

HCSS SECURITY

# The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

*A Framework to Assess Security Sectors' Potential  
Contribution to Stability*

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*Dorith Kool and Tim Sweijts*



HCSS helps governments, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to understand the fast-changing environment and seeks to anticipate the challenges of the future with practical policy solutions and advice.

**The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly**

A Framework to Assess Security Sectors' Potential Contribution to Stability

HCSS Security

*The Hague* Centre for Strategic Studies

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Contribution to Stability*

*“All well-adapted systems are alike, all non-adapted systems experience maladaptation in their own way,... But in the chaos of maladaptation, there is an order.”*

*Alexander Gorban, 2010*

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## Executive Summary

The global security threat presented by state fragility is increasing. Efforts to strengthen the capacity and capability of state institutions and actors responsible for the provision, management, and oversight of security, known as security sector reform (SSR), are becoming more important. Empirical evidence suggests that countries with poorly governed security sectors have a 30 to 45 percent higher risk of violence and civil conflict.

For years the international community has spent considerable effort to promote stability by reforming and strengthening security sectors in fragile and conflict prone states. These efforts have met with mixed results, however. The international community must therefore find alternative ways to better understand security sectors' potential contribution to stability.

The first step to effectively engage with security sectors is to understand what characteristics render them more likely to make a positive contribution to stability, defined as the combination of state and human security. Such an understanding can be used in decision-making processes whether to engage with security sectors in the first place and can subsequently help in the design of security sector reform interventions that are tailored to specific local needs.

### A Security Sector Assessment Framework

This report presents a security sector assessment framework (SSAF) that can be used to assess security sectors and their potential contribution to stability. This will help policymakers identify the type of challenges to be considered when engaging with security sectors across different contexts. The SSAF is rooted in the notion that a security sector's potential contribution to stability is dependent on three distinct characteristics: ability, motivation, legitimacy. The three characteristics are in turn rooted in the six principles of good governance that also apply to other public service institutions: effectiveness, inclusiveness, rule of law, accountability, transparency and responsiveness (see Figure 1). The three characteristics determine *what* conditions are necessary for security sectors to contribute to stability while the principles explain *how* and *why* they do so.




Figure 1: Three characteristics and six principles

## Ability

A security sector that is able to maintain internal security conforms to two conditions. The security sector must possess the financial, material, and human resources and intelligence capacity– *potential ability* – as well as the capability to effectively use the resources at its disposal to maintain a monopoly on the use of force within its national borders to a high professional standard – *actual ability*. A security sector that is unable to provide security, either because it lacks the necessary resources or the capability to use available resources in an effective way, has obvious implications for security. At the core, it leaves open spaces for contestation of power and competition for and over the provision of security and risks arbitrariness of security provision. The ability of a security sector to provide security is the result of its *effectiveness* which is dependent on the extent to which the security sector can fulfil respective roles and responsibilities successfully and to a high professional standard using available resources.

## Motivation

A well-resourced, well-trained and well-managed security sector does not automatically act as the security guardian of the population. Instead, it may be more strongly motivated to protect the regime and/or particular ethnic constituencies, and/or exploit the population to obtain financial benefit. The second characteristic the security sector must meet in order to contribute to stability is the motivation to protect the people on an equal basis. Motivation hinges on two factors: institutional and actor motivation. Both the security sector as an institution and individual security actors must be motivated to protect the population according to two principles of good governance: *inclusiveness* and *rule of law*. The security sector must provide equal opportunity for all persons regardless of identity to receive and participate in the provision of security. Additionally, the security sector and actors must perform in accordance with the rule of law meaning that laws are enforced impartially based on accepted rules and procedures. There is no discrimination in how and what laws are enforced between persons. Together, level of *inclusiveness* and adherence to *rule of law* indicate how the security sector is structured and what purpose it seeks to achieve.

## Legitimacy

Finally, in order to contribute to stability, security sectors must also be legitimate. Legitimacy is rooted in accountability, transparency and responsiveness, which should result in the general acceptance by the population of the security sector's exclusive authority to provide security. Legitimacy positively impacts stability because it provides the foundation for rule by consent rather than rule by coercion. Legitimacy ensures that the population trusts the security sector and is willing to cooperate and provide the security sector with critical intelligence on potential threats. While the characteristics ability and motivation largely take a top-down approach and focus on the behavior of the security sector towards the people, the third characteristic legitimacy takes a bottom-up approach. Legitimacy hinges on three principles: accountability, transparency (i.e., *input legitimacy*), and responsiveness (i.e., *output legitimacy*). Although not a direct measure of bottom-up perception, the rules and mechanisms through which a security sector governs (input legitimacy) and executes (output legitimacy) security provision and the quality thereof are commonly associated with popular perceptions of legitimacy.

Overall, a security sector is more likely to contribute to stability if it meets the three characteristics (ability, motivation, legitimacy) and adheres to the concomitant six principles of good governance (effectiveness, inclusiveness, rule of law, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness). In fragile states with (dormant) conflict, security sectors typically do not meet these characteristics and principles. A security sector's performance on the three characteristics creates different security sector *types*. A

security sector may for instance be unable to provide security because it has insufficient resources, intelligence capacity and capability, despite being highly motivated to protect the population. The security sector may also be very effective but not motivated to protect the population instead choosing to use its resources for self-enrichment.

## Applying the Security Sector Assessment Framework

The SSAF can be used to assess security sectors worldwide. While security sectors defy simple categorization, there are some defining characteristics that are analytically and empirically distinct that can help understand security sectors and their contribution to stability. Even though security sectors across the globe are unique, security sectors can be meaningfully categorized because they exhibit different characteristics based on how they perform on these six principles with different implications for their likelihood to make a positive contribution to stability. This is important from a policy-making perspective because it helps identify possible entry-points for security sector reform and alternative engagements to promote stability.

Each of the categories of the SSAF was therefore operationalized with a set of quantitative indicators to allow for an empirical mapping of security sectors worldwide. These proxy indicators were identified on the basis of literature review and expert judgment and were then selected based on considerations of data availability for the largest number of countries. This yielded an overview of security sectors in 82 countries located in geographically diverse regions and with different levels of stability (see Figure 2). A combination of deductive and inductive methodologies was applied to synthesize a security sector typology.

## Six Security Sector Types

Based on an empirical analysis of security sectors along these defining characteristics and principles, this report classifies security sectors in six types: the criminal, the repressive, the oppressive, the fragmented, the transitioning, and the stable security sector. These six different security sector types contribute to or undermine stability in distinct ways:

- The criminal security sector promotes the proliferation of non-state actors and criminal networks that create and stimulate insecurity and conflict. It does not prioritize protection of the population and instead financially profits from licit and illicit trade.

- The repressive security sector exclusively protects the regime and rules by coercion rather than consent. The population is subject to state sponsored violence without the opportunity to scrutinize the security sector’s performance.
- The oppressive security sector exclusively protects the regime but is unable to control security actors and maintain a monopoly on the use of force. Security sector actors operate autonomously and subject the population to indiscriminate use of force.
- The fragmented security sector supports and/or directly engages with informal security actors. Security provision is decentralized and as a result the security sector does not control how force is used.
- The transitioning security sector is relatively stable but not resilient because it is governed by old regime structures that are not adept at responding to contemporary security issues and/or located in a volatile region.
- The stable security sector makes a positive contribution to stability. It possesses a monopoly on the use of force, exercises authority according to agreed-upon rules and procedures, and protects both state and human security.




Figure 2: Global overview of security sector types

The six-pronged typology has been corroborated with an extensive review of the relevant literature on the performance and nature of security sectors. The extant literature does not explicitly identify combinations of the three characteristics, as the SSAF represents a novel contribution. The extant literature does recognize similar security sectors to make similar contributions to stability. This report offers in depth descriptions of the six security sector types which are illustrated with an assortment of contemporary cases. An annex to this report offers three case studies of security sectors using the SSAF. The contribution of the SSAF in turn is to corroborate insights from the fragmented literature on security sectors with the methodology offered by

the SSAF to more explicitly cluster countries with similar security sector structures together. It is important to note that these different security sector types provide a first order categorization. It is not static or template-like but provides direction and guidance to help policymakers determine security sectors' potential contribution to stability. The ideal security sector that contributes to stability can be understood as a full triangle whereby the three points resemble the three characteristics security sectors must meet to contribute to stability (see Figure 3). Like a triangle, security sectors that fail to meet all three characteristics do not form complete structures that are resilient and contribute to stability. Depending on what specific characteristic security sectors fail to meet the structure will differ and have different implications for stability.




Figure 3: Security sector types

## Making Use of the Security Sector Assessment Framework: Policy Recommendations

This report offers two principal recommendations to policymakers for assessing and engaging with security sectors in fragile and conflict prone states.




First, it recommends that the SSAF and the findings of this report are used to conduct SSAF assessments as part of the pre-political, analytical process feeding the decision-



making process on whether to engage with security sectors in fragile and conflict-prone states. The SSAF should become an integral component of this analytical process to assess security sectors and identify the possible adverse implications of engagement for stability. To that end the SSAF presented in this report is further elaborated into a SSAF manual which is offered in the annex. The SSAF manual provides guidelines on the additional questions that should be asked to deepen understanding and analysis based on the SSAF to conduct further in-depth country case studies to direct and inform decision-making on possible engagement with security sectors.

Second, it recommends that policymakers use the security sector types identified in this report in the design of specific SSR interventions to promote stability. This report clearly indicates that security sectors contribute to and undermine stability in various ways. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach for how to engage with security sectors in fragile states. Any engagement with security sectors should be designed according to the security sector type and the specific challenges it presents to stability. This requires additional research on the types of interventions that are most suited to the six security sector types, which falls outside the scope of this research project. The design of tailored SSR interventions should certainly consider the specific security weaknesses and strengths of the individual six security sector types. The identified weaknesses and strengths, however, merely provide a first indication of possible entry points for intervention and should be complemented with in-depth and context specific research. This report recognizes that tailoring SSR interventions is an inherently complex endeavor that requires substantial expertise, detail, and nuance. While the scope of this report is limited to the analysis of security sectors to inform the tailoring of interventions, it does offer some recommendations to demonstrate the importance of addressing security sectors’ specific challenges based on the SSAF. It does not however offer any in-depth analysis of what type of interventions would be most suited and how these should be conducted. In this light, the following policy recommendations offer a first indication of potential entry points for engagement based on the analysis of six security sector types identified in this report (see Table 1).

With the SSAF and the respective policy recommendations, this report seeks to bridge the gap between policy analysis and policy making by providing the analytical tools to better understand the role of security sectors in (in)stability. It offers a practical framework to help inform the tailored design of interventions and thereby hopes to make a contribution to enhance the effectiveness of future interventions – and future non-interventions – intended to increase the stability of fragile and conflict prone states.

Security Sector Type	Description	Possible focal areas for SSR interventions
<p><b>Criminal</b></p> 	<p>The criminal security sector scores medium on ability, motivation, legitimacy. The security sector is systematically challenged by non-state actors and criminal networks that are directly or indirectly tied to formal security actors. Corruption is deeply imbedded in the security sector.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance management and oversight mechanisms to address ties between formal security actors and criminal networks</li> <li>• Strengthen the rule of law</li> </ul>
<p><b>Repressive</b></p> 	<p>The repressive security sector scores medium on ability and medium-low on both motivation and legitimacy. The security sector is structured, commanded, staffed and equipped exclusively to protect the regime. It is not a guardian of public security and rules by coercion to clamp down on internal and external opposition.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen inclusiveness of security provision to ensure citizens are protected on an equal basis</li> <li>• Enhance accountability mechanisms to reinforce responsiveness to security needs</li> <li>• Address excessive use of force</li> </ul>
<p><b>Oppressive</b></p> 	<p>The oppressive security sector scores low to medium-low on ability, motivation, legitimacy. The security sector exercises authority brutally to protect the regime. It does not have the resources, intelligence capacity and capability to function in a cohesive and effective way according to the law.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Address impunity of formal security actors that use excessive amounts of force</li> <li>• Enforce inclusiveness of security provision</li> <li>• Strengthen capacity to provide security to the population</li> </ul>




Security Sector Type	Description	Possible focal areas for SSR interventions
<p><b>Fragmented</b></p>  <p>The radar chart for 'Fragmented security sector' shows scores on four axes: Ability, Motivation, Legitimacy, and Legitimacy. The Ability axis is at a 'Low' level. The Motivation axis is at a 'Medium-Low' level. The Legitimacy axis is at a 'Medium' level. The final Legitimacy axis is at a 'Medium-High' level. The area under the lines is shaded light blue.</p>	<p>The fragmented security sector scores low on ability, medium on motivation and low to medium-low on legitimacy. The security sector lacks effective, centralized and well-coordinated security institutions. The provision of security is decentralized due to direct and indirect ties to informal security actors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manage ties between formal and informal security networks so that the security sector maintains a monopoly on the use of force</li> <li>• Address the partisan nature of security provision</li> <li>• Strengthen oversight mechanisms to centralize decision-making and control over the use of force</li> </ul>
<p><b>Transitioning</b></p>  <p>The radar chart for 'Transitioning security sector' shows scores on four axes: Ability, Motivation, Legitimacy, and Legitimacy. The Ability axis is at a 'Medium-High' level. The Motivation axis is at a 'High' level. The Legitimacy axis is at a 'Medium-High' level. The final Legitimacy axis is at a 'High' level. The area under the lines is shaded medium blue.</p>	<p>The transitioning security sector scores medium to medium-high on ability, medium-high to high on motivation and medium, medium-high or high on legitimacy. The security sector does not adequately protect the population due to old regime structures that prevail and affect the modus operandi in destabilizing ways.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance expertise of security actors to respond to contemporary security issues</li> <li>• Reform old and destabilizing security sector structures and logics</li> <li>• Address corruption at all levels of the security sector</li> </ul>
<p><b>Stable</b></p>  <p>The radar chart for 'Stable security sector' shows scores on four axes: Ability, Motivation, Legitimacy, and Legitimacy. The Ability axis is at a 'High' level. The Motivation axis is at a 'High' level. The Legitimacy axis is at a 'High' level. The final Legitimacy axis is at a 'High' level. The area under the lines is shaded dark blue.</p>	<p>The stable security sector scores high on ability, motivation, legitimacy. The security sector presents the ideal structure that positively contributes to stability. It is founded on the principles of good governance and accordingly has a high degree of ability, motivation and legitimacy.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No SSR is required</li> </ul>

Table 1: Possible focal areas for SSR interventions

# 1. Introduction: Background and Objectives<sup>1</sup>

State fragility continues to present a global security threat that is expected to affect a growing number of people.<sup>2</sup> Predictions suggest that between 2018 and 2030 the number of people living in fragile contexts will increase from 1.8 billion to 2.3 billion people.<sup>3</sup> In past years, international engagement with fragile and conflict-prone states has expanded in both scale and frequency as part of renewed emphasis on the risks associated with state fragility in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).<sup>4</sup> The European Union explicitly draws a connection between state fragility and Europe's internal security. Because "fragility beyond our borders threatens our vital interests", it has expressed the long-term ambition to create more "resilient, secure and sustainable societies."<sup>5</sup> Bringing stability to fragile and conflict-prone states has proven to be a pernicious problem for Western governments, however.<sup>6</sup> Alongside socio-economic development initiatives to bolster societal security, efforts have focused on strengthening the capacity and capability of state institutions and actors responsible for the provision, management, and oversight of security, also known as security sector reform (SSR).<sup>7</sup> In fact, in 2018, more than half of the global SSR funds went to fragile states with a high likelihood of political instability.<sup>8</sup> In this context, it is critically important to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which security sectors in fragile states make a positive contribution to stability by providing both for state security and human security.<sup>9</sup>

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- 1 This research project has been commissioned by the Team Conflict Prevention at the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. The authors would like to thank Professor Dr. Georg Frerks from the University of Utrecht and the Netherlands Defence Academy, Paul Sinning, director of HCSS, and Marnix Provoost, policy officer at the Team Conflict Prevention, for their valuable feedback. Needless to say that the responsibility for the content of the report, including any errors or omissions, lies with the authors alone.
  - 2 "Poverty, Instability and Violence in Fragile States," Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, May 2, 2019.
  - 3 George Ingram and Nancy Lindberg, "Implementing a Fragility Strategy," Brookings Blum Roundtable on Global Poverty (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2019).
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  - 5 European External Action Service, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016), 23.
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  - 7 European Commission, "The European Union's Partnership with the G5 Sahel Countries" (European Commission, 2019).
  - 8 Konstantin Bärwaldt, "Strategy, Jointness, Capacity: Institutional Requirements for Supporting Security Sector Reform" (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018), 4.2018
  - 9 This report builds on a longer tradition of research on security sectors and existing frameworks including the Institutional Assessment Framework for enhancing democratic governance of the security sector, see Nicole Ball, Tsjard Bouta, and Luc van de Goor, "Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework" (The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael, 2003).

