government								
	Region		x						
When in conflict cycle	Before conflict					x	x		x
	During conflict	x	x			x	x		
	After conflict	x				x	x		x
Duration	Short								
	Medium								
	Long			x	x				x
Level of violence	High					x			
	Medium			x					
	Low			x		x			
Sequence	Military first								
	Simultaneous	x				x			
	Civilian first								
Partners	Other agencies	x				x		x	
	NGOs								
	Allies			x					
	Intl. organizations								
	Local actors				x				
	Local government					x			
Location operation	Home								
	Abroad							x	

Table 2. Isolated constitutive elements of stabilization by country

The definitions of stabilization were deconstructed by isolating their constituent elements. The result of this exercise is an overview of these elements and their variations across countries, which are visualized in

Table **2**. (Further detail about the type of documents examined, the analytical procedures carried out, as well as the findings thus yielded, is provided in Annex B & Annex C).

With respect to who should actually be involved in stabilization (actors) it is generally agreed that stabilization involves both military and civilian activities. The primary role of the military is to provide a secure environment in which civilian actors can carry out their activities, such as facilitating a political settlement. Western states, as well as organizations such as the EU, are committed to a comprehensive approach which combines military and civilian efforts, whilst identifying different civilian partners. The US and Canada see (national) civilian agencies as preferred partners, whereas for instance the Netherlands asserts that the military should support "local parties."[34]

Definitions of stabilization used in military doctrines mention different **short-term objectives**. The French view is that stabilization is aimed at "restoring the conditions for minimal viability of a state (or a region), which puts an end to violence as a means of contestation and lays the foundation for a return to normal life by launching a civilian reconstruction process."[35] The US, conversely, underlines another set of short-term objectives: "to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief."[36]

Similarly, the **long-term objectives** of stabilization vary across countries. The UK regards "non-violent contest for power, and […] sustainable socio-economic development" as the ultimate goals of stabilization.[37] The Netherlands, on the other hand, sees "sustainable rule of law" as the primary long-term objective.[38]

Furthermore, countries hold different views on the **violence level and duration** which are characteristic for stabilization operations. The Dutch and German views are that stabilizations operations are "of low and medium intensity,"[39] whereas New Zealand doctrine states that they may be coercive as well. Some states stress that stabilization operations by their very nature should be long-term, while others do not specify any duration.

Lastly, no consensus exists about the **timing** of stabilization operation. The French doctrine postulates that stabilization is aimed at "*restoring* the conditions for minimal viability of a state,"[40] indicating that operations are to be launched after violent conflict has broken out. The UK does not exclude any options, but takes a blanket approach; it sees stabilization as a process that "support[s] states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict."[41]

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[34] Haas and Defensiestaf, *Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine*, 103.
[35] Ministère de la Défense, *Contribution Des Forces Armées À La Stabilisation*, 15.
[36] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations," vii.
[37] Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, 239.
[38] Haas and Defensiestaf, *Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine*, 103.
[39] "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr," 79.
[40] Ministère de la Défense, *Contribution Des Forces Armées À La Stabilisation*, 15.
[41] Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, 239.

IN LIEU OF DEFINITION: 3 LAYERS OF STABILIZATION

We thus find that there is no consensus on the military definition of stabilization. We saw in the non-military examples that various professional groups made different choices on how to select and combine several definitional building blocks. Some of them, like the medics, decided that in their case – and with current technological capabilities – a more temporary, punctuated, third-party, activist approach best served their purposes. Others, like avionics experts, came to the very different conclusion that their field required a more structural, long-term, direct, built-in approach. The defense community has not, to this date, been able to forge such a consensus. This report does not attempt to rectify this situation and come up with one stable all-encompassing definition of stabilization. Not only because different situations require different solutions, but also because the different choices made by countries as to what they understand by stabilization and how they want to tackle it are profoundly political ones. Analysts can – and we did – dissect the different building blocks that can be used to define stabilization, but the choice of which of these definitional building blocks can or should be used at any given juncture in time or in any given situation is ultimately political and not analytical. But these political choices can still be informed, we hope, by this 'menu' of decision elements.

One additional element of definitional clarification might still be useful for the discussion about future stabilization efforts. In thinking about stabilization, we differentiate between three layers of stabilization: operations, missions and efforts.

Figure 7. Three different layers of stabilization

Most of the discussion about military stabilization focuses on **stabilization operations**, i.e. the military-operational part of any attempt to stabilize a security situation in a particular theater. There can be no doubt that the military contribution to stabilizing an often chaotic situation can be of paramount importance. But it is equally clear – and even much more so after 20 years of experience with expeditionary stabilization operations – that a military stabilization operation has to be part and parcel of a broader **stabilization mission**. Such a stabilization mission then refers to the efforts that any nation (or groups of nations) may

undertake to stabilize a situation in which security has been jeopardized in any way. This mission is likely to include a broader whole-of-government (or even whole-of-society) endeavor to deal with that particular situation. Over the past 10 years many governments have gradually recognized the importance of tackling the full spectrum of security challenges that emanate from any conflict zone and not just the purely hard military ones.[42] But what is still missing in many countries is the third layer of stabilization, which we call **stabilization efforts**. This refers to an even broader approach to stabilization in which countries not only look at the entire spectrum of instruments of power they can bring to bear directly to stabilize a concrete security situation (whether before or after a conflict, whether directly or indirectly, whether short- or long-term, etc.). In addition, they also look more holistically at all of their policies – including the not directly security-relevant ones – and how these affect stability in other countries. A concrete example of this might be Europe's agricultural policy. Attempts to protect European farmers contribute to a situation in which North Africa's youth cohorts cannot be as usefully and gainfully employed in agriculture as they could be in the absence of European protectionist policies. As a result, they can be more easily incited to various forms of violence. We have always known that there are many cross-cutting issues between socio-economic and security policy issues. And yet these linkages are now often obscured or severed by institutional stovepipes and political myopia. We therefore propose this third layer for stabilization governance and planning (or design), which we call stabilization efforts. In stabilization efforts, different departments would work together as joint custodians of the broader security agenda – of all those cross-linkages between overall national policies and security policy.

[42] We hereby use full spectrum in the European sense (i.e. that when we look at the entire set of instruments of power that can be applied to conflict zones, the real missing links are on the softer side of the spectrum) than in the American sense (where full spectrum is often focused on the hardest side of the spectrum).

WHAT IS STRATEGIC DESIGN?

This report advocates a 'strategic design' approach to the question of how to deal with future stabilization efforts. Many readers may be surprised to see the term *design* associated with military planning. When most people think about military planning, they typically think of military staffs huddled over a set of maps to come up with an optimal course of action for an operation. When they think of design, they are much more likely to think of imaginative designers creating hip and cool designs for mobile phones, interior decorating or architecture. And yet these two at first sight totally different terms have grown closer to each other over the past few years, even to the extent that the US Army now has an official Army Design Methodology that is used for operational planning purposes. This section of the report will start out by describing how various disciplines outside of the military domain have come to think of and practice design; and will then turn its attention to the way in which a few military organizations have started including it into their approach to military endeavors.

DESIGN THINKING OUTSIDE OF DEFENSE

DESIGN THINKING – THE IDEA

The trend towards design thinking has gained – and continues to gain – significant traction in different parts of the world in thinking about strategic planning in many areas of private and public life (see Figure 8, which shows how often the search term 'design thinking' was entered on Google Search over the past decade).



Figure 8. Growing interest in 'Design Thinking'

Tim Brennan, one of the managers in Apple Computer's Creative Services department that designed the first Macintosh computer in the 1980s, once began a presentation of his group's work by showing the following visual (Figure 9): "Here's how we work," he said. "Somebody calls up with a project; we do some stuff; and the money follows." [43]



Figure 9. Tim Brennan's (Apple) view of design

Most honest professionals who see Brennan's doodle in Figure 9 will probably chuckle in recognition of how many development processes really occur – with far more iterations in many more different directions and in a much more non-linear way than planning textbooks would suggest. But rather than accepting the black box view of design suggested in this picture, the *design thinking* school has developed a set of ideas and tools that try to demystify what design is all about.[44] And one of their main ideas is that design is not based on divine inspiration gifted to creative geniuses like Steve Jobs, but is just a different way of tackling problem solving that lies within everybody's reach.

One of the seminal publications in this new school of thought was *Change by Design*, a 2007 book by Tim Brown, [45] the CEO of one of the most influential and innovative global design consultancies, IDEO. [46] Brown juxtaposes traditional, more analytical, blue-print, ivory tower approaches to planning with more experiential, in-the-field, emergent approaches. He describes the traditional approach to planning in the service sector as follows:

> *"In traditional attempts to design a service, we 'script' the service, creating a 'user experience blueprint' that attempts to describe everything that will happen to the customer during the experience. For a hotel, for instance, this would include everything from what the lobby looks like to what the check-in service is like. Attention to all these details leads to a relatively complicated script, which makes us confident that we have covered all the bases. The problem is, even when we get these scripts right, it's amazing how often things go wrong."* [47]

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[43] Dubberly, "How Do You Design," 10.
[44] Liedtka and Ogilvie, *Designing for Growth: A Design Thinking Toolkit for Managers*; Liedtka, *Solving Problems with Design Thinking*, 2013; Martin, *Design of Business: Why Design Thinking Is the Next Competitive Advantage*; Brown, *Change by Design*, 2009; Kelley and Kelley, *Creative Confidence*.
[45] Brown, *Change by Design*, 2009.
[46] IDEO (pronounced "eye-dee-oh",) describes itself as an award-winning global design firm that takes a human-centered, design-based approach to helping organizations in the public and private sectors innovate and grow. It also has a
[47] Brown, "The Merits of an Evolutionary Approach to Design," 18.

Many military operational planners and/or commanders will no doubt recognize this description. Brown offers quite a few examples where "time and again, initiatives falter because they are not based on the client's or customer's needs and have never been prototyped to solicit feedback. Even when people do go into the field, they may enter with preconceived notions of what the needs and solutions are. This flawed approach remains the norm in both the business and social sectors."[48]

Against this more outside-in approach, which shows remarkable similarities with the way in which we currently plan military operations, he posits what he in 2009 called the *design thinking* process:

> *"The design thinking process is best thought of as a system of overlapping spaces rather than a sequence of orderly steps. There are three spaces to keep in mind: inspiration, ideation, and implementation. Think of inspiration as the problem or opportunity that motivates the search for solutions; ideation as the process of generating, developing, and testing ideas; and implementation as the path that leads from the project stage into people's lives. The reason to call these spaces, rather than steps, is that they are not always undertaken sequentially."*[49]

DESIGN THINKING – THE PROCESS

This basic idea behind human-centered design thinking has subsequently been further developed in a couple of different ways. We will present here three different ways of visualizing the process

The first visual[50], from the famous Stanford Design School (Figure 10. Design Thinking) identifies 2 processes of first divergence and then convergence: one (to the left) that focuses more on the demand-side (empathize and define); and then one (to the right) that focuses more on the supply-side (ideate, prototype, test, iterate) – but with both clearly recognizing that sustainable solutions derive from constantly keeping supply-side and demand-side considerations in mind.

[48] Brown and Wyatt, "Design Thinking for Social Innovation," 32.
[49] Ibid., 33.
[50] For a brilliant compendium of one-hundred ways of visualizing design in fields such as architecture, industrial design, mechanical engineering, quality management and software development, see Dubberly, "How Do You Design."



Figure 10. Design Thinking[51]

The second one comes from popular recent work by Jeanne Liedtka, former Chief Learning Officer at United Technologies Corporation, a Fortune 50 company, and now on the faculty of the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business, and a number of co-authors.[51] She calls her approach the D4G (designing for growth) approach, which is based on four stages of design thinking that each respond to a basic question (Figure 10):

- *'What Is?'*: developing a better understanding of current reality, including broadening and sometimes even reframing our definition of the problem or opportunity we want to tackle and also trying to uncover unarticulated needs – all with an eye towards specifying design criteria;
- 'What if?': a more creativity-focused stage in which we use a series of trigger questions that help us think outside our own boxes. Next, we take these ideas and treat them explicitly as hypotheses (in the form of concepts) and begin to think systematically about evaluating them against our design criteria;
- 'What wows?': winnowing down the field of interesting concepts identified in the 'What if' stage to a manageable number, looking for those that hit the sweet spot (the 'wow zone') where the chance of a significant upside for our stakeholders matches our organizational resources and capabilities and our ability to sustainably deliver the new offering. This stage includes transforming 'wow-zone'-concepts into something a potential customer can interact with: a prototype; and
- 'What works?': trying out low-fidelity prototypes with actual users. If they like it and give us useful feedback, we refine the prototype and test it with yet more users, iterating in this way until we feel confident about the value of our new idea and are ready to scale it. As we move through this process, we keep in mind some of the principles of this learning-in-action stage: work in fast feedback cycles, minimize the cost of conducting experiments, fail early to succeed sooner, and test for key trade-offs and assumptions early on.

[51] Liedtka, *Solving Problems with Design Thinking*, 2013; Liedtka and Ogilvie, *Designing for Growth: A Design Thinking Toolkit for Managers*; Carr et al., "The Influence of Design Thinking in Business."



Figure 10. The D4G approach52

A final quite appealing visualization hails once again from IDEO, who published a Human-Centered Design Toolkit in cooperation with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Toolkit specifies three similar stages to the ones Brown identified in the 2009 book, but renames (and simplifies) them into 'hear', 'create' and 'deliver'. The design process, as described here, moves from the more concrete (the bottom part) over the more abstract (the top part) back to the more concrete.



Figure 11. The Human-Centered Design Toolkit[53]

The design literature in the business management journals and books is replete with many tools – mostly qualitative, but also quantitative – that are quite likely to resonate with military planners that have been struggling with recent planning innovations such as 'effects-based planning', 'adaptive campaigning', 'human terrain mapping', 'strategic learning', ´comprehensive planning', 'sense and respond planning', 'critical thinking' etc.. These tools include – but are not limited to – *Ethnographic research* (in field explorations of 'what is'), *Visualization* (using imagery to envision possibilities and bring them to life), *Journey Mapping* (assessing the existing experience through the customer's eyes), *Value Chain Analysis* (assessing the current value chain that supports the customer's journey), *Mind Mapping*

[52] Design: Nadine Froughi
[53] IDEO Human Centered Design Toolkit. CC BY-NC-SA 3.0

(generating insights from exploration activities and using those to create design criteria), *Brainstorming* (generating new possibilities and new alternative business models), *Concept Development* (assembling innovative elements into a coherent alternative solution that can be explored and evaluated), *Assumption Testing* (isolating and testing the key assumptions that will drive the success or failure of a concept), *Rapid Prototyping* (expressing a new concept in a tangible form for exploration, testing, and refinement), *Customer Co-Creation* (enrolling customers to participate in creating the solution that best meets their needs), and *Learning Launch* (creating an affordable experiment that lets customers experience the new solution over an extended period of time, to test key assumptions with market data).



Figure 12. Criteria for success (Design: Nadine Froughi)

The first stage of the design process – the one we will focus our attention on when we will return to stabilization efforts in the next chapter – "is often about discovering which constraints are important and establishing a framework for evaluating them. Constraints can best be visualized in terms of three overlapping criteria for successful ideas (see Figure 12): *feasibility* (what is functionally possible within the foreseeable future); *viability* (what is likely to become part of a sustainable business model); and *desirability* (what makes sense to people and for people)." [54] The important thing here is that in this school of thinking – and contrary to most people's impression of design as something that is done by creative people in some design studio in relatively splendid isolation – design does not start with dreaming up something 'cool', but with an attempt to fully immerse oneself in the context of what one is trying to achieve – what they call ethnographic research. In a recent talk at the yearly Clinton Global Initiative,[55] Tim Brown from IDEO emphasized that the key element here was to go out and understand these constraints by "spending time in the field." He was asked what IDEO did after they had collected their data and had come back from doing their ethnographic research. He replied "You don't actually come back. More and more today we're jumping straight into prototyping these ideas in the field." Could we imagine soldiers who would spend more time in the field – also and maybe even especially before tensions erupt into military violence - trying out these types of fast-prototyping of security solutions?

Recent successes of crowd-funding websites such as Kickstarter or Indiegogo have actually pushed this idea a few notches further by giving various potential customers not only the opportunity to provide feedback on an inventor's initial idea (thereby giving her a chance to refine her original idea), but also to co-invest in the project (thereby allowing the author to gauge the actual market viability of her idea and to turn them into stakeholders instead of just customers[56]). This is no longer just us trying to figure out what (we think) they need (which we

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[54] Brown, *Change by Design*, 2009.

[55] *A Conversation Between Tim Brown and Linda Tischler - 2012 CGI Annual Meeting*.

[56] We also see a similar phenomenon in the recent launch-to-learn philosophy, in which especially startups launch products with a minimal feature set much earlier than they previously would have just to learn from the behavior of early adopters. "[Y]ou don't have all of the answers; you have to get them from the market. You'll have hunches as to what the right answers are, but these are dangerous assumptions, not facts. You could be solving problems that no one cares about. The best way to learn the truth and convert assumptions into facts is to launch your company. Create a minimally viable product (MVP) that has the smallest feature set required to land your first customers… Your intuition will tell you that everything needs to be perfect, so

do to some extent in defense planning); not even us going there to learn what they need (which military planners do not typically do ahead of time, but end up doing once they are in theater – often after the conflict has already reached critical mass); but them coming to us (or better yet: us finding creative ways of having them come to us) and becoming co-creators of whatever solutions they jointly come up with – which military planners rarely if ever do[57]). This model also opens up some fascinating new avenues to explore for the defense and security world. Could we imagine defense- or security-related Kickstarter-like websites where local communities in conflict zones could develop promising ideas that promote stability and/or security and then also solicit funding or other forms of support in order to prototype them (in the field)?

It may be useful to illustrate design thinking with a concrete example. Whereas many examples by now have been documented in the literature, we decided to present an example from a part of the world in which also Western militaries have been active in recent years: the Gulf of Guinea. The example comes from a public policy domain (public health) that is distinctly different from the security one, but we encourage the reader to constantly try to imagine what the security equivalent might look like. IDEO's WSUP (Water Sanitation for the Urban Poor[58]) program aims to provide feasible, viable and desirable in-home sanitation solutions for the urban poor. The scale of this problem is staggering, as it affects some 1 billion city dwellers worldwide who lack adequate sanitation facilities in their homes. Many might think that the first priority would have been to start designing a cheap toilet that does not require a sanitation infrastructure. But instead, IDEO started by going in the field and conducting interviews with families in Kumasi and Accra, Ghana, while at the same time researching the global state of sanitation innovation. Based on these findings, they realized that the problem was not so much designing the actual toilet, but a sustainable business service model that would allow for the collection and processing of refuse. So they came up with a concept for a "high touch service toilet." They prototyped various working toilets in Kumasi households, a process that quickly revealed people's true in-home sanitation needs. With user feedback, they iterated their designs and ultimately arrived at a practical, functional commode. But they also designed (and experimented with) a business service model in which micro-entrepreneurs would rent out portable toilets to families and charge a weekly or monthly fee to collect the waste. Unilever then trained and distributed franchise opportunities to local operators to run the service and eventually manufacture and supply the toilets. Operators could lease-to-own the toilets, growing their own business over time. Within three months, the WSUP team was able to deliver the final initial deliverables consisting of a research report, the basic structure of how the service would work, branding details (logo and uniforms), and a 3-D prototype of the portable toilet and waste tank (see Figure 13).

launching quickly will probably feel very wrong (at first). But your MVP is only the first release and not the ultimate vision. You will keep building, expanding, and developing your product. But now with customers in tow, you can be sure that you're solving real customer problems. Don't wait – the only way to learn is to launch." Scheinrock and Richter-Sand, *The Agile Startup*, 45.

[57] Even if the US approach to using SOF in Africa might bear some resemblance to this.

[58] "Water & Sanitation for the Urban Poor"; Unilever, WSUP, and IDEO, "Ghanasan."



