



The Hague Centre
for Strategic Studies

Saudi Arabia's Mineral Gambit

What the EU Can Learn from Vision 2030

Laurence Krakow

February 2026





Saudi Arabia's Mineral Gambit

What the EU Can Learn from Vision 2030

Author:

Laurence Krakow

Editor:

Irina Patrahau

February 2026

The analysis presented in the paper, including the conclusions and recommendations, is the product of independent research. The responsibility for the content of this paper lies with the authors and the authors alone.

© *The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies*. All rights reserved.
No part of this report may be reproduced and/or published in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from HCSS. All images are subject to the licenses of their respective owners.

Cover photo:

[Canva](#)

HCSS
Lange Voorhout 1
2514 EA The Hague

Follow us on social media:
[@hcssnl](#)

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
Email: info@hcss.nl

1. Introduction

In January 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted the ninth edition of the Future of Minerals Forum, a key international event gathering leaders from 89 countries, 78 of the industry's top executives, and a total of 18,000 participants.¹ The forum provides a platform to showcase emerging technologies and negotiate large-scale mining and processing projects. Most importantly, it signifies Saudi Arabia's interest in becoming a leading actor in global mineral supply chains.

As part of its broader strategy to diversify its economy away from oil, the Kingdom launched Vision 2030, a plan to develop its mining sector, expand domestic mineral refining capacity and increase downstream manufacturing capabilities with the ambition to produce electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy technologies.

In many respects, Saudi Arabia's ambitions mirror those laid out in the European Union's (EU) Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and Net-Zero Industry Act. The former framework articulates the EU's ambitions to build sustainable and resilient supply chains by increasing domestic mineral production and processing, reducing dependencies on a single country, and expanding its recycling capabilities.² The latter is an action plan for the Union to produce at least 40 percent of its demand in green technologies and their components.³ Taken together, these two frameworks formulate the same objectives as those spelled out in Saudi's Vision 2030.

This snapshot seeks to analyse Saudi Arabia's approach to critical raw materials and identify policy instruments that the EU could adapt to strengthen its own approach. It focuses on the Kingdom's strategy to develop its mineral sector as well as administrative, financial and diplomatic tools for achieving its goals. Acknowledging that the Saudi strategy is not replicable for the EU due to differences in their political economies, the EU could learn from the Kingdom's approach in both its domestic and foreign engagements.

¹ "Official Event Brochure," Future Minerals Forum 2026, January 13, 2026, https://www.futuremineralsforum.com/media/pqmkbic/fmf26-official-event-brochure_100126.pdf.

² "Critical Raw Materials Act - Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs," European Commission, accessed January 20, 2026, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en.

³ "Net-Zero Industry Act," European Commission, accessed February 11, 2026, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/net-zero-industry-act_en.

2. Saudi Arabia's approach to critical minerals

2.1 Mineral resources

Saudi Arabia is believed to hold over 45 different minerals valued at \$2.5 billion (see Figure 1).⁴ The country possesses relatively well explored reserves of gold, lead, zinc, silver, and critical minerals such as copper, bauxite, and copper.⁵ The Kingdom also holds several other critical minerals for which it does not have clear estimates yet, such as heavy and light rare earth elements (REE), niobium, tungsten, and tantalum.⁶ Some companies also successfully extracted lithium, although not in an economically viable quantity.⁷




Figure 1: Map of mineral deposits in Saudi Arabia⁸

⁴ "Strategy for the Mining Sector," Saudi Vision 2030, accessed January 5, 2026, <https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/explore/strategies/strategy-for-the-mining-sector>.

⁵ Al Workman et al., *Mineral Inventory and Potential Assessment Report*, Volume 1 (Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, 2016), 4, <https://ngd.sgs.gov.sa/media/1052/mineral-potential-assessment-volume-1-metallic-minerals.pdf>.

⁶ Workman et al., *Mineral Inventory and Potential Assessment Report*.

⁷ Pasha Magid, "Saudi Ma'aden Has Extracted Lithium from Seawater, CEO Says," *Commodities, Reuters*, May 21, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/saudi-maaden-has-extracted-lithium-seawater-ceo-says-2024-05-21/>.