Empirical evidence suggests that a security sector that is accountable and inclusive and that abides by the rule of law can effectively provide stability to the state and its people.<sup>10</sup> Yet, empirical evidence also shows that SSR missions have frequently failed to bring stability.<sup>11</sup> In part, SSR missions fail to bring stability due to shortcomings in the planning, management and execution of the mission.<sup>12</sup> In part, SSR missions fail to bring stability because they take place in complex less-than-ideal environments where the security sector itself sustains instability for a variety of reasons.<sup>13</sup> In this latter case, the security sector may lack sufficient financial, material, and human resources to effectively provide security and be relatively powerless vis-à-vis local warlords and militias that hold ultimate control over the provision of security.<sup>14</sup> The security sector may simply not be interested in protecting the people and act as a tool of repression to keep the state's regime in power as can be observed in Iran and Syria.<sup>15</sup> The security sector may also profit from activities through human trafficking as, for instance, in Libya.<sup>16</sup> In other cases, formal security actors may act as parasites on society because they exploit the people that they are supposed to protect.<sup>17</sup> Examples in case include formal security actors in states such as Mali, Nigeria, and South-Sudan where the security sector is fragmented and "hijacked by military officials" that routinely engage in fraud, theft, and embezzlement.<sup>18</sup> When the security sector forms part of and sustains dysfunctional security structures, SSR interventions risk further undermining rather than promoting stability.<sup>19</sup> The first step to effectively engage with security sectors is, therefore, to understand what characteristics render them more likely to make a positive contribution to stability, defined as contributing both to state and to human security.<sup>20</sup>

This report considers a security sector's potential contribution to stability as being dependent on three distinct characteristics: ability, motivation, legitimacy. The three characteristics are in turn rooted in the six principles of good governance that also

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- 10 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R)" (Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2019).
- 11 Bärwaldt, "Strategy, Jointness, Capacity: Institutional Requirements for Supporting Security Sector Reform," 4.
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- 14 Nicole Ball, "Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Conflict-Affected Countries," *Public Administration and Development: The International Journal of Management Research and Practice* 25, no. 1 (2005): 26.
- 15 See Erica Marat, "Reforming Police in Post-Communist Countries: International Efforts, Domestic Heroes," *Comparative Politics* 48, no. 3 (2016): 333–352 for more information on state-centric vs. society centric police forces; Youhanna Najdi, "Government In Iran Spends Over \$24.5 Million Per Day On Suppressing Dissent," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 20, 2019.; Kheder Khaddour, "The Assad Regime's Hold on the Syrian State" (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2015), 13.
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- 20 Oscar A. Gómez and Des Gasper, "Human Security: A Thematic Guidance Note for Regional and National Human Development Report Teams" (New York: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report Office, 2016).

apply to other public service institutions: effectiveness, inclusiveness, rule of law, accountability, transparency and responsiveness (see Figure 4).<sup>21</sup>

Security sectors across the world exhibit very different characteristics based on their performance on the six principles, with myriad implications for their likelihood to make a positive contribution to stability. It is after all not only the size of the security sector's budget or the specific capabilities of security actors that are relevant. How these "resources of coercion" are controlled and whether they are used for the protection of citizens is equally important.<sup>22</sup> This is far from trivial. Empirical evidence suggests that countries with poorly governed security sectors have a 30 to 45 percent higher risk of violence and civil conflict.<sup>23</sup> If a security sector is able but not motivated to protect the population, material support to that security sector is likely to only further exacerbate social and political tensions. This is especially true when the security sector and security actors are not supported by the population. In this case, bottom-up efforts to strengthen civil-military relations may be a more viable option to promote stability.<sup>24</sup> A comprehensive understanding of different security sector structures on the basis of these three characteristics will therefore not only be important in the decision-making process whether or not to offer SSR in the first place, but it will also help policymakers in tailoring the design of SSR efforts to the specific needs of fragile security environments and its populations.<sup>25</sup>

This report's objective is to create a security sector assessment framework (SSAF) that can be used to assess security sectors and their potential contribution to stability. This will help policymakers to identify the type of challenges to be considered when engaging with security sectors across different contexts.<sup>26</sup> In meeting these objectives, this report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 explains the core concepts within the SSAF to assess security sectors. Chapter 3 operationalizes and applies the SSAF to 82 countries on the basis of which it offers a typology of six security sectors. Chapter 4 concludes and offers

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- 21 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, "The Security Sector," SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), 2015).
  - 22 Blanca Camps-Febrer, "Layers of Security: The Security Sector and Power Struggle in Morocco," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 12, no. 1 (2019): 107.
  - 23 Rorden Wilkinson and David Hulme, *The Millennium Development Goals and Beyond: Global Development after 2015*, vol. 65 (London: Routledge, 2012), 79; International Security Sector Advisory Team, "The Contribution and Role of SSR in the Prevention of Violent Conflict" (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control Armed Forces (DCAF), 2017).
  - 24 Godfrey Musila, "Enhancing Security Sector Accountability and Professionalism in Africa Through Civilian Oversight: A Review of Legal and Institutional Frameworks," SSRN Scholarly Paper (New York: Social Science Research Network, 2018), 2; Ulrika Lorentzi, "Security Sector Reform Is a Top down Idea, That Needs Bottom up Implementation: Engaging Civil Society and Integrating Gender in SSR," Report from the Security Sector Reform and Resolution 1325 Conference (Stockholm: Operation 1325, 2010).
  - 25 Nathaniel Allen and Rachel Kleinfeld, "Why Security Sector Governance Matters in Fragile States," United States Institute of Peace, June 11, 2019.
  - 26 The timing of this report coincides with increased efforts by the Netherlands Ministry of Defense to promote stability in fragile states. In 2017, the Netherlands committed to provide 5 million euros in support of the G5 Sahel military force comprised of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Netherlands Pledges €5 Million in Support of Regional Military Force in the Sahel," Government of the Netherlands, December 13, 2017.

policy recommendations on how the SSAF can be further developed and subsequently used by policymakers to assess security sectors going forward. The annexes to this report contain a methodology and manual for the SSAF, the ordinal scores for the country, three case studies, and a bibliography of the consulted literature.

## 2. A Security Sector Assessment Framework

A security sector can be defined as the institutions and personnel responsible for the provision, management, and oversight of security in a country. The core security sector actors with executive roles in the provision of internal security are the police and intelligence services. Civil authorities responsible for the management and oversight of the executive security sector actors include the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the judiciary, and prosecution and correctional structures.<sup>27</sup> The military is included in this report's analysis only when it is involved in the provision of internal security or if it is in any other way relevant for understanding the security sector's contribution to internal stability. Throughout this report, security sector actors are referred to as security actors. Militias, warlords, and other non-state actors that are not formally part of the state's security sector but that may maintain informal ties to the security sector are included in the analysis and referred to as informal security actors.

To assess whether security sectors make a positive contribution to stability, this report develops a SSAF which consists of three characteristics and six principles. This chapter explains the three characteristics and six principles and describes how they relate to one another.

### 2.1 Three Characteristics and Six Principles of Good Governance

The three characteristics ability, motivation, legitimacy determine whether security sectors make a positive contribution to stability. Whether a security sector is able, motivated, and legitimate is dependent on the adherence to the six principles of good governance: effectiveness, inclusiveness, rule of law, accountability, transparency and

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27 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, "The Security Sector."



responsiveness.<sup>28</sup> The three characteristics determine *what* conditions are necessary for security sectors to contribute to stability while the principles explain *how* and *why* they do so.




Figure 4: Three characteristics and six principles

Good security sector governance (SSG) is of vital importance based on the notion that a security sector’s contribution to stability is not only dependent on adequate resources, but also on how these resources are managed and used.<sup>29</sup> The principles of good governance should be adhered to at the institutional and actors levels of the security sector and be deeply imbedded in the culture and civil-security sector relations of the country concerned. The SSG principles therefore set out the standards for how relations between security institutions, actors, and the population should be structured.<sup>30</sup>

28 These definitions are taken from the DCAF SSR backgrounder “The Security Sector.” DCAF also recognizes efficiency as a principle of good security sector governance that considers whether “institutions make the best possible use of public resources in fulfilling their respective roles, responsibilities and missions.” This report does not address the principle efficiency as a separate principle due to limited data availability. This report employs the principle ‘inclusiveness’ instead of the DCAF-used term ‘participation’ to emphasize that persons must have equal opportunity to participate in and receive security provision. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “The Security Sector.” The OSCE also recognizes the principle of security sector governance (SSG) and that the security sector should be subject to the same standards of governance as other public sector institutions. See: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R).” In addition, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) recognizes the centrality of security sector governance for stability. See: Centre for International Governance Innovation, “Security Sector Governance,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2020.

29 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R),” 2.

30 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Guidelines for OSCE Staff” (Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2016).

Adherence to these principles ensures that the security sector is capable of fulfilling its mandate to protect both the state and its people according to lawfully defined and accepted standards. The principles can be mapped on the three characteristics ability, motivation, legitimacy.

The first characteristic ability is dependent on the effectiveness of the security sector. It describes the degree to which the security sector is able to carry out its mandate to maintain a monopoly on the use of force to a high professional standard. Ability derives partly from possessing sufficient financial, material, and human resources and intelligence capacity and partly from having the capability to convert these available resources into security provision proficiency. A security sector is considered highly able when it effectively maintains a monopoly on the use of force within its territory.

The second characteristic motivation depends on inclusiveness and the rule of law. It describes the degree to which the security sector is motivated to safeguard the security of the state and of its citizens equally in accordance with legally defined and accepted rules. A security sector is considered highly motivated when all citizens have equal opportunity to receive and participate in security provision, are subject to the same laws that are impartially enforced, and protected from the arbitrary exercise of power by security actors.

The third characteristic legitimacy depends on the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of the security sector. This means that the security sector is held accountable for its actions and decision-making and is considered responsive to its citizens' security needs and expectations. Accountability, transparency, and responsiveness directly impact the legitimacy of the security sector because these principles contribute to trust between the population and security actors. Essentially, legitimacy consists of input and output elements that concern the rules and mechanisms through which the security sector governs (input legitimacy) and executes (output legitimacy) security provision and the quality thereof.<sup>31</sup> A security sector is considered highly legitimate when it responds to its citizens' security needs and expectations and is publicly held liable by independent oversight structures. Legitimacy is crucial because it ensures that the security sector and its actors is supported by the population. The population's support in turn increases the likelihood it will provide the security sector with intelligence on potential threats that is essential for the security sector to be able to provide security effectively.<sup>32</sup>

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31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, Conflict and Fragility* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010), 8, 23–27.

32 Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer, and Oliver Wils, "Security Sector Reform Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation," *Handbook* (Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center, 2004), 15.

The three characteristics contributing to stability in the security sector are, in practice, interdependent. The interactions between the three characteristics ensure that the security sector is supported by the population and contributes to stability. Security personnel must be well-equipped and sufficiently trained in order to be physically and mentally motivated to provide services. Both for analytical and for substantive reasons it is important to first consider these characteristics separately. A well-resourced security sector does not necessarily have personnel that is motivated to provide security to the population equally. This may be due to, for instance, underlying societal, ethnic, or religious divisions within society. Similarly, a security sector that is motivated to provide security to its citizens is not always held accountable for its actions and may not publicly and transparently communicate operational decisions to the public.

The three components and adherent principles should be assessed, prioritized, and made relevant to the particularities of the security sector concerned. Security sector governance deficits may be so vast that they cannot be addressed simultaneously. In this case, policymakers should assess which characteristics are most likely in specific contexts to create the minimal conditions needed to contribute to particular ends short of stability. This report examines the conditions that are deemed important for a security sector to contribute to stability but recognizes that in fragile contexts these conditions cannot be easily created due to destabilizing norms and ways that are widespread and deeply imbedded in the culture and civil-security sector relations. In fragile contexts, policymakers may need to assess which conditions are more likely to contribute to stability and should be addressed first and foremost.<sup>33</sup>

The next section elaborates on the three characteristics and the six principles in greater detail.

### 2.1.1 Ability: Effectiveness

A security sector that is able to maintain internal security conforms to two conditions. The security sector must possess the financial, material, and human resources and intelligence capacity– *potential ability* – as well as the capability to effectively use the resources at its disposal to maintain a monopoly on the use of force within its national borders to a high professional standard – *actual ability*. A security sector that is unable to provide security, either because it lacks the necessary resources and information on potential security threats or the capacity to use available resources in an effective way, has obvious implications for security. At the core, it leaves open spaces for contestation of power and competition for and over the provision of security and risks arbitrariness of security provision. The ability of a security sector to provide security is the result of its effectiveness which is dependent on the extent to which the security sector can fulfil

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33 Merilee S. Grindle, “Good Enough Governance Revisited,” *Development Policy Review* 25, no. 5 (2007): 533–574.

respective roles and responsibilities successfully and to a high professional standard using available resources.<sup>34</sup>

Distinguishing between *potential ability* – resources available – and *actual ability* – capability to use resources effectively – is crucial because sufficient resources do not necessarily translate into a security sector’s good performance in terms of providing security for the population.<sup>35</sup> In Russia, for example, high levels of corruption indicate that available resources are not used effectively to fight human insecurity from criminal networks.<sup>36</sup> It is not uncommon for illegal businesses and criminal networks that maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with formal security actors to be “controlled and protected by prosecutors,” thereby undermining the security sector’s actual ability to control the use of force and provide security.<sup>37</sup> Security sectors that are structured to sustain destabilizing networks may have the means to provide security but chose to spend it in ways that undermine the ability to provide security. In this way, the degree of disconnect – or alternatively, the degree of correlation – between the potential and actual ability of a security sector offers an indication of the security sector’s effectiveness. Moreover, it already sheds light on the nature of the security sector, including the type of security provision it is designed to produce.

A security sector’s potential ability depends on available financial, material, and human resources and intelligence capacity.<sup>38</sup> Financial resources are a prerequisite to train security actors, pay salaries, and purchase the material resources that enable security actors to effectively address security threats.<sup>39</sup> Material resources include barracks, training facilities, vehicles, weapons, and information and communications technology.<sup>40</sup> Having sufficient resources also includes having enough security actors, including police and other internal security officers, to operate the available resources to provide security properly.<sup>41</sup> The security sector must also have access to reliable intelligence of what and who presents a security threat to the state as well as to the

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34 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R),” 11.

35 Nicolas Masson, Lena Andersson, and Mohammed Salah Aldin, “Strengthening Financial Oversight in the Security Sector” (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2012), 48.

36 Mark Galeotti, “Gangster’s Paradise: How Organised Crime Took over Russia,” *The Guardian*, March 23, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/23/how-organised-crime-took-over-russia-vory-super-mafia>.

37 Serguei Cheloukhine, *Policing in Russia: Combating Corruption Since the 2009 Police Reforms* (Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 39.

38 Ashley J. Tellis et al., “Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 45–46, 104, 136.

39 Chris Smith, “Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering?,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 1, no. 01 (2001): 5–20; Nadine Ansorg, “Security Sector Reform in Africa: Donor Approaches versus Local Needs,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no. 1 (2017): 129–44.

40 “The Armed Forces: Roles and Responsibilities in Good Security Sector Governance” (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), 2015), 3.

41 Adedeji Ebo and Heiner Hänggi, “The United Nations and Security Sector Reform: Policy and Practice” (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), 2019).

people.<sup>42</sup> In democratic contexts, intelligence is able to support both state and human security through the collection and organization of information that can contribute to the identification and prevention of acts of violence, crime, domestic instability, and terror, as well as external threats of war.<sup>43</sup> The security sector requires sufficient intelligence and information to be able to identify security threats in a timely manner and to efficiently allocate the resources and capacity to address these threats. Without sufficient and accurate intelligence, available resources and the capacity to use these becomes futile. In developed countries the military typically does not play a direct role in the provision of internal security, with the exception of crisis situations and emergencies. In this case, military performance does not proxy for the security sector's potential ability to maintain internal security. However, in fragile contexts it is often the case that the internal and external security force cannot be separated entirely as the military may be tasked to maintain internal security or to consume a disproportionate amount of resources (financial, material and human).<sup>44</sup> In this case, the military has a direct impact on the security sector's potential ability and effectiveness to provide security.

The security sector must also possess the skills to convert available resources and intelligence into security provision proficiency. A security sector that possesses sufficient resources without the appropriate skills to use them is unable to maintain stability and may even exacerbate instability.<sup>45</sup> The *actual ability* of the security sector refers to the extent to which the state maintains a monopoly on the use of force and can enforce authority within its total government territory to a high professional standard.<sup>46</sup> This means that the security sector does not face any systematic challenge by actors within

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42 Peter Wilson, "Analysis: The Contribution of Intelligence Services to Security Sector Reform," *Conflict, Security & Development* 5, no. 1 (2005): 87–107; McCartney, Fischer, and Wils, "Security Sector Reform Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation."

43 Fairlie Chappuis, "The Place of Intelligence in the State's Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force," Think Piece (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017), 3; Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O'Brien, and Andrew Rathmell, "Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform:" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 1–3.

44 Security Sectors may have military forces that are involved in policing functions to varying degrees. See: Monica den Boer, Detlef Nogala, and Hans-Gerd Jaschke, *European Police Science and Research Bulletin. Special Conference Edition Nr. 2 Special Conference Edition Nr. 2*, 2nd ed. (Luxembourg: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 2017), 57. Also see: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, "Gendarmeries and Constabulary-Type Police: Roles and Responsibilities of Police with Mixed Military and Civilian Characteristics: Roles and Responsibilities of Police with Mixed Military and Civilian Characteristics," SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), 2019). There is also an observed growing role of the military in policing functions in Western states. See for instance, Delphine Resteigne and Philippe Manigart, "Boots on the Streets: A 'Policization' of the Armed Forces as the New Normal?," *Journal of Military Studies* 8, no. 2019 (2019): 16–27. Also consider: Emma Murray and Paul Taylor, "'Soldiering By Consent' and Military–Civil Relations: Military Transition Into the Public Space of Policing," *Illness, Crisis & Loss* 27, no. 4 (2019): 235–254.

45 Rahul K Bhonsle, "Human Resources in Security Sector: An Integrated Model for the 21st Century," *October* 4, no. 4 (2010): 18; and, Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, "To Arrest Insecurity: Time for a Revised Security Sector Reform Agenda: Analysis," *Conflict, Security & Development* 5, no. 3 (2005): 304.

46 Philipp Rotmann, "Men with Guns: Political Economy Lessons for Disbanding or Integrating Hybrid Security Forces," Global Public Policy Institute, September 12, 2019.

and outside the security sector that undermine its ability to provide both state and human security.<sup>47</sup>

A security sector that has neither the resources nor the capacity to maintain a monopoly on the use of force contributes to instability because it leaves a security vacuum that is filled by non-state actors.

Limited resources force the security sector to prioritize some security issues, geographical regions, and/or population groups in its provision of security. This means that some people will be protected while other people will be left relatively unprotected.<sup>48</sup> In addition to identity-based discrimination, a deficiency in resources commonly leaves rural areas less protected.<sup>49</sup> Colombia is just one example where rural areas are systematically neglected and disproportionately threatened by the presence of illegal armed groups, including the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), that remain somewhat unchallenged by the state's authorities.<sup>50</sup> Consisting of between 3,000 and 8,000 combatants, the AGC is one of Colombia's largest illegal armed groups and has strengthened its ties with rearmed paramilitaries in central Colombia.<sup>51</sup> The security sector's lack of intelligence on these groups whereabouts further undermines the security sectors' ability to fight the presence of these groups. It should not be assumed however that informal security actors inherently threaten the security of the population. In some cases, informal security actors that undermine the security sector's ability to provide security by challenging its monopoly on the use of force are able to govern effectively to provide security to the population. Informal security actors may even protect the population from excessive use of force and violence of security actors. Security actors may also become hybrid actors that sometimes operate in concert with state objectives and sometimes compete with it.<sup>52</sup> Hybrid actors that officially assume state functions may enjoy considerable degrees of autonomy allowing them to gradually gain control over the security sector.<sup>53</sup> In Mexico, weak security institutions have allowed security

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47 Jörn Grävingholt, Sebastian Ziaja, and Merle Kreibaum, "State Fragility: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Empirical Typology," *Deutsches Institut Für Entwicklungspolitik*, no. 3 (2012): 8.

48 Herbert Wulf, "Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries" (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004), 5.

49 Omar S. Mahmood, "Rethinking Strategy to Stop the Spread of Terrorism," Institute for Security Studies, June 12, 2019.

50 Luis Jaime Acosta and Julia Symmes Cobb, "Colombian Dissident Rebel Leader Issues New Call to Arms Three Years after Peace Deal," Reuters, August 29, 2019; Colombia Reports, "Illegal Armed Groups | Colombia Reports," *Colombia Reports* (blog), July 20, 2019; Andrés Macías, "Citizen Security and Social Coexistence in Colombia: A Public Policy Approach in a Post-Conflict Scenario" (International Conference on Public Policy, Milan, 2015).

51 Colombia Reports, "Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan," Colombia Reports, October 22, 2019.

52 Niagale Bagayoko, Eboe Hutchful, and Robin Luckham, "Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority," *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no. 1 (2016): 1; David Pilling, "Sudan's Army Clashes with Security Forces over Protests," *The Irish Times*, April 8, 2019; Al Jazeera, "Sudan's Military Seizes Power from President Omar al-Bashir," Al Jazeera, April 11, 2019.