Figure 13. IDEO's Clean Team project in Ghana[59]

Over the past two years, the project was rolled out and slowly scaled up. By the end of 2012, Clean Team had 106 households as customers (with the average household containing upwards of 10-15 family members) and had begun production of 1,000 new Clean Team toilets. In January 2013, the first container load of 384 Uniloo toilets arrived in Kumasi, Ghana. Clean Team aims to service 10,000 households in 2014.[60]

It is intriguing to ponder whether such a 'human centric-design' approach might also be applicable to defense and security challenges, especially also in relatively permissive environments, i.e. in pre-crisis stabilization efforts. And whether the defense and security community might want to develop such 'design' skills, whereby they would start doing similar things for security as the development ecosystem is now doing in the development area (as in the case of WSUP, where IDEO, a multinational design firm, partnered with Unilever, a large multinational, to produce an economically sustainable model that deals with a major health, environment and broader socio-economic issue).

Another important aspect to design that is emphasized by Tim Brown is that design thinking should be more about designing behaviors than about designing objects. The military equivalent here might be that also stabilization efforts (or even just operations) should be more about designing behaviors than about planning operations. Brown illustrates this point by

[59] HCD Connect / IDEO. http://www.ideo.org/projects/clean-team
[60] "OpenIDEO - Realisation - 300+ Clean Team Toilets Delivered to Ghana."

referring to the famous example of trying to induce men to reduce spillage in public urinals.[61] The standard approach to influencing men's behavior remains to post various instructional signs near the urinals, as in Figure 14, but in the 1990s Jos van Bedaf, the manager of the cleaning department at Schiphol airport, came up with the idea of putting a fly in the urinal (Figure 15) to nudge men towards aiming at the fly, which has been credited for reducing spillage by 80%.

Figure 14 . Instructing behavior[62]

Figure 15. Nudging behavior[63]

This increased focus on more subtle forms of influencing (nudging) that are more inspired by the behavioral psychology of the person that is to be influenced than by the power of the influencer can be found back in many applied disciplines that deal with how humans interact with each other.[64] Defense strategists and planners might want to ask themselves whether they have thought enough (and/or experimented enough with) about what the equivalent of the bathroom fly would be for defense and security.

DESIGN THINKING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Design thinking has also become quite popular as a new approach towards policy-making in a number of different governments.[65]

- Sitra, Finland's leading state think tank, has a strategic design practice (The Helsinki Design Labs) that is responsible for long-term planning around health, education, and ageing ("helps government leaders see the "architecture of problems." "We assist decision-makers to view challenges from a big-picture perspective, and provide guidance toward more complete solutions that consider all aspects of a problem. Our mission is to advance this way of working – we call it strategic design."[66]).

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[61] Brown, "From Blueprint to Genetic Code: The Merits of an Evolutionary Approach to Design," 18.

[62] Source: Shutterstock, http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-2336454/stock-vector-please-always-sit-down-when-using-the-toilet.html?src=KMOeKkJT2IVehb1IhCl4YA-1-73

[63] Fly 'target' embossed in toilets of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. CC-Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic. https://www.flickr.com/photos/methodshop/2483875119/

[64] Witness the focus on behavioral economics in economics; or on nudging in policy, as popularized by University of Chicago economist Richard Thaler and Harvard Law School professor Cass Sunstein in their 2008 book. Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*. This nudging thinking proved quite influential in the thinking of both the Obama administration in the US and of David Camerons cabinet in the UK. Subramanian, "Nudge Back in Fashion at White House."

[65] Antonelli, "On Governing by Design"; Carstensen and Bason, "Powering Collaborative Policy Innovation"; Steinberg, "Public-Sector Chief Design Officers, Anyone?."

[66] "About HDL - Helsinki Design Lab."

- Singapore: Design thinking is being "embedded in the DNA of the Singaporean government" as it rolls out directives crucial to its strategic agenda[67] through The Human Experience (THE) Lab, a part of the Public Services Division of the powerful Prime Minister's Office with a vision for "A Public Service that delivers human-centric solutions to national outcomes for and with our people for an inclusive Singapore," [68] and a Policy Design Lab ("a two-three year project … [that] aims to develop an inventory of policy design tools for application at the national/ state level"[69]).
- The UK Cabinet Office, building on the perceived success of Nesta's (the UK's National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts) Public Services Lab ("trialing some of the most innovative solutions and bringing them to scale across the country's public services" [70]), is currently setting up a Policy Lab to work on live issues and experiment with design-led approaches such as user-centered design, rapid prototyping of policy, and using digital tools to analyze data." The aim is to "establish an entirely new organization able to bring new and challenging ways of working into the heart of policy-making in Government.[71]
- Denmark has experimented with MindLab ("a cross-governmental innovation unit which involves citizens and businesses in creating new solutions for society" [72]).
- The Australian government currently runs its own design center DesignGov ("Building and brokering a world leading innovation and design culture and capability across Australia's public sector" [73]). The World Economic Forum has a Global Agenda Council on Design & Innovation 2012-2014 to initiate "a series of dialogues to raise awareness and understanding of the role of design and innovation as a creative response to the salient issues of today." [74]

Although design has also come in for some criticism, [75] most observers agree that at least in the more traditional design of hardware or (especially) software,[76] design thinking has clearly led to significant improvements as not (just) the brilliant designer, but (also and even increasingly) experiential learning from user involvement and experiences has come to play an ever more important role in the way various products or even services are developed. Design is 'human-centered' in the sense that it involves the end user (who, in the case of military operations is clearly not the operator, but the security customer – i.e. the citizen – in a war- or conflict-torn country or region) much earlier in the process and much more organically.

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[67] Harrington, "What Design Can Bring to Policy-Making."
[68] "The He(Art) Of Designing Policies | Challenge Online."
[69] "Policy Design Lab – About Us."
[70] National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (Nesta), "Public Services Lab - Nesta."
[71] Montgomery, "Government to Use Design Principles in Policy-Making"; Olliff-Cooper, "Cabinet Office Policy Lab Aims to Create Designer Public Services."
[72] "MindLab - About MindLab."
[73] "About | DesignGov."
[74] The World Economic Forum, "Global Agenda Council on Design & Innovation 2012-2014"; Kestler, "How Designers Can Help Policy-Makers Put People First."
[75] Woudhuysen, "The Craze for Design Thinking"; "Why Design Thinking Won't Save You."
[76] For some recent real-life examples of managers who successfully applied design methods at 3M, Toyota, IBM, Intuit, and SAP; entrepreneurial start-ups such as MeYou Health; and government and social sector organizations, including the City of Dublin and Denmark's The Good Kitchen, see Liedtka, *Solving Problems with Design Thinking*, 2013.

DESIGN THINKING IN DEFENSE

In the past decade design has also entered the vocabulary of a number of Western (primarily Anglo-Saxon) defense organizations. Although the fundamental intuitions behind design thinking in defense are quite similar to those of design thinking in the non-defense fields, their intellectual antecedents are quite distinct and also the current state-of-play shows some interesting differences.

ISRAEL

The first defense organization to explicitly start using design terminology – more specifically by introducing the term *Systemic Operational Design* – was the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). A key role in this was played by Brigadier General (Retired) Shimon Naveh and the members of the IDF's then in-house think tank: the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI). Shimon Naveh, a bright and apparently quite charismatic but controversial Israeli General with a PhD in War Studies from King's College, London, developed a new conceptual approach to operational planning in the mid-1990s that drew heavily upon postmodern French philosophy, literary theory, architecture and psychology[77]. Naveh founded the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI or MALTAM in its Hebrew acronym) in 1995 and headed it until it was dismantled 10 years later, following a harsh report by the state comptroller. The theories appear to have had quite some influence on some of the students at the institute who played key roles in the Second Lebanon War such as Brigadier General Gal Hirsh, commander of the 91st Division – who was removed from his post after that war – and Brigadier General Aviv Kochavi, former commander of the Paratroops and the Gaza Division, then chief of the General Staff operations division and now head of military intelligence.

In the absence of a single authoritative document on Israeli SOD, quite different descriptions of the approach appear to co-exist.[78] The most detailed description of the approach was co-authored by six US and UK officers who worked with Naveh on Exercise Unified Quest (UQ 05), the U.S. Army's annual Title X war game at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania in May 2005. Prior to this exercise (between January and April 2005), Naveh instructed this group of students on SOD methodologies and thought processes in a series of Training and Doctrine

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[77] Naveh may very well represent the first intrusion – however modest – of post-modernist ideas into military planning circles. It is ironic that this intrusion would happen in a country that is so focused (by necessity, in the eyes of many) on 'realist' approaches to national security. As in other disciplines, many scholars (and practitioners – including military ones) may feel some sympathy for the post-modernists' thoughtful and scathing critique on the basic assumptions of much of today's scientific and practical activity. But their highly aestheticized – l'art pour l'art – and often convoluted way of expressing themselves undoubtedly temper much of that initial sympathy. But as in the many other areas in which post-modernism has been introduced (and), their views have been more influential in a negative sense (what's wrong with the current approaches), than in a positive one.

[78] "SOD is a commander-led discursive approach to operational design that facilitates operational planning and execution by developing and articulating a hypothetical systems framework and logic within which planning can proceed. This implies a unique view of design and its relation to planning, a view that is consistent with the complex nature of todays security environment." Dalton, "Systemic Operational Design," 26.

Command (TRADOC) sponsored workshops held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The entire effort appears to have been constructed as an alternative to the "Classical Elements of Operational Design and Effects Based Planning."[79] This document defines SOD as follows:

> *"Systemic Operational Design (SOD) is an application of systems theory to operational art. It is an attempt to rationalize complexity through systemic logic employing a holistic approach that translates strategic direction and policy into operational level designs. SOD focuses upon the relationships between entities within a system to develop rationale for systemic behaviors that accounts for the logic of the system, facilitating a cycle of design, plan, act, and learn. This is accomplished through seven discourses, leading to a holistic design of an operation that will facilitate planning."*[80]

At the highest level of operational planning, SOD – contrary to the NATO operational planning process (OPP) for instance – does not see a strategic directive as etched in stone, but accepts that one's understanding of a problem (and therewith also the definition of the end-state or of the strategic objectives) can evolve and change. It sees the system into which an operation is launched not as a closed one, but as an open one. The boundaries of this system may not be fully known (or even knowable) and may change; and its properties and internal dynamics may be emergent, complex and adaptive. The system therefore is unlikely to lend itself to deterministic analysis or prediction. In this sense, SOD shares many of the basic insights from systems theory with CAS-approaches, but from those insights, it appears to put more emphasis on (deductive!) discursive analysis instead of on modeling (like Effects-Based Approach to Operations) or on experiential learning approaches (like CAS). "SOD commences with the premise that operational design requires problem setting instead of problem solving. It is prompted more by the inquiry of how should I think about the problem rather than what is the problem."



Figure 16. System framing in SOD

The SOD approach to operational design differs from those of the NATO OPP or EBAO (Operational Analysis) in "the use of egalitarian discourse rather than directive interaction, and the provision of a narrative rather than an emphasis on visual products."[81] The approach starts with the framing of the system into which energy is to be injected through operational actions. "The aim of systems framing is to rationalize the strategic directive by establishing system boundaries and identifying what has changed – what is the cause for intervention."[82] This is done through structured storming ("free thinking, yet within a certain framework") around a set of questions. The systems framing discourse yields two products: a diagram that captures the hypothetical system, its components and the relationships that exist between them; and a running narrative that compliments the systems diagram and that captures key insights that emerge during the systems framing session. Three subcomponents

[79] Sorrells et al., *Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction*, iv. The only version that Naveh himself (who was apparently very insistent not to publish his material out of fear that this was more likely to impede rather than stimulate creative discussion) seems to have authored are a set of powerpoint slides.
[80] Ibid., 15.
[81] Ibid., 22.
[82] Dalton, "Systemic Operational Design," 37.

of the system (rival, command and logistics) are then explored for a) inherent tensions between the current state and the desired system trend that emerged from the system framing effort and b) for design ideas that can minimize or eliminate these tensions.

The second layer is the framing of the operation itself. "Operation framing conceptualizes an operation that exploits the differences and tensions within the system in an attempt to shape the system toward conditions more in the designers' favor. It accomplishes this by positioning forces in space and time and by providing a frame for key ideas on how the operation will unfold." [83] The last two steps then are to design an operational logic (operational effects) and operational form (forms of function) to complement the rationalization of the rival. The operational effects discourse considers the interrelation of the rival and friendly force within the systemic context and seeks to identify forms of maneuver that will generate effects in support of the broad conditions identified during the operation framing discourse. The forms of function discourse then sets up the detailed planning in the form of a directed Course of Action, at which point the more traditional forms of purposive planning re-emerge. The key product produced during this discourse is the actual operational design, which takes the form of a narrative and a graphic.[84]

Figure 17. SOD in action: Walking through walls (Eyal Weizman, "Lethal Theory" 96-97)

There is one clear concrete example of SOD-style system and operation framing from Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, which has been described in more detail in a fascinating article by the architect and researcher Eyal Weizman (and based on an interview with Israeli Brigadier General Kochavi, who headed this particular operation [85]). Confronted with a potentially extremely lethal urban operation in the kasbah of old Nablus, Kochavi's staff essentially reframed the urban system in such a way that they came up with an entirely different solution to urban warfare: rather than entering the city through streets, where Israeli soldiers would be highly vulnerable to booby traps, sniper fire, etc. the staff decided to literally walk through walls. They essentially made a tunnel for themselves by blasting holes through the walls of the Palestinian homes and moving through the town in this way. "This is the essence of war. I need to win. I need to emerge from an unexpected place. And this is what we tried to do. This is why we opted for the methodology of moving through walls... Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing. We were thus moving from the interior of homes to their exterior in a surprising manner and in places we were not expected, arriving from behind and hitting the enemy that awaited us behind a

[83] Sorrells et al., *Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction*, 26.
[84] Dalton, "Systemic Operational Design," 39–42.
[85] Weizman, "Lethal Theory." Open 2009/No.18/2030: *War Zone Amsterdam*. http://www.skor.nl/_files/Files/OPEN18_P80-99%281%29.pdf

corner... Because it was the first time that this methodology was tested [at such a scale], during the operation itself we were learning how to adjust ourselves to the relevant urban space, and similarly, how to adjust the relevant urban space to our needs... We took this microtactical practice [of moving through walls] and turned it into a method, and thanks to this method, we were able to interpret the whole space differently! ... I said to my troops, "Friends! This is not a matter of your choice! There is no other way of moving! If until now you were used to moving along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls!" [86] Naveh's comment: "In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem…Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and practice."

The association with the 2006 Lebanon War[87] proved quite damaging to the term Systemic Operation Design, which appears to have (officially) fallen into disrepute. Naveh himself has claimed that Systemic Operational Design was not well received by the Israeli military institution due to anti-intellectualism and self-preservation processes.[88]

The Israeli Defense Force still appears to be using incarnations of Systemic Operational Design without calling it SOD.[89] Shimon Naveh himself still heads Operational Design, a consultancy, which in Summer 2008 was transformed into a Booz Allen Hamilton Centre of Excellence, and which trains and advises a number of US military customers on operational planning issues.

UNITED STATES

The ideas behind systemic operational design quickly found their way into US doctrine, initially apparently again through the personality of Shimon Naveh who spent some time at the US then still existing Joint Forces Command and in the US Army as a consultant working for Booz Allen Hamilton. These efforts clear had an important impact on US Army doctrine, initially under the term campaign design, as became clear in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOCs) January 2008 doctrinal pamphlet *U.S. Army Commanders*

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[86] Ibid., 56.. For a more prosaic description of what actually happened: "If you still believe, as the IDF would like you to, that moving through walls is a relatively gentle form of warfare, the following description of the sequence of events might change your mind. To begin with, soldiers assemble behind the wall and then, using explosives, drills or hammers, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Stun grenades are then sometimes thrown, or a few random shots fired into what is usually a private living-room occupied by unsuspecting civilians. When the soldiers have passed through the wall, the occupants are locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the operation is concluded, often without water, toilet, food or medicine." Weizman, "The Art of War: Deleuze, Guattari, Debord and the Israeli Defense Force."

[87] Both because it was seen as a lost war in Israel, and maybe also because Gen Kokhavi became the center of a controversy around threats to prosecute him for war crimes (as a consequence of which he canceled plans to study in the United Kingdom), the association with SOD (and with Shimon Naveh) now seems to be shunned in Israel (and – by extension – abroad).

[88] Naveh, "Operational Art and the IDF: A Critical Study of a Command Culture." US Army Major Zweibelson also added that those same biases are also "manifest in the U.S. Army today concerning design doctrine and theory." Zweibelson, *To Design or Not to Design (Part Four)*.

[89] Zweibelson, "An Awkward Tango: Pairing Traditional Military Planning to Design and Why It Currently Fails to Work."

Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD).[90] That document describes it as "a cognitive model intended for use by commanders charged with designing, planning, and executing military campaigns. It was developed over a three year period during a series of strategic and operational-level seminars and wargames that comprised UNIFIED QUEST,[91] which is the Army's annual U.S. Code Title 10 Future Warfare Study Plan and capstone wargame. It incorporates recent operational experience, **elements of Systemic Operational Design** [emphasis added] and recently published joint doctrine. CACD proposes a method for commanders to develop a shared understanding of complex operational problems within their commands (commanders appreciation) and design a broad approach for problem resolution that links tactical actions to strategic aims (campaign design). It responds to the need for greater strategic thinking at all echelons when facing complex operational problems. The complexity of today's operational environment requires a different approach to problem solving. It requires the commanders' direct participation in a heavily inductive reasoning process upfront. This process must produce a well-framed problem hypothesis and an associated campaign design—a conceptual approach for the problem. This appreciation of the problem and the design of a solution can then be handed off to a deductive reasoning process executed by the staff under the commanders' direction that, in turn, produces executable plans and orders for implementation. The first process is one of formulation, a creative, heuristic, and iterative activity; the second is one of implementation, a practical, logical, and disciplined linear activity."

The document – clearly learning from stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan – puts a much higher premium than before on the initial framing of the problem – "the act of establishing the context of a situation within which a commander must act to realize strategic aims by examining the assigned problem from multiple perspectives" – and the subsequent mission analysis ("the first step in a process towards understanding how the problem might be solved." In this document, campaign design was clearly positioned at the outset of the operational planning stage. In essence, it was seen as a prequel to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) The thinking was that at the beginning of the operational planning process, a commander should pay more attention than before to the framing stage in which the problem was dissected and various broad approaches to solving it were explored in more depth.

From the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command' (TRADOC), the idea was taken up by the US Army's School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).[92] In July 2007 SAMS received the mission to further develop design thinking for the Army. "This required our faculty to establish an open experimental environment to encourage learning, and generate the atmosphere for new thinking to flourish. SAMS developed, taught, and refined an initial curriculum that has matured into a 24-lesson design course grounded in theory, history, philosophy, and doctrine. Our students and faculty have written monographs and professional articles to carry the word to the field and aid further development. Twenty five seminars have studied design as a theory of reflective practice – and indeed, our graduates have taken it straight from the classroom to the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, bringing to the operating force the ability to incorporate a well - thought-out strategic cognitive construct as a complement to what commanders attempt to do intuitively." [93]

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[90] Sorrells et al., *Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction*..
[91] After Unified Quest,
[92] For more details, see Grigsby Jr et al., "Integrated Planning."
[93] School of Advanced Military Studies, Ryan, and Banach, "Art of Design," ii.

In March 2010 the Army officially incorporated the concept of Design into doctrine into its Field Manual FM 5-0: The Operations Process. This document devotes an entire chapter to design (immediately after the section devoted to planning[94]) defined as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them? (section 3-1). Conceptual and detailed planning: “Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. The conceptual component is represented by the cognitive application of design. The detailed component translates broad concepts into a complete and practical plan. During planning, these components overlap with no clear delineation between them. As commanders conceptualize the operation, their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Design is continuous throughout planning and evolves with increased understanding throughout the operations process. Design underpins the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept—the tangible link to detailed planning—is forged.” Then it goes into quite some detail about how to do design.