⁸ Workman et al., *Mineral Inventory and Potential Assessment Report*, 33–323.

2.2 Mineral strategy

Historically, Saudi Arabia has relied on hydrocarbon revenues. This allowed the Kingdom to accumulate capital while leaving other economic sectors comparatively underdeveloped.⁹ Oil wealth conferred Saudi Arabia international influence, based on which it has built and sustained close relations with several major powers.¹⁰

However, growing uncertainty over the long-term future of oil due to global climate goals, combined with increasingly prevalent price volatility affecting the government's main revenue stream, exposed the limits of this industrial model.¹¹ In response, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman launched Vision 2030 in 2016, an ambitious reform agenda aimed at diversifying the country's economy.¹²

Under Vision 2030, the Kingdom sets out the following goals:

1. Raising non-oil state revenues from SAR 163 billion to SAR 1 trillion by 2030.¹³
2. Creating 90,000 new jobs through the expansion of the mining sector which should contribute SAR 97 billion to the GDP by 2020.¹⁴
3. Localising about 50 percent of the military equipment expenditures by 2030, up from just 2 percent in 2016, by expanding the downstream defence industry through increased mineral extraction and refining.¹⁵
4. Scaling up domestic electric batteries and vehicle manufacturing capabilities with the aim of producing about 500,000 vehicles by 2030.¹⁶

The expansion of Saudi Arabia's mining sector is therefore not an isolated objective, but a key enabler of broader industrial ambitions that the Kingdom hopes to achieve. It does so through a multifaceted approach that combines developing domestic capabilities, streamlining administrative procedures, leveraging its financial resources, and establishing international partnerships. These are explored below.

2.3 Tools for implementation

Maaden

The first way in which Saudi Arabia aims to secure mineral supply is to increase domestic mining. In 1997, it established the *Saudi Arabian Mining Company* (Maaden), 63.78 percent of which is still owned by the state.¹⁷ The firm initially focused on the extraction and refining of gold alongside by-

⁹ Hussein Sharaa, "How Saudi Arabia Harnessed Its Oil Boom to Foster Development," *Al Majalla*, August 14, 2025, <https://en.majalla.com/node/326894>.

¹⁰ Jenny Spalding, "The Deal That Keeps the Oil Flowing," *Epicenter*, June 1, 2023, <https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/deal-keeps-oil-flowing>.

¹¹ Mawadda Iskandar, "The Persian Gulf Push into Strategic Minerals: A Plan for Post-Oil Dominance," *The Cradle*, September 5, 2023, <https://thecradle.co/articles/thecradle.co>.

¹² "Vision 2030," Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, April 25, 2016, 6, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/media/rc0b5oy1/saudi_vision203.pdf.

¹³ "Vision 2030," 67.

¹⁴ "Vision 2030," 49.

¹⁵ "Vision 2030," 48.

¹⁶ Asna Wajid, *The Geopolitics of the Gulf States' Push for Critical Minerals* (IISS, 2025), <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-middle-east/2025/07/the-geopolitics-of-the-gulf-states-push-for-critical-minerals/>.

¹⁷ "Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden): Shareholders, Shareholding Structure," MarketScreener, accessed January 5, 2026, <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/SAUDI-ARABIAN-MINING-COMP-6500086/company-shareholders/>.

products like silver, zinc, and copper.¹⁸ To expand its portfolio the company launched several new projects since 2009, including mines and refineries with local and foreign collaborators, thereby becoming a producer of phosphate, bauxite (alumina), and copper (see Figure 2 and 3).¹⁹ More recently, it announced it would collaborate with Aramco to tap into the Kingdom's lithium reserves.²⁰ In November 2025, it also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States (US) to build the first rare earth element refinery.²¹




Figure 2: Map of Maaden mines and processing plants²²

¹⁸ "Our Story," Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden) - Leading Mining & Metals Company, accessed January 20, 2026, <https://maaden.com/discover-us/our-story>; "Base Metals and New Minerals," Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden) - Leading Mining & Metals Company, accessed January 20, 2026, <https://maaden.com/discover-us/core-business-units/base-metals-and-new-minerals>.