53 Thanassis Cambanis et al., *Hybrid Actors: Armed Groups and State Fragmentation in the Middle East* (New York: The Century Foundation, 2019).

actors to maintain ties to criminal groups and gain access to illegal drugs and weapons trade thereby strengthening their coercive power vis-à-vis the state.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, in Afghanistan and Congo security actors retain ties to warlords or ‘big men’ and use access to state resources as a building block to institutionalize their power.<sup>55</sup> Security actors in ungoverned spaces are subject to two masters: the commanding officer within the state’s forces and the commander of the non-state group to which they are tied.<sup>56</sup> The resultant forces within forces allow security actors to decide who is protected and who is not, based on political, ethnic or otherwise identity-based divides.<sup>57</sup> Religious, ethnic and family ties, lack of cohesion and coordination undermines the security sector’s operational proficiency thereby destabilizing an already volatile environment.<sup>58</sup> The fragmentation of state resources means that the government is no longer the primary decision-maker of how instruments of force are used which constitutes a core impediment to the maintenance of stability.<sup>59</sup>

Security sectors that do not possess the resources, intelligence and the capability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force create a security vacuum and fertile environment for the proliferation of non-state actors that exploit weak state institutions to gain a hold on power. Resource constraints combined with weak security institutions and the capacity to use available resources in Mali, Chad and Nigeria have allowed the terrorist organizations including Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and their affiliates to gain a considerable foothold over the past years.<sup>60</sup> Similar resource constraints, alongside lack of institutional capability, have allowed the Islamic State to spread in Iraq and to takeover major cities within Iraq despite being outnumbered.<sup>61</sup>

The security sector’s actual ability depends on two elements: institutional and actor capability. At the institutional level, the security sector must have the skills to plan,

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- 54 John Lindsay-Poland, “How U.S. Guns Sold to Mexico End Up With Security Forces Accused of Crime and Human Rights Abuses,” *The Intercept*, April 26, 2018.
- 55 Cosmas Ekwom Kamais, “Military Integration of Armed Groups as a Conflict Resolution Approach in Africa: Good Strategy or Bad Compromise?,” *Open Access Library Journal* 6 (2019): 1–16; Philipp Münch and Alex Veit, “Intermediaries of Intervention: How Local Power Brokers Shape External Peace- and State-Building in Afghanistan and Congo,” *International Peacekeeping* 25, no. 2 (2018): 266–92.
- 56 Stabilisation Unit, “The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation - A guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners” (London: Stabilisation Unit, 2019), 77.
- 57 Christine Bell et al., “Military Power-Sharing and Inclusion in Peace Processes” (Edinburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme, 2018).
- 58 Bell et al.
- 59 Cambanis et al., *Hybrid Actors*.
- 60 E. J. Hogendoorn, “To Help Defeat Boko Haram, the EU Should Push for Good Governance and Accountability” (The Hague: International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 2018), 2; International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, “West Africa & Sahel,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, October 10, 2018; Méryl Demuyneck and LI M. Julie Coleman J. D., “The Shifting Sands of the Sahel’s Terrorism Landscape,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, March 12, 2020; John Campbell, “Where Exactly Is the Islamic State in West Africa?,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2019; International Crisis Group, “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province” (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2019). Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have several splinter groups active terrorist groups in the region include for instance Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), the Islamic West Africa Province (ISWAP).
- 61 The Economist, “Why Iraq’s Army Crumbled,” *The Economist*, June 19, 2014.

manage and control the use of resources within and between security institutions.<sup>62</sup> This depends on its internal structure and functioning, including the division of responsibilities, communication, coordination and the institutionalized relationships between officials.<sup>63</sup> Lack of trust and competition over financial or material resources between security institutions undermines coherence and thereby the ability for the security sector to function effectively.<sup>64</sup> This is the case for example in Iraq where four major security forces operate with relative autonomy resulting in disunity of purpose, lack of communication and coordination, weak command and control, and an inability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force.<sup>65</sup> In authoritarian regimes, institutional capability may be purposively undermined to prevent internal opposition from threatening the sitting regime's hold on power.<sup>66</sup> Such regimes often create overlapping or rivalry security institutions that constantly monitor each other's behavior. Individual security actors must also be physically and mentally fit to conduct security tasks and should know when and how to apply force. In states with weak institutions such as for instance Brazil this is not the case, with police forces resorting to extreme violence in their effort to contain illegal drug trafficking.<sup>67</sup>

Adequate resources are therefore a pre-requisite for stability but are by no means sufficient. A security sector that possesses the resources, intelligence and the capacity to effectively maintain a monopoly on the use of force through brutal suppression of the population will be a source of instability.<sup>68</sup> Effective security provision that promotes stability also requires the motivation on the part of the security sector to provide security not just to the state but also to the people.

### 2.1.2 Motivation: Inclusiveness and Rule of Law

The second characteristic the security sector must meet in order to contribute to stability is the motivation to protect the people on an equal basis. The failure to contribute to stability is not always a question of insufficient resources and capacity and may be attributed to a lack of willingness to equally protect the state's citizens.<sup>69</sup> A well-resourced, well-trained and well-managed security sector does not automatically act as the security guardian of the population. Instead, it may be more strongly motivated

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62 William Byrd and Mark Sedra, "The Financial Dimension of Security Sector Reform" (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010), 99.

63 Scheye and Peake, 305.

64 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Guidelines for OSCE Staff."

65 Erwin van Veen and Sardar Aziz, "A State with Four Armies: How to Deal with the Case of Iraq," War on the Rocks, November 11, 2019.

66 Anthony S. Marcum and Jonathan N. Brown, "Is More Institutional Coup-Proofing Better or Worse for Regime Protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1 (2017): 109.

67 Gabriel Stargardter, "A Surge in Killings by Police Roils Bolsonaro's Brazil," Reuters, October 9, 2019.

68 Nora-Elise Beck and Lars Döbert, "Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Syria Must Go Hand in Hand," Atlantic Council, December 6, 2019.

69 Lawrence Rosenthal, "Policing and Equal Protection," *Yale Law & Policy Review* 21, no. 53 (2003): 53–103.



to protect the regime and/or particular ethnic constituencies, and/or exploit the population to obtain financial benefit. In authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia the primary impediment to stability as defined in this report is not a lack of resources or capacity but the security sector's primary purpose to protect the regime.<sup>70</sup> In Syria, the security sector is part of a "minority regime" composed of the Alawite minority that is structured to ensure that resources remain concentrated in the hands of the Alawite community.<sup>71</sup> In Liberia, the internal security institutions are intimately linked to criminal networks of illicit resource and drug trade and are more motivated to parasite on the unstable and fragmented security environment than to provide security to the population.<sup>72</sup>

Motivation hinges on two factors: institutional and actor motivation. Both the security sector as an institution and individual security actors must be motivated to protect the population according to two principles of good governance: inclusiveness and rule of law. Security sectors that are motivated to provide security at the institutional level but whose security actors act autonomously and protect only segments of the population or use excessive force is unlikely to be supported by the population. The security sector must provide equal opportunity for all persons regardless of identity (sex, age, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or socio-economic background) to receive and participate in the provision of security.<sup>73</sup> Additionally, the security sector and actors must perform in accordance with the rule of law meaning that laws are enforced impartially based on accepted rules and procedures.<sup>74</sup> There is no discrimination in how and what laws are enforced between persons. Together, level of inclusiveness and adherence to rule of law indicate how the security sector is structured and what purpose it seeks to achieve.

Motivation considers the *type* of security the security sector is motivated to provide and to *whom* it provides security. The security sector can support two 'types' of security: state security or human security. It contributes to stability by providing both state and human security.<sup>75</sup> This is because only a state that is secured against internal and

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70 Jack Hardy, "Hundreds of Saudi Police Officers Trained in Britain 'Aiding Regime to Commit Torture,'" *The Telegraph*, January 27, 2019; Michael Makara, "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring," *Democracy and Security* 9, no. 4 (2013): 334–359; James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131–65; Staci Strobl, "Policing in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia: Understanding the Role of Sectarian History and Politics," *Policing and Society* 26, no. 5 (2016): 544–562.

71 Heiko Wimmen, "Syria's Path From Civic Uprising to Civil War" (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2016), 6. See also: Zoltan Barany, "Who Will Shield the Imams? Regime Protection in Iran and the Middle East," *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 49–59.

72 Christine Cheng, Jonathan Goodhand, and Patrick Meehan, "Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project. Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains That Reduce Violent Conflict" (London: United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit, 2018), 32–35; Judith Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime? Evidence from Illicit Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone," *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal* 3, no. 1 (2018): 9.

73 "Security Sector Governance: Applying the Principles of Good Governance to the Security Sector" (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), 2015).

74 Aisha Fofana Ibrahim, Alex Sivalie Mbayo, and Rosaline Mearthy, "Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform and Governance" (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2015), 13.

75 Almadan Orozobekova and Alexander Wolters, "Regime Security vs. Human Security: The Case of an Uprising in Kyrgyzstan, 2010" (Bishkek: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; OSCE Academy, 2015).

external threats can effectively carry out its functions to protect the livelihood and dignity of the people.<sup>76</sup> However, there is a fine line between protecting the state in the service of the people and protecting the state at the expense of the people.<sup>77</sup> In some cases, the security sector may act autonomously to provide its own interests and not protect the state or the people. The security sector must protect the state only to the extent that it creates an environment that allows the state to operate in the service of the people.<sup>78</sup>

Institutional motivation means that the security sector is structured to protect the people on an equal basis and does not prioritize the protection of the state/regime at the expense of the people.<sup>79</sup> Actor motivation means that individual security actors within the security sector are motivated to offer the type of security provision its security institution is mandated to provide. It considers whether security actors do not abuse positions in the security sector to obtain personal financial or material benefit.

At the institutional level, the motivation to provide security is typically shaped by the political system of a state and the way in which public institutions are structured to serve their specific purpose.<sup>80</sup> There is a fundamental difference between governments that mandate the security forces solely with the protection of the regime in mind, and those that pursue the protection of political and civil rights alongside the security of the regime. In states with authoritarian tendencies including Eritrea, China, and Cambodia the security sector primarily functions as a tool of repression to fortify the power of the governing elite.<sup>81</sup> The security sector includes politicized and overlapping security agencies and secret police forces.<sup>82</sup> In this case, the military may be directly involved in the provision of internal security. In Egypt, the military brutally cracks down violently on protesters and opposition and holds special loyalty ties to the regime to enhance regime resilience against internal and external threats to power.<sup>83</sup>

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76 Orozobekova and Wolters; Gómez and Gasper, “Human Security: A Thematic Guidance Note for Regional and National Human Development Report Teams.”

77 Frank Edem Kofigah, *The Security Challenges in Africa. “Bridging the Gap Between Human Security and State Security Through Institutional Reforms”* (Munich: Grin Verlag, 2015). M. C. Abad, “The Challenge of Balancing State Security with Human Security,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, August 30, 2000; Eleanor Gordon, “Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or Its People?,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 8, no. 2–3 (2014): 126–148.

78 Barbara Von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007).

79 IGI Global, “What Is Institutional Culture,” IGI Global, 2020.

80 Ornella Moderan, “Political Leadership and National Ownership of Security Sector Reform Processes,” Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2015); Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Securing Peace? Regime Types and Security Sector Reform in the Patani (Thailand) and Bangsamoro (the Philippines) Peace Processes, 2011–2016,” *Strategic Analysis* 42, no. 4 (2018): 377–401.

81 Jodi Vittori, “Bahrain’s Fragility and Security Sector Procurement” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019); Zachary Laub, “Authoritarianism in Eritrea and the Migrant Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed March 18, 2020; “Exclusive: China’s Internal Security Force on Frontlines of Hong Kong Protests,” *Reuters*, March 18, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia: New Waves of Repression,” Human Rights Watch, January 27, 2016.

82 Quinlivan, “Coups-Proofing,” 131.

83 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Egypt,” Human Rights Watch, December 12, 2019.

In democratic societies, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, the security sector is primarily motivated to address the security needs of the population. Efforts to promote state and human security are closely intertwined and complement each other. This is evident through the sustained efforts to guarantee inclusiveness, equal protection and address ethnic proliferation by police forces.<sup>84</sup> However, the picture is not black and white as not all democracies are motivated to provide human security on a fair and inclusive basis. Sustained efforts to promote inclusiveness and equal protection may be window-dressing for instance to gain domestic and international recognition and not result in any structural changes. Since the attempted coup in 2016, the security sector in Turkey is increasingly exclusively focused on regime security.<sup>85</sup> The regime seeks to protect state security by increasing its direct grip over the security institutions and intelligence agencies while disabling constitutional and civil oversight mechanisms. Regardless of regime type, security sectors that function first and foremost to preserve the security of the regime or to sustain its own interests typically threaten the security of the people.<sup>86</sup>

Motivation also considers *whom* the security sector is motivated to protect. While in some cases the security sector completely disregards the security of the population, in others the power of the ruling elite is contingent on protecting ethnic and/or religious ties. When this is the case, the security sector will protect a specific fraction of the population and govern according to a structure of inclusion and exclusion.<sup>87</sup> In Bahrain, the security sector is structured to protect the Sunni ruling class. The Shia population is underrepresented among the rank and file of the national police and are disproportionately affected by repressive policing strategies.<sup>88</sup> In Syria, the top brass in the security sector primarily drawn from the Alawite community – adherents to Shia Islam – despite making up only about 10 percent of the total population.<sup>89</sup>

The underlying motivation of the security sector shapes the behavior of individual security actors by creating broader incentive structures.<sup>90</sup> This includes reward and penalty systems and the presence of spoilers and supporters. To contribute to stability, security actors must be rewarded for protecting the people and punished for suppressing the people in favor of (exclusively) protecting the state or regime, the elite or individual powerholders. When the inverse is true the motivation to protect

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84 Politie, “Proactief controleren (etnisch profileren),” Politie, accessed March 18, 2020. See also: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Hague (7 October 2019),” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, October 7, 2019.

85 Özlem Kaygusuz, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Regime Security in Turkey: Moving to an ‘Exceptional State’ under AKP,” *South European Society and Politics* 23, no. 2 (2018): 281–302.

86 Fragile States Index, “PI: State Legitimacy,” Fragile States Index, 2018.

87 Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing,” 1999.

88 Vittori, “Bahrain’s Fragility and Security Sector Procurement.”

89 Wimmen, “Syria’s Path From Civic Uprising to Civil War.”

90 Ben A. Vollaard, “Police Effectiveness: Measurement and Incentives” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006).

the people is undermined. In countries such as Egypt where loyal security forces are granted (higher positions) and economic benefits while opposers are purged and tortured there is greater incentive to support than oppose the regime.<sup>91</sup> In countries such as Liberia where ties to informal networks trading licit and illicit goods are not properly sanctioned, there is greater incentive to protect individual interests than to protect the state or the population.<sup>92</sup>

Incentives to provide security can be both economic and security in nature. Joining the security sector may be the best option to secure a stable income. When alternative more profitable sources of income become available, individual security actors may abandon their duty and start acting as parasites, profiting from lack of effective regulation and absence of control mechanisms. Alternatively, joining the security sector may be the best option to obtain the necessary resources and the power to protect family or religious or ethnic kin. When confronted by an imminent threat to survival, the imperative to provide impartial security to the population takes second place.<sup>93</sup> Spoilers may play an important role in thwarting the security sector's ability and motivation to protect the people. A stable security structure is not in everyone's interest. For some, unstable environments with weak and fragmented security sectors, offer ample opportunity for personal economic enrichment and survival.<sup>94</sup>

In sum, stability also depends on the motivation of the security sector to provide security to the population. If they lack that very fundamental motivation security sectors may very well become part of the forces behind cycles of conflict and instability.

### 2.1.3 Legitimacy: Accountability, Transparency, Responsiveness

Finally, in order to contribute to stability, security sectors must also be legitimate.<sup>95</sup> Legitimacy is rooted in accountability, transparency and responsiveness, which should result in the general acceptance by the population of the security sector's exclusive authority to provide security.<sup>96</sup> Legitimacy positively impacts stability because it provides the foundation for rule by consent rather than rule by coercion.<sup>97</sup> Legitimacy ensures that the population trusts and supports the security sector and security actors and is therefore willing to cooperate in ways that contribute to promoting stability,

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91 Ruth Michaelson, "Contractor, Actor ... Protest Leader? The Egyptian Exile Driving Rare Dissent," *The Guardian*, September 25, 2019; Stephen Roll and Luca Miede, "Egypt Engulfed by Militarism," *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2019* (Barcelona: Panorama, 2019).

92 William S. Reno, "Liberia: Durable Illicit Power Structures," in *Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations/National Defense University, 2017), 99–124.

93 Rotmann, "Men with Guns."

94 Guro Lien, "Bringing the Economy Back in: The Political Economy of Security Sector Reform," *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 8, no. 2 (2013): 36.

95 Karoline Eickhoff and Luise K. Müller, "Conflict Prevention and the Legitimacy of Governance Actors" (Berlin: Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, 2017), 7–9.

96 Lisa Schirch and Deborah Mancini-Griffoli, *Local Ownership in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches* (Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2015), 9.

97 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*.

for instance by providing information on emerging security threats.<sup>98</sup> In this way, intelligence gathering is reinforced by the condition of being legitimate which in turn strengthens security sectors' ability to provide security.

While the characteristics ability and motivation take a top-down approach and focus on the behavior of the security sector towards the people, the third characteristic takes a bottom-up approach.<sup>99</sup> Legitimacy at the institutional and actor level hinges on three principles: accountability, transparency (i.e., *input legitimacy*), and responsiveness (i.e., *output legitimacy*). Although not a direct measure of bottom-up perception, the rules and mechanisms through which a security sector governs (input legitimacy) and executes (output legitimacy) security provision and the quality thereof are commonly associated with popular perceptions of legitimacy.<sup>100</sup>

The first measure of legitimacy at the institutional level is input or process-based legitimacy, based on the rules and mechanisms through which the state governs and executes the provision of security. The security sector can be said to possess input legitimacy when it satisfies the principles accountability and transparency.<sup>101</sup> Accountability ensures that the security sector and the security actors act in the population's best interest by taking the responsibility to hold security actors liable for deviant behavior that threatens the security of the people.<sup>102</sup> This is facilitated by the presence of oversight and sanctioning mechanisms to monitor, control and correct the performance of security actors. Input legitimacy assesses levels of legitimacy at the institutional level and to what extent the security sector is structured to provide security in a way that contributes to stability. Nigeria's security sector is a case in point of a security sector with relatively low levels of accountability as the security sector lacks appropriate formal and public accountability mechanisms such as, for instance, a procedure for filing complaints against government officials.<sup>103</sup> A security sector must furthermore be transparent and communicate publicly about both decision-making processes and their outcomes regarding the provision of security. Publicly accessible information on such decision-making procedures allows citizens to monitor and thereby question behavior that deviates from the public interest.<sup>104</sup> This is key to ensure

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98 Andrew Goldsmith, "Police Reform and the Problem of Trust," *Theoretical Criminology* 9, no. 4 (2005): 443–470."

99 Florian Weigand, "Investigating the Role of Legitimacy in the Political Order of Conflict-Torn Spaces," *Security in transition*, 2015, 16, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62691/1/Investigating-Legitimacy-in-the-Political-Order-of-Conflict-torn-spaces.pdf>.

100 Eickhoff and Müller, "Conflict Prevention and the Legitimacy of Governance Actors," 7–9; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 15, 20.

101 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 25; Sergio Marco Gemperle, "Improving State Legitimacy? The Role of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States," *Global Crime* 19, no. 1 (2017): 24.

102 "Security Sector Governance: Applying the Principles of Good Governance to the Security Sector," 3.

103 Oluwakemi Okenyodo, "Governance, Accountability, and Security in Nigeria" (Washington, D.C.: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016).