The need to look above the “chess pieces” in play, and what they might or might not do on the chess board, to instead ask deeper questions about the nature of skill, the motives that drive the human players, and the purpose of games altogether.”[95]

In this same period, US Joint Forces Command Commander General Mattis also became a strong advocate of operational design and of migrating it into the joint area[96]. As he put it: “Design does not replace planning, but planning is incomplete without design. The balance between the two varies from operation to operation as well as within each operation. Operational design must help the commander provide enough structure to an ill- structured problem so that planning can lead to effective action toward strategic objectives. Executed correctly, the two processes always are complementary, overlapping, synergistic, and continuous.” [97] In 2010, USJFCOMs Joint Warfighting Center published “Design in Military Operations. A Primer for Joint Warfighters” as part of the authoritative Joint Doctrine Series. This document defines design as “A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.” [98] The document identifies five components of design: Frame the environment, Frame the problem, Develop the operational approach, Document the results and Reframe as required (see Figure 18). These components are further developed in the text, which also offers a number of concrete historical examples.

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[94] And the document keeps repeating, whenever it mentions planning, that design is part of planning

[95] Zweibelson, “Seven Design Theory Considerations,” November 1, 2012, 81–82.

[96] School of Advanced Military Studies, Ryan, and Banach, “Art of Design,” 1; “USJFCOM Offers New Vision for Joint Approach to Operational Design.”

[97] Mattis, “Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design, Memorandum to Joint Forces Command.”

[98] United States Joint Forces Command, *Design in Military Operations*, Pamphlet 10:4.



Figure 18. US Army Design Methodology

These documents appear to have marked the high tide for military design to date. At that point, design was recognized throughout the US Armed Forces (but especially by the US Army and the US Joint Forces Command) as an important complement to the more traditional and linear approaches to operational planning. It clearly represented an attempt to better align the operational echelon with the strategic one – both with the higher-level objectives that operations are supposed to serve and also with (a better understanding of) the strategic environment in which these operations unfold themselves. We also have to point out, however, that (contrary to the preceding US doctrinal documents that were still inspired by effects-based planning) these documents really limit themselves to the military realm. The military commander and his staff stand center-stage in all of these documents, and there is little emphasis on the broader piece. The JFCOM doctrinal pamphlet on design, for instance, explicitly states that "most complex problems are not solved by the military instrument alone, so still ahead is the challenge of collaborating on design with our interagency and multinational partners." This current report is an attempt to leapfrog the military-only stage in designing stabilization efforts. In the US, however, 2012 signals the retreat of design thinking.

In May 2012, FM 5-0 was superseded by two new documents: the 30-page Army Doctrine Publication ADP 5-0 The Operations Process ("the Army's view on planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations") and the more detailed (88 pp.) Army Doctrine Reference Publication ADPR 5-0 The Operations Process. In both of these documents, design no longer received a separate section, although they still contained what is now called The Army design methodology, referred to as a methodology for "applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them… Army design methodology is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual planning, but must be integrated with the detailed planning typically associated with the MDMP to produce executable plans. Key concepts that underline the Army design methodology include:

- Critical and creative thinking;
- Collaboration and dialogue;

- Framing;
- Narrative construction."

The main design elements of FM 5-0 and Pamphlet 10 can still be found back in AD(R)P 5-0: design "entails framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem." It is still seen as the more conceptual stage of the MDMP that has to guide the commander in devising the initial plan and can function as an emergency brake on the more traditional planning process: "The understanding developed through Army design methodology continues through preparation and execution in the form of continuous assessment. Assessment, to include updated running estimates, helps commanders measure the overall effectiveness of employing forces and capabilities to ensure that the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable within the context of the higher commander's intent and concept of operations. If the current operational approach fails to meet these criteria, or if aspects of the operational environment or problem change significantly, the commander may decide to reframe. Reframing involves revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. Reframing can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting in an entirely new plan." But whereas the main innovative elements of design still seem to be present in these important doctrinal documents, their relative importance seems to have declined.

The main changes from FM 5-0 to ADP/ADRP 5-0 therefore include the relabeling of design to Army design methodology and the modification of its definition, as well as its association with conceptual planning and operational art. Commanders are also recommended now to adjust their focus on design to their familiarity with the problem and the time available: in an unfamiliar situation where time is available for it, they are recommended to do it before they start the more traditional process; if they are familiar with it and have the time, they are told they can do the tow in parallel; and if they have no time, "commanders may conduct the MDMP and publish an operation order without formally conducting Army design methodology. As time becomes available during execution, commanders may then initiate Army design methodology to help refine their commander's visualization and the initial plan developed using the MDMP."

The discussion on design clearly continues. As Maj Ben Zweibelson, who has written a number of impressive papers on the topic, states that "design doctrinal publications… have met with extremely mixed reviews[99]" The U.S. Army Research Institute identified and documented a number of organizational barriers to integrating Design into Army operations including terminology and language barriers, conceptual barriers, organizational culture barriers, command-level barriers, and applications barriers.[100] Zweibelson adds – quite convincingly – that the main problem lies in the different epistemological frameworks and the Army's unwillingness to accept this.[101] He clearly draws lines between design converts and design skeptics: "any discussions on design theory applications within military contexts often

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[99] Zweibelson, "An Awkward Tango: Pairing Traditional Military Planning to Design and Why It Currently Fails to Work."

[100] Grome et al., *Incorporating Army Design Methodology into Army Operations*.

[101] "Institutionally and as a practicing community of professionals, the military has little trouble agreeing upon the principles of traditional planning. Yet we collectively remain fiercely divided, confused, and often resistant to design in any form, whether a rival methodology, complimentary, or even a subset of traditional planning." Zweibelson, "An Awkward Tango: Pairing Traditional Military Planning to Design and Why It Currently Fails to Work."

revolve around a small population of design practitioners using complex terms and exclusive language, contrasted by a larger population of design skeptics that routinely demand a universal, scripted, and complete examples for "doing design right."[102]



Figure 19. Differences between military planning and design thinking

NATO

NATO doctrine has also included the operational design concept into Allied Joint Doctrine in December 2010. The first doctrinal publication AJP-01(D) document, which is supposed to provide keystone doctrine for the planning, execution and support of Allied joint operations, devotes an entire section to Operational Design.[103]

[102] Zweibelson, "Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications," 87.
[103] AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, which should provide more details on the details of (and maybe changes in) operational design, has still not been promulgated.



Figure 20 NATO Operational Art

At first glance, it may appear that design would have replaced actual detailed planning (in current US parlance). But a closer look reveals that the more linear planning method still dominates this AJP, although a number of key tenets of Israeli/US-style design have been incorporated such as the importance of framing, of broader consultation (comprehensive approach), of visualization, of more operational art/intuition elements

"Operational Design frames the problem, and then develops and refines a commanders operational ideas – his vision of how he sees the campaign unfolding – to provide detailed and actionable plans. Operational design continues, often interrupted by changes in strategic guidance, throughout the duration of a campaign; it should not be deemed complete or immutable from the outset and never simply implemented as a given without adaptation in the face of changing circumstances. Review and refinement are critical aspects of continuous operational re-design, as a situation changes or the commanders understanding of the problem or environment changes, in response to military intervention, the actions and reactions of other actors (including opponents), and the unavoidable consequences of chance and friction. Operational re-design, to include reframing the problem and environment, and adjusting the end-state if required, is likely to be the norm rather than an exception. It is for this reason that a Commander should become accustomed to uncertainty, and should thrive on turning chaos to his advantage. To that end, he should exploit assessment (including the invaluable contributions from his own battlefield circulation, dialogue with allies and collaboration with other actors) as an integral part of his campaign design process." [104]

This report submits that the comprehensive-strategic level requires the same level of structured and deliberate scrutiny, creativity and effort as do the other levels. Whereas the discussions and practice of operational planning have widened, they can only go so far. In the absence of truly comprehensive and forward-planning fora, we have to find better ways of structuring the forward comprehensive design discussions that typically precede any decision to start a stabilization operation. This means that we have to come up with a new way of approaching future stabilization efforts that is more comprehensive, cross-echelon, effects-based, creative, adaptive and potentially more sustainable. This report calls this approach *strategic design*. We will sketch some possible thinking and building blocks of such an

[104] NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), "AJP-01(D) - Allied Joint Doctrine," 5–9.

approach and will then offer some illustrative examples of possible outcomes of how these blocks can be put together into one or more possible – and potentially promising – designs. All of this, we hope, will provide inputs for a number of design sessions in which the key stakeholders of future stabilization efforts can play with the thinking and building blocks in order to come to new, broadly supported and potentially more effective stabilization efforts.

DESIGNING STABILIZATION EFFORTS

After having defined the topic at hand (stabilization) and having introduced a new approach to designing purposive defense efforts ('strategic design'), this chapter now puts these two together by sketching some new design options for stabilization efforts. Current planning for stabilization efforts typically starts with a concrete conflict and with some form of political guidance from our political leaders who, after some analysis and a lot more political wrangling, identify a political objective for an operation. That objective is then forged into concrete operational plans by military staffs, whose options are primarily driven by whatever capability bundle they happen to have available at that given moment in time. Another way of expressing this sequence is to state that we start by defining the ends and that from those we subsequently derive first objectives and then means. This amounts to a top-down and linear approach to the planning of what are in essence complex endeavors: precisely the type of approach that design thinking tries to remedy. It goes without saying that political direction and control over such endeavors, both in the planning and the execution stages, is of the essence. There is and should be political (i.e. democratic) primacy over the entire comprehensive decision-making process from the very beginning through the very end. Taking this as a point of departure, in complex endeavors it may be more appropriate to start thinking in terms of a bottom-up and spiral 'design' approach.[105]

FROM STRATEGIC DESIGN ELEMENTS TO STRATEGIC DESIGN SKETCHES

Figure 21. A fashion design sketch

"Campaign design and planning are qualitatively different yet interrelated activities essential for solving complex theater problems. Design inquires into the nature of a problem to conceive a framework for solving that problem. Planning applies established procedures to solve a largely understood problem within an accepted framework. In general, design is "framing the problem" while planning is "problem solving."[106]

Our strategic design approach starts from the premise that there are a number of fundamental design choices that have to be made before any real planning can even start. These we call strategic design elements. We see them as building (and thinking) blocks that can be put together in myriad different ways to start forming design sketches.

[105] In fact, in most of our recent operations we have seen politicians redefine the ends and objectives as well as the instruments as time progressed and more insight was gathered about what was and – more importantly – was not feasible.

[106] Text-fragments from Kelly, Brennan, and Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, *Alien How Operational Art Devoured Strategy*, 21.

These sketches can be seen as the security equivalent of things like the architectural design sketch by the Danish architect Jørn Utzon's that won the competition for the design of Sydney's now iconic opera house (Figure 22) or the sketches of fashion designers (like the ones in Figure 21).[107]



Figure 22. An architectural design sketch

These sketches are best thought of as stylized artists' impressions on which to base the more fine-tuned detailed 'planning' (which materials to use, how to engineer/construct/manufacture it, etc.) . They are more suggestive and inspirational than they are strict blueprints to be produced. The final product might still deviate from the sketch – as was also the case with the Sydney Opera House, but everybody who looks at the sketch immediately 'gets' it. If we think about this in more analytical terms – thinking back about our deconstruction of definitions of stabilization operations in military doctrines – we see that some concrete high-level design choices have been made in these sketches. To refer to the fashion examples: these are clearly for women; they are part of the summer collection, they are two pieces that leave the stomach naked, the bottoms are quite short, portica yellow is the dominant color, etc.. In this sense these sketches do represent combinations of design choices that have been impressionistically sketched on paper in order to serve as the basis for more detailed planning. It is in precisely this sense that we present our strategic design sketches for stabilization efforts. They have nothing of the esthetic artistry of the two examples. But they do share the same function: to serve as the basis for a broader discussion about and a comparative assessment of those higher-level choices – in our case to inform the political decision-making process that will ultimately decide which design options should be planned out.[108]

Our first order of business was therefore to go out in search of *strategic design elements* for stabilization efforts. To this aim the HCSS team scanned a number of different sources – both primary and secondary. Our analysis of the ways in which different countries define stabilization (0) in a defense and security context already yielded a number of useful elements. Beyond these definitions, the team also examined the relevant content of a number of doctrines and operational planning documents in search of key (strategic) design elements. Finally, we also perused a number of scholarly analyses (including critical ones) of recent

[107] Figure 22 source: http://gibmee.deviantart.com/art/Fashion-Design-Brush-3-100445037. Labeled for reuse.

[108] Our intuition here is that rather than picking a single course of action, which is then planned out by an operational commander and his staff, a portfolio-approach to the actual planning process may be more appropriate. But in this report we decided to limit ourselves to the sketches and their trade-off analysis.

operations such as those in Iraqi, the Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, etc. In all of these documents, the HCSS team went looking for a number of fundamental strategic choices that were (or were not) made in the decision-making process. Finally, we also had an in-house brainstorm in which we identified a couple more out-of-the-box design elements. The final result of this analysis consists of a fairly wide range of strategic design elements, each of which contains a number of options planners can choose from. (0 and 0 provide further detail) While this list is far from exhaustive, we feel confident it provides a useful starting point for a more systematic exploration of the high-level choices that should be examined prior to (and during) the design of stabilization efforts. We emphasize that all stakeholders who might participate in such 'design sessions' would be welcome to add their own 'building blocks' to the broader set that they themselves and others could then use to develop potentially promising design sketches.

The second step in our process was to develop a number of *strategic design sketches* representing an intrinsically plausible combination of choices for each strategic design element. Here again, the theoretically possible combinations are innumerable. In the next chapter we will present a number of combinations that we feel are logically consistent and potentially promising, even though they have never been pursued as such in recent crises.

There are numerous ways in which strategic design elements could be combined into strategic design sketches. The HCSS experimented with a few different approaches: 'real-life' vs. 'abstract'; totally 'blue sky' or with some 'trick', etc. We finally converged on an approach in which we selected one choice for one dominant SDE, and then examined which other SDE choices might flow from that primary choice. This allowed us to derive some design choices that differ quite substantially from the ones that have been made so far. For the sake of illustration, we picked a combination of a few strategic design elements that are frequently used:

- *Where*: the environment from which the main stabilization effort will take place – air, land, sea, cyber, human;
- *When*: the moment at which the intervention should take place – before, early, during, after a ceasefire, post-conflict;
- *Aim*: how 'broad' the aim of the stabilization effort is – maximalist (attacking root causes and creating sustainable security and stability; minimalist (e.g. just stop the fighting between conflicting parties) or somewhere in between these two;

With some strategic design elements that are not typically considered:

- *Who*: whether it is smarter, under the given circumstances, to engage in the stabilization efforts oneself, or whether it might be smarter to empower/enable a third party to take the lead; and
- *Taking sides:* whether one decides to (try to be) neutral, whether one interposes oneself between warring factions, or whether one picks sides and fights alongside one (or more) of the factions; and
- The **DIMEL** strategic design element, which consists of the frequently used DIME (Diplomatic/Information/Military/Economic) acronym to which we added an L for Legal[109].

[109] More recently, some military organizations have started using the 'DIMEFIL' acronym – DIME plus Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement. HCSS has always felt that acronyms, while useful, should always be seen as an analytical 'aid' that should help stimulate critical thinking, and not as a fossilized and ready-made

There are of course countless additional strategic design elements that could be included in this analysis, but for clarity's sake, we decided to start with a modest subset.



Figure 23. Examples of strategic design sketches

We want to emphasize that these strategic design sketches are presented here for purely illustrative purposes. The SDEs that were selected are only a sample of those that could be usefully applied. The method that we used to combine SDEs into a strategic design sketch – picking a dominant one and then matching it with choices for the other SDEs – is only one of many possible ones. So the actual strategic design sketches that others may develop may very well differ significantly from the ones we are presenting here. But the point we are trying to convey is that it may behoove the key stakeholders in stabilization efforts (both in the public and the private sector) to engage in these kinds of strategic design exercises prior to the emergence of a new crisis. Such discussions will undoubtedly lead to far more strategic design elements and to more and different strategic design sketches. But we submit that this very discussion would be an extremely useful form of anticipating future stabilization efforts, and not only conceptually, but possibly even quite practically.

We envisage that at least various government departments (not just the traditional 3D departments, but also the agriculture, education, economic, etc. departments) would be invited for a wide-ranging discussion about the strategic design elements, the combinatorial choices within them and the criteria by which these choices can be adjudicated. Ideally, one might also wish to include a number of important non-governmental actors in these discussions, such as NGOs that are likely to be present in-theater; private companies with a (potential) commercial interest in the conflict zone, etc. One could even envisage inviting representatives of in-theater stakeholders in certain possible conflict zones to such discussions. The result then would be that whenever a new real-life crisis situation emerges, decision-makers would be able to draw upon the strategic insights that might have emerged from such design exercises.

The highly (party-) politicized nature of decision-making on defense and security matters makes it extremely difficult to engage in these kinds of pro-active, pre-political discussions about strategic design options for stabilization missions in most countries of the European Union or NATO. Despite recent cut-backs in defense spending, the Netherlands still occupies a privileged position within that group. HCSS therefore suggests that a broad effort along these

'solution' that thwarts critical thinking. As an example, our 'L" does not stand for Law enforcement, but for 'legal'

lines might still provide unique value added to the emerging discussion about stabilization missions within the country itself, but also within the alliances to which it belongs.

A FEW (ILLUSTRATIVE) EXAMPLES OF STRATEGIC DESIGN SKETCHES

A 'FORENSIC' DESIGN SKETCH



Figure 24. Forensic Mission Option

THE KEY DESIGN ELEMENT

The 'L' in 'DIME**L**'. This high-level design option (based on the DIMEL design element) assumes that the Netherlands does not intervene militarily (either directly or indirectly), but that it deploys a set of deployable conflict forensic capabilities that aim at bolstering international law in general and personal accountability for human rights violations and crimes against humanity in specific.

ATTENDANT DESIGN ELEMENTS

Since the 'L' from the DIMEL strategic design element is the central focal point of this design sketch, some other choices flow from that initial design decision. For the sake of this example, we suggested that this task could best be fulfilled ('Who') by 'us' and not by third parties. Trained Dutch forensics experts and cutting-edge forensic tools would be deployed as soon as possible ('When'). Some thought might even be given to forensic 'surge' capabilities that can help with the inevitable 'fog' and propaganda that accompanies conflicts. In this SDK, impartiality would be key, meaning that the forensic units would have to observe meticulous neutrality ('Taking sides'). The aim ('aim') of this forensic capability would be quite limited: not to stop the fighting or to produce a durable solution to the conflict, but rather to provide a trusted ability to record and track crimes that are committed during a conflict. With respect to the strategic functions, this strategic design sketch clearly highlights the strategic function deterrence through dedicated conflict forensics capabilities (and their ensuing deterrent effects).

DISCUSSION

The highly imperfect nature of the current international legal system is one important reason why international demand for stabilization so far outstrips its supply. Potential destabilizers (and their lower-level associates) can now make a quite plausible (in their own eyes) cost/benefit calculation whereby their own parochial objectives (often rationalized/framed as legitimate redress for some perceived past injustice) can be realized in the short-run without even a remote danger of ever being held personally accountable before a national or international court of justice. At the *national* level, most governments have both a legal framework that governs such domestic stabilization efforts (e.g. during the recent riots in some

of our capitals) and the mechanisms to enforce it.[110] At the *international* level, however, the analogous legal framework is universally recognized as woefully insufficient and the enforcement capabilities as essentially non-existent. One of the important implications of this situation is that the international community loses the deterrent effect of personal accountability for various war crimes.