¹⁹ Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden) - Leading Mining & Metals Company, "Our Story."

²⁰ "New Aramco Transition Minerals JV with Ma'aden to Focus on Lithium; KAUST DLE Work Progresses," *International Mining*, January 15, 2025, <https://im-mining.com/2025/01/15/new-aramco-transition-minerals-jv-with-maaden-to-focus-on-lithium-kaust-dle-work-progresses/>.

²¹ Gracelin Baskaran and Kamal Aubakirov, "Ten Years of C5+1: U.S.–Central Asia Minerals Cooperation," *CSIS*, November 4, 2025, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ten-years-c51-us-central-asia-minerals-cooperation>.

²² Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden) - Leading Mining & Metals Company, "Our Story."

Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden)

Gold

1997: Mahd Ad Dhahab gold mine, 100% owned by Maaden

2003: Bulghah & Sukhaybarat gold mine, 100% owned by Maaden

2009: Al Almar gold, copper, and zinc mine, 100% owned by Maaden

2014: Creation of Maaden Barrick Copper Company (MBCC) which operates the Jabal Sayid copper mine, owned by Maaden (50%) and Barrick Mining Corporation (50%)

2014: As Suq gold mined, 100% owned by Maaden

2016: Ad Duwayhi gold mine, 100% owned by Maaden

2020: Mansourah and Massarah gold mine and processing plant, 100% owned by Maaden

Phosphate

2007: Creation of Maaden Phosphate Company (MAP), owned by Maaden (70%) and Saudi Basic Arabian Mining [SABIC] (30%)

2007: Al Jalamid Phosphate mine and processing plant producing phosphate concentrate, 100% owned by MAP

2011: Ras Al Khair refining plant which produces ammonia and fertilizer, 100% owned by MAP

2013: Creation of Maaden Wa'ad Al Shamal Phosphate Company (MWPC), a company that aims to produce and refine phosphate, owned by Maaden, SABIC, and Mosaic

2025: Maaden bought back Mosaic's shares in MWPC

Bauxite

2011: Creation of Maaden Aluminum Company (MAC), owned by Maaden (74.9%) and Aluminum Company of America [Alcoa] (25.1%)

2014: Al Ba'itha bauxite mine, 100% owned by MAC

2014: Ras Al Khair alumina refinery, 100% owned by MAC

2025: Maaden bought back the 25.1% shares of Alcoa, making MAC 100% owned by Maaden

Others

2008: Az Zabirah low-grade bauxite and kaolin mine, 100% owned by Maaden

2011: Zargat magnesite mine and processing plant, 100% owned by Maaden

2025: Maaden and Aramco sign preliminary agreements to establish a joint venture to mine lithium

2025: Maaden signs deal with MP Materials Corp. to build REE refinery

Figure 3: Timeline of Maaden mines and processing plants ²³

²³ Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden) - Leading Mining & Metals Company, "Our Story."

In 30 years, Maaden became the largest multicommodity company in the Middle East, and 15th globally.²⁴ Maaden provides the Saudi government with an instrument to directly initiate and steer mineral extraction and processing projects in line with the Kingdom's national interest. It removes the process of having to engage with private mining companies, allowing accelerated project implementation and increased strategic coherence.

Streamlined administrative processes and financial support

A second instrument deployed by the Kingdom is the launch of a legislative framework in 2020 that provides fiscal incentives such as a reduced tax rate and the right for 100 percent foreign ownership in mining concessions, while simultaneously adapting the various licences type to industry needs.²⁵ In addition, Saudi Arabia launched Taadeen in 2019, an online platform that allows companies to consult available mining locations, active licences, and the latest geological data.²⁶ Taadeen also offers live updates on licence application status.²⁷ Together, the 2020 Mining Code and Taadeen allow for a significant decrease in administrative burden. They offer a centralised tool for investors to access information and for administrative workers to process permit applications. Therefore, Saudi Arabia can deliver exploration permits within a competitive timeframe of about 4 to 6 months.²⁸