104 Augustin Loada and Ornella Moderan, "Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance" (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2015), 11,23,41.

supportive relations between the general population and security officials that is the foundation for an effective security sector.

The second measure of legitimacy is output or performance-based legitimacy. Output legitimacy is measured by the good governance principle of responsiveness. It considers to what extent security forces respond to the population's security needs in a timely manner and according to agreed-upon rules and procedures.<sup>105</sup> At the core, responsiveness requires that the security sector's interests align with the population's expectations of security provision.<sup>106</sup> This means that the security sector must be responsive to the security needs and preferences of all its citizens.<sup>107</sup> In India<sup>108</sup>, Myanmar<sup>109</sup>, and Sri Lanka<sup>110</sup>, for instance, the police force has low responsiveness scores due to excessive use of force against the Muslim population. The security sector's degree of responsiveness most closely reflects legitimacy at the actor level because it assesses how security actors engage with the population. Responsiveness is often determined by institutional structures, however, in some cases, the security sector's interests may diverge at the institutional and actor level. Security actors may not be responsive to the security needs of the population at the behest of the regime or because they act at their own discretion to secure their own interests.

To contribute to stability the security sector must be perceived as legitimate at the institutional and actor level. Institutional deficiencies including weak accountability mechanisms undermines the population's trust in the integrity of police forces in the same way police forces that use excessive amounts of force reflect badly on the security sector institutions.<sup>111</sup> Deficiencies in legitimacy at the institutional and actor level undermines the population's support for the security sector and renders it unlikely that the population will cooperate and provide intelligence on security threats. The population's support and provision of intelligence is, in turn, crucial to be able to counter threats to security.

Through adherence to the three principles, accountability, transparency and responsiveness a security sector is considered legitimate.<sup>112</sup> Legitimacy enhances the

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105 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 20.

106 Robert S. Erikson, "Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion," *Political Science*, 2013.

107 Sergio Marco Gemperle, "Improving State Legitimacy? The Role of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States," *Global Crime* 19, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 25; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 26.

108 Jayshree Bajoria, "Shoot the Traitors': Discrimination Against Muslims under India's New Citizenship Policy" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2020).; Jeffrey Gettleman et al., "How Delhi's Police Turned Against Muslims," *The New York Times*, March 12, 2020.

109 Human Rights Watch, "Crimes against Humanity by Burmese Security Forces Against the Rohingya Muslim Population," Human Rights Watch, September 25, 2017.

110 Human Rights Watch, "Sri Lanka: Muslims Face Threats, Attacks: Authorities Should Act Against Incitement by Buddhist Nationalists," Human Rights Watch, July 3, 2019.

111 Monica Duffy Toft, "A Legitimacy Chain Approach to Security Sector Reform: Working for Citizens and States" (London, United Kingdom: LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, April 2018).

112 Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli, *Local Ownership in Security*.

security sector's contribution to stability because it fosters trust between the security sector and the population that is in turn more likely to support and cooperate with the security sector in constructive ways by providing relevant information on security threats thereby enhancing the security sectors ability to provide security.<sup>113</sup> Support by the population of the security sector institutions and actors is critical to counteract the influence of informal security actors that may create destabilizing structures and undermine stability. When the security sector's procedures and performance are not perceived as legitimate by its citizens, informal security actors are more likely to fill the void and compete with the state's monopoly on the use of force.<sup>114</sup> It is for instance widely recognized that partiality and weakness in Lebanon's security sector's response to security issues has undermined its legitimacy and allowed Hezbollah to gain informal and formal legitimacy as a security provider.<sup>115</sup> Legitimacy fosters resilience against internal and external pressures. A legitimate security sector is more adept at managing conflict and will be able to contain lower level public outbursts of violence.<sup>116</sup>

Overall, a security sector contributes to stability if it meets the three characteristics (ability, motivation, legitimacy) and adheres to the concomitant six principles of good governance (effectiveness, inclusiveness, rule of law, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness). In fragile states with (dormant) conflict, security sectors typically do not meet these characteristics and principles. A security sector's performance on the three characteristics creates different security sector *types*. A security sector may for instance be unable to provide security because it has insufficient resources and capability, despite being highly motivated to protect the population. The security sector may also be very effective but not motivated to protect the population instead choosing to use its resources for self-enrichment. The next chapter applies the SSAF to 82 countries and security sectors to identify different security sector types.

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113 Toft, "A Legitimacy Chain Approach to Security Sector Reform: Working for Citizens and States," 4.

114 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*.

115 Aram Nerguizian, "The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and Military Legitimacy" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017

116 Elena A. Korosteleva and Trine Flockhart, "Resilience in EU and International Institutions: Redefining Local Ownership in a New Global Governance Agenda," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 2020, 1–23.

## 3. A Security Sector Typology

The SSAF can be used to assess security sectors worldwide. While security sectors defy simple categorization, there are some defining characteristics that are analytically and empirically distinct that can help understand security sectors and their contribution to stability. It is important to note however that the security sector types presented in this chapter provide a first order categorization that warrants further analysis. It is not static or template-like but provides direction and guidance to help policymakers determine security sectors' potential contribution to stability. This chapter first explains how the SSAF can be operationalized to identify security sector types. It then proceeds to present six security sector types which are illustrated using case examples derived from the data.

### 3.1 Operationalization of the Security Sector Assessment Framework: Methodology

The SSAF can be used to understand and assess security sectors potential contribution to stability. In so doing, the SSAF has been operationalized using eight relevant proxy indicators (see Table 2). The operationalization of the SSAF using a fixed set of quantitative indicators allows for the comparison between security sectors that can subsequently be further explained, defined and substantiated through further in depth, qualitative research. These proxy indicators were identified on the basis of literature review and expert judgment and were then selected based on considerations of data availability for the largest number of countries that were deemed of interest. These countries meet the three characteristics to varying degrees, impact stability in different ways and are located in geographically diverse regions. The subsequent section briefly explains the method that was used that is further elaborated upon in Annex A: The SSAF Methodology and Manual.



Characteristic	Principle	Proxy Indicator
Ability	Effectiveness	Number of Policemen per 100,000 Inhabitants. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - Crime Trends Survey, Interpol, National Security Reports <sup>117</sup> )
		Monopoly on the Use of Force. (Bertelsmann Transformation Index <sup>118</sup> )
Motivation	Inclusiveness	Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ranking averaged. (Freedom House <sup>119</sup> )
		Equal protection index. (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset 2020 <sup>120</sup> )
	Rule of law	Rule of law index. (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset 2020 <sup>121</sup> )
Legitimacy	Accountability	Accountability index. (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset 2019 <sup>122</sup> )
	Transparency	State Legitimacy Scale. (Fragile States Index <sup>123</sup> )
	Responsiveness	Security Apparatus Scale. (Fragile States Index <sup>124</sup> )

Table 2: Proxy indicators to measure three characteristics, six principles

The security sector’s performance in 82 countries on the three characteristics was measured and scaled according to a five-point ordinal scale (see Table 3).

To compare data results between security sectors across the eight indicators for the three characteristics ability, motivation, legitimacy a five-point ordinal score was used ranging from low, medium-low, medium, medium-high, and high. High scores mean the security sector perfectly satisfies the characteristic while low scores mean the security sector does not satisfy the characteristic at all. The characteristic ability is measured using two indicators of maximum 5 points each and therefore a total score of 1-10. The characteristics motivation and legitimacy are measured using three indicators of maximum 5 points each and therefore a total of 1-15. The aggregated characteristic scores were subsequently normalized between 0-1 and then multiplied by 100 so that performance could be expressed in percentiles (see Table 3).<sup>125</sup> Countries were assigned labels (between low and high) based on their percentile scores for each characteristic. The five-point scale is based on percentile scores on the eight indicators. The chosen breakdown for labeling the percentiles: 15-20-30-20-15 resembles a normal distribution. As countries move away

117 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Criminal Justice Personnel,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed April 2, 2020; INTERPOL, “Member Countries,” INTERPOL, 2020; Secretary-General, “Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,” Report of the Secretary-General (Salvador: United Nations, February 1, 2010).

118 Bertelsmann Stiftung, “Methodology,” Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, accessed March 26, 2020.

119 “Freedom in the World Research Methodology - Freedom in the World 2020 Methodology,” Freedom House, 2020.

120 Varieties of Democracy, “V-Dem Codebook V9” (Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy, 2019).

121 Varieties of Democracy.

122 Varieties of Democracy.

123 Fragile States Index, “PI: State Legitimacy.”

124 Fragile States Index.

125 Normalization between 0 and 1 results in the lowest score in the series being assigned 0 and the highest score being assigned 1.

from the medium category, it becomes progressively more difficult to score low or high on each of the three characteristics. Countries only obtain a low or high label if they fall above the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile or below the 15<sup>th</sup> percentile on ability, motivation, or legitimacy. The chosen breakdown helps more accurately understand security sectors conceptually and allows for the identification of several security sector types.

Low	Country scores between below the 15 <sup>th</sup> percentile on ability, motivation, or legitimacy
Medium-low	Country scores between 15 <sup>th</sup> and 35 <sup>th</sup> percentile on ability, motivation, or legitimacy
Medium	Country scores between 35 <sup>th</sup> and 65 <sup>th</sup> percentile on ability, motivation, or legitimacy
Medium-high	Country scores between 65 <sup>th</sup> and 85 <sup>th</sup> percentile on ability, motivation, or legitimacy
High	Country scores above the 85 <sup>th</sup> percentile on ability, motivation, or legitimacy

Table 3: Country scoring criteria

The comprehensive list of security sector scores in 82 countries was then analyzed to identify all possible combinations of low to high scores on the three characteristics that emerged from the data.

A combination of deductive and inductive methodologies was applied to synthesize a security sector typology. An initial deductive approach looked at all possible combinations of ordinal scale performance within ability, motivation, and legitimacy. This resulted in the identification of a total of 120 ordinal scale combinations that were possible in theory. A literature review was conducted to eliminate combinations based on redundancy with other ordinal scale combinations on the one hand and based on the likelihood that they would exist in the real world on the other. Both the theoretical deduction and the literature review warranted the conclusion that some combinations of scores on the three characteristics are not likely to reflect existing security sectors.<sup>126</sup> This two-pronged approach thus allowed for elimination of redundant and less meaningful combinations.<sup>127</sup> This process allowed for the identification of six distinct security sector types. These security sector types were then tested in the available data which covers 82 countries. This inductive process led to the introduction of ordinal scale tolerances to adjust for the fact that several ordinal scale combinations (read: security sector types) were not populated by any countries in the data. Tolerances (i.e.: the country scores *either* high *or* medium-high) were introduced on the basis of the previously conducted literature review on the one hand and on the basis of the sample dataset on the other. Because some countries,

126 For instance, it is unlikely that security sectors score high on ability and motivation yet low on legitimacy. This is because a security sector that is able and motivated to protect the people is also likely to have mechanisms in place to ensure security actors are responsive to peoples' needs and held accountable for deviant behavior.

127 For instance, by comparing the data with literature on security sectors it became apparent that security sectors with medium-low and medium scores on legitimacy have similar implications for stability if both score low on ability and medium on motivation. These two categories were therefore clustered together (see Table 4).

including the United States and several Sahel countries, are excluded from the dataset due to lack of data, tolerances in the final security sector typology were adjusted (where necessary) to correct for these countries' likely scores within the ability, motivation, and legitimacy characteristic. The final six-pronged typology was then corroborated with an extensive review of the relevant literature on the performance and nature of security sectors. The extant literature does not explicitly identify combinations of the three characteristics, as this is a novel contribution, but does identify different ways in which the security sector is structured and contributes to or undermines stability, which is discussed in greater detail in the sections below.

### 3.2 Six Security Sector Types

From the 82 countries included in the analysis a total of 62 security sectors are meaningfully categorized in the six security sector types (see Table 4). Security sectors' scores on ability, motivation, legitimacy at the country-level are provided in Annex B Data. The remaining countries do not neatly fit the identified security sector types and fall into sub-categories that require further research. These sub-categories are not included in this report as security sector types and only briefly analyzed in Annex B Data.

The six security sector types identified in this report are the criminal –, the repressive –, the oppressive –, the fragmented –, the transitioning –, and the stable security sector (see Table 4).

These six different security sector types contribute to or undermine stability in distinct ways:

- The criminal security sector promotes the proliferation of non-state actors and criminal networks that create and stimulate insecurity and conflict. It does not prioritize protection of the population and instead financially profits off trading licit and illicit goods.
- The repressive security sector exclusively protects the regime and rules by coercion rather than consent. The population is subject to state sponsored violence without the opportunity to scrutinize the security sector's performance.
- The oppressive security sector exclusively protects the regime but is unable to control security actors and maintain a monopoly on the use of force. State sponsored security actors operate autonomously and subject the population to indiscriminate use of force.
- The fragmented security sector supports and/or directly engages with informal security actors. Security provision is decentralized and as a result the security sector does not control how force is used.
- The transitioning security sector is relatively stable but not resilient because it is governed by old regime structures that are not adept at responding to contemporary security issues and/or located in a volatile region.

- The stable security sector makes a positive contribution to stability. It possesses a monopoly on the use of force, exercises authority according to agreed-upon rules and procedures and protects both state and human security.

The following sections describe these six security sector types in more detail.

Security Sector Type	Description	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
<b>Criminal</b> 	Systematically challenged by non-state actors and criminal networks that are directly or indirectly tied to security actors. Corruption is deeply imbedded in the security sector.	Medium	Medium	Medium
<b>Repressive</b> 	Structured, commanded, staffed and equipped exclusively to protect the regime. The security sector is not a guardian of public security and rules by coercion to clamp down on internal and external opposition.	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
<b>Oppressive</b> 	Exercises authority brutally to protect the regime. It does not have the resources and capability to function in a cohesive and effective way according to the law.	Low/ Medium-low	Low/ Medium-low	Low/ Medium-low
<b>Fragmented</b> 	Lacks effective, centralized and well-coordinated security institutions. The provision of security is decentralized due to direct and indirect ties to local security providers.	Low	Medium	Medium-low / Medium
<b>Transitioning</b> 	Does not adequately protect the population due to old regime structures that prevail and influence contemporary structures and decision-making and/or regional instability.	Medium/ Medium-high	Medium-high/High	Medium/ Medium-high/High
<b>Stable</b> 	The ideal structure that positively contributes to stability. It is founded on the principles of good governance and accordingly has a high degree of ability, motivation and legitimacy.	High	High	High

Table 4: Security sector typology

### 3.2.1 The Criminal Security Sector

The criminal security sector faces systematic challenge from organized criminal groups that have direct or indirect ties to the security sector. This dynamic is deeply imbedded into the structure and functioning of the security sector.<sup>128</sup> This dynamic overshadows efforts to promote stability despite the fact that criminal security sectors typically do possess some resources. As a result, criminal security sectors score medium on the three characteristics ability, motivation, legitimacy (see Figure 5). Mexico, Brazil and Liberia are examples in case (see Table 5).




Figure 5: The criminal security sector

Criminal	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
	Brazil	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Colombia	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Ecuador	Medium	Medium	Medium
	El Salvador	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Lesotho	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Liberia	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Mexico	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Peru	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Ukraine	Medium	Medium	Medium

Table 5: Countries with criminal security sector structures

The criminal security sector scores medium on ability since the security sector generally does not possess all the necessary resources (financial, material, human) and intelligence capacity to address widespread crime. Apart from this lack of resources and intelligence the security sector suffers from institutional inertia and unprofessional security forces that are not adequately trained to convert resources into security provision proficiency.

128 Ivan Briscoe and David Keseberg, "Only Connect: The Survival and Spread of Organized Crime in Latin America," *PRISM* | *National Defense University* 8, no. 1 (2019).

This means that the security sector is not able to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, allowing national and transnational criminal organizations to thrive. The security sector is systematically challenged by the parallel existence and activity of criminal networks that largely determine who is protected.<sup>129</sup> Although these criminal organizations may provide security to the population in some cases these criminal organizations routinely engage in violence and threaten the security of the population with relative impunity. It is not uncommon in Mexico, Brazil and Liberia for criminal organizations to threaten and use excessive force against the population. These criminal networks are infiltrated both in the security sector and society at large to such a degree that it is exceedingly difficult to take them on and bring them to justice. In the criminal security sector, the combination of moderate ability and moderate motivation is crucial. The security sector does not have a monopoly on the use of force because it lacks the resources and the capability. It also lacks the motivation to protect the population. This unfortunate combination undermines the security sector's ability to defeat the criminal networks and protect the population.

At the same time, the medium score on motivation does mean that the security sector adheres to the principles inclusiveness and rule of law at least to some degree. There are some rules and mechanisms in place that control and constrain the security sector's completely arbitrary exercise of power. Yet, although the security sector adheres to the principles of good governance on paper in practice existent laws and protections tend to be adhered to only haphazardly at a structural level by security sector institutions and by security actors.<sup>130</sup> In some cases, the security sector may be motivated to provide security at the institutional level but be corrupted by the lack of motivation at the actor level due to preference for personal enrichment to such a degree that it becomes a direct or indirect culprit in such networks. There is insufficient commitment to protect the population from violence and crime. Security actors are not independent and engage in mutually symbiotic relationships with criminal networks through which they obtain profits off trading licit and illicit goods including arms, drugs and human trafficking.<sup>131</sup> To sustain this dynamic, elites tend to have strong preference for a fragmented security environment which is permissive to their trade.<sup>132</sup> As a result, informal security structures become institutionalized and supported by the formal security sector.

This dynamic bolsters insecurity, which can be further exacerbated by the security sector's inability to insulate the population from the violent consequences of widespread

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129 Jenny Pearce, "Elites and Violence in Latin America: Logics of the Fragmented Security State," *Violence, Security, and Peace Working Papers* (London: LSE Latin America and Caribbean Centre, 2018), 1.

130 The Democracy & Human Rights Working Group, "Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law in Mexico: Making the Case," *McCain Institute* (blog), September 2016; Human Rights Watch, "Mexico: Events of 2017," Human Rights Watch, 2018.

131 Pearce, "Elites and Violence in Latin America," 5.

132 Pearce, "Elites and Violence in Latin America," 1.

organized crime.<sup>133</sup> The weakness of the security sector creates additional incentive for security actors to cooperate with criminal networks. A vicious cycle develops whereby an increasing number of security actors are absorbed by corrupt networks which further undermines the security situation, thereby incentivizing other actors to seek similar protection from criminal networks. Security sector officers that challenge criminal networks face punishment from criminal organizations.<sup>134</sup>

The security sector's inability and unwillingness to provide security means that in the end security services and protection are not inclusive. Rural areas tend to be disproportionately affected since criminal groups often carry out their activities in remote areas where formal security actors are even less likely to operate due to resource shortages, including vehicles and staff.<sup>135</sup> Women and girls also tend to be particularly vulnerable to acts of violence by criminal groups including sexual abuse and human trafficking.<sup>136</sup> The security sector's lack of motivation to protect the population undermines the population's support for the security sector which creates the incentive to support criminal networks already undermining stability.