The political preconditions for major improvements in the international legal system are glaringly absent. And yet developments such as the creation of relatively 'new' institutions such as the ICC (in The Hague) or of emerging new norms such as R2P do suggest there is a growing appetite for more effective legal norms and mechanisms in ever more parts of the world. This high-level design sketch fits nicely within this broader trend. Rather than the binary choice that currently presents itself before the international community (to intervene or not), this option would facilitate another choice which would be to sanction the presence of a variety of conflict monitoring sensors and validators (whether human or not) to start documenting what is actually occurring in conflict zones. As with current DNA evidence for crime forensics or blood samples in the anti-doping efforts in many sports, this evidence would be stored and curated so that the international community (or a subset thereof) would be able to use it in future criminal proceedings. Providing such a contribution to stabilization would fit particularly well with the profile of a country like The Netherlands that prides itself on playing a quite unique role in the international legal system, that hosts a number of key elements of the emerging international institutional setup and that even has the upholding of international law as one of three reasons for having armed forces inscribed in its Constitution (see Article 97).

In recent years, international trials (and investigations) for alleged war crimes have typically occurred years after the alleged crimes have been committed. Given the sometimes ethereal nature of some of the forensic (e.g. biological) evidence, this makes the collection of forensic evidence extremely difficult. The question this design sketch tries to answer is whether the international community should not be able (or even owe it to itself) to collect this evidence in real-time[111].

IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR ARMED FORCES

This design sketch would require exploring whether existing military (e.g. ISR) capabilities could be used for forensic purposes in conflict zones, whether existing civilian forensic capabilities (e.g. the NFI in The Netherlands) could be made available for such purposes, or whether new capabilities should/could be developed. It may even entail creating dedicated 'conflict forensics' units: whatever crimes are being committed on either side of a conflict, these units, on behalf of the international community, would record and/or collect them and attempt to bring them to justice. Some of this could be done in stand-off mode – e.g. authenticating mobile phone material etc.; but some of it may require in-theater capabilities such as drones etc. (that would have to be piloted – and maybe protected – by somebody) or even actual forensic 'boots on the grounds' – which may also require some elements of force protection, etc. This sketch would also require entering into a dialogue with the legal

[110] London and Paris: some of the rioters also went on a rampage, thinking that they might be able to get away with it; but most of them were ultimately brought to justice

[111] Another way of thinking about this design sketch would be to see this as the legal equivalent to the medical surge capabilities that are currently provided by NGOs like the Red Cross.

community – a difficult proposition even under the best of circumstances – about how such forensic evidence could be provided in a legally admissible way.

AN 'INDIRECT' DESIGN SKETCH



Figure 25. The Indirect Option

THE KEY DESIGN ELEMENT

'Who': The key design choice of this strategic design sketch would be that the actual stabilization effort of a conflict would be done by third parties to the conflict, supported and enabled by Western forces.

ATTENDANT DESIGN ELEMENTS

The more traditional purely military design elements that are typically used in operational planning would certainly figure quite prominently in this option. But the main difference would be that the West's role would not be a central one, but more of an ancillary one. One concrete possibility here would be that the West would start putting a significantly larger portion of its resources than it currently allocates to building up the military capabilities of third parties like the African Union.

Most likely this design option would have a dominant land component, with important joint supporting elements ('Where'). Given the expected difficulties with force generation, the option would most likely still only be activated after the conflict has erupted, but possible still at an earlier stage than would be possible with the current NATO or EU procedures ('When'). The stabilization force would, depending on the circumstances, just be positioned between the combating forces in order to separate them from each other ('Taking sides'). Its main activities would be of a military nature (the 'M' of 'DI**M**EL') but its aim would presumably be more maximalist than would be sustainable if Western nations would be the ones doing the actual stabilizing (as we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan).

DISCUSSION

In most recent conflicts, this fundamental element of strategic choice was pre-empted by a discussion about which of *our* existing capabilities could be used to stabilize a conflict situation, and whether the fundamental choice about the employment of force was whether or not we wanted to intervene with *our* forces. In most cases, this meant that the *de facto* decision quickly ended up being not to intervene, as the threshold for intervention is usually–quite understandably–very high. In a few others cases, where Western interests where perceived to be bigger and therefore the intervention threshold a little lower, the West did decide to intervene itself. But even here, one might ask the question whether this decision is always to be preferred over an option where responsible regional stakeholders (like the African Union) assume this responsibility. France decided to intervene in Mali, for instance, because the

ECOWAS force was not ready yet to assume these military responsibilities. All major recent Western military interventions (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, etc.) also ended up – more by ultimate default than by original design – devoting significant (military) resources to building up local military and law enforcement capabilities, but the 'after the facts'[112].

Learning from these experiences, this strategic design sketch would put responsible (!) local, regional or third-party defense and/or security providers center-stage in Western planning for stabilization efforts. The Netherlands/the West would allocate significantly more resources than we do now to building up such capabilities in and around various potential crisis zones (North Africa, Great Lakes, Caucasus, etc.). And after a crisis erupts, the West would still assist these local security providers with critical assistance in areas such as planning, C2, intelligence, lift, etc., but all of this would be done 'from behind'[113].

IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR ARMED FORCES

Such a strategic mission design would imply much more emphasis on the development and maintenance of an international stabilization ecosystem. It would mean to be constantly on the lookout for competent and responsible security actors and to be situationally aware of their capabilities and intent. It would also mean putting a lot more emphasis on (and allocate more resources to) training others and to develop enablers for them. But it may also require putting more effort in what could be called disabling assets (or permissive action links), to allow us to also deny access to those enablers if those force providers are not living up to expectations or start becoming destabilizers in their own right.

A 'GREEN'[114] STRATEGIC DESIGN SKETCH

THE KEY DESIGN ELEMENT

This high-level design option focuses on the 'party of peace' in a conflict. It does not take sides *against* one (or more) of the conflicting parties, but *in favor of* the 'healthy' fibers in a society that is under threat of or already in conflict by protecting and/or empowering them.

DISCUSSION

Conflicts are typically thought of (and war-gamed) as consisting of two (or more) opposing forces (enemies, blue/red) that are at each other's throats and have to be separated from other and/or forced into a cessation of armed conflict. The reality of conflict that there is

[112] And in Iraq's case, even after first destroying local security capabilities.
[113] We want to point out that this has very much become the main modus operandi of the United States' African Command (Africom): building partner military capabilities through low-cost, small-footprint presence (AFRICOM's Theater Security Cooperation programs (TSCP) remain the cornerstone of our sustained security engagement with African partners, are focused on building operational and institutional capacity and developing human capital, and provide a framework within which the command engages with regional partners in cooperative military activities and development).
[114] Green here refers not the environment, but to the 'neutral' green teams that are sometimes used alongside the 'blue team' ('us') and the 'red team' (the 'enemy') in war games. We also like to think of this side as 'green', as it is the color that represents hope.

always another important party to the conflict: the often silent majority within a society that resents being torn asunder by conflict – including the human and economic toll it demands. One of the tragedies which occur when conflict erupts, and that allows it to spiral into often uncontrollable surges of ever more vicious conflict, is that the middle ground (including the more moderate forces on both sides) quickly evaporates. Societies thereby lose the intrinsic resilience they have to violent conflict. In many recent conflicts – including in Iraq and Afghanistan – 'bystanders' have often been pushed by circumstances (or even by actions by external forces) to take sides in the conflict.

The West does not possess many 'surge' capabilities that are targeted at such societal resilience to conflict. The military surge capabilities we do have are typically focused on red ('the enemy') and on blue ('our' forces). The international community does have some non-military surge capabilities – mostly in the emergency assistance. Food and medical areas, but these typically see the 'green' side as the 'victim'. This option would instead see this side as the party of peace (as contrasted to the party/ies of war) and would focus its main efforts on empowering that party to the conflict. The essence of this strategic design option would therefore be to apply external means to protect and bolster that middle (green) ground in order to counteract the debilitating cascading effects of radicalization.

IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR ARMED FORCES

Also this design sketch suggests a potentially very different type of 'armed force' that is not (or less) focused on 'the enemy' and how to counter him, but on the remaining healthy fibers within a society that is spiraling down towards conflict. In extreme cases this may still require employing force – including kinetic force – against the violent and armed groups. But its main focus would be on identifying and 'nurturing' the 'healthy' parts of a conflict-prone society. It may entail delineating and protecting a geographical perimeter within which these green elements can go on with their lives, but it could also entail more than that. It could also mean enabling communication between various 'green' elements as well as providing them with access to basic resources. It could include options to step into the information war (including on social media) that increasingly accompanies conflict by countering particularly inflammatory propaganda based on real-time verified and curated information that can be trusted by the 'middle ground'. This option will necessarily include deployable capabilities to mediate the conflict and to develop non-violent solutions.

THE NON-KINETIC (-INDUSTRIAL) OPTION



Figure 26. The Non-Kinetic (-Industrial) Option

A KEY DESIGN ELEMENT

This design sketch focuses on what we have called the kineticity design element. Despite being an infelicitous term, the term kinetic is used by contemporary (Western) analysts for the

industrial incarnation of 'strike'. The main design choice in this strategic design sketch is for our armed forces to stabilize a conflict through non-kinetic means.

DISCUSSION

Humans have always availed (and will in all likelihood always continue to avail) themselves of whatever they can find and create around themselves in order to attempt to impose their will on others.[115] The arms that have been used in armed conflict have always reflected the age in which that conflict occurred. In pre-historical times, that meant essentially wood, a few primitive ropes and some stones (for clubs, spears, bows, slings). In the Bronze Age, bronze was added to the mix to yield edged more lethal metal weapons; the Iron Age added the much more commonly available iron to the mix – and so on until we reach the current industrial-age armed force based on steel and firepower. Industrial warfare saw nation-states creating and equipping large armies and navies (and in the 20th century also air forces) based on mass conscription, rapid transportation (first on railroads, then by sea and air) and unprecedented communication (from telegraph to wireless communications). It also saw a new mix of physical capability elements such as rifled breech-loading infantry weapons capable of massive amounts of fire, high-velocity breech-loading artillery, metal warships, submarines, aircraft, rockets and missiles, armored warfare, and nuclear weapons. The history of the past two centuries has essentially seen the ever more sophisticated further refinement of this basic industrial capability mix.

But we are increasingly observing the diminishing returns to this 'industrial-kinetic' incarnation of armed force. On the cost side, current cost trends for these kinetic-industrial capabilities increasingly seem to price them out of the market (in terms of value for money) in even the most affluent developed countries. As to the security value that is obtained from this money, we have all witnessed how the apogee of industrial-age armed force as it is visible today in the United States and most of its NATO Allies proved unable to achieve its political goals against vastly 'inferior' forces such as Al Qaeda or the Taliban. This raises the question whether, as we look ahead at the future, our industrial age capability bundle is likely to continue to provide us with good value for money, or whether we should start envisaging a possible post-industrial-kinetic capability bundle, that would be based more on the advances in bio-, cogno-. Info- and nano-sciences.

IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR ARMED FORCES

When our armed forces are currently confronted with stabilization options for various conflicts around the world, we have to essentially resort to the capabilities ***. But the essence of this strategic design sketch would be that our capability portfolio would start looking a lot more

[115] One could refer here to Clausewitz original formulation of his wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit (amazing trinity) consisting of primordial drives in people (which he framed negatively as violence, hatred, and enmity, but which could also merely be seen in a more neutral sense as an individual's drive to obtain one's will); the interplay between chance and volition in the application of armed force; and the political aims to which this armed force is subordinated. Whereas the first can be seen as universal, the second and third elements of the trinity clearly depend on the particular juncture in time. Clausewitz, *On War*.

post-industrial, with significantly more capabilities that we would currently call cyber or 'non-lethal', including a much wider array of behavior influencing capabilities.

SELECTING STRATEGIC DESIGN OPTIONS: CRITERIA AND TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS

The various design sketches we presented in the previous section were intended to provide some impressions of intrinsically coherent, plausible and potentially promising design options. They were only – and purposefully – presented in extremely reduced form to suggest that there might be some promise in such an approach and not to pre-empt a more detailed discussion at the design sessions we are recommending to take place. Our hope is that such sessions would generate some 'meatier' design sketches that could provide the basis for more detailed capability development and/or operational planning.

But In order for such pre-political sketches to be useful in actual political decision-making we still have to figure out a way to assess their relative 'attractiveness'. This requires developing a set of criteria by which the applicability of such sketches to specific circumstances can be assessed. It is clear that their respective advantages and disadvantages will depend largely on the precise context of every individual stabilization mission and on the political goals (the desired effects) our political leaders will determine for it. But it should prove possible – maybe also by using some generic scenarios – to gauge the actual attractiveness of various sketches.

As in the previous chapter, our intention in this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive list of such criteria. We hope a workable list could be generated in a more inclusive way through workshops with the various stakeholders in possible future stabilization efforts. But we hereby present a few of them, based on previous HCSS work, just to give our readers a feel for what they might look like. We will then apply them illustratively to the few sketches we presented in the previous section.

- **Financial cost** – the impact of this design option on a financial investment (inexpensive is excellent).
- **Effectiveness** – the effectiveness of this design option in obtaining various possible political objectives. This would imply spelling out some plausible objectives and scoring the option against them (maybe even for different time horizons (high is excellent).
- **Domestic support** – the degree to which a design option would be likely to be supported by Dutch public opinion (high is excellent).
- **International political benefits** – the international political benefits The Netherlands can expect to derive from this design option (high is excellent).
- **Antagonizing great powers/negative reaction** – the potential of a given design option to antagonize great powers (low is excellent).
- **Contribution to international law** – the degree to which this design option would contribute to the upholding or further development of international law (high is excellent).

	Forensic	Green	Indirect	Non-Kinetic
Financial cost	4	3	2	3
Effectiveness	2	3	4	3
Stopping the fighting	2	3	4	3
Contributing to a sustainable solution	4	4	3	3
Domestic support	5	3	4	4
International political benefits	5	3	3	3
Antagonizing great powers	1	2	3	3
Contribution to international law	5	3	2	2

Table 3. Selecting Strategic Design Options

If we apply these criteria – illustratively – to the design sketches that were developed in the previous section of this paper, the outcome might look something like Table 3. In this table, HCSS has color-coded each cell from dark green (highly attractive) to dark red (highly unattractive). This is nothing more than a subjective judgment call by HCSS, and by HCSS alone. The main point of this exercise would be to map how different stakeholders gauge the relative attractiveness of certain 'stabilization' options based on various criteria – in hopes of identifying promising options that are widely supported. To just illustrate HCSS' intuitions in this table: the 'forensic' strategic design sketch scores quite well on many criteria (cost, domestic support. International brownie points, contribution to international law) but very bad on 'antagonizing great powers' (who may fear the precedent this may create for greater intrusion into their domestic affairs) and quite bad on effectiveness, especially in terms of stopping the fighting.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The demand for stabilization in an increasingly complex and interdependent world is unlikely to disappear – including (and even especially) in Europe's immediate neighborhood. At the same time the supply of (cost-) effective stabilization can be expected to remain distinctly suboptimal for quite some time to come. This combination of strong and high-payoff demand and weak and high-cost supply offers great opportunities for even modest-sized stabilization providers to design a new and improved capability portfolio that can add real value to a coalition effort. The fundamental recommendation of this report is therefore to include a new 'design' stage in the typical decision-making sequence for dealing with stabilization challenges in which multiple stakeholders would explore various new options.



Figure 27. Stabilization decision-making – at present

In the current decision-making sequence (for a stylized representation, see Figure 27), stabilization challenges usually appear on politicians' radar screen when it is already very late in the game. At that point, the particular challenge is thrown into a domestic political cauldron where it is analyzed from the point of view of the key political players' views of their country's national interests and – sometimes – values. It then immediately becomes the subject of a number of political bargains between these players. At the same time, this domestic bargaining process is also thrown in a number of multilateral consultations where similar political horse-trading takes place between different countries. The political games that ensue in the best case yield a political 'decision' that specifies a set of fairly vague political objectives. In case a military contribution is requested, the military is tasked to come up with an operational plan based on this political guidance.



Figure 28. Stabilization decision-making - proposed

This report proposes inserting a new 'design' stage in this sequence (see Figure 28). A stabilization challenge would still be viewed and framed from the point of view of a country's

interests and values, but it would then be subjected to a 'design' exercise in which the key stakeholders from the public and the private sector would design a number of stabilization options and would assess their attractiveness based on a number of collaboratively developed criteria. As part of the Netherlands' increased focus on the strategic function 'anticipation',[116] this report recommends engaging in such 'design sessions' precisely in moments where no concrete decisions have to be made. This might lead to some innovative design options along the lines of the few examples that are presented in this report. Such more 'generic' design sessions might also facilitate, and expedite, the more 'applied' design sessions that might take place in a concrete case in which a time-critical decision has to be made. This design session could then inform the political decision-making process , which would in turn lead to a comprehensive operational planning process that would yield a comprehensive operational plan – of which the military operational plan would be a subset.

"In order to cope with the uncertainty of dealing with ill-defined problems, a designer has to have the self-confidence to define, redefine and change the problem as given, in the light of solutions that emerge in the very process of designing."[117]



Figure 29. Solving problems with design thinking[118]

[116] Ministerie van Defensie, *Verkenningen Houvast Voor de Krijgsmacht van de Toekomst*; Bekkers et al., *Anticipatie*.
[117] Cross, *Design Thinking*.
[118] Liedtka, *Solving Problems with Design Thinking*, 2013. Image design origin: Stephanie Walter (CC BY-SA 3.0) http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adaptive-iceberg-1024.jpg

ANNEX A: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: UN, EU AND NATO VIEWS ON STABILIZATION

A.1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary stabilization missions are multilateral enterprises. Practically if not actually all states lack the requisite means, expertise and legitimacy to conduct stabilization unilaterally. Therefore, stabilization missions are virtually always deployed under the auspices of multinational organizations. For the Netherlands, the most important multilateral organizations in this regard are the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These organizations have developed diverging approaches to stabilization.

The UN has the longest tradition of involvement in post-conflict situations. Since 1948, the UN has deployed peacekeeping missions, contributing to the stabilization of countries emerging from violent conflict. Peacekeeping has since evolved to encompass tasks ranging from creating a safe and secure environment to institution-building.

The EUs involvement in stabilization is much less longstanding. The EU has nevertheless deployed an impressive number of missions since 2003. EU stabilization is primarily focused on capacity-building and the provision of training and advice.

NATOs role in stabilization is relatively recent. NATO has transformed itself into a multi-purpose security institution. While NATO generally operates at the high end of the violence spectrum, it also carries out initial stabilization tasks after violent conflict has been stemmed.

Below we describe in detail how stabilization is approached by the UN, the EU and NATO. We address the conduct of stabilization by these organizations, and highlight recent developments and contentious issues. This provides an insight into the divergence of mission types that these multilateral organizations engage in.

A.2 UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSIONS

THE UN'S APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

The UN stabilizes conflicts by deploying peacekeepers. Peacekeeping is "a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted."[119] It consists of "many elements – military, police, and civilian – working together to help lay the

[119] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18.

foundations for sustainable peace."[120] Modern peacekeeping missions are multidimensional, and also contribute to peacebuilding measures, which are "aimed at reducing the risk of a country lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management."[121]

UN peacekeeping missions "help countries emerging from conflict make the transition to sustainable peace."[122] Important measures to achieve this goal include the creation of a secure and stable environment; facilitation of a political process and the establishment of legitimate institutions of governance; and coordination activities with international actors.[123]

EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING

The role of peacekeepers in stabilization has evolved considerably over time. Originally, the objectives of peacekeeping were limited. During the Cold War, peacekeeping consisted primarily of supervising ceasefire agreements by putting boots on the ground between no-longer-warring parties. Peacekeeping missions did not necessarily play a role in devising a political settlement, but created space for peace negotiations between the conflict parties.[124] This changed after the end of the Cold War. Newfound consensus in the Security Council led to a rapid increase in peacekeeping missions.[125] Peacekeepers were given a wide variety of new tasks, ranging from the organizations of elections to the repatriation of refugees.[126] However, the initial optimism about the use of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool was extinguished by the failure of missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia.[127] It became clear that peacekeeping by non-violent methods was not necessarily the right panacea for the peaceful solution of conflicts.

In Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia peacekeepers were sent into situations where non-violent stabilization was not possible. In such cases, as painful lessons learned, peace enforcement, which "involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures," might be more appropriate.[128] It was also contended by then UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Gali, that peace enforcement should not be carried out by peacekeepers.[129] Military alliances, such as NATO, are better equipped to carry out such activities. Peacekeepers, conversely, are not equipped for enforcement measures, and should not be expected to engage in such activities, because it would harm the unique nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, it was held, was inextricably intertwined with the principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense or in defense of the mandate. Meanwhile, the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force remain characteristic for peacekeeping, although their interpretation has changed over time. The

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[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid., 22–23.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 5.
[125] Berdal, "The Security Council and Peacekeeping," 187.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid., 194.
[128] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18.
[129] Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations," para. 12.

interpretation of the principles has become more flexible. Consent is only required from the main parties of the conflict. Moreover, peacekeepers should be impartial and implement their mandate without prejudice, but they should take action in the face of behavior that works against the peace process. Finally, peacekeepers may use force at a tactical level to protect themselves, their mandates, and civilians under imminent threat of physical harm.[130]

CONDUCT OF CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Since the early 2000s, there has been a renewed surge in peacekeeping. Currently 116,000 people serve in 15 peacekeeping missions around the world, which constitutes a tenfold increase compared to the late 1990s.[131] The UN spends over $7.5 billion on peacekeeping per year. Peacekeeping enjoys wide international support, because "it is a very versatile tool but also cost effective."[132]

Contemporary peacekeeping missions are multidimensional and carry out a wide range of stabilization activities. They do not only stem violence, but also support and carry out programs designed to prevent the recurrence of violence.[133] Peacekeeping missions fill the security and public order vacuum to stabilize countries. They address the root causes of conflict and ensure that partners on the ground can carry out their activities. The focus of peacekeeping has shifted to a long-term holistic approach to stabilization.

The strengthening of domestic capabilities is a central focal point in contemporary peacekeeping missions. Especially "institutions responsible for ensuring security and rule of law" must be strengthened. Otherwise, when the United Nations reduces its military and police presence [it risks] jeopardizing the gains [it has] made."[134] Peacekeepers provide direct support to national government and facilitate the activities of other actors on the ground by providing a safe and secure environment. Concretely, peacekeepers may be mandated to carry out the following stabilization tasks:

- Provide support to basic safety and security by assisting national security sector reform programs and capacity building of the military, police and other law enforcement institutions;
- Enable national governments in developing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs;
- Support strengthening the rule of law institutions of the host country;
- Support peace consolidation and inclusive political processes;
- Help establish security conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid;
- Protect civilians, particularly those under threat of imminent physical violence;

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[130] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 31–34.
[131] United Nations, "Peacekeeping Factsheet."
[132] Ladsous, Interview to MINUSTAH FM.
[133] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 25.
[134] Ban, Secretary Generals Remarks to the Security Council Open Debate on United Nations Peacekeeping: A Multidisciplinary Approach.

- Cooperate and coordinate with partners to support host government in designing economic development policies.[135]

Contemporary peacekeeping missions thus engage in a wide range of stabilization tasks. In the short term they provide security, protect the civilian population, and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.[136] In the long term, peacekeepers support institution-building and socio-economic reconstruction.

The advent of multidimensional peacekeeping has resulted in the use of the term stabilization mission. To date, three such missions have been launched: the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004; the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010; and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013. The mandates of these missions are focused on institution-building and the strengthening of local capacities. However, other recently launched missions which are not called stabilization missions, such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), have similar multidimensional mandates. Thus, the name stabilization mission does not denote a specific type of peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping has become multidimensional across the board.

ISSUES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Peacekeeping can be considered to be a very useful and cost-effective tool for deterring and reversing conflict.[137] The demand for peacekeeping remains high, and is even expected to grow. Peacekeeping missions operate in large and complex environments that require long-term stabilization. In some cases peacekeepers are deployed in situations where peace processes have collapsed.[138] As a result, peacekeeping is faced with considerable issues. Long-term presences in complex and volatile conflict situations have caused personnel overstretch in the headquarters and on the ground, and significant financial pressures. Moreover, peacekeepers need better guidance to carry out their tasks effectively in complex environments.

A reform process is ongoing to address the aforementioned challenges. If peacekeeping is to remain a widely used stabilization tool, it will have to evolve in order to deal with these challenges. It has been recognized that complex stabilization missions require a “clear and achievable mandate.”[139] Peacekeepers need clear guidance on the delivery of critical roles, i.e. the protection of civilians; a robust implementation of the mandate; and essential reconstruction tasks.[140] Some recent developments in this regard can be identified. In March 2013, for example, the formation of an intervention brigade under the command of the MONUSCO force commander was approved.[141] This intervention brigade is authorized to use

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[135] UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 2086*, para. 18.
[136] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 23.
[137] Center on International Cooperation, *Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty*, 1.
[138] Ibid., i.
[139] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 10.
[140] Ibid., 19.
[141] UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 2098*, para. 9.

force to neutralize armed groups in eastern DRC to protect civilians. The capabilities of peacekeeping missions also need to be linked to operational tasks. Peacekeepers require adequate equipment and support to carry out their mandate. More personnel and financial resources are required to carry out large-scale, complex stabilization missions. To meet the high demand for peacekeeping, the UN increasingly cooperates with partners. In Mali, for example, French troops provide a parallel force alongside MINUSMA.[142]

IN SUM

The UN deploys peacekeepers to achieve both short-term and long-term stabilization objectives. The primary task of peacekeepers is to provide security, especially for the civilian population. By creating a safe and secure environment, other actors can contribute to the long-term peace consolidation process. Peacekeepers often contribute to this process too, for example by supporting capacity-building and institution-building programs. UN stabilization typically takes place after violent conflict has ended. Peacekeeping is positively not an enforcement measure, because peacekeepers are not equipped for enforcement tasks. What is more, the future utility of peacekeeping would be decreased if peacekeepers would engage in enforcement action, because it would be much harder to obtain consent for the deployment of future missions. Peacekeepers therefore operate at the low end of the violence spectrum. However, peacekeepers may use tactical force. In fragile post-conflict situations, civilians are at risk, even if a peace process is ongoing. In such cases, t is imperative that vulnerable people are protected by peacekeepers.

A.2 EU STABILIZATION MISSIONS

THE EU APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

The European Union (EU) draws on a wide array of policy tools to stabilize countries, ranging from development funds to the deployment of civilian and military missions. The EUs approach to stabilization is focused on both security and development, because "there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and […] without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace."[143] Transition from fragility to stability is achieved by improving security conditions and addressing the root causes of conflict. The latter requires the creation of "grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development [as well as] robust public institutions and a more accountable government, capable of providing basic development services." [144]

The EU addresses security challenges through capacity-building programs. Strengthening the capacities of the security, law enforcement and rule of law sectors provides national governments with autonomous capabilities to respond to security threats.[145] Additionally, the

[142] UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 2100*, para. 18.
[143] Council of the European Union, "Security and Development: Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council," para. 1.
[144] European External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel," 2.
[145] Ibid., 7.

EU helps to create the conditions for sustainable peace by promoting a political dialogue; supporting the creation of accountable institutions; and contributing to socio-economic development.[146] The EUs initial response to crises is aimed at the immediate needs of the population, such as the improvement of access to basic services.[147] The long-term objectives of EU stabilization efforts are to enhance "political stability, security, good governance, social cohesion […] and economic and education opportunities."[148]

EVOLUTION OF EU STABILIZATION MISSIONS

The EU conducts military and civilian stabilization missions within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The conduct of missions under the flag of the EU is a relatively recent development. In the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU first referred to stabilization and conflict management tasks it aspired to be able to carry out. An expanded list, which was introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon, enumerates these tasks: "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization."[149]

Since 2003, thirty CSDP mission have been launched. These missions have carried out a multitude of tasks, ranging from border assistance (EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya) to taking over judiciary and administrative tasks from the local government (EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo).[150] In recent years, however, the focus of CSDP missions has narrowed, and a pattern seems to be emerging in the mandates. Most ongoing missions provide training and technical assistance. In Mali and Somalia the EU trains soldiers, and capacity-building missions in Niger and the Horn of Africa support the strengthening of the local law enforcement sectors. Ongoing missions have also set up security sector reform programs.[151] By providing training and advice, the EU strengthens the autonomous capacity of the host state to address security threats. These activities contribute to stabilization in post-conflict situations, but also play a role in conflict prevention. In Mali and Somalia, the EU seems to contribute to a secure post-conflict environment by training the militaries of the host states. In the Horn of Africa, on the other hand, the EU seeks to prevent insecurity by bolstering state capacity for law enforcement.[152]

CONDUCT OF EU STABILIZATION MISSIONS

The decision to launch a CSDP mission is made by the member states in the Council of the EU.[153] The EU cannot launch missions on its own accord, and it does not have autonomous means or capacities. The standing EU battle groups are not to be deployed in CSDP

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[146] Ibid.
[147] Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility," 7.
[148] European External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel," 4.
[149] *Treaty on European Union*.
[150] European External Action Service, "Ongoing Missions and Operations."
[151] Ibid.
[152] European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," 11.
[153] Rehrl and Weisserth, *Handbook CSDP*, 57.

missions.[154] The member states decide on the design of the CSDP missions when a crisis emerges, and provide the necessary material and personnel.[155] Since the planning process of CSDP missions is to a large extent owned by the member states, no doctrinal planning documents for EU missions exist. Recently, however, regional strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region have been adopted. CDSP action in these regions is embedded in the regional strategies.

CSDP missions draw on the expertise of the member states. EU stabilization missions are generally much smaller than mission deployed by the UN or NATO. UN peacekeeping missions, for example, often have a large footprint, because the monitoring of a peace progress requires the presence of a large number of troops. The EU does not engage in stabilization activates that require a large footprint (with exception of EULEX Kosovo). Instead, EU stabilization missions are small-scale and primarily require highly trained personnel that can provide advice and support for capacity-building.

OBSTACLES TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CSDP

Small-scale EU training and capacity-building missions can make a considerable contribution to stabilization. However, the focus on these types of missions is indicative of restraint among the member states to engage in more ambitious missions. There is a lack of political will to carry out all the tasks enumerated in the Treaty, especially missions requiring considerable military engagement.

The member states disagree about the EUs role as a stabilization and crisis management actor. Some member states, such as France, believe the EU should strengthen its capabilities for military action and should set up permanent military command and control structures.[156] Other member states, such as the UK, believe the EUs role in stabilization should be limited. The UK in particular is concerned that the EU will conflict with NATO.[157] In this respect the accession of Cyprus to the EU is particularly problematic. Due to Cyprus antagonistic relationship with NATO member Turkey, integration and division of stabilization tasks between the EU and NATO is currently impossible.[158]

OTHER EU STABILIZATION TOOLS

The EU complements CSDP action with other policy tools. CSDP missions primarily contribute to the improvement of security conditions, while stabilization also requires socio-economic development and political dialogue. The Commission plays an important role in reconstruction and development. Under the Instrument for Stability, the Commission funds projects which focus on issues “such as support to mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, strengthening Rule of Law, Transitional Justice or the role of natural resources in conflict.”[159] Financial assistance for socio-economic development is given through the European

[154] Hatzigeorgopoulos, “EU Battlegroups: Battling Irrelevance?.”
[155] Keohane, “Lessons from EU Peace Operations,” 208.
[156] Spear, “Is There a Distinctive European Approach to Stability and Reconstruction Operations?,” 8.
[157] Biscop and Coelmont, “A Strategy for CSDP: Europes Ambitions as a Global Security Provider,” 21.
[158] Simon and Mattelaer, “EUnity of Command: The Planning and Conduct of CSDP Operations,” 8.
[159] European Commission, “Instrument for Stability (IfS) – EU in Action.”

Development Fund.[160] Moreover, the European External Action Service promotes political dialogue, for example by appointing EU special representatives.

The policies of the different EU institutions are part of the EUs comprehensive approach to stabilization. Since security and development are inextricably intertwined, the EUs policies are coordinated within and overarching strategy. Although a comprehensive approach to stabilization is not unique, the EU is somewhat special because it possesses all policy tools to promote security and development in all phases of the conflict cycle. It has a number of funds for long-term socio-economic development, a diplomatic service, and the capabilities to deploy civilian and military stabilization missions. In general, however, the EU seeks to cooperate with partners and will not act unilaterally.[161]

IN SUM

The EU deploys small-scale military and civilian stabilization missions that provide training, assistance and advice. The primary short-term objective of the EU is to improve security conditions by strengthening the host states autonomous capabilities to respond to security threats. This is achieved by deploying highly trained experts from the member states. The EU seeks to achieve its long-term objectives, such as political stability and socio-economic development, by including other policy tools in a comprehensive approach to stabilization. Funds are available for institution-building and long-term economic reconstruction. EU representatives moreover facilitate a political dialogue.

EU stabilization missions are deployed in low-violence situations, either before violent conflict has emerged or after a firm ceasefire is in place. Unlike the UN, the EU does not deploy immediately after violent conflict has ended. The EU at the low end of the violence spectrum and does not engage in enforcement activities, because this is regarded as NATOs prerogative. The EU also does not carry out troop intensive activities, such as ceasefire monitoring, partly because there is a lack of political will, and partly because the UN already carries out these activities.

A.3 NATO STABILIZATION MISSIONS

NATO APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

Crisis management is NATOs umbrella term for all activities which refer to the concept of stabilization operations. NATOs role in crisis management goes “beyond military operations.” [162] A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian in nature and can be caused by “political or armed conflict, technological incidents or natural disasters.”[163] NATO can address the “full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts”[164] – and employs a comprehensive

[160] European Commission, “European Development Fund.”
[161] Rehrl and Weisserth, *Handbook CSDP*, 20.
[162] NATO, “NATO - Crisis Management.”
[163] Ibid.
[164] NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 7.

approach which combines political, civilian and military means for effective crisis management. Generally, though, NATO becomes engaged while violent conflict is ongoing.[165]

All crisis management operations outside an Article 5 collective self-defense scenario are called "crisis response operations" (CRO) or, alternatively, "peace support operations."[166] They may be conducted in any part of the world, contrary to the Euro-Atlantic coverage of Article 5, and are conducted in support of a UN Security Council mandate or "at the invitation of a sovereign government."[167] Indeed, the different kinds of CROs that NATO foresees are strongly aligned to the requirements of the UN. CROs can be peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention as well as peacemaking and peacebuilding operations, depending on the mandate of the mission and its basis in the UN charter.[168]

Although these types of operations correspond well with our definition of a stabilization mission, the concept of stabilization as such has not been described a the strategic level in an overarching document (although recently a political guidance document was published, more about which below). Instead, NATO published a doctrine at the tactical level which spells out stabilization activities and tasks which can occur within the framework of any NATO operation within any campaign theme.[169]

THE EVOLUTION OF STABILIZATION IN NATO

For much of its existence since 1949, NATOs main purpose was the deterrence and the countering of the Soviet threat. Although this initial purpose of providing relative peace and stability in Europe was arguably a stabilization mission of its own, it is essentially after the end of the Cold War that NATO began to engage in operations which are closer to our definition of stabilization.

Contrary to the predictions of some,[170] the lifting of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Warsaw pact did not lead to the end of NATO. Instead, NATO operations gradually became more visible than ever before. With the adoption of the 1991 Strategic Concept, the Alliance paved the way for the "management of crises affecting the security of its members," moving away from the primary focus on Article 5.[171]

Soon after, in 1992, NATOs capabilities were needed in the emerging conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The 1993 air campaign *Deny Flight,* aimed at prohibiting flights of the Bosnian Serbs, constituted NATOs first non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO). The air campaign evolved into operation *Deliberate Force* in 1995. After the Dayton Agreements ended the war in Bosnia, NATO was given the responsibility for the military aspects of the consolidation of peace.

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[165] Ibid., 19.
[166] Also referred to as: non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO)
[167] NATO, "NATO - Crisis Management."
[168] Ibid.
[169] NATO, "NATO Standard ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks," para. 0001.
[170] Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
[171] NATO, "NATO - Crisis Management."

Following more experiences in the Balkans, with operations in Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo, the 1999 Strategic Concept put more emphasis on conflict prevention and crisis management and underlined that crisis management operations would include non-Article 5 operations.[172]

9/11 was a cataclysmic event in many ways. For the first time ever, NATO invoked Article 5: collective defense clause. In the aftermath of 9/11, NATO launched the maritime monitoring operation *Active Endeavor* in the Mediterranean. More importantly, however, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions in Afghanistan, which evolved from the US-led Operation *Enduring Freedom* in 2003, is still ongoing.

The 2010 Strategic Concept has been drafted with the Afghanistan experience in mind and stresses a comprehensive approach to crisis management which emphasizes training, the development of local forces, and the enhancement of civil-military planning and cooperation and NATOs involvement in all stages of a crisis.[173] Furthermore, the 2010 Strategic Concept contains the explicit goal to "further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations."[174]

Within the bulk of CROs, stabilization and reconstruction efforts have recently received greater attention. In September 2011, NATO released its vision on its role in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in crisis management and crisis response operations.[175] Stabilization and reconstruction address "complex problems in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states."[176] They contribute to a "comprehensive approach to crisis management and to complementarity, coherence and coordination of the international community's efforts towards security, development and governance. […] Stabilization and reconstruction activities should be understood to include support to establishing long-term stability and strengthened governance, local capacity building and the promotion of ownership by the relevant national authorities, encouragement of the rule of law and establishing the basis for economic, human and social development."[177]

Concerning the duration of NATO efforts, it is stressed that NATO should handover its stabilization and reconstruction activities to the national authorities or international actors as soon as conditions allow.[178]

CONDUCT OF NATO STABILIZATION MISSIONS

All decisions to conduct crisis management operations have to be taken by consensus on a case by case basis in the North Atlantic Council, and there is no obligation for NATO members to take part in non-Article 5 crisis response operations.[179] Currently, NATO has around

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[172] Ibid.
[173] NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*; NATO, "NATO - Crisis Management."
[174] Ibid., 21.
[175] NATO, "NATO - Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATOs Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction."
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid.
[179] NATO, "NATOs Assessment of a Crisis and Development of Response Strategies."

110,000 military personal engaged in missions around the globe, “from combat to peacekeeping, to training and logistics support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief.” [180]

At the tactical level stabilization activities and tasks can occur “within the framework of any operation within any campaign theme,”[181] and can be conducted “across the spectrum of conflict in conjunction with offensive and defensive tactical activities and supported by enabling activities.”[182] Stabilization is one type of activity, next to either offensive, defensive or enabling activities which all come with respective tasks.

There are four types stabilization activities, namely Security and Control, Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), Support to Initial Restoration of Services, and Support to Initial Governance Tasks. [183] For every type of stabilization activity, there are a number of corresponding stabilization tasks which are executed continuously throughout all operations.[184] To illustrate this point and its implication for land forces describes stability as one type of activity, next to either offensive, defensive or enabling activities which all come with respective tasks.



Figure 30. NATO Land Tactics[185]

[180] NATO, “NATO Operations and Missions.”
[181] NATO, “NATO Standard ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks,” para. 0001.
[182] Ibid., para. 0102.
[183] Ibid., para. 0131.
[184] Ibid., para. 0110.
[185] Ibid.

ISSUES

The ability of NATO to act depends heavily on the political will of its member states. The thirteen additional members who entered the Alliance over the course of the last fifteen years have not made decision making much easier. NATO has been described as multi-tier entity with different groups of countries finding it increasingly difficult to agree on a common course of action.[186] On the other hand it has been argued that it is precisely because NATOs post Cold War purpose has not been defined too concretely, that the Alliance has survived.[187]

Frictions within NATO also exist on how (stabilization) operations should be conducted. For example during the Afghanistan campaign, differing views on the use of force in military operations and a diverging willingness to take risks among the troop contributors were seen to undermine Alliance solidarity.