Since 2022, the Kingdom also conducts regular bidding rounds whereby it puts up for auction exploration licences for pre-selected partially studied areas. The use of competitive bidding rather than the customary first-come-first-served technique allows for the delivery of exploration permits in as fast as 90 days.²⁹

Finally, in 2024, Saudi Arabia launched the Exploration Enablement Program (EEP) with a budget of SAR 685 million.³⁰ The EEP offers financial aid of up to SAR 7 million per licence to support reconnaissance and/or exploration for Class-A minerals³¹ in the first five years of a permit but also labour costs where applicable.³² In addition, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) can provide up to 75 percent of capital needs for late-stage exploration or early-stage mining projects.³³

²⁴ "Global Reach," Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden) - Leading Mining & Metals Company, accessed January 20, 2026, <https://maaden.com/our-innovation/global-reach>.

²⁵ Saudi Vision 2030, "Strategy for the Mining Sector"; "Mining Investment Law," ESNAD, 2020, <https://mining.smsc.sa/resources/images/docs/mininginvestmentE.pdf>; Mariem Saad and Nicolas Bremer, *FDI and the Saudi Mining Investment Law* (Bremer, 2025), 3, <https://www.bremerlf.com/resources/fdi-and-the-saudi-mining-investment-law>.

²⁶ "Homepage | Ta'adeen Platform," Taadeen, accessed January 20, 2026, <https://taadeen.sa/en>.

²⁷ "Homepage | Ta'adeen Platform," Taadeen, accessed January 20, 2026, <https://taadeen.sa/en>.

²⁸ *Arabian Shield Exploration Accelerates With 90-Day Shift* (Eurogroup Consulting, 2025), <https://saudiminingconsulting.com/insights/articles/arabian-shield-exploration-accelerates-90-day-shift>.

²⁹ Julienne Raboca, "Antofagasta Targets Almost 30% Copper Output Growth before 2030, CEO Says at FMF Riyadh," *Fastmarkets*, January 19, 2026, <https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/antofagasta-targets-copper-output-growth-2030-ceo-fmf-riyadh/>.

³⁰ "Exploration Enablement Program," Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, 2024, 3, <https://taadeen.sa/en/exploration-enablement-program>.

³¹ Defined in the Mining Investment Law in page 4 as metallic minerals as well as precious and semi-precious stones, and ores. These minerals often require advanced operations

³² Defined in the Mining Investment Law in page 4 as metallic minerals as well as precious and semi-precious stones, and ores. These minerals often require advanced operations.

³³ "SIDF Announces Its Financing Incentives as Part of ISSI," accessed January 20, 2026, <https://www.sidf.gov.sa/News/SIDF-Announces-Its-Financing-Incentives-as-Part-of-ISSI>; "Mining Investor Guide," Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, 2022, 3, <https://taadeen.sa/sites/default/files/2024-01/Mining%20Investor%20guide.pdf>.

Strategic partnerships and investments

To complement its domestic capabilities, the Kingdom also uses diplomatic and financial instruments to advance its mineral ambitions with international partners. In 2022, it launched the Future of Minerals Forum, which has since become a major international platform showcasing Saudi Arabia's mining sector. The forum allows government officials and representatives from Maaden to engage with stakeholders and negotiate partnerships, often resulting in multiple announcements.³⁴

In 2023, Saudi Arabia also hosted the first Saudi-Arab-African Economic Conference, which brought together leaders from Africa and the Middle East. It aimed to promote cooperation with a focus on four sectors: agriculture, industry, mining, and trade.³⁵ The event concluded with the signing of three memoranda of understanding on minerals cooperation with Chad, Senegal and Mauritania.³⁶

These conferences, which are not isolated cases, illustrate how Saudi Arabia uses diplomacy to secure mineral partnerships. Aside from large fora, Saudi Arabia also engages with countries bilaterally, resting on long-standing relationships built through fossil fuel trade. The state tries to preserve its internationally neutral status by fostering economic ties with states from all political blocks.³⁷ The Kingdom is being especially careful to maintain close relations with China, which it directly challenges by wanting to become a competitor in the electric vehicle manufacturing market. To do so, it encouraged China to invest in Saudi Arabia, and the two parties have signed multiple agreements to deepen cooperation in the manufacturing, technology, and mineral sector.³⁸