Finally, the criminal security sector also scores medium on input and output legitimacy. The security sector is accountable, transparent and responsive to some degree but falls short on implementation. Although laws exist and are publicly available in practice the security sector fails to effectively address integrity transgressions.<sup>137</sup> Collusion between security institutions including the judiciary and criminal networks means that corruption is systematic and institutionalized at the institutional and actor levels.<sup>138</sup> Formal security actors are frequently involved in illicit trade and bought off by criminal

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- 133 Mark L. Schneider, "Anti-Corruption in the Americas: What Works?" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2020). Latin America and the global community have been forced to acknowledge that systemic corruption and organized crime networks have increasingly posed serious existential threats to democracy. Organized crime and related corruption in Latin America have generated the world's highest rates of homicides, kidnappings, assaults, and drug trafficking for nations not at war, destroying lives and families throughout the region. They also undermine political institutions and the rule of law, which in turn weaken legitimate business, destroy social cohesion, and foster generalized fear at all levels of society. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, adopted in 1996, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, adopted in 2003, are evidence of the awareness of the negative effects of organized crime and related corruption. However, they have yet to be implemented sufficiently to make a dent in public perception and the unfortunate reality of widespread corruption as the medium for criminal operations and the nearly uncontested elite domination of economic life in many countries of the region. The Open Government Partnership, agreed to in 2011 by eight nations and which now has 78 country members, is another example of efforts to grapple with the dangers of corruption with a combination of civil society and private and public sector transparency. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
- 134 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Enabling Offence: Obstruction of Justice," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, April 2018; Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Mexico," Human Rights Watch, December 9, 2019.
- 135 César Muñoz Acebes and Daniel Wilkinson, "Rainforest Mafias: How Violence and Impunity Fuel Deforestation in Brazil's Amazon" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2019).
- 136 Christine Murray, "Mexico Human Trafficking Cases Rise by a Third but Many States Found Lagging," Reuters, January 22, 2020.
- 137 Maureen Meyer, "Mexico's Police: Many Reforms, Little Progress" (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2014), 3.
- 138 Rachele Marie Bin, "Drug Lords and the Colombian Judiciary: A Story of Threats, Bribes and Bullets," *Pacific Basin Law Journal* 5, no. 1-2 (1986): 178-82; Human Rights Watch, "Liberia at a Crossroads: Human Rights Challenges for the New Government: Building the Rule of Law" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005); Meyer, "Mexico's Police," 6; Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime?"

groups in exchange for financial profits.<sup>139</sup> The informal security networks may be known to the security sector but are left alone, usually with some form of payment in return for impunity.<sup>140</sup> This means that both security sector institutions and security actors are perceived as illegitimate and untrustworthy making it unlikely that the population will provide necessary intelligence on impeding security threats. In Liberia, for instance, security forces, including the police and criminal courts, are frequently found to protect the cultivation and trade of illicit drugs.<sup>141</sup> In Brazil too, investigations find that police officers receive bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye to crime.<sup>142</sup> Moreover, deviant behavior such as excessive use of force and human rights abuses are regularly left unsanctioned. Security sector forces committing crimes – including torture and forced disappearances – that are not reported and, writ-large, not dealt with is common in El Salvador and Colombia.<sup>143</sup>

In countries with criminal security sectors there is no adequate public communication about decision-making processes regarding security provision. The veneer of secrecy shrouding such processes hinders public investigation and prosecution into abuses by security forces at all levels.<sup>144</sup> Individuals entering the security sector are not properly vetted for ties to criminal networks, allowing these individuals to sustain their criminal activities while formally working in the security sector.<sup>145</sup> The lack of accountability and transparency mechanisms allows a dynamic to develop whereby security must be bought. Security actors will protect the population when doing so is rewarded by leaders of criminal organization to which they are tied and vice-versa neglect duties when doing so is rewarded.<sup>146</sup> The low levels of responsiveness and selective provision of security undermines the population's trust of the security sector making it more likely they will support informal security networks that more effectively offer protection.<sup>147</sup> This leave a security vacuum that is filled by non-state criminal groups that over time gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Especially, vis-à-vis the perceived corrupt,

139 Brianna Lee, Danielle Renwick, and Rocio Cara Labrador, "Mexico's Drug War," Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 2019.

140 Center for the Study of Democracy, "Examining the Links Between Organised Crime and Corruption" (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2010).

141 Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime?," 9.

142 Imelda Cengic, "Brazil Cracks Down on Gangs and Corrupt Government Agents," Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, accessed March 24, 2020.

143 Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2020: Rights Trends in El Salvador," Human Rights Watch, December 6, 2019.; Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2018: Rights Trends in Colombia," Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2018.

144 Adriana García García, "Transparency in Mexico: An Overview of Access to Information Regulations and Their Effectiveness at the Federal and State Level," *Wilson Center - Mexico Institute*, 2016, 27; Folke Bernadotte Academy, "Liberia: Integrity and Accountability Important for a Society Free from Corruption," Folke Bernadotte Academy, December 18, 2019; Julia Muravska et al., "Organised Crime, Corruption, and the Vulnerability of Defence and Security Forces" (London: Transparency International UK, 2011), 15; International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "Liberia SSR Snapshot," DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, August 17, 2018.

145 Elijah Stevens, "Criminal Groups Infiltrated El Salvador Security Forces: Official," *InSight Crime*, December 15, 2015; Hubert Williams, "Core Factors of Police Corruption Across the World," *Forum on Crime and Society* 2, no. 1 (2002): 1-16; "Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security," The White House, 2016.

146 Adriaan Alsema, "Colombia Colluding with Illegal Armed Groups, Suppressing Peaceful Protest, Failing to Implement Peace: UN," *Colombia Reports*, February 27, 2020.

147 Toft, "A Legitimacy Chain Approach to Security Sector Reform: Working for Citizens and States," 4.



weak and absent security sector that lack the resources and commitment to enforce the rule of law.<sup>148</sup>

This criminal security sector contributes to instability because it promotes the proliferation of non-state actors and criminal networks that create insecurity and conflict. The collusion between security actors and organized criminal networks creates a permissible environment for lucrative illicit trade that leaves the population without any reliable source of protection.<sup>149</sup> Individual insecurity forces people to comply with criminals in order to remain safe from harm.<sup>150</sup>

### 3.2.2 The Repressive Security Sector

The repressive security sector is structured, commanded, staffed and equipped to protect the regime.<sup>151</sup> It is not a guardian of public security and primarily functions as a repressive tool to clamp down on internal opposition. The security sector has medium ability but low motivation to provide security to the people alongside low levels of legitimacy (see Figure 6). China, Iran and Thailand are illustrative of the repressive security sector (see Table 6).




Figure 6: The repressive security sector

Repressive	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
	Cambodia	Medium	Low	Medium-low
	China	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Guinea	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Iran	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Thailand	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Turkey	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low

Table 6: Countries with repressive security sector structures

148 Briscoe and Keseberg, “Only Connect.”

149 Angélica Durán-Martínez, *The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia and Mexico* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 145.

150 Acebes and Wilkinson, “Rainforest Mafias: How Violence and Impunity Fuel Deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon.”

151 Erica De Bruin, “Mapping Coercive Institutions: The State Security Forces Dataset, 1960-2010” (New York: Social Science Research Network, 2019), 1.

The security sector has medium levels of ability to provide security. It has the resources (financial, material, human), intelligence capacity, and the capability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. The security sector is able to effectively oversee and control the domestic situation. While there may be non-state actors operating in the country, the state does not experience any systematic challenge to its authority. There is extensive surveillance and any activity threatening the state is dealt with forcefully. China for instance is able to maintain a monopoly on the use of force although it has a relatively small police force by relying on employment of its gendarmerie force the People's Armed Forces (PAP) and high levels of surveillance to control the population.<sup>152</sup> Turkey's intelligence agencies and high levels of surveillance also have a key role in repressing opposition.<sup>153</sup> Typically, the security sector is large and composed of several security organizations that are mandated, to varying degrees, to protect the regime. Iran, for instance, has over seventeen security institutions and three main bodies involved in internal intelligence that function to protect the regime and are overseen by the Supreme Leader.<sup>154</sup> These security institutions act as the "eyes and ears of the regime" and penetrate deeply into society to identify and address any internal opposition.<sup>155</sup>

To understand the dynamics of a repressive security sector it is critical to understand the link between ability and motivation. This is because although the security has the ability to provide security to the population, the latter remains largely unprotected because the security sector lacks the motivation. The security sector therefore has low to medium-low scores on motivation. First and foremost, this is because the state itself is undemocratic and rule is maintained by coercion, not popular consent. The security sector is deeply entrenched in politics, either as a protector of the political elite or as an actor in the government itself, and more often both. The former is the case in Iran while the latter is the case in Thailand where the military essentially holds control over

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152 This report measures ability using two proxy indicators that measure number of policemen per 100,000 inhabitants and states' monopoly on the use of force. China scores medium on ability because it maintains high levels of monopoly on the use of force but has low on number of policemen per 100,000 inhabitants suggesting it relies on other means to repress challenge to its monopoly on the use of force. Turkey's medium scores on ability can be explained by similar logic as it also has a moderately sized police force and likely relies on means other than the police force to maintain monopoly on the use of force including extensive surveillance of the population. "Exclusive"; Dean Cheng, "China Copes With Insecurity by Boosting National Security Spending," The Heritage Foundation, March 14, 2018; Joel Wuthnow, "China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform," China Strategic Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, April 2019); Zi Yang, "The Chinese People's Armed Police in a Time of Armed Forces Restructuring," Jamestown, March 24, 2016; INTERPOL, "Member Countries"; Özgün E. Topak, "The Authoritarian Surveillant Assemblage: Authoritarian State Surveillance in Turkey," *Security Dialogue* 50, no. 5 (2019): 454–472.

153 Topak, "The Authoritarian Surveillant Assemblage"; Jessica Chen Weiss, "Understanding and Rolling Back Digital Authoritarianism," *War on the Rocks*, February 17, 2020.

154 Saeid Golkar, "Iran's Coercive Apparatus: Capacity and Desire," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 5, 2018.

155 Golkar.

the government.<sup>156</sup> In both cases, the population does not play any significant role in decision-making over the management and execution of security provision.

The primary objective to protect the regime enforced at the institutional and actor level undermines the commitment to inclusiveness and the rule of law. To create an environment that is conducive to loyalty rather than dissent, the state instils fear for dissent and offers lucrative benefits for loyalty within in a ‘carrots and sticks’ approach.<sup>157</sup> The population is not protected on an equal basis as a basic right and must ‘earn’ protection through loyalty to the regime either based on ethnic identity, religion or political affiliation. This typically also means that security forces are drawn from the same socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds to strengthen group cohesion such as, for example, in Iran and Cambodia. In Iran, the security forces are largely composed of the Basij forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps while in Cambodia security officers are largely drawn from the Cambodian People’s Party.<sup>158</sup> This kind of partisan security provision that favors the loyal leaves other segments of the population unprotected.

Fear for dissent is instilled by purging security officers whose loyalty is questionable and by creating security forces within the security sector mandated to oversee and control the performance of fellow security actors.<sup>159</sup> This kind of pervasive surveillance also known as coup-proofing provides another layer of insulation to keep the security sector, security actors and the population subservient to the regime.<sup>160</sup> The regime’s effort to remain in power also means that arbitrary and excessive use of force is not constrained by subordination to well-defined and publicly agreed-upon laws and procedures if such force is used in order to protect the regime.<sup>161</sup> This is evident in Turkey where security officials are bribed with higher positions in the military or with financial means in exchange of loyalty to the regime.<sup>162</sup> Although the population generally does not support the security sector it is unlikely to publicly voice criticism for fear of being subjected to state sponsored violence. This typically results in some form of resistance developing

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156 To understand the security sector’s contribution to stability in Thailand requires understanding the role of the military. This is because the military has traditionally held a prominent role in domestic politics and internal security provision and is a key actor undermining reform and stability. Peter Zomber, “2019 a False Dawn for Democracy in Thailand, Analysts Say,” *Voice of America News*, December 28, 2019.; Siwach Sripokangkul, “On the Path to Democracy in Thailand: Military Reform Is the First Step,” *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review* 17, no. 1 (2017): 1–24.; Brendan Howe, *National Security, Statecentricity, and Governance in East Asia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 37–60.

157 Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Continued Power of Militaries in an Increasingly Autocratic World,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 12, 2019.; Paul W. Chambers, “‘Neo-Sultanistic Tendencies’: The Trajectory of Civil-Military Relations in Cambodia,” *Asian Security* 11, no. 3 (2015): 180.

158 Golkar, “Iran’s Coercive Apparatus.”; Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia: Party Extends Control of Security Forces,” *Human Rights Watch*, February 4, 2015.

159 Tom Rogan, “Why Iran Protests Will Fail,” *Washington Examiner*, January 13, 2020.

160 Human Rights Watch, “China’s Global Threat to Human Rights,” *Human Rights Watch*, January 3, 2020.

161 Chambers, “‘Neo-Sultanistic Tendencies,’” 179.

162 Tom Karako, “Coup-Proofing? Making Sense of Turkey’s S-400 Decision,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, July 15, 2019.

on the margins that creates a perpetual state of instability, especially because such resistance is unlikely to result in the complete overhaul of the security sector.

The security sector tends to score medium-low on legitimacy. The security sector is not responsive to people's security needs, there are few accountability mechanisms in place, and decision-making is not, or only partially, open to the public for scrutiny. Security sector actors are rarely subject to civilian oversight mechanisms and enjoy legal impunity for excessive use of force or violation of human rights.<sup>163</sup> The low levels of legitimacy at the institutional level are effectively enforced at the actor level to ensure that security actors function to exclusively protect the regime while leaving little room for disobedience. In China, police forces' use of brutal and indiscriminate tactics has become standard.<sup>164</sup> Following this trend, it is not uncommon for security actors in repressive security sectors to enjoy wide-ranging legal protection. Apart from the security forces, the broader security sector including judges and prosecutors are often under tremendous pressure from the regime undermining their independence and impartiality.<sup>165</sup> Security forces are partially responsive but may purposively overlook particular security issues. In Guinea, for instance, police violence in the form of violent suppression of protests and unlawful detentions by security actors go unpunished due to dysfunctional judicial systems.<sup>166</sup> Similarly, in Thailand former junta members and security officers committing human rights abuses enjoy impunity due to constitutional provisions and lack of accountability mechanisms.<sup>167</sup>

Relatively low levels of legitimacy also mean impartial investigations are few and far between. Citizens may be accused of committing crimes without the security sector having to provide formal evidence. This is the case in Iran where security forces arrest persons without due process. They do not require evidence and citizens are subsequently subject to unfair trials and given limited or no access to legal justice systems.<sup>168</sup> This further points to low levels of transparency with respect to decision-making procedures. Details on decision-making and performance of security actors, including incidences of deviant behavior such as the violation of human rights, is kept in secret far away from public scrutiny.<sup>169</sup> The low levels of legitimacy mean the security sector is not trusted and supported by the population that perceive the institutions responsible for providing security as the primary threat to their security.

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163 Chambers, "Neo-Sultanistic Tendencies," 179.

164 Amnesty International, "Hong Kong: Arbitrary Arrests, Brutal Beatings and Torture in Police Detention Revealed," Amnesty International, September 19, 2019.

165 European Commission, "Key Findings of the 2019 Report on Turkey," European Commission, May 29, 2019.

166 Human Rights Watch, "Guinea: Events of 2019," Human Rights Watch, 2020.

167 Human Rights Watch, "Thailand: Events of 2019," Human Rights Watch, 2020.

168 Human Rights Watch, "Iran: Unrelenting Repression," Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019.

169 Human Rights Watch, "Iran: Deliberate Coverup of Brutal Crackdown," Human Rights Watch, November 27, 2019.

The repressive security sector contributes to instability because rule by coercion and repression rather than consent is brittle. The constant opposition to the state’s authority and legitimacy may not challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force but does create an insecure environment rife with human rights violations.<sup>170</sup> The security sector is robust and unlikely to be toppled by instability while the population is perpetually exposed to insecurity. Because the security sector exerts its resources to protect the regime the population is left unprotected with little to no space for scrutiny, reform and improvement.

### 3.2.3 The Oppressive Security Sector

The oppressive security sector exercises authority in harsh ways to protect the regime. It differs from the repressive security sector in that it does not have the resources, intelligence, and capability to function in a cohesive and effective way. The security sector has low to medium-low ability, motivation, legitimacy (see Figure 7). Countries with an oppressive security sector include Pakistan and South-Sudan (see Table 7).

The oppressive security sector has a clearly defined mandate to protect the state. It resembles the repressive security sector in Iran, China and Turkey in terms of its intention and scores similarly low on motivation, legitimacy. However, contrary to the repressive security sector, the oppressive security sector lacks the resources, intelligence, and the capability to effectively carry out its mandate to protect the regime.




Figure 7: The oppressive security sector

Oppressive	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
	Bangladesh	Medium-low	Low	Medium-low
	Pakistan	Low	Medium-low	Medium-low
	South Sudan	Medium-low	Low	Low

Table 7: Countries with oppressive security sector structures

170 Alexander Burian, “SSR and Conflict Prevention,” DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, March 9, 2018.

The oppressive security sector has low ability to provide security for its population. There is a deficiency in resources, intelligence capacity and basic capabilities within the repressive security sector's institutions.<sup>171</sup> Police forces are typically under-resourced – both in terms of salaries and material resources. Military forces of countries with oppressive security sectors may be quite strong and capable. For example, Pakistan has a very powerful military and ranks fifteenth in the global firepower index, three ranks above Israel, and is one of nine nations with nuclear weapons.<sup>172</sup> Pakistan is the 20<sup>th</sup> largest military spender globally and has increased its budget yearly since 2009 so that in 2018 its military burden was 4.0% of its GDP - the highest level since 2004.<sup>173</sup> While Pakistan has holds substantial raw military power, the military is primarily equipped for a conventional war against its historical adversary India and not the insurgency waged by the Taliban.<sup>174</sup> Internal security units take secondary importance and lack the requisite training and resources to effectively protect the population against militant violence. The resources that are available are insufficiently allocated due to high levels of corruption.<sup>175</sup>

The security sector's ability to provide internal security is further undermined because typically recruitment is based on political or ethnic affiliation and patronage rather than merit and expertise meaning level of professionalism is generally low. This is particularly evident in South-Sudan where police forces receive little to no training and are selected purely based on loyalty to the regime.<sup>176</sup>

Moreover, coordination between different security institutions is poor. In the case of South-Sudan, the security sector does not have an accurate system to register the number of soldiers and officers. There is little incentive among commanders to reform the system because artificially inflating numbers allows them to pocket the salaries of

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171 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "South Sudan SSR Background Note," DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, January 14, 2016.

172 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "World Nuclear Forces," in *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 235.; GlobalFirepower.com, "2020 Military Strength Ranking," GlobalFirepower.com, accessed April 14, 2020.

173 Nan Tian et al., "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018," *SIPRI Fact Sheet*, 2019, 7.

174 Stephen Watts et al., "Countering Others' Insurgencies Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context" (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation: National Security Research Division, 2014), 120.; Shuja Nawaz, "Who Controls Pakistan's Security Forces?," Special Report 297 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 1.; Mustafa Qadri, "Pakistan's Army: As Inept as It Is Corrupt," *The Guardian*, May 3, 2009.