The 2011 Libyan air campaign is another example of heterogeneous ideas regarding the use of military power within the Alliance. The coalition of the willing that contributed to *Operation Unified Protector* and the no-fly zone over Libya is seen by some as a model for the future, especially since austerity measures and decreased defense spendings across the members states could make burden sharing more rather than less difficult.[188] In terms of stabilization tasks and activities, it is hard to imagine them being possible solely by operations from the air. Yet, it is doubtful whether there will be a lot of appetite in the near future for complex operations like Afghanistan which require a significant number of boots on the ground.

IN SUM

NATO has undergone a remarkable transformation since the end of the Cold War and has become a multi-purpose security institution. Today NATO calls itself a "regional organization with global reach."[189] NATO does not refer to stabilization as an independent campaign type at the strategic level but uses the term crisis management to describe operations which are essentially stabilization missions. Over time NATO has become more akin to the EU and the UN because the increasing attention for combining civil, military, and political instruments in crisis management. However, NATO still is a militarily oriented organization, and does not have the comprehensive policy toolbox the EU possesses. NATO therefore prefers quick handovers of responsibility to national or international actors after it has become involved.

A.4 MULTILATERAL STABILIZATION MISSIONS: CONCLUSION

The UN, EU, and NATO all engage in stabilization missions, although each has developed distinct approaches to stabilization.

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[186] Noetzel and Schreer, "Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter?."
[187] Forster and Wallace, "What Is NATO For?," 111.
[188] Daalder and Stavridis, "NATOs Victory in Libya."
[189] NATO, "NATO - Crisis Management."

The UN, EU and NATO typically become involved at different stages in a conflict and carry out different tasks. This has allowed the organizations to build expertise and to complement each other. Both within and across organizations, a comprehensive approach is to stabilization is increasingly being adopted. NATO, for example, has the assets and expertise to intervene in ongoing conflict. The UN does not, but possesses the legitimacy and has extensive experience in monitoring ceasefires and institution-building. The EU, in turn, has a very broad portfolio at its disposal which can be deployed in different stages.



Figure 31. Timing of involvement of multilateral organizations in the conflict cycle

In Figure 31, we have attempted to visualize the involvement of multilateral organizations in the conflict cycle. The EU typically engages in stabilization when the level of violence is low. Through funding and capacity-building missions, the EU seeks to prevent conflict before it escalates, or to consolidate security and improve development when a sustainable ceasefire is in place. Because the EU has an extensive portfolio of funding mechanisms, it can remain involved long after violent conflict has ended. UN stabilization overlaps somewhat with EU involvement, although the UN also becomes involved in more violent situations. Peacekeepers may be deployed when a ceasefire is in place, even if the situation on the ground remains volatile. Peacekeepers may also be deployed to dissuade conflict actors in a conflict which is no longer active. Unlike the EU, the UN deploys large-scale missions. NATO, lastly, typically becomes engaged for shorter periods of time (the ISAF operation in Afghanistan notwithstanding) when violent conflict is ongoing. Unlike UN peacekeepers and EU advisors, NATO is able to use force to initiate stabilization.

A.5 HOW STRATEGIC DESIGN FITS INTO NATOS OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

The past decade has seen some interesting new thinking about the relative merits of the particular form of operational planning that took root, as we described before, in Western military establishments in the 19th century, as it was perfected over the past two centuries,

and as culminated in some of the most dramatic campaign plans from Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm.[190]

When confronted with any mission – including stabilization missions – military planners are expected to identify a certain (typically) military objective/end state and then proceed to plan how to achieve that with their current military capability bundle. This process, known as the operational planning process, as specified in a number of NATO doctrinal manuals,[191] has seen quite a few changes in the past decade. Military planners across the developed world are now encouraged to spend more time on the broader strategic design element in the early stages of the planning process. Within NATO, for instance, the new Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) process, outlined in the following diagram, differentiates between the strategic, operational and tactical planning processes, which each go through a number of sequential (but interconnected) steps (see Figure 32).



Figure 32. Stages of NATOs Operational Planning Process

At the strategic echelon,[192] the Strategic Operations Planning Group (located at SHAPE, the strategic military headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO)) is supposed to take care of the strategic planning process, whereas the Joint Operations Planning Group (located at the Joint Force Commands, ACOs operational military headquarters) is in charge of the operational-level planning. Each one of these three processes follows the same generic six sequential phases (See Figure 33):

1. Situational awareness – understanding the complex system within which a mission may take place)
2. Assessment (whereby the complex system is related to NATO)
3. Option development (with the Brussels side of the house responsible for the political-military options, and SHAPE and the JTFs for the purely military response options)
4. Planning,
5. Execution

[190] For a good overview, see Citino, *Quest for Decisive Victory*; Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*.
[191] MC133/3 (NATO's Operational Planning System, 08-2005); COPD ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (11-2010) and AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning
[192] The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national resources, including military, to achieve them. (AAP-6)

6. Transition (i.e. the handover of responsibility to another actor such as the UN, or a local actor).



Figure 33. NATO Crisis Response Planning

Over the past years Alliance planners, taking their cue from lessons learned in recent operations, have put significant effort into pushing this Crisis Response Planning framework to the left (the assessment) and the top (the strategic level) on this diagram. While this is a significant and sensible improvement to the previous OPP procedures, one of the weaker links in the current system remains the top-level, and especially the political-strategic level, where the genuinely comprehensive (i.e. not only military but also other instruments of national – and alliance – power) planning steps are supposed to be carried out. This level remains essentially under the purview of the national capitals as represented within NATO by the North Atlantic Council, the Alliances highest political decision-making body. And at that level, sound analysis is invariably trumped by other considerations, which may have to more with politics than with policy.

At the operational (and - to a lesser extent - strategic-military) echelon, Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) development has evolved in a structured thinking and planning process in which a numbers of courses of action (COA) are first developed, then tested against a set of (mostly operational-level) criteria, after which they are refined, wargamed, and then, finally, selected (see Figure 34 & Figure 35).



Figure 34. Course of Action development



Figure 35. Concept of Operations development

Under the influence - and to the credit - of the officers and civilians involved in this process, efforts have been made to widen both the actual effort involved and the debate about operational planning. It is widely acknowledged that in many of the recent complex endeavors our countries have been engaged in militarily,[193] actual effects are generated by a variety of actors beyond the military (See Figure **36**).



Figure 36. Effects created by variety of actors

In theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan, much effort has been put in overcoming some of these stovepipes, including in the deliberate planning process (Figure 37).

These efforts to comprehensivize the operational planning process have even extended to the strategic design stage, but then primarily for ongoing operations (as opposed to the forward piece - i.e. before a decision is made to intervene) and with a continued focus on the military aspect (see the bottom box of Figure 38).

[193] Alberts and Hayes, *Planning*, 2007.



Figure 37. Towards comprehensive planning



Figure 38. Strategic design

Yet, most of these efforts continue to focus on the military operational-level. An important reason for this disconnect between the strategic and the operational level may be while there is ample evidence that non-military considerations play an increasing role in the military planning process, there is so far little evidence that military considerations play a role in the decision-making processes of these non-military effectors. So a key question is how a better understanding of the entire system and of the various instruments of power that affect it (including non-military ones) can improve the military planning process at the strategic level.

ANNEX B: PLANNING LEVELS AND DOCTRINE

Modern military theory divides war into strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Although this division has its basis in the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War, modern theory regarding these three levels was formulated by the Prussians following the Franco-Prussian War. It has been most thoroughly developed by the Soviets. The levels allow causes and effects of all forms of war and conflict to be better understood—despite their growing complexity. Each level is concerned with planning (making strategy), which involves analyzing the situation, estimating friendly and enemy capabilities and limitations, and devising possible courses of action. Corresponding to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and conflict are national (grand) strategy with its national military strategy subcomponent, operational strategy, and battlefield strategy (tactics).[194]

LEVELS OF OPERATION

In the Dutch perspective there are five levels in the conduct of military operations: grand strategy, military-strategic, operational, tactical and technical level. It is impossible to draw a clear dividing line between the levels; there is usually a gradual overlap between the successive levels.

1. **Grand strategic level**. Grand strategy is the coordinated, systematic development and use of the economic, diplomatic, psychological, military and other political instruments of a state, alliance or coalition to protect national, Allied or coalition interests.

    - **Strategic policy papers** describe the vital security interests of a nation or coalition, the reasons for establishing armed forces and their main tasks (Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie, Defence White Paper, Defensienota, UN Capstone Document).
    - **Stabilization**. The generic aim of stabilization operations as part of a military mission is described. The UN refers to peacekeeping, peace enforcing, peace building operations.

2. **Military-strategic level**. Military strategy is the coordinated, systematic development and use of military means of power of a state or alliance to achieve the military elements of the objectives in the grand strategy.

    - **Strategic doctrine publications** describe the use of the military instrument as part of national or multinational security policy. A national defense doctrine, also referred to as inter-service or joint doctrine, is to be found at this level. There are also international or combined joint doctrine publications. This type of doctrine applies to joint activities by naval, land and air forces in international operations (Netherlands Defense Doctrine, NATO AJP-01, UK JDP 0-1).
    - **Stabilization**. The character of stabilization operations is described explaining the varieties of stabilization operations and by emphasizing the need to cooperate with national civil agencies and NGOs and host country authorities, forces and agencies.

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[194] Haas and Defensiestaf, *Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine*; USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE), *Air and Space Power Mentoring Guide*.

3. **Operational level**. Operational strategy involves the design and direction of joint campaigns (conducted by means of joint activities by different Services) and/or multinational campaigns (conducted by military forces from different countries) in order to achieve a military-strategic objective defined in a strategic directive. The operational level provides the link between the military strategic objectives and the tactical deployment of units in a particular area of operations. At the operational level, military assets are used to achieve the objective that has been set by the military-strategic authority for that area of operations.

    - **Operational doctrine publications** describe the inter-service or joint activities (joint forces commander) and the operations planned and conducted by naval, land and air components within this framework (Joint Operations Doctrine, NATO AJP 3).
    - **Stabilization**. Focuses on the role and aim of stabilizations operations as part of an operational plan or campaign.

4. **Tactical level**. The term tactics refers to the way in which units are deployed and operate in order to help achieve the operational aim of a campaign by means of combat and other forms of military action, in a particular arrangement and sequence. At the tactical level, units fight to complete tactical assignments which form part of the campaign plan.

    - **Tactical doctrine publications**, usually in the form of handbooks and field manuals, look at activities within the particular service and are mainly service-specific in nature (Leidraad, Field Manual, NATO ATP).
    - **Stabilization**. Describes the different activities and tasks as part of a stabilization operation (NATO ATP 3.2.1.1).

5. **Technical level**. The technical level determines the way in which small units, sometimes even individual personnel or weapon systems, are deployed and operate in order to achieve the tactical objective of a battle or other type of tactical activity, in a particular arrangement and sequence. The technical level deals with the actual execution of combat actions, usually with a specific weapon system.

    - **Technical Documents or procedures** describe individual procedures or operational and maintenance procedures for weapons systems (Handboek Soldaat, Handleiding, Dash One, Technical Manual, Operator Manual, Instructiekaart).

Level	Document	Echelon
Grand Strategic		
Military Strategic		
Operational		
Tactical		

Table 4. Levels of documents and echelons of countries under study

In our study we have consulted planning documents mainly from the military strategic level in order to get an idea about differing views on stabilization in different countries (see Table 4). We found that in some cases, for example in the UK, New Zealand, German, and Canadian documents, the level of strategic vision on stabilization (Echelon) differed from the respective

document level (see 0). It is important to keep the different planning levels in mind because they indicate at which level policy makers and military planners consider stabilization as a possible course of action and they inform us about varying objectives as well as audiences. For example, although the Canadian definition of stabilization is contained in a document at the military strategic level, its content suggests that stabilization is not an independent campaign theme in that country. Furthermore, the division into different strategic levels contributes to a clearer analytical understanding of a complex phenomenon that so far lacks a uniform definition.

ANNEX C: DECONSTRUCTING DEFINITIONS OF STABILIZATION

Stabilization has become a commonly used term in Western military doctrine, but its meaning may be ambiguous. To get a better insight in what constitutes stabilization, we have deconstructed definitions used by a number of Western states (see Table 5). We have assumed that definitions are the result of well-considered choices and emphasize issues of paramount importance to the drafter. Thus, deconstructing definitions provides an insight in the diverging views of states on the constitutive elements of stabilization.

The definitions of stabilization which were deconstructed were taken the military strategic and military operational documents of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and NATO. These countries were selected because they have defined stabilization at the military strategic or military operational level. Other countries do not define stabilization or do not use the term at all.

	Definition of Stabilization
 **CAN**	Stability operations: "tactical operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved."[195]
 **FRA**	"Stabilization is a process of crisis management aimed at restoring the conditions for minimal viability of a state (or a region), which puts an end to violence as a means of contestation and lays the foundation for a return to normal life by launching a civilian reconstruction process. The stabilization phase is the period of crisis management in which this process in dominant."[196]
 **GER**	"Stabilization forces are intended for multinational, joint military operations of low and medium intensity lasting for an extended period of time and spanning the broad spectrum of peace stabilization missions."[197]
 **NL**	Stabilization: "supporting the creation of the conditions for the development of sustainable rule of law by local parties through a generally long-term military presence."[198]
 **NZL**	"Stability and support operations impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. Stability and support operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive combat operations, or as the primary objective of a campaign. Stability and support operations provide an environment in which the other instruments of power — diplomatic, and economic — can predominate, in cooperation with a lawful government. Stability and support operations may include combat as part of the overall stabilization."[199]

[195] Canada, Department of National Defence, and Depository Services Program (Canada), *CFJP 101, Canadian Military Doctrine*.
[196] Ministère de la Défense, *Contribution Des Forces Armées À La Stabilisation*.
[197] "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr."
[198] Haas and Defensiestaf, *Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine*.
[199] New Zealand Defence Force and R.R. Jones, *The New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication Doctrine, (3rdedition) (NZDDP-D)*.

UK	Stabilization: "the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalizes non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development."[200]
US	"Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief."[201]
NATO	Stabilization: "the process by which support is given to places descending into or emerging from violent conflict. This is achieved by: preventing or reducing violence; protecting people and key institutions; promoting political processes, which lead to greater stability and preparing for longer-term development; and non-violent politics."[202]

Table 5. Overview of definitions of stabilization

The definitions of stabilization were deconstructed by isolating elements, such the actor, which were explicitly mentioned or unambiguously referred to in the definitions. The result of this exercise is an overview of constitutive elements and their possible variations, which can be seen in Table 6.[203]

Element	Options								
Focus of the definition	Process		x		x		x		x
	Operations	x				x		x	
	Role armed forces			x					
Actor	Only military			x					
	Primarily military				x		x	x	
	Military-civilian	x	x			x			
	Civilian-military					x			
	Primarily civilian								
Action	Support				x	x	x		x
	Maintain	x						x	
	Restore	x	x			x		x	
	Establish	x			x				
	Impose					x			

[200] Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*.
[201] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations," 3–0.
[202] NATO, "NATO Standard ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks."
[203] Some predicted variations, such as international organizations under partners, were included even if they were not mentioned in the definitions, because they are significant omissions.

Short-term objectives	End to violence		x				x		x
	Security and control					x		x	
	Start reconstruction		x						
	Minimal state viability	x	x						
	Basic government services					x		x	
	Protection population						x		x
	Protection infrastructure						x	x	x
	Humanitarian relief							x	
Long-term objectives	Progress	x							
	Order	x							
	Normal life		x						
	Non-violent politics						x		
	Rule of law				x				x
	Socioeconomic development						x		
	None							x	
Referent object	State		x				x		
	Society								
	Government								
	Region		x						
When in conflict cycle	Before conflict					x	x		x
	During conflict	x	x			x	x		
	After conflict	x				x	x		x
Duration	Short								
	Medium								
	Long			x	x				x
Level of violence	High					x			
	Medium			x					
	Low			x		x			
Sequence	Military first								
	Simultaneous	x				x			
	Civilian first								
Partners	Other agencies	x				x		x	
	NGOs								
	Allies			x					
	Intl. organizations								
	Local actors				x				
	Local government					x			
Location operation	Home								
	Abroad							x	

Table 6. Isolated constitutive elements of stabilization by country

The isolated constitutive elements show that stabilization is broad concept. Countries hold considerably diverging views and emphasize a wide range of different elements.

The *focus* varies across countries. France, the Netherlands, and the UK focus on the process of stabilization, which is comprehensive and overarching. Canada, New Zealand, and the US, on the other hand, take a narrower approach and focus on the stabilization operations, which is part of the larger stabilization process. Germany is the odd one out: due to the nature of the document in which it defines stabilization, it exclusively focuses on the military contribution to stabilization.

In most cases the military is the *actor* who carries out stabilization. Most countries also mention the role of non-military, often civilian actors. The prominence of the military is partly due to the

fact that the definitions used are drawn from military documents. Because the German definition was drawn from a document that focuses solely on the military, it mentions no other actors, unlike all other countries.

Different *actions* are mentioned in the definitions of stabilization. The coerciveness of actions varies across operations. The Netherlands and New Zealand, for example, refer to both non-coercive actions, such as support, but also to more coercive actions, such as establish and impose.

Short-term objectives are the concrete objectives of initial stabilization activities. Numerous short-term objectives are mentioned in definitions, indicating the existence of diverging views on the priorities of stabilization. Short-term objectives range from ending violence to re-establishing basic services. No single short-term objective features in all definitions. Interestingly, at least on the basis of this document, the US seems to regard stabilization as a short-term measure, since it only mentions short-term objectives.

Long-term objectives are the ultimate goals of stabilization. The stabilizer initiates the process to achieve these objectives. Long-term objectives are more abstract and comprehensive than short-term objectives. For example, the Canadian and French long-term objectives are abstract: respectively progress and normal life, while the Dutch long-term objective is somewhat more concrete, viz. rule of law.

The *referent object* refers the thing which needs to be stabilized. The only explicitly mentioned referent objects are the state and the region. This suggests that states believe only a sovereign state (or a collection of sovereign states) can be stabilized. States do not mention narrower referent objects of stabilization, such as the government or society.

Stabilization can take place at different moments in the *conflict cycle*. In the literature stabilization is generally regarded as something which takes place after violent conflict has ended. However, states have a less restrictive view of stabilization; they believe it can also take place before conflict has erupted and while conflict is ongoing.

The *duration* of stabilization is not addressed by many states. Germany, the Netherlands and NATO have included this element, and believe that stabilization is a long-term effort.

The *violence level* gives an insight what types of operations are considered to be stabilization operations. Because the term stabilization is often used in the literature to refer to post-conflict measures, it might be expected that stabilization is characterized by a low level of violence. However, the stabilization definitions give a different impression. New Zealand and Germany, for instance, mention the medium and high levels of violence in addition to low violence operations.

Partners support the stabilization which is carried out by the primary stabilizer. Canada, New Zealand and the US use the rather vague term other agencies. However, New Zealand gives a concrete example, viz. the local government. The Netherlands identifies local actors as partners.

Only the US has included an explicit reference to the *location of the stabilization operation*. The US states that stabilization should take place outside its borders.

ANNEX D: PARAMETERS

The non-exhaustive list of parameters presented here is the product of our efforts to structure the complexity of stabilization operations. Through an extensive literature review and the consultation of in-house expertise we came up with a comprehensive list of main aspects and choices that have to/can be made in the planning process of a stabilization operation.[204] We treat the parameters as strategic design elements which contribute to the overall strategic mission design framework.

We have structured the parameters along the following categories: Context, Ends, Ways, Means, Actors, Time & Timing. *Context* describes facts and conditions in both the stabilizing country and the host state that one can barely influence. *Ends* describe different objectives and goals which stabilization missions can have. *Ways* lists different manners to go about a stabilization operation. For example, either military or civilian actors could be dominant. *Means* describes different capabilities than can be used. For instance, an operation could be pursued by heavy involvement of the air force but without deploying regular land forces. *Actors* outlines different scenarios of who is actually intervening. Will it only be the Netherlands, a coalition of the willing, or a regional organization backed with an international mandate? Furthermore *Timing* is important. Will the operation take place before, during, or after the eruption of a violent conflict?