The diplomatic efforts are complemented by financial investments through Manara Minerals Investment Company. This company acquires minority stakes in global mining ventures with a focus on copper, lithium, nickel, and iron ore projects.³⁹ This allows the Kingdom to secure shares in foreign mining operations with limited risks, as Manara invests in established and profitable ventures rather than uncertain projects. Manara has already acquired a 10 percent stake in Vale Base Metals Limited, gaining access to copper and cobalt projects worldwide.⁴⁰ The firm is currently negotiating with other mining ventures, but no new agreements have been announced.⁴¹

³⁴ "About FMF," Future Minerals Forum, accessed January 20, 2026, <http://www.futuremineralsforum.com/about-fmf/>.

³⁵ "Saudi-Arab-African Economic Conference," Saudipedia, November 14, 2024, <https://saudipedia.com/en/article/2968/economy-and-business/saudi-arab-african-economic-conference>.

³⁶ "Ministry of Industry Inks 3 MoUs with 3 African Countries for Mining Cooperation," *Argaam*, September 11, 2023, <https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1683810>.

³⁷ Aya Nader, "Saudi Arabia Bids to Become a Hub for Energy Transition Minerals," *Climate Home News*, September 10, 2025, <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/09/10/digging-beyond-oil-saudi-arabia-bids-to-become-a-hub-for-energy-transition-minerals/>.

³⁸ Zineb Riboua, *The Great Leap South* (Hudson Institute, 2025), <https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/great-leap-south-october-2025-zineb-riboua>.

³⁹ "The Key Pillars of Our Investment Strategy," Manara Minerals, accessed January 5, 2026, <https://www.manaraminerals.com/Investments.html>.

⁴⁰ "New Saudi Venture Manara Minerals Partners with Global Mining Leader Vale," PIF, July 28, 2023, <https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/news-and-insights/newswire/2023/new-saudi-venture-manara-minerals-partners-with-global-mining-leader-vale/>.

⁴¹ Pesha Magid, "Codelco, Saudi in Talks on Copper Investment, 2025 Output Seen Up," *Commodities*, *Reuters*, January 17, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/codelco-saudi-talks-copper-investment-2025-output-seen-up-2025-01-17/>; Eric Gacuruzwa, "Saudi Arabia Pursues US\$2B Stake in Zambia's Copper Mines with First Quantum," *FurtherAfrica*, October 22, 2024, <https://furtherafrica.com/2024/10/22/saudi-arabia-pursues-us2b-stake-in-zambias-copper-mines-with-first-quantum/>.

3. Lessons learnt for Europe's mineral sector

Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has become a global player in mineral supply chains. It achieved this by (1) strategically using its state-owned mining company and positioning it to lead mineral extraction in the Middle East; (2) attracting foreign investment through a revised mining legislative framework, accelerated licensing procedures, first-come-first serve bidding rounds, and financial advantages; and (3) negotiating with states from all political blocks and investing in global projects. Saudi Arabia's state-driven, vertically integrated strategy has shown significant results so far.

The Union's economic model, rooted in free-market competition, limits the EU's capacity to replicate Saudi Arabia's state-driven approach.⁴² For instance, the EU does not possess a centralised state-owned mining company that it can directly mandate to carry out strategic projects. Moreover, the EU does not have the mandate to offer permits, but it is supporting member states to accelerate the process.

Even though a similar approach cannot be replicated by the EU, the Union could nonetheless learn from the Saudi strategy along three dimensions, explained below.