175 Justice Tankebe and Muhammad Asif, "Police Legitimacy and Support for Vigilante Violence in Pakistan," *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 40, no. 4 (2016): 343–362.; Farida Faisal and A. R. Jafri, "Corruption as a Source of Failure of Good Governance and Management in Pakistan: Proposed Remedial Measures," *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society (JPUHS)* 30, no. 1 (2017): 57–75.; GAN Integrity, "Pakistan Corruption Report," GAN Integrity, 2017.; Hassan Abbas, "Role of Pakistan Police in Counterinsurgency," *Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series*, no. 5 (2009): 1–8.; International Crisis Group, "Reforming Pakistan's Police" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008); Human Rights Watch, "This Crooked System: Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan," Human Rights Watch, September 26, 2016.; Shehyar Warraich, "Pakistani Police Highly Under-Resourced," *The News*, January 26, 2020.; Abdul Waheed Parry and Khursheed ul Aalam, "Pakistan Tiptoeing on Security Challenges," Humanitarian and Social Research Center (INSAMER), July 18, 2019.

176 Human Rights Watch, "South Sudan Should End Its Repressive Practices," Human Rights Watch, March 17, 2017.

so-called ghost soldiers.<sup>177</sup> The lack of resources, intelligence capacity, and capability means the security sector is unable to identify emerging security threats and manage civil unrest, creating a fertile environment for non-state armed groups to proliferate.<sup>178</sup> This can also be ascribed to challenges in the regional security environment, as the countries affected by oppressive security sectors may experience border disputes or cross-border violence. Pakistan and South-Sudan both suffer contested national boundaries with their neighboring countries India and Sudan respectively, while Bangladesh suffers from large refugee streams from Myanmar that severely represses its Rohingya population.<sup>179</sup> The instability that results from the failure to build and sustain an effective security sector is further exacerbated by a lack of motivation to protect the people.

Oppressive security sectors are not motivated to provide human security to all citizens on an inclusive and impartial basis. The oppressive security sector is fundamentally state-centric instead of population-centric. There is little personal autonomy since the security sector, as the arm of the state, interferes in the daily lives of the people, to suppress political opposition to the regime as is evident in South-Sudan where the National Security Service and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Military Intelligence intimidate and harass individuals and critics of the security services and the government in general.<sup>180</sup> Similarly, in Bangladesh, the police forces are highly militarized and employed to suppress political opposition.<sup>181</sup> The state-centric structure means that the oppressive security sector does not protect the rights and freedoms of social groups equally and interferes in the ability of social groups to participate in and receive security provision. However, the security sector's motivation to protect the regime at the institutional level is not always effectively enforced at the actor level to ensure the regime's orders are executed properly. Rather than protecting the regime, security actors often operate autonomously. Since security actors tend to have identity-based ties to the regime the security sector generally operates in favor of one ethnic or political group. As a result, large parts of the population are disproportionately affected by state violence. For instance, in Bangladesh security forces primarily commit crimes against indigenous minorities that go unpunished.<sup>182</sup>

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177 Claudia Breitung, Wolf-Christian Paes, and Luuk van de Vondervoort, "In Need of a Critical Re-Think: Security Sector Reform in South Sudan" (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2016).

178 Robert A Portada, John H. Riley, and Michael D. Gambone, "Security Sector Reform in South Sudan: Identifying Roles for Private Military and Security Companies," *Journal of Third World Studies* 31, no. 2 (2014): 151–78.

179 Salma Malik, "Security Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Challenges, Remedies and Future Prospects," *South Asian Survey* 16, no. 2 (2009): 273–89; International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "South Sudan SSR Background Note"; Human Rights Watch, "Bangladesh: Events of 2018," Human Rights Watch, 2019.

180 Breitung, Paes, and van de Vondervoort, "In Need of a Critical Re-Think: Security Sector Reform in South Sudan," 20.

181 M. Jashim Uddin, "Security Sector Reform in Bangladesh," *South Asian Survey* 16, no. 2 (2009): 209–30.

182 Uddin, "Security Sector Reform in Bangladesh"; Minority Rights Group International, "Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh" (London, United Kingdom: Minority Rights Group International, 2016).

Moreover, laws are not predictably, impartially and equally enforced across social groups and security forces often violate the law. This, together with the presence of ethnic divisions, leads to frequent human rights abuses by security forces towards minority groups. In South Sudan arbitrary arrests and violent crackdowns by police forces against the population are not uncommon.<sup>183</sup> Additionally, the failure to clearly stipulate and limit the role of the military in the state's affairs generally leads to military interference in society as well as in politics.<sup>184</sup> The security sector's inability and unwillingness to operate in a cohesive and effective way undermines the population's trust that security actors will provide necessary protection in times of need. Such confidence is necessary for security forces to be taken seriously and obeyed by the population.

The security sector also has low levels of legitimacy. This means that there are no adequate laws to ensure the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of the security sector, or, when these do exist, they are not adhered to. The common challenge to input legitimacy is that the government of the country itself is ineffective and does not adhere to these principles of good governance. There is a lack of (effective) civilian oversight mechanisms over the performance of the police forces. As a consequence, misuse of police power, arbitrary arrests, the nexus between the security sector and crime and violations of minority's and human rights are common problems.<sup>185</sup> The levels of responsiveness are low because the repressive security sector is primarily state-driven and oriented to protect select groups of the population. It does not respond to peoples' needs equally and in a timely manner. Although the security sector promotes selective provision of security at the institutional level the security sector's inability to effectively enforce its mandate means an autonomous dynamic of ethnic favoritism develops at the actor level. Security actors that function exclusively to protect the regime may also act to protect affiliated ethnic groups without official orders to do so. In South Sudan, the low level of responsiveness is generated by the fact that ethnic groups are not equally represented in security sector resulting in ethnic targeting of civilians by state security officials.<sup>186</sup> This undermines the population's trust in the security sector's integrity and the fear of being subjected to random acts of violence by security actors and empowered ethnic groups.

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183 Sarah Detzner, "Security Sector Reform in Sudan and South Sudan: Incubating Progress" (London: Conflict Research Program, 2019).;

184 Uddin, "Security Sector Reform in Bangladesh."

185 Fair, "Security Sector Governance in Pakistan," 5. ; Human Rights Watch, "'This Crooked System': Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan." ; Human Rights Watch, "Pakistan: Overhaul Abusive Police Force," Human Rights Watch, September 26, 2016.; Human Rights Watch. For Bangladesh see: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, "Committee Against Torture Examines the Situation in Bangladesh," United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, July 30, 2019. For South-Sudan see: Amnesty International, "'Do You Think We Will Prosecute Ourselves?': No Prospects for Accountability in South Sudan" (London: Amnesty International, 2019).

186 Ajibade Samuel Idowu, Abiodun Akeem Oladiti, and Adetoun Esther Adenuga, "Ethnicity, Inequality and the Tragedy of African Development: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and the South Sudan," *Journal of Globalization Studies* 1, no. 10 (2019): 117-20; Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: South Sudan" (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018), 3-5, 33; International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "South Sudan SSR Background Note."



The oppressive security sector contributes to instability because it endorses the proliferation of uncontrolled violence. Excessive use of force is authorized by the state, widespread and infiltrates all levels of society but tends to be arbitrary due to lack of resources, intelligence capacity and capability. Security actors act under the guise of providing regime security but also engage in acts of violence in an unrestrained and incoherent way. As a result, the population lives under the constant threat of sudden indiscriminate use of force by security actors.

### 3.2.4 The Fragmented Security Sector

The fragmented security sector lacks effective, centralized and well-coordinated security institutions and actors. It is an actor in a wider complex and dynamic competition between state and non-state actors for security provision. While the fragmented security sector is generally motivated to provide security, it is largely unable and has medium-low to medium levels of legitimacy (see Figure 8). Mali and Nigeria are illustrative of fragmented security sectors due to the widespread presence of non-state actors that both support and undermine security provision (see Table 8).




Figure 8: The fragmented security sector

Fragmented	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
	Mali	Low	Medium	Medium-low
	Myanmar	Low	Medium	Medium-low
	Nigeria	Low	Medium	Medium

Table 8: Countries with fragmented security sector structures

The fragmented security sector is not able to provide security because it does not possess the resources, intelligence capacity, and capability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. This allows it to protect only some geographical regions and persons, leaving rural and sparsely populated areas unprotected.<sup>187</sup> Nigeria has 187 policemen for

187 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "Mali SSR Background Note," International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), November 2, 2019.

every 100,000 citizens while in Mali there are 38 policemen per 100,000 people, both very low relative to its population size.<sup>188</sup> In addition to a lack of resources, the security sector lacks intelligence capacities to identify potential and emerging security threats and the capability to effectively convert available resources into security provision proficiency. There are problems in the coordination, communication, and execution of orders. Insufficient resources and capability weaknesses of the security sector allow non-state actors to gain a foothold and challenge the fragmented security sector's power and authority. The violence that accompanies proliferation of non-state actors leaves a security vacuum that is filled by informal vigilante security groups that take law enforcement into their own hands at the local and the community levels.<sup>189</sup>

These informal security groups proliferate with the connivance of security sector officials that may, in some cases, even sub-contract vigilantes to provide security on their behalf. In the latter case, vigilante groups perform a variety of state functions including policing and counter-insurgency operations.<sup>190</sup> They may be provided with official uniforms, equipment and salaries, as is for instance the case in Nigeria where local authorities actively equip these groups.<sup>191</sup> In Myanmar, vigilante groups are actively supported by the central government.<sup>192</sup> Sub-contracted vigilante become quasi-state actors that operate on behalf of the state but enjoy considerable autonomy. In different ways, co-operation with these vigilante groups, bolsters the security sector's effectiveness because vigilante may be considered more trustworthy by the population by virtue of having their roots in the local community, shared ethnic ties, language, culture and threat perception.<sup>193</sup> Vigilante groups reinforce security sectors' intelligence capacity by using their acquaintance with the rural areas to identify, track and combat insurgents.<sup>194</sup> Reliance on non-state actors is also problematic, however. The weaker the state, the more prone it is to delegating security functions to vigilante groups and the less able it is to control their behavior to prevent abuses of power. Stronger vigilante groups that are better at providing security are also more difficult to demobilize and are more likely to become entrenched in the formal security sector of the state.<sup>195</sup>

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188 Team (ISSAT).

189 Ernest Ogbosor, *Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria* (United States Institute of Peace Special Report 391. Washington, DC, 2016), 16.

190 International Crisis Group, "Double-Edged Sword: Vigilantes in African Counter-Insurgencies" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017).

191 Chris MA Kwaja, "Non-State Security Actors in North-Central Zone of Nigeria" (Rule of Law and Empowerment Initiative, 2017), 32; Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria: Government Must Disband Vigilante Groups," Human Rights Watch, May 20, 2002; J. Obidiegwu Uche and C. Elekwa Blessing, "The Extent Vigilante Security Group Collaborate With the Police in Minimizing Crime in ABIA State," *IOSR Journal of Research & Method in Education (IOSR-JRME)* 9, no. 4 (2019): 41–45.

192 Andrew Selth, "Burma: The Return of the 'Vigilantes,'" Lowy Institute, April 22, 2015.

193 A. Carl LeVan and Patrick Ukata, *The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 658.

194 "On Boko Haram Front Line, Nigerian Vigilantes Amass Victories and Power," *Reuters*, June 15, 2017.

195 International Crisis Group, "Double-Edged Sword."

The medium score on motivation suggests that the fragmented security sector is partially inclusive and observant of the rule of law at the institutional level. The security sector is subject to well-defined laws that ensure inclusiveness and provide constraints on individual and institutional behavior. In Mali this includes adoption of the 1997 Code of Conduct of the Armed Forces and Security that emphasizes the armed forces' obligation to protect citizens, professionalism and the separation of policing from military functions.<sup>196</sup> However, the presence of and collaboration with informal security actors undermines the fragmented security sector's motivation to provide security on an inclusive basis. There is tension between the security sector's motivation to provide security at the institutional level and its dependence on informal security networks that may be biased towards protecting segments of society thereby undermining the motivation to provide inclusive security at the actor level. This is especially true in already fragmented, social and politically fluid countries where these groups operate at the community level without coherent structures and strong central leadership.<sup>197</sup> Through reliance on these groups the security sector becomes part of these fragmented and hybrid security networks that co-exist, cooperate and compete. Their 'quasi-state' status places the informal security actors at the forefront of the competition over authority and power with the state.<sup>198</sup> Although collaboration with vigilante groups may enhance the population's support for the security sector it also comes with the threat that these actors will pursue their own narrow agendas that diverge from the formal security sector's agenda, for instance protecting loyal constituencies, ethnic ties and sustaining wealth through trade in licit and illicit goods. In countries already affected by ethnic and political rivalries, empowered vigilante groups may turn into predatory and quasi-criminal organizations that undermine, rather than support, the security sector in promoting stability.<sup>199</sup> While the presence of vigilantes typically results in fragmented security governance and instability at the local level vigilantism may also be an important form of protection from crime for communities where the security sector is absent or believed to be corrupt, unreliable and violent.<sup>200</sup>

The fragmented security sector has medium-low to medium legitimacy. The security sector is only partially accountable, transparent and responsive to peoples' security needs. Although there are oversight mechanisms and procedures to control unbecoming conduct of security forces, high levels of corruption hinder effective implementation.<sup>201</sup> The primary factor undermining legitimacy, however, is that the performance of the

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196 Boubacar N'Diaye and Adedeji Ebo, "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Mali" (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2008).

197 International Security Sector Advisory Team, "ISSAT Background Note on Security Sector Reform in Mali" (Geneva: International Security Sector Advisory Team, September 2016).

198 David Pratten, "The Politics of Protection: Perspectives on Vigilantism in Nigeria," *Africa* 78, no. 1 (2008): 3.

199 International Crisis Group, "Double-Edged Sword."

200 Chukwuma CC Osakwe and Bulus Nom Audu, "Understanding Contemporary Vigilantism: A Case Study of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN)," *KIU Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 2 (2019): 132.

201 Okenyodo, "Governance, Accountability, and Security in Nigeria."

informal security groups is not regulated in any systematic and structured way.<sup>202</sup> The inherent danger in tolerating and even enforcing informal security groups is that such groups operate outside of legal state structures and are therefore not subject to accountability and transparency mechanisms. The vigilante work on behalf of the state but take the law into their own hands, dispensing justice and punishment as they see fit.<sup>203</sup> These mechanisms may not be supported and perceived as legitimate by the population. In this case, cooperating with vigilante may also undermine the population's support for the security sector. While some vigilant groups have formal ties to the security sector this is not always manifested in formal agreements or memoranda of understanding delineating respective roles and responsibilities.<sup>204</sup> When external monitoring of vigilante groups exists, it is not formalized and enforced.<sup>205</sup> Even vigilante auxiliaries that are not self-appointed and that act with legal authority are not subject to the same legal consequences as formal security actors for deviant behavior.<sup>206</sup>

The lack of oversight undermines the security sectors responsiveness as it allows vigilantes to engage in acts of violence against the communities they are supposed to protect.<sup>207</sup> In Nigeria, for instance, vigilante groups operating with the authorities' consent engage in gross violation of human rights with relative impunity.<sup>208</sup> This is also evident in Myanmar where vigilant groups co-opted by the security sector have been responsible for numerous extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary arrests.<sup>209</sup> While the security sector may not tolerate such actions, it has relatively little to no authority to impose sanctions.<sup>210</sup> The exemption from accountability measures allows vigilantes to maintain a de facto monopoly on the use of force in certain regions and to determine how force is used and who is protected, putting further strain on already volatile security contexts. The ties between the security sector and vigilantes also means that the population's distrust towards vigilante groups that behave violently also undermines trust in state security institutions and actors. This gives vigilante substantial power to determine the perceived legitimacy of the security sector and security actors and thereby to what extent the population will comply to its orders.<sup>211</sup>

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202 Pratten, "The Politics of Protection," 3.

203 Pratten, 1.

204 Ogbozor, *Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria*, 2016, 3.

205 Ogbozor, 1.

206 LeVan and Ukata, *The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics*, 658.

207 International Crisis Group, "Double-Edged Sword."

208 Leighann Spencer, "Vigilantism Is Flourishing in Nigeria – with Official Support," *The Conversation*, November 9, 2017.

209 Mratt Kyaw Thu, "The Ugly Return of Vigilante Violence," *Frontier Myanmar*, accessed March 25, 2020, <https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-ugly-return-of-vigilante-violence>; Amnesty International, "We Will Destroy Everything: Military Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State, Myanmar" (London: Amnesty International, 2018), 37.

210 Mratt Kyaw Thu, "The Ugly Return of Vigilante Violence," *Frontier Myanmar*, accessed March 25, 2020.

211 Toft, "A Legitimacy Chain Approach to Security Sector Reform: Working for Citizens and States"; Goldsmith, "Police Reform and the Problem of Trust"; Allen and Kleinfeld, "Why Security Sector Governance Matters in Fragile States"; Dorian Schaap, "Police Trust-Building Strategies. A Socio-Institutional, Comparative Approach," *Policing and Society*, 2020, 1–17.

These risks associated with vigilante groups is inherent in the contexts in which they emerge – namely, weak states that are unable to hold a monopoly on the use of force.<sup>212</sup>

The fragmented security sector contributes to instability because although it is motivated to provide security to at least some degree, it is not able to control the use of force and protect the population effectively. Efforts to strengthen security provision by allowing informal security actors to operate at the community level result in the emergence of hybrid and decentralized security governance structures that clearly contradict traditional functions and responsibility of formal security sectors in the first place.<sup>213</sup> In countries like Nigeria and Mali informal security networks’ key role in security provision, leads to contestation of power between the security sector and informal security actors that challenges the formers legitimate authority.<sup>214</sup> Although vigilantism creates highly fragmented and volatility security dynamics it has different implications than general lawlessness. This is because the security sector may support, albeit indirectly in some cases, such vigilant groups that may provide security to citizens either because the security sector is absent or acts violently against the population.

### 3.2.5 The Transitioning Security Sector

The transitioning security sector is relatively stable but not resilient for two reasons. The transitioning security sector’s structure and decision-making may be influenced by legacies of the past such as in Hungary and Poland or the countries that are geographically located in volatile regions such as Botswana and Uruguay (see Table 9). The transitioning security sector generally has high levels of motivation to provide security and, with few exceptions, medium to medium-high levels on ability, legitimacy (see Figure 9).<sup>215</sup>




Figure 9: The transitioning security sector

212 International Crisis Group, “Double-Edged Sword.”

213 Pratten, “The Politics of Protection,” 4.

214 Ogbozor, *Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria*, 2016, 3; Pratten, 4.

215 Slovenia and Costa-rica are the only two countries that score high on legitimacy.

Transitioning	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
	Costa Rica	Medium-high	High	High
	Czechia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Estonia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Latvia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Lithuania	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Slovakia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Uruguay	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Botswana	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Bulgaria	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Croatia	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Hungary	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium
	Chile	Medium	High	Medium-high
	Poland	Medium	High	Medium-high
	Slovenia	Medium	High	High
	Tunisia	Medium	High	Medium
	Ghana	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	India	Medium	Medium-high	Medium
	Indonesia	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Jamaica	Medium	Medium-high	Medium
	Jordan	Medium	Medium-high	Medium
	Panama	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	South Africa	Medium	Medium-high	Medium

Table 9: Countries with transitioning security sector structures

Transitioning security sectors are found in post-communist Eastern and Central European countries that have transitioned from Soviet Republics to democratic states, including Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.<sup>216</sup> It also includes countries with past military dictatorships or authoritarian regimes where the ruling elite enjoyed close links to a sympathetic and supportive security sector such as Ghana and South Africa.<sup>217</sup> It also includes security sectors in as Jordan and Tunisia that continue to rely on their security sector to control political opposition, and Chile, Jamaica and Panama where the legacy of guardian structures of past regimes obstructs the democratic

216 Bojan Bugarič, "A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: 'Lands in-between' Democracy and Authoritarianism," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 13, no. 1 (2015): 222.; Willem van Eekelen, "The Parliamentary Dimension of Security Sector Reform," *Sicherheit Und Frieden* 23, no. 3 (2005): 21–31.; Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin, "Crime, Insecurity and Police Reform in Post-Socialist CEE," *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, no. 2 (2005): 1–15.