D.1 CONTEXT

INTERVENING COUNTRY

HOME PUBLIC

- Sentiment public
    - Support stabilization/intervention (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Syria?)
    - Opposed to stabilization/intervention (e.g. Afghanistan-type operations)
    - Public is indifferent (Mali?)
- Strategic Culture
    - Use of Force legitimate tool for solving conflicts and enforcing stability (e.g. US)
    - Opposed to use of force in international relations (e.g. Germany)

[204]Sources consulted: Barry, "Hard Fighting, Hard Times, Hard Choices: Strategic Challenges Facing Modern Armies"; Betz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency"; Codner, "Military Doctrine and Intervention"; Czege, "The Hard Truth about Easy Fighting Theories: The Army Is Needed Most When Specific Outcomes Matter"; Matthew Ford, Patrick Rose, and Howard Body, "COIN Is Dead—Long Live Transformation"; Gross, *Afghanistan: Enter 2014*; Heisbourg, "A Surprising Little War"; Metz, "Strategic Horizons: Planning for Americas Next War"; Petraeus, "General David Petraeus"; *Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation - RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report*; Strategic Landpower Task Force, *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*; Panetta, Obama, and United States Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership*; UK MOD, "JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution," 3–40; Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations," 3–07; Rabasa et al., *From Insurgency to Stability*; Baumann, "Shifting Parameters of Military Crisis Management"; NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), "AJP-01(D) - Allied Joint Doctrine," -01.

- Amount of risk willing to take
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low

- Predetermined exit strategy required?
    - Yes
    - No

TARGET/HOST STATE

GEOGRAPHY

- Terrain
    - Mountainous
    - Desert
    - Jungle
    - Urban
    - Arctic/winter
    - Amphibious
- Climate
    - Tropical
    - Dry/arid
    - Mild
    - Continental/microclimate
    - Polar
- Proximity
    - To stabilizing state
    - To allies
    - To forward bases

STATE

- Governance
    - Strong
    - Medium
    - Weak
- Type of government
    - Autocracy
    - Anocracy
    - Democracy
- Ideology government
- Bilateral/Multilateral relations
    - Member of military alliance
    - Member of regional organization
    - Special relationship with great power (e.g. US, UK, Russia, China)

- Located in a sphere of influence
    - Yes
    - No
- Level of economic development
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low
- Development communication infrastructure
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low
- History
    - Colonial relations
    - History of armed conflict
    - Regional relations
- Religion

SOCIETY

- Demographics
    - Youth bulge
        - Yes
        - No
    - Sizeable minority groups
        - Yes
        - No
- Majority/minority relations
    - Friendly/normal
    - Hostile
    - Deteriorating
    - Improving
- Level of urbanization
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low
- Level of education population (incl. literacy)
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low
- Cultural similar stabilizer – society

CONFLICT

- Type
    - Interstate
    - Intrastate
    - Insurgency
- Conflict environment

        - Isolated/limited to one state
        - Multiple states involved
        - Regional spillover
- Certainty about situation on the ground
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low
- Type of adversary
    - Nation state
    - Factions within a state
    - Non-state actors (insurgents/terrorists)
- Unity of the adversary
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low
- Tactics adversary
    - Conventional
    - Asymmetric/Guerilla
    - Irrational (e.g. North Korea, Libya)
- Level of capabilities
    - High
    - Medium
    - Low
    - Unclear
- Command adversary
    - Centralized
    - De-centralized
    - No command structures
- Presence potential partners
    - Yes
    - No
    - Unclear

LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY

- Morality/motivation
    - Seek moral outcome/intervene for moral reasons (e.g. R2P)
    - Self interest
        - Economic interests
        - Security interests
- Legitimacy
    - Seek UNSC mandate
    - Justification without UNSC mandate
        - Protection of the population (e.g. Kosovo)
        - Regional legitimacy (regional organization approves actions)

        - Fabricate justification (e.g. Iraq)
- International law
    - Only act if operation is in accordance with international law
    - Act even if operation violates international law

D.2 ENDS

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

- Address and remove root causes of conflict
    - Aim: Deep political and socio-economic transformation (pre-Afghanistan)
    - Aim: Acceptable levels of corruption and violence which local stakeholders can manage without external assistance (post-Afghanistan?)
- Take symbolic action do something

GOALS

- Removal of regime
- Absolute military victory
- Reversion of conventional aggression
- Support of opposition
- Support of the government
- Security forces
- Governance
- Safe havens and no-fly zones
- Reconstruction and development
- Enforcing embargos
- Fighting terrorism
- Rule of law
- Political settlement
- Restoration essential services
- Protect the population

D.3 WAYS

ACTIVITY

- Preventive
    - Capacity-building
    - Deterrence
    - Containment
- Intervention
    - Regime change
    - Combat/neutralize major threats
    - Remove CBRN hazards
    - Peace enforcement/ pacification
    - Enforce no-fly zone
- After end violent conflict
    - Peacekeeping

- Peacebuilding
- Advice/SSR
- Training
- COIN
- Disarmament
- Demobilization

ROLE OF MILITARY

- Military dominant
  - Security operations
- Military-civilian operation
  - Hearts & minds operations
- Civilian actors dominant: military support for civilian operations
  - Humanitarian operations
  - Reconstruction
  - Diplomatic efforts

EXPANSIVENESS

- Strategic hamlet
- Ink spot
- Whole country
- Regional

LENGTH

- Short
- Medium
- Long

SPEED

- As soon as possible/ immediate action
  - This presupposes high level of readiness
  - Surprise
- Gradual
  - Wait for crossing of red line/threshold (only in interventions)
  - De-escalation
  - Establish military presence

RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL PARTIES

- Support, assist one or more warring parties (take sides)
- Separate, pacify warring parties (stay neutral)

APPROACH

- Top-down: impose change
- Bottom-up: grow resilience

CONSENT

- Seek consent of host state
- Do not seek consent of host state
- No clear authority to give consent for operation

D.4 MEANS

DEPLOYMENT

- Capabilities
    - Air
        - Strategic & tactical airlift
        - Combat aircraft (FW/RW)
        - Drones/ UAVs
        - Tactical transport/Utility helicopters
        - Support aircraft (AWACS, tankers)
    - Land
        - Regular land forces
        - Special forces
        - Marines
    - Sea
        - Warships
        - Amphibious transport vessels
        - Support vessels
    - Cyber
        - Human domain
    - Sequence
        - Clear – Hold – Build (US doctrine)
        - Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop (UK Doctrine)
        - Concurrent actions: secure + reconstruct (NZ doctrine)
        - Parallel operations (as opposite to sequential)
    - Kineticity
        - Heavy
        - Light
        - Non-kinetic
    - Amount of force (same as kineticity?)
    - Footprint/Troop size
        - Small
        - Medium
        - Large
    - Weapons System
        - High tech/precise
        - Conventional

D.5 ACTORS

WHO

- Only Self
- Self & Other
    - Other: (close) allies
    - Other: Culturally close third party (like-minded)
    - Other: State(s) neighboring host nation
    - Other: Regional organization
    - Other: International organization
        - ➢ Size coalition
            - Small (e.g. coalition of the willing)
            - Large (e.g. NATO)
                - Military strategic reasons
                - Political reasons
- Only other
    - No cooperation with Other
    - Give indirect (military/political) support to Other/Enable Other

D.6 TIME

- Preventive (before violent conflict erupts)
- Intervention
- After ceasefire (directly after violent conflict)
- Post-conflict (after violent conflict has ended for some time)
- Normalization

ANNEX E: FROM EFFECTS TO OBJECTIVES TO END-STATES

Before effects, objectives and end states are formulated, the definitions of and distinction between these three kinds of aims need to be unequivocally clear. The following definitions may help to clarify the aim of stabilization and stability operations.

- **Effect**: The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set ofactions, or another effect (1st order, 2nd order effects). The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.
- **Objective**: The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to the commanders plan.
- **End-state**: The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commanders objectives.

Based on these definitions effects can be seen as to contribute to the achievement of objectives and obtaining multiple (pre)defined objectives combine to achieve an end-state. Although these different aims may be identified at each planning level, ideally a variety of tactical effects will lead to several operational objectives, which in turn will lead to a single strategic end-state.

Applied to the phenomenon of stabilization this means that, from a strategic perspective, the outcome of stabilization is formulated in an end state, while stabilization operations lead to objectives and stability tasks & activities lead to effects.

It is important to note that, while effects at the tactical level are usually planned or, at the very least, anticipated, unintended effects do occur as well, leading to undesired consequences such as a failure to achieve objectives and the inability to reach an end-state. Similarly, badly formulated or, worse, the wrong objectives may lead to an unintended outcome, such as failure to achieve an end-state or an undesired end-state.

The overwhelming importance of studiously formulating the end-state, objectives and effects is adamant. How well these outcomes are formulated depends in part on the precise definition of the process leading to the desired outcome.

ANNEX F: STRATEGIC DESIGN SKETCHES

F.1 INTRODUCTION

It is essential to note that strategic mission design is no substitute for proper operational planning. Nor is it part of the operational planning process, which could include an *operational design* phase. The whole idea of working with strategic mission design is aimed at producing a sketch-like view of what the mission could look like, prior to starting any operational planning. It produces a rough – even artistic – sketch to serve as input for the operational planning process. The strategic mission design process is aiming at collecting, analyzing, consolidating the different ideas about a possible or prospective mission that live in the minds of strategic planners at the political and military levels, within the involved ministries and, if other (non-governmental) agencies need to be involved, outside.

The following strategic design options serve to illustrate the working of the strategic mission design framework as discussed in this report and to train ourselves into thinking within the framework. The design options in this chapter were selected on the basis of different criteria.

First of all they must be more or less 'out-of-the-box', in so far that they must not have been used in the past within the Dutch context. Second, although their appearance may be outlandish, they must be realistic as well, so as not to alienate prospective users. Third, they must vary in the choice of the *key design element*, in order to demonstrate the versatile utility of the strategic design concept. Fourth, they must be based on current events, to create an immediate appeal on the basis of recognition. Fifth, although the strategic design options appear realistic, the outcome must be completely fictitious.

As mentioned, each of the cases is worked out starting with a different key design element. The ensuing design elements are chosen through logical reasoning, based on the (military) experience and knowledge of the authors. This does not mean that if others would use this framework they would arrive at the same conclusion, that is, design a similar mission. The outcome very much depends on the different backgrounds, experience and creativity of the persons taking part in the discussion. Essential to this process is that for every contingency a different key design element may be selected, resulting in a unique mission design. It is in a sense, *strategic art.*

Although the strategic mission design framework lists a set of design elements, this is by no means limitative. The essence of strategic mission design is not the use of a specific set of design elements, it is the different approach to the political-military decision-making process in advance of the actual planning process. The list, therefore, can be amended or extended with different, new design elements as political and military planners see fit.

Each design option mentioned below is named after its key design element. The first three options will use the design elements that were in the discussion of the framework. The second three options will use new design elements.

F.2 CURAÇAO – THE 'WHO' OPTION

CONTEXT

Curaçao is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Politically unstable, reasonably wealthy, yet economically fragile with a high corruption rate. Predominantly inhabited by African-creoles with a grudge against Dutch rule, dating back to the time of slavery, i.e. the slave uprising in 1795 (The Revolution of July 17), its suppression and the cruel punishment of its leaders. Despite the fact that the uprising started the emancipation of slaves, progress was very slow and African creoles were underrepresented in government services and business management and were not getting an equal share of the accumulating wealth until well into the 1960's. Violent riots broke out at the Shell oil refinery in 1969, eventually suppressed by Dutch marines. Shell left the island in the 1980's, after which the refinery was leased to the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PVDSA. Among the population there is widespread support for the late Hugo Chavez, the so-called Chavistas, who claim that, since the Venezuelan state oil company runs the oil refinery on the island, Venezuela means more to the people and economy of Curaçao than the Netherlands. In the eyes of many Curaçaoans all the Dutch ever do is 'wave their finger', withdraw financial support, interfere in island affairs and treat Antilleans as second class citizens. Venezuela claims the island for historical reasons.

In 2012, the independence party Pueblo Soberano (PS) becomes the largest party on the island. In May 2013, however, party leader Hermin Wiels is murdered. Since then two of the murder suspects were also found killed. This is reason for PS supporters to take to the streets in organized armed gangs to avenge the murder of Wiels and to deal with the persons who are behind the murders. They clearly refer to the Netherlands. Local government services are attacked, buildings destroyed and authorities threatened. Opponents of the PS have in reaction also organized and armed themselves, and since then several collisions occurred involving casualties. The Dutch army company stationed on the island, has tightened the surveillance and protection of government buildings, Hato Airport and the headquarters of the Dutch commander in the Caribbean and shots have been fired at armed militias. Venezuela has voiced its support for the PS and has threatened to shoot-down Dutch military aircraft which enter Venezuelan airspace or Dutch warships entering Venezuelan territorial waters. The airspace over the island is well within reach of Venezuelan air defense systems (S-300). The island government has declared a state of emergency and asked the Netherlands to intervene. The Netherlands maintains one infantry company and one navy frigate in the area on a permanent, rotational basis.

DESIGN PROCESS

The Dutch government utilizes the 'Strategic Design Concept' to consider the request and analyze the situation before coming to a decision.

In the eyes of the Dutch government there is one precondition of paramount importance: whatever action the Dutch government decides to take, further escalation is to be avoided at all cost. Clearly visible, large-scale Dutch involvement would almost certainly deteriorate the situation. This means that the handling of the matter should remain in the hands of the island

authorities with the Dutch authorities in a purely supporting role in the background. Therefore, the key design element in preparing for the mission appears to be the WHO-question: who will be in charge? The answer is clear: the government of Curacao. Because this means that the Dutch government will play a supporting role, this automatically answers the TAKING SIDES-question and the WHEN-question: the Dutch government will side with the government of Curacao in its efforts DURING the crisis to restore law and order. Next, as the decision was made to support the island authorities, the following design element to be addressed is the DIMEL-question: which instruments of power – diplomacy, information, military, economic and legal – can be engaged to assist the island authorities in controlling crisis? In other words, how will the Dutch government support the island authorities? Once again, the necessity to avoid further escalation prevents the deployment of additional troops to the island. Whatever support the military can provide, it should be done with the troops already in place in the area. The fact that the troubles have not yet reached the level and intensity of an armed rebellion seems to justify this decision. This also means that the crisis may be controlled by local law-enforcement without the use of heavy force. If local policemen come under attack of armed rioters, however, Dutch troops should be able to come to their aid. To augment the local police force, Dutch police officers of Antillean descent could be flown in. Furthermore, the local prosecutors office could be temporarily strengthened with personnel from the Netherlands. To prevent international escalation with regard to the Venezuelan statements and claims, this should be dealt with diplomatically from the Netherlands. One further form of support could be delivered by supplying timely and accurate information on the whereabouts, numbers, weapons and identities of the rioters. This would not only help the island authorities to take proper measures, but also enable law-enforcement to prepare the prosecution of perpetrators. To sum up, the instruments of power that could be made available to the government of Curacao are military, information and legal. Diplomatic efforts towards Venezuela will be undertaken from the Netherlands. Should economic assistance be necessary, it will also be made available by the Netherlands. As the decision was made to employ only infantry (Land) and sailors (Sea) stationed in the area, the WHERE-question is at least partially answered. The necessary information to control the crisis and to support law-enforcement, troops and prosecution efforts can be provided from the air by unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles and by cyber operations.

F.3 MALI – THE 'DIMEL' OPTION

CONTEXT

In 2012 France intervened in Mali to halt the Touareg revolt in the North. The intervention was effective in that the French were able to drive the Touareg back after heavy fighting. In June 2013 a cease-fire was agreed, but in September 2013 the Touareg unilaterally ended the cease-fire and fighting resumed. Unconfirmed reports of attacks on non-combatants, torture of prisoners and random executions followed. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is deployed to support the political process, carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks – with a focus on major population centers and lines of communication – protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections. MINUSMA increasingly come under attack. Several UN soldiers have been found killed, although it is as yet unclear whether Touareg rebels were responsible. The European Union Training Mission

(EUTM) has ceased its training of Mali army units. French armed forces have stepped up their operations and are slowly making progress to enforce another cease-fire. Reports of war crimes continue to be brought forward by the population, however no hard evidence has been produced so far. The UN requests support from member nations, who have thus far not contributed.

DESIGN PROCESS

The Netherlands considers a positive response to the UN request. Given the public and political resistance in the Netherlands against armed contributions by air and land forces, a large-scale deployment is not considered. Because of this resistance, the 'DIMEL' design element is determined to be the key design element. Since the fighting is still going on and the Touareg rebels do not have a formal political organization, a diplomatic effort seems pointless. Economic assistance is put on hold until the fighting has ceased and a climate for economic reconstruction is established. Information about the possible occurrence of war crimes appears to be of paramount importance, especially since legal action against such crimes is in need of hard evidence. The Dutch government decides to pursue the 'Legal' option.

Gathering and supplying information on war crimes is therefore chosen as the core of the Dutch contribution to the UN effort in Mali. Although this objective does not appear to contribute to the declared end-state, a cease-fire, detection and prosecution of war crimes does contribute to international law and order in the long run. The 'AIM' design element is sufficiently dealt with.

Since no reports of war crimes by French forces have been brought forward, the search for war crimes will primarily focus on the rebelling groups. Nevertheless in the process of gathering information on war crimes it is possible, that criminal acts committed by troops of other parties, be they EU, UN or French, are discovered. In such a case these crimes will be registered and reported without prejudice. This means that during the process of gathering information on war crimes the units or organizations tasked with this mission must not take sides with any of the parties involved. The answer to the 'TAKING SIDES' question, therefore is 'No'.

It seems obvious that the gathering of information on war crimes takes place during the fighting and continues until well after the cease-fire to check if all parties adhere to it. The 'WHEN' question is therefore answered with 'during' and 'after cease-fire'.

The next design element to be addressed is the 'WHERE' question. This has already been done in part, since the noted Dutch resistance against involvement of land and air forces. Moreover, since Mali is a landlocked nation, no naval contribution is needed. The same goes for cyber, as the Touareg forces do not appear to operate as a network centric organization. Their use of IT equipment is limited. Deploying human intelligence operators is prevented by the same resistance towards deploying ground forces. Nevertheless, a significant contribution could be made by deploying unmanned aerial and spatial reconnaissance platforms, such as (MALE) UAVs and observation satellites. Such deployments, while not completely risk-free, would not involve the exposure of military personnel to attacks by rebel forces. Satellites and UAV could continuously patrol over Mali, especially in areas where fighting takes place. Satellites can observe the area on a daily basis completely undetected,

while MALE UAV's could patrol certain areas establishing a so-called *pattern of life*, and detecting deviation from this pattern. Regular medium to high-level orbits over the battlefield by MALE UAV's will go almost entirely undetected, thus enabling the uninterrupted observation of the actions of all parties to the conflict. Notwithstanding the resistance to the deployment of air forces, an 'unmanned' contribution would make the 'air' option the prime choice in the 'WHERE' design element.

The gathered and analyzed information would then be made available through the UN to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, enabling investigators and prosecutors to act upon it.

Since the Dutch contribution involves Dutch unmanned air and space assets and comes on top of what the international community is already doing in Mali, the gathering of information on war crimes is an entirely Dutch enterprise, and should be led by a Dutch commander. The answer to the 'WHO' question is 'We'.

F.4 SYRIA – THE 'WHERE' OPTION

CONTEXT

The UN considers intervention in Syria on behalf of the Syrian government to stop the rebellion by oppositional forces, Muslim fundamentalists and strive for a peaceful solution. The UN Security Council members tend to support the idea of an armed intervention. The Netherlands considers options to contribute to such an operation.

DESIGN PROCESS

The Dutch government utilizes the 'Strategic Mission Design Concept' to consider the request and analyze the situation before coming to a decision. The design element 'TAKING SIDES' is considered a given, since the UN considers intervening on behalf of the present government, i.e. against the, predominantly fundamentalist Muslim opposition. 'TAKING SIDES', however is not considered the key design element.