First, the EU can be more proactive in identifying projects that would enhance its competitiveness in the mineral sector. While it cannot establish its own mining company, the EU can learn from Saudi Arabia's state-led project identification and competitive calls for investors. To date, the EU has relied mostly on a passive model, inviting companies to submit proposals for "strategic projects", meaning projects that align with the CRMA objectives.⁴³ Although projects with a strategic status benefit from streamlined licensing procedures and increased visibility to financial institutions, it is unlikely to enable the EU to meet its CRMA targets. The application procedure is both costly and risky for investors: proposal preparation is expensive and uncertain, unsuccessful applicants receive no benefits, and successful ones do not automatically get financial support and still face lengthy permitting procedures if their projects are appealed.⁴⁴ The shortcomings are even greater for strategic projects located outside of the EU, where the Union does not even have the mandate to streamline the licensing procedure.⁴⁵

To reduce risks for investors and accelerate project development, the EU should adopt a more proactive approach by identifying itself priority projects and inviting companies to develop them. For decades, geological exploration across member states has received insufficient investment, making the EU unable to grasp its mineral potential. Despite the CRMA calling for better state-driven geological exploration, the responsibility of conducting exploration work still relies primarily on

⁴² "Competition," EUR-Lex, accessed January 23, 2026, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/08.html>.

⁴³ "Strategic Projects on Critical Raw Materials Gain Momentum in Second Selection Round for Potential Funding and Faster Permitting - Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs," European Commission, January 19, 2026, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/strategic-projects-critical-raw-materials-gain-momentum-second-selection-round-potential-funding-and-2026-01-19_en.

⁴⁴ *Special Report 04/2026: Critical Raw Materials for the Energy Transition* (European Court of Auditors, 2026), 44–48, <http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/sr-2026-04>.

⁴⁵ *Special Report 04/2026*, 45.

private companies. The capital-intensive and uncertain nature of the process deters investment. On average only 1 in about 1000 early exploration project results in a viable mine.⁴⁶

Once member states strengthen their geological knowledge, the EU could support in designating priority projects and call for applications for specific areas. This would reduce uncertainty for investors and improve the effectiveness of policy tools like strategic projects designation.

Second, the EU could improve its domestic approach to minerals by targeting financial support to attract investors. A key shortcoming of the “strategic projects” designation is that, while it connects companies with financial hubs, it does not provide direct financial aid.⁴⁷ In response, the EU presented RESourceEU in December 2025, an action plan that involves mobilising €3 billion to be spend in aid funding for projects that support CRMA ambitions. The European Commission is still in the process of gathering the funds and has set a 12-month deadline to do so.⁴⁸ The RESourceEU action plan represents an important step, though timely and effective implementation will be critical to compete with faster moving actors like Saudi Arabia.

Third, the EU should more strategically target its international engagements. Through RESourceEU, the EU has reaffirmed its commitment to engage with like-minded partners to secure critical minerals.⁴⁹ However, until now, the EU’s approach has been fragmented with individual countries acting in line with the EU’s strategy but not in a coordinated manner. European engagement abroad is often focused on sectors like governance and development cooperation with little involvement in the CRM sector. The EU should be more proactive in identifying European collective strengths and engage meaningfully in a mutually beneficial manner.⁵⁰ Realistically, the European mining sector will remain less competitive than of other state actors like Saudi Arabia due to structural constraints including civil society opposition and high environmental standards. However, on an international level, by upholding its commitment to sustainable supply chains and mutually beneficial partnerships, the EU can position itself as an attractive and reliable partner that brings added value. It is therefore timely for the EU to realise where it can bring value and engage in a coherent manner with international partners.

⁴⁶ *Special Report 04/2026*, 31–32.

⁴⁷ *Special Report 04/2026*, 46.

⁴⁸ “Commission Adopts RESourceEU to Secure Raw Materials, Reduce Dependencies and Boost Competitiveness,” European Commission, December 3, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2891.

⁴⁹ European Commission, “Commission Adopts RESourceEU to Secure Raw Materials, Reduce Dependencies and Boost Competitiveness.”

⁵⁰ Irina Patrahau et al., *Win-Win Partnerships for Critical Raw Materials: Advancing Europe-West Africa Cooperation* (HCSS, 2026), 86–87, <https://hcss.nl/report/win-win-partnerships-for-critical-raw-materials-advancing-europe-west-africa-cooperation/>.