217 Patrick Pephrah Obuobi, "Evaluating Ghana's Intelligence Oversight Regime," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 31, no. 2 (2018): 312–41; Lisa Rakner, "Breaking BAD: Understanding Backlash Against Democracy in Africa" (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 2018).

transition.<sup>218</sup> The second group countries with the transitioning security sector type are the so-called ‘democratic front runners’ located in volatile regions including Costa Rica, Botswana and Uruguay.<sup>219</sup> In addition, the transitioning security sector includes countries that have made the democratic transition but that have recently featured authoritarian tendencies of some sort, including India and Indonesia.<sup>220</sup>

The medium to medium-high scores on ability indicate that the transitioning security sector tends to contain stable institutions with sufficient numbers of material resources, intelligence capacity, and capabilities to maintain a reasonable degree of monopoly on the use of force within the state’s territory. However, legacies of the past regimes present a number of obstacles for the ability to maintain security. For instance, economic underdevelopment, lack of societal trust and political instability.<sup>221</sup> These problems increase demands on the already pressed internal police forces whose authority is often challenged as a result of lack of resources, security personnel and poorly functioning equipment.<sup>222</sup>

The security sector also falls short on expertise both at the institutional and actor level to effectively coordinate and manage sometimes newly consolidated democratic institutions partly due to heavy reliance on experts from the former regime including security officers.<sup>223</sup> The inherited ways of the old regime may undermine a *modus operandi* necessary to effectively manage and coordinate the security sector according

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- 218 For Jordan see: Pete W. Moore, “A Political-Economic History of Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate: Authoritarian State-Building and Fiscal Crisis,” *The Middle East Journal* 73, no. 2 (2019): 242; For Tunisia see: Dokhi Fassihian, “Democratic Backsliding in Tunisia: The Case for Renewed International Attention” (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2018), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/policy-brief/2018/democratic-backsliding-tunisia-case-renewed-international-attention>; Yezid Sayigh, “Bringing Tunisia’s Transition to Its Security Sector,” Carnegie Middle East Center, February 5, 2016, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2016/02/05/bringing-tunisia-s-transition-to-its-security-sector-pub-62563>; Cengiz Günay and Fabian Somavilla, “Tunisia’s Democratization at Risk,” *Mediterranean Politics*, 2019, 1–9; Bassem Bouguerra, “Reforming Tunisia’s Troubled Security Sector” (Lebanon: Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, 2014). For Chile see: J. Patrice McSherry, “Chile: A Return to ‘Guardian Democracy?’,” The North American Congress on Latin America, April 17, 2018. For Jamaica see: Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Jamaica” (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). For Panama see: Burton L. Gordon, Richard L. Millet, and Gustavo Anguizola, “Panama,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, March 21, 2020.
- 219 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “Uruguay Country Profile,” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), accessed March 16, 2020.; John A. Booth, *Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 1; John A. Booth, “Democratic Development in Costa Rica,” *Democratization* 15, no. 4 (2008): 714–732; Rorisang Lekalake, “Botswana’s Democratic Consolidation: What Will It Take?,” Policy Paper (Afrobarometer, 2016), 1; Kenneth Good and Ian Taylor, “Botswana: A Minimalist Democracy,” *Democratization* 15, no. 4 (2008): 750.
- 220 Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline,” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 54, no. 3 (2018): 307; Priya Chacko, “The Right Turn in India: Authoritarianism, Populism and Neoliberalisation,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, no. 4 (2018): 541–65.
- 221 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans Born, “Security Sector Reform: Narrowing the Gap between Theory and Practice” (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control Armed Forces (DCAF), 2011), 6; Michael D. Wiatrowski, *Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries* (London: Routledge, 2016); Andrew Goldsmith, “Policing Weak States: Citizen Safety and State Responsibility,” *Policing & Society* 13, no. 1 (2002): 3–21.2011
- 222 Wiatrowski, *Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries*, 32; Emil W. Plywaczewski and Piotr Walancik, “Challenges and Changes to the Police System in Poland,” *Book Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies* (2002), 2004, 92; Tiina Randma-Liiv et al., “Public Sector Organization in Central and Eastern Europe: From Agencification to De-Agencification,” *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences*, December 1, 2011.
- 223 Caparini and Marenin, “Crime, Insecurity and Police Reform in Post-Socialist CEE”; Marat, “Reforming Police in Post-Communist Countries”; Laurie Nathan, “Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies,” *Journal of Security Sector Management* 2, no. 3 (2004): 4.

to the good governance principles.<sup>224</sup> For countries located in geographically volatile regions the ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force is further challenged by exposure to cross-border criminal networks as is evident in Chile and Uruguay.<sup>225</sup>

The security sector is highly motivated to provide security to the population. The institutions and mechanisms in place are inclusive and promote the equal protection of all groups according to the rule of law.<sup>226</sup> However, in transitioning security sectors the effects of these high levels of motivation are somewhat dampened by vulnerabilities that exist due to legacies of the past or regional instability.<sup>227</sup> These legacies influence the performance of security actors and may even shape the structure of security sector institutions. To varying degrees, intangible concepts and norms inherited from the past hinder reform in the security sector's institutions and affect its modus operandi in destabilizing ways.<sup>228</sup> The culture of the security sector's autonomy and its resistance to civilian control remains to some degree, undermining the inclusiveness of the security institutions. This is for instance evident in Indonesia and India where religious minorities are disproportionately subject to police violence.<sup>229</sup>

More obvious, however, is resistance to reform from security officers and politicians that act as spoilers and politicize the security services to consolidate power.<sup>230</sup> The reforms established by decree are not always equally woven into the fabric neither of social life nor of civil-security sector relations. Sometimes, values underlying the principles of good governance may be rejected by security actors.<sup>231</sup> The inclusiveness and adherence to the rule of law of security provision is challenged by elites that exploit social and

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224 Nathan, "Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies," 4.

225 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "Chile Country Profile," International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), accessed March 13, 2020.; Gabriel Gonzalez Zorrilla, "Uruguay: The New Global Drug Trafficking Hub," DW.COM, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/uruguay-the-new-global-drug-trafficking-hub/a-49922226>; "Uruguay 2019 Crime & Safety Report," September 4, 2019, <https://www.osac.gov/Country/Uruguay/Content/Detail/Report/e6e26a6e-22be-40f4-8e5d-15f4aec2fefb>; Leonardo Haberkorn, "Uruguayans Turn Tough on Crime to Tackle Growing Violence," AP NEWS, March 27, 2019, <https://apnews.com/11d932d176604ce391bcd107a739c9fb>; "Crime Top Concern in Uruguay's General Election," BBC News, October 27, 2019, sec. Latin America & Caribbean.

226 van Eekelen, "The Parliamentary Dimension of Security Sector Reform."

227 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, "Escaping the Slide towards Authoritarianism in New Democracies Alerts from the Western Balkans | International IDEA," International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, March 17, 2020.

228 Martin Krygier, "The Challenge of Institutionalisation: Post-Communist 'Transitions', Populism, and the Rule of Law," *European Constitutional Law Review* 15, no. 3 (2019): 547.; Caparini and Marenin, "Crime, Insecurity and Police Reform in Post-Socialist CEE."

229 Andreas Harsono, "Indonesia's Religious Minorities Under Threat," Human Rights Watch, February 2, 2017.; Bajoria, "Shoot the Traitors': Discrimination Against Muslims under India's New Citizenship Policy."

230 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, "Escaping the Slide towards Authoritarianism in New Democracies Alerts from the Western Balkans | International IDEA."; Ursula C. Schroeder and Fairlie Chappuis, "New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local Agency and Domestic Politics," *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 2 (2014): 138.

231 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo ; New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), 94.



political polarization, as is evident in Poland, Hungary, and Tunisia.<sup>232</sup> Sometimes, security actors use the law for self-serving purposes, engaging in schemes of corruption or embezzlement and engaging in economic relationships with the business sector. This means that the security sector operates, to varying degrees, in the specter of informal networks that undermine the inclusiveness and impartiality of security provision.<sup>233</sup> The fact that the population does not generally support these informal networks further undermines the population's support for the security sector and likelihood they will obey the law. Unstable circumstances in the region may exacerbate the defects in the security sector and overshadow the security sector's motivation to constrain excessive use of force. In Uruguay regional instability and growing domestic violence has led it to resort to repressive measures and the militarization of internal security.<sup>234</sup> Similarly, in Tunisia terrorist violence has led the security sector to implement increasingly militarized measures.<sup>235</sup>

Yet, transitioning security sectors generally score – with a few exceptions – medium to medium-high on legitimacy. This means that there are accountability mechanisms in place to guarantee the security forces are responsive to peoples' security needs and penalized for deviant behavior. These mechanisms are largely transparent although they are often undermined by the politicization of security services and undemocratic attempts to dismantle checks and balances. This type of regression can be observed in Slovenia for instance where the capture of state institutions by political elite weakens the credibility and independence of the rule-of-law in the country.<sup>236</sup> Systematic attempts to remove constraints tend to occur at the top echelon of the security sector by security elites. Moreover, accountability mechanisms are subject to political favoritism, even though there is considerable effort to shield such manipulation. In Panama and Jamaica, despite their democratic transitions, instances of corruption and the influence of private sector interests on public policy decisions persist.<sup>237</sup> In Botswana ethnic favoritism further fuels ethnic tensions within the security sector.<sup>238</sup> The responsiveness of the security sector to address security needs equally is thereby undermined. Such

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232 For Poland see: Cas Mudde, "Poland's Rightwing Populist Win Should Be a Wake-up Call for Liberal Democrats | Cas Mudde," *The Guardian*, October 21, 2019. For Hungary see: Zack Beauchamp, "It Happened There: How Democracy Died in Hungary," *Vox*, September 13, 2018. For Tunisia see: International Crisis Group, "Stemming Tunisia's Authoritarian Drift" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018).

233 Bugarič, "A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," 222.

234 Angelika Albaladejo, "Uruguay Faces Rising Public Pressure to Militarize Fight Against Crime," *InSight Crime* (blog), May 18, 2018; Sebastian Sperling, "Can Uruguay Resist Latin America's Authoritarian Reflex?," *International Politics and Society*, October 21, 2019; "Crime Top Concern in Uruguay's General Election"; Haberkorn, "Uruguayans Turn Tough on Crime to Tackle Growing Violence"; Brett J. Kyle and Andrew G. Reiter, "A New Dawn for Latin American Militaries: Across the Region, Militarization Is on the Rise, Posing a Major Threat to Democracy and Justice. What Can Be Done?," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 51, no. 1 (2019): 21; Overseas Security Advisory Council, "Uruguay 2019 Crime & Safety Report."

235 World Politics Review, *Tunisia's Young Democracy Risks Being Consumed by the Very Forces It Unleashed*, 2019; Amnesty International UK, "Tunisia: New Evidence of Torture Five Years on from 'Jasmine Revolution,'" Amnesty International UK, January 14, 2016.

236 Bugarič, "A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," 221.

237 Gordon, Millet, and Anguizola, "Panama"; Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: Jamaica."

238 John Vidal, "The Tribes Paying the Brutal Price of Conservation," *The Observer*, August 28, 2016.

deficiencies in legitimacy are not trivial. Legitimacy is crucial to obtain the population’s support. Without it the population is likely to seek alternative sources or protection, thereby stimulating the proliferation of informal security networks that undermine the state’s ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force.<sup>239</sup>

The transitioning security sector can contribute to instability due to structural deficiencies that undermine the implementation of the governance principles that foster stability, in particular due to the intractability of old regime structures and logics that influence to a greater or lesser extent contemporary decision-making and policies. The security sector performs reasonably well on the three characteristics ability, motivation, legitimacy and has the potential to become a stable security sector.

### 3.2.6 The Stable Security Sector

The stable security sector makes a positive contribution to stability. It is founded on the principles of good governance and accordingly has a high degree of ability, motivation, legitimacy (see Figure 10). Denmark and the Netherlands are illustrative of the stable security sector (see Table 10).




Figure 10: The stable security sector

Stable	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
	Australia	High*	High	High
	Austria	High*	High	High
	Belgium	High*	High	High
	Canada	High*	High	High
	Denmark	High*	High	High
	Finland	High*	High	High
	France	High*	High	High

239 Ana Kantor and Mariam Persson, “Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia” (Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010), 5, 10–13; Toft, “A Legitimacy Chain Approach to Security Sector Reform: Working for Citizens and States,” 4.

Stable	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
	Germany	High*	High	High
	Iceland	High*	High	High
	Ireland	High*	High	High
	Japan	High*	High	High
	Luxembourg	High*	High	High
	Mauritius	High	High	High
	Netherlands	High*	High	High
	New Zealand	High*	High	High
	Norway	High*	High	High
	Portugal	High*	High	High
	Sweden	High*	High	High
	Switzerland	High*	High	High

\* This score is assigned based on expert judgement and secondary sources.

**Table 10: Countries with stable security sector structures<sup>240</sup>**

The stable security sector is able to provide security to the both the population and the state because it possesses the resources (financial, material, human), intelligence capacity, and the capability both at the institutional and actor level for effective law enforcement and security provision. The stable security sector maintains a sufficient number of police forces relative to the population and holds a monopoly on the use of force. It has sufficient intelligence and information to be able to identify emerging security threats and the resources and capacity to deal with these threats effectively. The security sector is not systematically challenged by informal security actors both within and outside of the security sector that compete for and over the provision of security. Countries with effective security sectors typically feature low levels of low levels of homicide and serious crime.<sup>241</sup> Stability results from the security sectors ability to translate high input (potential ability) into high output (actual ability).

The ability to provide security is complemented by the high levels of motivation to protect the people. The security of the state is regarded as an important pillar to stability but does not overwrite the security sector’s responsibility to protect the people on an

240 The countries with an asterisk (\*) in Table 10 lack data on the BTI State Monopoly on Violence indicator. The reason why they are not accounted for by the BTI is because they are established democracies no longer in a transition phases and their state monopoly on violence strong enough to assume as high. Moreover, they all have a comparably high number of policemen per 100.000 people and also rank among the highest on other common measures of security sector ability such as the World Internal Security & Police Index 2016. Mamdooh A. Abdelmottle, “World Internal Security & Police Index 2016” (Land O’Lakes, FL: International Police Science Association, 2016). Based on expert judgement and secondary sources this report therefore assigns these countries high scores on ability.

241 Numbeo, “Crime Index by Country 2020,” Numbeo, 2020; World Bank, “Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People),” The World Bank Group, accessed February 5, 2020.

equal basis.<sup>242</sup> The security sector is subject to a democratically chosen government which provides the security forces with a mandate to enforce the law. Both the security sector as an institution and individual security actors are generally motivated to protect the people according to the principles of inclusiveness and the rule of law.<sup>243</sup> Levels of discrimination according to identity (sex, age, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or socio-economic background) to receive and participate in the provision of security may exist but are relatively low.<sup>244</sup> Moreover, all persons are subject to the same laws that are generally enforced impartially based on accepted rules and procedures. The stable security sector protects the state and its interests to the same degree as it protects the security of the population.

In stable security sectors, ability and motivation reinforce one another. Stable security sectors tend to be salient in developed democratic states that are able to equip their security forces with considerable resources. These security sectors contribute to stability because they use the available resources in a way that promotes equal and impartial protection of the people they are intended to serve.<sup>245</sup>

The stable security sector structure also has high levels of legitimacy. Security actors are held accountable while decision-making processes are transparent to the population. Although security actors may have additional rights that are not shared by the general population, they are not placed above the law. Violation of rights are adequately dealt with. The stable security sector is furthermore responsive to peoples' security needs. It acts in a timely manner to address security needs on an equal basis and according to agreed rules and procedures. Although motivation is not a direct proxy for legitimacy, a security sector with high levels of motivation tends to be considered more legitimate. Security sectors that act in the population's best interest are more likely to have accountability mechanisms in place to ensure deviant behavior is sanctioned.<sup>246</sup>

Stable security sectors can be found in most Western (European) countries that have substantial and well-trained police forces, with adequate monetary budgets, institutional facilities, and technological capacities, that allow them to identify threats and effectively maintain internal security within their national borders.<sup>247</sup> The police forces of European Union (EU) member-states also cooperate through the European Police Office (Europol),

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242 Abad, "The Challenge of Balancing State Security with Human Security."

243 The Federal Government, "Interministerial Strategy to Support Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Context of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding" (Berlin: German Federal Foreign Office, 2019), 8.

244 International Security Sector Advisory Team, "The Contribution and Role of SSR in the Prevention of Violent Conflict," 9.

245 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R)," 1-4.

246 International Security Sector Advisory Team, "The Contribution and Role of SSR in the Prevention of Violent Conflict," 8-9.

247 Please note, for analysis this report excluded all countries with a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants, because they are generally not part of the other data sources, thus the data in our analysis. That means that very small countries such as Vatican, Monaco would generally also fall into this category.

which constitutes a key instrument of the wider European internal security architecture, to combat organized criminal networks and terrorism on a regional level.<sup>248</sup>

In this report's sample, there is no data for most Western (European) countries for the Monopoly on the Use of Violence indicator which comes from the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index that analyzes transformation processes toward democracy of developing and transition countries. Hence, the Index does not contain data for countries that already maintain stable democratic governments. These Western countries were given a high score on ability based on expert judgment so that they could be included in the scope of the analysis. In this way, a more elaborate picture can be sketched of what constitutes and distinguishes a stable security sector. In the Netherlands, Germany, or Canada for example, effective institutions are the key that turns potential ability in actual ability.<sup>249</sup> High aggregate scores on motivation, such as in Denmark, or New Zealand indicate that the security sector is an actor of the democratically-based state, rendering the security forces accountable and subject to public scrutiny as well.<sup>250</sup> Security sector recruitment and promotion is geared towards merit based systems with the goal to establish a security force that combats discrimination and injustice. Publicly available complaint mechanisms are in place to promote that the police respond to the security needs of the population.<sup>251</sup> High levels of responsiveness result in high levels of legitimacy by the population. In the Netherlands, citizens in 2019 reported higher levels of trust in the police despite an increase in the number of reported crimes.<sup>252</sup>

### 3.3 Conclusion

The analysis offered in this chapter clearly suggests that there are defining characteristics which are shared between security sectors. The fact that security sectors with similar scores on the characteristics of the SSAF are recognized in the literature to have similar outcomes for stability indicates that the SSAF yields meaningful categorizations of security sectors. This report corroborates the fragmented literature on security sectors with the data derived from the SSAF to more explicitly cluster countries with similar security sector structures together. This yields a total of six security sector types (see Figure 11).

The ideal security sector that contributes to stability can be understood as a full triangle whereby the three points resemble the three characteristics security sectors

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248 European Parliament, "Police Cooperation," Fact Sheets on the European Union, February 2020.