As within the Netherlands there seems to be very little public and political support for a large-scale long-term deployment involving (large numbers of) ground forces, it is evident that the 'WHERE' question should be considered the 'key design element'.

A Dutch land force contribution is ruled out because of Dutch resentment against such an option. Since a naval contribution would only make sense if the Syrian navy poses a serious threat to intervening forces or if an amphibious assault is considered, a naval contribution does not seem likely. Lacking a sea-based helicopter platform to support air borne operations ashore is another reason not to deploy naval forces.

Contributing to the overall cyber war effort is an option that would certainly come into view once the Netherlands has developed a 'cyber tool' that is militarily significant enough to be operationally effective. At the moment this is not the case, therefore this option is not considered.

An air option would be possible to some extent, taking into account that deploying aircraft abroad would also entail basing these aircraft in neighboring countries. NATO partner Turkey

seems to be the most suitable country, but Jordan could also be a possibility. For obvious reasons Israel or Lebanon would not be suitable, because of their internal troubles, their belligerent position towards Syria and other countries in the region. All in all, provided foreign basing can be arranged, preferably together with like-minded (NATO) partners, an air force contribution is considered a serious option.

If the Netherlands would seriously consider a contribution with some form of air power, it would have to be suited to assist in achieving the overall end-state, as determined by the UN. The corresponding design element is the 'AIM' element. This element enables political and military leaders to distinguish between the overall end-state on the one hand, and the objectives and effects that contribute to an end-state on the other hand. Since a full-scale intervention and a long-term 'peaceful solution' would need the orchestrated engagement of all instruments of power, it is safe to assume that the employment of air power assets alone will most certainly not contribute directly towards that end-state. However, depending on what kind of air power assets would be employed, several different effects could be created and various objectives could be met. The deployment of air defense fighter aircraft would certainly contribute to conquering some level of air superiority over the area of operational responsibility, including Syrian and Lebanese airspace. If absolute air supremacy would be an objective, an extensive contribution would be necessary to wage an intensive air war to achieve this objective. At present the Netherlands, with its obsolescing F-16 fighters, does not possess the capability to survive and operate in the hostile air environment created by Syrian ground base air defense systems, such as the Russian built S-300. A contribution to achieve air superiority in Syrian/Lebanese airspace is therefore less desirable.

It is more likely that major contributing nations such as the US would deploy fighter aircraft to battle for total air supremacy over Syria. Once a certain level of air superiority is achieved it would certainly be possible to commit Dutch F-16's for ground attacks, either to support coalition ground forces or to destroy specific Syrian targets or heavy weapons. Furthermore, if total air supremacy is obtained Dutch transport aircraft and helicopters could also be employed in supporting roles and even Apache attack helicopters could be offered to support coalition ground forces. The 'AIM' would therefore seem to indicate a primarily supportive contribution in ground attack roles, with fighter aircraft and, at a later stage, armed helicopters and transport helicopters, depending on the quality of air superiority attained.

This means that the Netherlands will almost certainly not take part from the outset of operations, that is, not before a sufficient level of air superiority over Syrian and Lebanese air space has been established. As a result the answer to the 'WHEN' question will certainly not be 'before', yet – depending on how quickly the appropriate level of air superiority will be established – 'early' may be applicable to committing fighter aircraft. For the deployment of armed helicopters, total air supremacy is necessary, therefore 'during' seems to be the earliest moment of committing these assets. The deployment of transport helicopters may not commence until after a 'cease fire'.

The 'WHO' design element seems to automatically evolve from the answer to the 'WHERE' question. Since the intervention would take place under a UN mandate and in all probability would attract a host of contributions from very different countries, the Netherlands with its limited contribution will most certainly not be asked to take charge of such a large coalition. Most likely the lead will be taken by a ground troops providing major power. The answer to the 'WHO' question will be set at 'others'.

Once we have established the 'WHERE', 'WHO', 'AIM' and 'WHEN', the only design element left is 'DIMEL', the national instruments of power. Since the Netherlands has opted to support the intervention and possibly the ensuing stabilization exclusively from the air, a ground component is not very likely, be it military or civilian.

Since coalition leadership is determined to be a matter for 'other' nations, a diplomatic effort undertaken by 'others' should primarily be aimed at bringing together a coalition of nations, able and willing to execute such a mission. This leaves out all other DIMEL options, except the military. The only diplomatic effort undertaken by the Netherlands will be aimed at acquiring basing for deployed aircraft in neighboring countries.

F.5 SOMALIA – A DIFFERENT 'DIMEL' OPTION

CONTEXT

The Federal Republic of Somalia[205] is located in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. Somalia has the longest coastline on the mainland, and its terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. Hot weather conditions prevail year-round, along with periodic monsoon winds and irregular rainfall. Somalia has a population of around 10 million. About 85% of local residents are ethnic Somalis, who have historically inhabited the northern part of the country. Ethnic minority groups make up the remainder of the nation's population, and are largely concentrated in the southern regions. Somali and Arabic are the official languages of Somalia, both of which belong to the Afro-Asiatic family. Most people in the territory are Muslims, the majority being Sunni.[206,207]

In the late nineteenth century, through a succession of treaties with several kingdoms, the British and Italians gained control of parts of the coast, and established British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. In the interior, Muhammad Abdullah Hassan's (*The Mad Mullah*) Dervish State successfully repelled the British Empire four times and forced it to retreat to the coastal region, but the Dervishes were finally defeated in 1920 by British airpower (*air policing*). Italy acquired full control of the northeastern and southern parts of the territory after successfully waging a Campaign of the Sultanates against the ruling Majeerteen Sultanate and Sultanate of Hobyo. This occupation lasted until 1941, when it was replaced by a British military administration. Northern Somalia would remain a protectorate, while southern Somalia by agreement became a United Nations Trusteeship in 1949. In 1960, the two regions united as planned to form the independent Somali Republic under a civilian government. Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and established the Somali Democratic Republic. In 1991, Barre's government collapsed as the Somali Civil War broke out.[208,209]

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[205] The *Federal Republic of Somalia* is the country's name per Article 1 of the *Provisional Constitution*.
[206] Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs of Somalia*.
[207] *Somolia: The World Factbook*.
[208] Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*.
[209] Greystone Press Staff, *The Illustrated Library of The World and Its Peoples: Africa, North and East*.

After the collapse of the central government in the ensuing civil war, the Somali Navy disbanded. With Somali territorial waters undefended, foreign fishing trawlers began illegally fishing on the Somali seaboard and ships from big companies started dumping waste off the coast of Somalia. This led to the erosion of the fish stock. Local fishermen subsequently started to band together to protect their resources. After seeing the profitability of ransom payments, some financiers and former militiamen later began to fund pirate activities, splitting the profits evenly with the pirates.[210,211]

It has been suggested that all home ports used by the pirates must be blockaded, or that ground forces should be deployed to destroy pirate bases on land. This however, would entail military intervention, a solution which there is opposition to since 1993's Operation Restore Hope. Adding to this, it would only address the symptoms, without removing the causes. Therefore in 2014 the UN General Assembly stated that land-based policies are the best way to combat piracy. Governments would have to employ socioeconomic measures such as poverty alleviation and good governance in order to deal with piracy (and even terrorism) effectively. In particular, a sustainable solution requires the establishment not only of effective governance but also the rule of law, reliable security agencies, and alternative employment opportunities for the Somali people.

In the spring of 2014 a UN security Council resolution is adopted vowing socioeconomic, rule-of-law and military support to the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Based on the UN mandate the EU reaches consensus to act accordingly and comes to an agreement with the Somali government to provide support to restore the economic infrastructure, educate, train and equip police and military forces. As a prominent EU member, the Netherlands is contemplating a significant contribution to this mission.

DESIGN PROCESS

As the Dutch government and population are not very keen on deploying large bodies of ground troops to Somalia, 'Land' does not seem an option. Given the causes of the impoverished state of the Somali people, especially in Somaliland and Puntland, who were deprived of their fishing grounds, the 'WHERE' question should primarily answered by 'at sea'. Yet, the 'WHERE' element is not the key design element.

Of course the fishery industry is not the most important industrial sector in Somalia. Agriculture, mainly livestock, is by far the most important source of income and Somaliland also sits on a lot of potentially economically retrievable oil. On top of that, within the projected Somali Exclusive Economic Zone there appears to be a lot of oil too. But the immediate reason for turning to piracy to supplement fishermen's income or compensate for the loss of it, was the fact that fishing grounds in the Somali basin have been 'plundered' by foreign (western) fisheries, while big ships have regularly dumped toxic waste in the area, destroying what was left of the fish population. Restoration of that part of Somalia's industry which provides income for the coastal population seems a priority.

[210] Abdullahi, "'Toxic Waste' behind Somali Piracy."
[211] Westcoot, "Somalia's Pirates Face Battles at Sea."

If Somalia wants to fully exploit its territorial waters to the extent of the projected EEZ, it needs to sign and ratify the UNCLOS[212] Treaty. At present the problem is that Somalia disputes the maritime boundary between its projected EEZ and that of Kenya. The UNCLOS Treaty states that member states with adjacent EEZ's should reach an agreement on their common maritime boundary, which Kenya and Somalia have at present been unable to do.

Therefore, before a lasting solution of the piracy problem can be reached and restoration of the Somali fisheries can be commenced, the UN needs to undertake a serious diplomatic effort to settle the differences between Kenya and Somalia. If the Netherlands wants to make a difference when it comes to restoring Somalia's fisheries, it seems appropriate that the Netherlands operates at the forefront of the UN diplomatic effort to settle the dispute and assist Somalia in implementing its projected EEZ. A diplomatic effort refers to the 'DIMEL' design element. But the fact that by restoring the Somali fisheries the Netherlands would also contribute to the restoration of the Somali economy also refers to the 'DIMEL' element. The 'DIMEL' element is should therefore be chosen as key design element to indicate the center of gravity of the Dutch effort to support Somalia.

While former Somali pirates who have been actively engaged in kidnapping or killing of people will be liable for prosecution and imprisonment, others may qualify for rehabilitation and re-integration. To enable these former pirates to set up shop again as independent fishermen, owning and operating their own boats, business plans need to be written to apply for a microcredit. This could be supported by specialized reservists from the IDEA[213] pool in the Netherlands.

Depending on the political and financial situation in the Netherlands and other operational commitments, the choice could be made to restrict the Dutch contribution to these activities: a diplomatic effort to settle the maritime boundary difference between the EEZs of Somalia and Kenya and further assistance to implement the Somali EEZ, and IDEA specialist support to establish small fisheries businesses by assisting former pirates to prepare a business plan and apply for a microcredit. Others could be assisted in a similar fashion to set up a boat building business to supply the fishermen with fishing vessels. Through IDEA Dutch companies could be invited to invest in these businesses. As fare as the 'TAKING SIDES' design element is concerned, the Dutch contribution would certainly be aimed at assisting the Somali people and government to get the country and economy back on its feet, however to be able to successfully mediate in solving the maritime boundary dispute with Kenya, this design element would definitively have to be set at 'NO'.

If the situation in the Netherlands permits, this could be followed by active support in assisting the Somali government with acquiring the capability to patrol and protect the Somali EEZ. This could be done by supplying the Somali coastguard with small coastal patrol vessels and by providing the education and training to operate them, as well as technical assistance to maintain them. On a broader scale the choice could be made to help the Somali government establish and run a functioning coast guard organization. It would require active engagement

[212] "Convention on the Law of the Sea."
[213] Ebbers, "Dick Scherjon: 'We Hebben Werk Voor 10.000 Reservisten.'"

of Dutch naval personnel as well as Marechaussee. The 'WHERE' design element would be set at 'SEA'.

As all these actions would take place either under the umbrella of the UN and/or that of the EU, the Dutch contribution would have to be tuned to the overall plan for Somalia and orchestrated with other activities. It is unlikely that the Netherlands would lead the overall operation. The design element 'WHO' would be set at 'Others'.

F.6 LAMPEDUSA – THE 'SCOPE' OPTION

CONTEXT

Lampedusa is an Italian island in the Mediterranean. It belongs with Linosa and Lampione to the Pelagie Islands. This southernmost part of Italy lies 205 kilometers south of Sicily and 113 km east of Tunisia. Administratively it belongs to the province of Agrigento and the Region of Sicily. Geologically the island belongs to the African continent. Culturally and historically it is usually included in Europe. In the 1990's Lampedusa became known as a place where immigrants arrived by boat, first mainly from Albania, and later from North Africa, hoping to get a residence permit for the European Union. There is a removal center for 500 people.

Presently Lampedusa is being swarmed by refugees and economic migrants from eastern Mediterranean and Africa. Some never make it to the island, perishing at sea because their boats are overloaded or in such a bad state that they literally fall apart and sink.[214]

The sheer mass of refugees makes it impossible for Italian authorities on Lampedusa to effectively control the processing and transferring of migrants to other European nations. Italy claims that the migrant problem has European dimensions and should be dealt with by the EU, not just Italy. Although the Italian government has moved almost all of the refugees in December 2013 to mainland Italy because of their primitive living circumstances on the small island, new refugees keep arriving every day.

After a formal Italian request to the EU to assist Italy in dealing with the seemingly unstoppable flow of refugees from Africa and other parts of the Mediterranean, the president of the EU commission consults with other EU members of which some, among them the Netherlands, offer to accept a number of refugees. The EU decides to assist Italy with the processing of migrants to these other EU countries. The Netherlands decides to a contribute to the EU effort.

DESIGN PROCESS

The Republic of Italy is a constitutional democracy with sufficient quality of governance to decide what course of action is necessary and sufficient civil services to execute its policies. However, given the massive influx of refugees through Italian islands in the Mediterranean, predominantly Lampedusa, it is lacking in manpower. In other words, Italy is not lacking quality of governance, it is lacking numbers.

[214] Vogel, "Barroso to Visit Lapedusa."

It goes without saying that if the EU or the Netherlands were to offer assistance, Italy's sovereignty would not be bypassed, it would remain in control of all actions taken to encounter the refugee problem. The answer to the 'WHO' question would be clear and simple: 'Others'. What the Netherlands would supply depends largely on what Italy would request, but given the fact that Italy is lacking manpower to process the vast number of refugees in a lawful, timely, administratively correct and humane manner. This means that a refugee's identity, age, land of origin, land of destination and reason for requesting entry and/or asylum must be established. In the Netherlands this kind of work would normally be done by the Royal Marechaussee. With this information, the Immigration & Naturalization Service (IND) would then test all applications for residence in the Netherlands for compliance with the law.

As far as the assistance provided to Italian border control authorities is concerned, the Marechaussee contribution would not bring new capabilities to the table, nor would it provide logistic support. Rather, it would augment the present Italian capability. The 'SCOPE' element would in this case determine the nature of the contribution and serve as key design element: 'Augmentation'.

When it comes to the part played by the IND, the story is different. The IND judges applications to enter the Netherlands not only on the basis of international law and European rules, it also executes Dutch policy based on Dutch national law. The IND therefore can only be of help if refugees explicitly request entry and/or asylum in the Netherlands. If the Netherlands has offered to accept its share of refugees or to process their applications, then the IND would step in. The next question would then be to determine whether the IND would process the refugees in Italy or whether this would be done on Dutch soil, where Dutch law applies and where refugees have access to the Dutch judicial system to appeal refused entry.

The Dutch contribution could be extended by supplying naval OPVs, coastguard patrol aircraft and MALE UAVs to patrol the main maritime approaches to Italy. This would involve the 'WHERE' element, which would be set at 'Air' and 'Sea'.

F.7 Maluku – Another 'SCOPE' option

CONTEXT

The (South) Moluccan Islands were part of the Netherlands East Indies until the independence of Indonesia in 1949. The southern Moluccas, Ambon, Seram and some smaller islands nearby, at first did not recognize Indonesian control of the Moluccas and revolted in 1950 by declaring the *Republik Maluku Selatan* (RMS) . The revolt was violently suppressed and the RMS government and its followers went into exile in the Netherlands. The population of the (South) Moluccan islands is predominantly Christian. Until recent there were regular outbursts of violence between Muslim and Christians on the North Moluccan Islands.

The Moluccan Islands are situated on the northern fringe of the Banda sea, which sits on the Banda Sea Plate. Earthquakes frequently visit the area, due to the confluence of three tectonic plates – the Eurasian, Pacific and Indo-Australian plates.

In the spring of 2014 a violent earthquake takes place in the Banda Sea and a huge tsunamic wave hits the islands on the edge of the Banda Sea Plate. The tsunami causes catastrophic

damage on Sulawesi, Ambon, Ceram, Buru, Flores and the southern Banda Islands. 7000 people are believed dead or missing, some 25.000 people are injured and at least 150.000 people are left homeless and are trying to flee the struck area.

Because of the widespread catastrophic damage, the shortage of relief capabilities and relief goods and the high number of displaced persons, the Indonesian government requests UN assistance. The UN Secretary General calls on nations to contribute to an international relief effort and turns to Australia for coordination as lead-nation. Australia complies but states it needs support from other nations, indicating that support from the Netherlands, as former colonial power, would be more than welcome. Given the at times fragile relationship with Indonesia, the Dutch government hesitates, but the Moluccan diaspora in the Netherlands (RMS) starts an intensive lobby for Dutch support to their relatives in Maluku. High-level diplomatic talks between the Indonesian, Australian and Dutch governments reveals that Indonesia will not refuse a helping hand from the Netherlands, provided it is offered unconditionally and the Dutch do not interfere with internal matters on the Moluccan islands. The Dutch government concedes and considers an indirect approach to assist in the relief effort.

DESIGN PROCESS

The operation would require a considerable logistic effort, not only to transport and distribute relief goods, but also to provide immediate and on-site assistance to search for survivors, localize, identify and burry victims, provide medical care to sick and wounded, and shelter to roofless and displaced people. As local infrastructure is virtually non-existent, a base camp to mount and control the operation from cannot be established on the islands that were hit by the tsunami. What is more, the nearest islands with intact and suitable infrastructure are too far removed from the disaster area. On top of that, basing foreign troops on Indonesian soil might prove difficult for local authorities. An alternative solution might be provided by establishing a so-called 'sea-based' capability.

A sea-based capability requires a large ship fitted to support amphibious operations. A Landing Platform Dock, such as HMS Rotterdam or HMS Johan de Witt, but also HMS Karel Doorman would fit this description. The problem is that Australia has decommissioned its only two Landing Platform Dock ships in 2010 and has at present no capacity for sea-basing at all. This is exactly where the Netherlands could of help. It would also fit the Netherlands requirement to indirectly support the relief aid operation, rather than directly.

Sea-basing alone will probably not be sufficient. Of course an LPD could launch landing vessels to bring goods and personnel ashore and bring sick and wounded on board, but this would only be of use in coastal areas. If one would want to reach farther inland, helicopters would be necessary, based on the ship and with sufficient power and lift capability for hot and humid atmospheric conditions. Medium to large transport helicopters, such as the CH-47 Chinook could fulfill this requirement. A Chinook-type of helicopter would require a large LPD, Johan de Witt, or the JSS, Karel Doorman. This ship could be made available to the Australian government, including the Dutch crew to operate it and its on-board systems. All the personnel and equipment, including helicopters, based on the ship would be Australian. Sufficient room and C2 facilities to accommodate an Australian staff to run the operation would be required and possibly a hospital facility to accommodate a Role 2 surgical team and Role 1 basic medical care facility.

This could only be provided by the JSS, HMS Karel Doorman. If the Netherlands would make this ship available to the Australian armed forces, the Netherlands would in fact support the Australian effort by supplying a capability they do not posses. The 'SCOPE' design element would be 'key' and set at: 'Capability'. The 'WHERE' design element would in support of this be set at 'Sea'.

To bring this about a diplomatic effort would have to be undertaken towards Indonesia accepting this Dutch role, which would bring a Dutch military vessel into Indonesian waters. The diplomatic effort towards Australia would be aimed at offering this capability and working out the details of the cooperation. The 'DIMEL'desin element would be set at 'D'.

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