249 The Federal Government, "Interministerial Strategy to Support Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Context of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding," 1, 8; DCAF, "Security Sector," DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2020.

250 Freedom House, "Denmark," Freedom House, 2020; Freedom House, "New Zealand," Freedom House, 2020.

251 Jonny Byrne and William Priestley, "Police Oversight Mechanisms in the Council of Europe Member States" (Strasbourg: European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 2017), 74.

252 Politie, "Onderzoek politie: Vertrouwen burger in politie stijgt," Politie, March 5, 2019.

must meet to contribute to stability. Like a triangle, security sectors that fail to meet all three characteristics do not form complete structures that are resilient and contribute to stability. Depending on what specific characteristic security sectors fail to meet the structure will differ and have different implications for stability. The final chapter offers conclusions and recommendations on this basis.




Figure 11: Security sector types

## 4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The security sector, as the term suggests, is key to maintaining a secure and stable environment. For years the international community has spent considerable effort to promote stability by reforming and strengthening security sectors in fragile and conflict prone states with mixed results. As fragile states continue to present a global security threat, the international community must seek alternative ways to better understand security sectors' potential contribution to stability. Such an understanding can be used in decision-making processes whether to engage with security sectors in the first place and can subsequently help in the design of security sector reform interventions that are tailored to specific local needs. Security sectors are key to stability (and instability) so any engagement requires a robust understanding of the security sector. This report contributes to this effort by presenting a SSAF to assess and understand security sectors' potential contribution to stability.

The SSAF identifies six distinct security sector types with distinct implications for stability. The symbiotic relationship between the three characteristics ability, motivation and legitimacy on the one hand, and the six principles of good governance on the other, strongly suggests that resources certainly are an important pre-requisite for a security sector's ability to contribute to stability, but that stability ultimately depends on how available resources are used and towards what end. Security sectors contribute to instability in direct and indirect ways. Security sectors may undermine stability directly by supporting crime and repressing the population, but also indirectly if they are not able to control non-state armed actors that propagate violence and conflict. This difference is crucial as the degree of the security sectors' involvement in encouraging instability indicates the types of engagements that are desirable and likely to be effective.




Although security sectors across the globe are unique, there are overlapping characteristics between security sectors that can be meaningfully categorized using the SSAF presented in this report. This is important from a policy-making perspective because it helps identify possible entry-points for security sector reform and alternative engagements to promote stability. This report offers two principal recommendations to policymakers for assessing and engaging with security sectors in fragile and conflict prone states.

First, it recommends that the SSAF and the findings of this report are used to conduct SSAF assessments as part of the pre-political, analytical process feeding the decision-making process on whether to engage with security sectors in fragile and conflict-prone states. The SSAF should become an integral component of this analytical process to assess security sectors and identify the possible adverse implications of engagement for stability. To that end the SSAF presented in this report is further elaborated into a SSAF manual which is offered in Annex A: The SSAF Methodology and Manual. The SSAF manual provides guidelines on the additional questions that should be asked to deepen understanding and analysis based on the SSAF to conduct further in-depth country case studies to direct and inform decision-making on possible engagement with security sectors.

Second, it recommends that policymakers use the security sector types identified in this report in the design of specific SSR interventions to promote stability. This report clearly indicates that security sectors contribute to and undermine stability in various ways. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach for how to engage with security sectors in fragile states. Any engagement with security sectors should be designed according to the security sector type and the specific challenges it presents to stability. This requires additional research on the types of interventions that are most suited to the six security sector types, which falls outside the scope of this research project. However, the design of tailored SSR interventions could start by considering the specific security weaknesses and strengths of these individual six security sector types (see Table 11). The identified weaknesses and strengths provide a first indication of possible entry points for intervention and should be complimented by in-depth and context-specific research. This report recognizes that tailoring SSR interventions is an inherently complex endeavor that requires substantial expertise, detail, and nuance. This report provides analysis of security sectors to inform the tailoring of interventions and offers some recommendations to demonstrate the importance of addressing security sectors’ specific challenges. It does not offer any in-depth analysis of what type of interventions would be most suited and how these should be conducted. In this light, the following policy recommendations offer a first indication of potential entry points for engagement based on the analysis of six security sector types identified in this report. These are in no way exhaustive but provide some direction for further research.

The criminal security sector scores medium on ability, motivation, legitimacy. SSR efforts, should they be undertaken, should focus on addressing the management and oversight of security provision. The primary factor undermining stability is the ties between security actors and criminal networks that engage in licit and illicit trade. SSR should not focus exclusively on providing financial and material resources because security actors are likely to use resources for personal enrichment and to maintain ties to criminal networks. Potential focal areas for SSR include enhancing management and oversight mechanisms to address ties between security actors and criminal networks and strengthening the rule of law.



Security Sector Type	Description	Possible focal areas for SSR interventions
<p><b>Criminal</b></p> 	<p>The criminal security sector scores medium on ability, motivation, legitimacy. The security sector is systematically challenged by non-state actors and criminal networks that are directly or indirectly tied to security actors. Corruption is deeply imbedded in the security sector.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance management and oversight mechanisms to address ties between security actors and criminal networks</li> <li>• Strengthen the rule of law</li> </ul>
<p><b>Repressive</b></p> 	<p>The repressive security sector scores medium on ability and medium-low on both motivation and legitimacy. The security sector is structured, commanded, staffed and equipped exclusively to protect the regime. It is not a guardian of public security and rules by coercion to clamp down on internal and external opposition.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen inclusiveness of security provision to ensure citizens are protected on an equal basis</li> <li>• Enhance accountability mechanisms to reinforce responsiveness to security needs</li> <li>• Address excessive use of force</li> </ul>
<p><b>Oppressive</b></p> 	<p>The oppressive security sector scores low to medium-low on ability, motivation, legitimacy. The security sector exercises authority brutally to protect the regime. It does not have the resources, intelligence capacity and capability to function in a cohesive and effective way according to the law.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Address impunity of security actors that use excessive amounts of force</li> <li>• Enforce inclusiveness of security provision</li> <li>• Strengthen capacity to provide security to the population</li> </ul>




Security Sector Type	Description	Possible focal areas for SSR interventions
<p><b>Fragmented</b></p> 	<p>The fragmented security sector scores low on ability, medium on motivation and low to medium-low on legitimacy. The security sector lacks effective, centralized and well-coordinated security institutions. The provision of security is decentralized due to direct and indirect ties to informal local security actors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manage ties between formal and informal security networks so that the security sector maintains a monopoly on the use of force</li> <li>• Address the partisan nature of security provision</li> <li>• Strengthen oversight mechanisms to centralize decision-making and control over the use of force</li> </ul>
<p><b>Transitioning</b></p> 	<p>The transitioning security sector scores medium to medium-high on ability, medium-high to high on motivation and medium, medium-high or high on legitimacy. The security sector does not adequately protect the population due to old regime structures that prevail and affect the modus operandi in destabilizing ways.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance expertise of security actors to respond to contemporary security issues</li> <li>• Reform old and destabilizing security sector structures and logics</li> <li>• Address corruption at all levels of the security sector</li> </ul>
<p><b>Stable</b></p> 	<p>The stable security sector scores high on ability, motivation, legitimacy. The security sector presents the ideal structure that positively contributes to stability. It is founded on the principles of good governance and accordingly has a high degree of ability, motivation and legitimacy.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No SSR is required</li> </ul>

Table II: Possible focal areas for SSR interventions

The repressive security sector scores medium on ability and, with few exceptions, medium-low on motivation and legitimacy. SSR efforts, should they be undertaken, should focus on strengthening the inclusiveness of security provision and adherence to the rule of law to ensure that all citizens are protected on an equal basis. SSR should not exclusively focus on providing financial and material resources and training because the security sector is structured to protect the regime rendering it unlikely that resources will be used to protect the population. Potential focus areas for SSR include enhancing accountability mechanisms to strengthen the responsiveness of the security sector to peoples' security needs and to address excessive use of force.

The oppressive security sector scores low to low-medium on ability, motivation, legitimacy. SSR efforts, should they be undertaken, should focus on addressing security actors' impunity and tendency to provide security on a partial basis to segments of the population. Security actors are recruited based on political or ethnic affiliation rather than on merit and act as guardians of the state often using excessive amounts of force. These SSR efforts should be complemented by efforts to strengthen security sectors' intelligence capacity and capability to respond to the populations' security needs by providing resources and training and strengthening the coordination between security institutions. Focus areas for SSR include addressing impunity and implementing effective accountability mechanisms to enforce inclusiveness and limit use of force and interference by security sectors in the daily lives of the population.

The fragmented security sector scores low on ability, medium on motivation and low to low-medium on legitimacy. SSR efforts, should they be undertaken, should focus on strengthening the security sector's ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. The direct and indirect ties to informal security actors typically result in security provision that is decentralized and partisan while security actors are not equally subject to oversight and accountability mechanisms. SSR efforts to strengthen the ability to provide security should therefore be complemented by efforts to address security actors' motivation to provide security to the population. Informal security networks may contribute to stability if these are subject to oversight and accountability mechanisms. Potential focus areas for SSR include enhancing capability to provide security and implementing proper oversight mechanisms in the process of further centralizing security provision.

The transitioning security sector scores medium to medium-high on ability, medium-high to high on motivation and medium, medium-high to high on legitimacy. SSR efforts, should they be undertaken, should enhance the expertise of security actors and take on old regime structures legacies that continue to shape the modus operandi of security sectors and thereby their capacity to effectively respond to contemporary security issues. High levels of corruption at the top echelon of the security sector and the politicization of security provision are further impediments to stability that

should be addressed. Potential focus areas for SSR include strengthening transparency mechanisms to identify and address political influence of the security sector and thereby reform old structures and strengthen the population's trust in the security sector.

The stable security sector scores high on ability, motivation, legitimacy. The stable security sector meets the three characteristics and contributes to stability and does not require SSR.

With the SSAF and the respective policy recommendations, this report seeks to bridge the gap between policy analysis and policy making by providing a better understanding of the role of security sectors in (in)stability. It offers a practical framework to inform the tailored design of interventions and thereby hopes to make a valuable contribution to enhance the effectiveness of future interventions – and future non-interventions – intended to increase stability of fragile and conflict prone states.

## 5. Annex A: The SSAF Methodology and Manual

The following section outlines, from a policymaking perspective, options for applying the security sector assessment framework (SSAF) outlined in the previous pages. It also provides insights into the methodological steps taken within the context of the SSAF's operationalization.

### 5.1 Applying the SSAF

From a methodological perspective, the SSAF can be understood as being comprised of three distinct steps, each of which is reliant on the outputs of the step that precedes it (Figure 12). The first – the processing of assessment indicators – leverages quantitative methods to operationalize the SSAF's core characteristics (ability, motivation, legitimacy) using open-source datasets. The second makes use of the outputs of step one to provide an initial assessment of security sectors' relative performance within ability, motivation, and legitimacy. The final step identifies security sector types.




Figure 12: Applying the assessment framework in three steps

## a. Step 1: Processing assessment indicators

Step one of the SSAF leverages open-source data to quantify security sectors' performance within the ability, motivation, and legitimacy characteristics. Taken together, the indicators that underly these characteristics are also designed to provide insights into security sectors' degree of adherence to the principles of effectiveness, inclusiveness, rule of law, accountability, transparency and responsiveness (Figure 13).




Figure 13: Three characteristics, six principles

Within the context of the SSAF, ability, motivation, and legitimacy are each operationalized by compiling, normalizing, and aggregating the statistics contained within open-source datasets (Table 12).

Characteristic	Proxy indicator
Ability	UNODC - Crime Trends Survey: Number of police and internal security officers per 100,000 inhabitants
	BTI Transformation Index: Monopoly on the use of force
Motivation	Freedom House: Average of Political Rights and Civil Liberties Rating
	V-DEM Equal protection index
	V-DEM Rule of law index
Legitimacy	Fragile States Index: State legitimacy scale
	V-DEM Accountability index
	Fragile States Index: State apparatus scale

Table 12: Proxy indicators to measure three characteristics, six principles

The applied (and recommended) procedures for compiling, normalizing, and aggregating the datasets that underly ability, motivation, and legitimacy are outlined in the sections below. Also outlined for each of these characteristics are a.) the question(s) they aim to answer, b.) those questions’ potential relevance to policymakers, c.) caveats relating to the recommended methodology, and d.) any additional (relevant) steps policymakers are recommended to take in order to maximise the policymaking utility of Step 1’s research outputs.

### i. Operationalizing ability

Within the context of the SSAF, security sectors’ performance within the ability characteristic is a reflection of its effectiveness which derives from two factors. These two factors are the resources and intelligence capacity available to the security sector on the one hand (*potential ability*), and to the degree to which the security sector succeeds at maintaining a monopoly on the use of force within its borders on the other (*actual ability*). Potential and actual ability are respectively measured by the UNODC Crime Trends Survey and by the BTI Transformation Index. The SSAF utilizes each of these indexes to proxy for several questions relating to potential and actual ability, outlined in Table 13.

<b>UNODC Crime Trends Survey</b> (Effectiveness: potential ability)	What financial resources does the security sector have at its disposal?
	What human resources does the security sector have at its disposal?
	What material resources does the security sector have at its disposal?
	What intelligence capacities does the security sector have at its disposal?
<b>BTI Transformation Index</b> (Effectiveness: actual ability)	Does the security sector hold a monopoly on the use of force within the country’s borders?

Table 13: Proxy questions, effectiveness

The SSAF uses the UNODC Crime Trends Survey to proxy for potential ability because it keeps a record of the number of police and internal security officers per 100,000 inhabitants. Though not a perfect proxy for a security sector’s potential ability, the size of a country’s police force – particularly when contrasted with measurements included within motivation, legitimacy, and even actual ability – constitutes a valuable first steppingstone. Within the SSAF, UNODC Crime Trends Survey data is compiled, normalized, and aggregated as follows (Table 14):

<b>Measurement</b>	Number of policemen per 100,000 inhabitants
<b>Description</b>	The UNODC compiles its list of countries by number of policemen from multiple sources. Most data are derived from the 2012 UNODC Crime Trends Survey, from Interpol country profiles or national security census. The data ranges from 2007-2019.
<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the UNODC was conducted as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. All countries with populations of 500,000 or lower were removed from the data. This is because small countries generally have disproportionately large police forces relative to their population size, meaning that including them would skew country scores after normalization. After this exclusion, the UNODC data covers 101 countries. As a result, the final dataset will include data on a maximum of 101 countries, depending on the data availability of the subsequent datasets.</li> <li>2. The most recent data points were normalized between 1-5 for all countries. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).</li> </ol>

Table 14: Data processing: UNODC Crime Trends Survey (Effectiveness: potential ability)<sup>253</sup>

The SSAF leverages the BTI to establish the degree to which a country’s security sector is able to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. The BTI is associated with several caveats, the most important of which is that it provides no insights into *how* a country achieves and maintains its monopoly in the use of force. The methods a security sector uses to achieve and maintain a monopoly on the use of force vary significantly between countries and may have profound implications on their potential contribution to stability. A security sector which makes liberal use of coercive instruments is likely to enjoy less long-term stability than one which is able to maintain a monopoly on the use of force by (relatively) peaceful means. This SSAF corrects for this shortcoming through indicators included within the motivation and legitimacy characteristics. Within the SSAF, BTI data is compiled, normalized, and aggregated as follows:

<b>Measurement</b>	Monopoly on the use of force (1-10 scale)
<b>Description</b>	The BTI assigns countries a score between 1 and 10 depending on the degree to which they have a monopoly the use of force within their borders, with a 10 indicating that it has a complete monopoly. The BTI features data on 129 countries. It excludes EU countries and other established democracies that are no longer in transition. The SSAF makes use of the BTI’s 2018 dataset.

253 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Criminal Justice Personnel”; INTERPOL, “Member Countries”; Secretary-General, “Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.”



<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the BTI was conducted as follows: 1. Country scores were rescaled between 1 and 5 to ensure that, upon aggregation, BTI and UNODC data would be afforded equal weight within the ability characteristic. To normalize data ranging 1-10 between 1 and 5, all 2018 data were first normalized between 0 and 1. The products of 0-1 normalization were subsequently multiplied by 4, after which all scores were increased by 1. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).
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Table 15: Data processing: BTI (Effectiveness: actual ability)<sup>254</sup>

A country’s final ability score is the product of its normalized (between 1 and 5) scores on the UNODC Crime Index and the BTI. In practice, this means that countries can score between 2 and 10 on ability.

## ii. Operationalizing motivation

Within the context of the SSAF, a security sector’s performance within the motivation characteristic is a reflection of the degree to which the security sector is organized in a way which guarantees inclusiveness on the one hand and the degree to which it adheres to the rule of law on the other. Inclusiveness is measured by a combination of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index and V-DEM’s Equal Protection Index. Rule of law is measured by leveraging V-DEM’s Rule of Law Index. The SSAF utilizes each of these indexes to proxy for several questions, outlined in Table 16.

<b>Freedom in the World Index (Inclusiveness)</b>	Is the security sector organized to protect the state/ regime or the people?
<b>Equal Protection Index (Inclusiveness)</b>	Does the security sector provide equal protection of rights and freedoms to all groups under its jurisdiction?
<b>Rule of Law Index (Rule of law)</b>	Does the security sector adhere to the rule of law?

Table 16: Proxy questions, inclusiveness and rule of law

Inclusiveness is measured by a combination of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index and V-DEM’s Equal Protection Index because these indices provide distinct – but equally important – measurements. The Freedom in the World Index provides a proxy for a country’s Polity type, allowing policymakers to distinguish between authoritarian and non-authoritarian countries. Though there is, as a general rule, a correlation between a country’s freedom level and the degree to which its security sector enforces the law in an inclusive manner, outliers *do* exist. Several semi-democratic countries

254 Bertelsmann Stiftung, “Methodology.”

are not inclusive due to cultural factors, among others. Similarly, inclusive autocrats – which repress all groups more or less equally – may exist. The data processing methods applied to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index and V-DEM’s Equal Protection Index are outlined in Table 17 and Table 18.

<b>Measurement</b>	To what extent do citizens enjoy political rights and civil liberties in the country?
<b>Description</b>	The SSAF makes use of the Political Rights and Civilian Liberties variables included within the Freedom in the World Index. These are both variables which range between 1 and 10, with lower scores indicating a higher freedom level. Freedom House is the most up-to-date and inclusive source of data available: it rates 210 countries and territories every year, including 2020. It is furthermore a reliable source since it is frequently cited by political scientists, journalists, and policymakers.
<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the Freedom in the World Index was conducted as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Country scores the Political Rights and Civilian Liberties variables were averaged to yield scores between 1 and 10 for all countries in 2020.</li> <li>2. To bring the Freedom House data in-line with other datasets included within the SSAF, scores were inverted so that higher scores correlated with higher democracy scores. They were also normalized between 1 and 5.</li> <li>3. To achieve this, all averaged 2020 data points were multiplied by -1. They were subsequently normalized between 0 and 1, multiplied by 4, and increased (across the board) by 1. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).</li> </ol>

Table 17: Data processing: Freedom in the World Index (Inclusiveness)<sup>255</sup>

<b>Measurement</b>	How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?
<b>Description</b>	The SSAF leverages V-DEM’s Equal Protection Index (v2x_eqprotec), which scores 202 countries between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating better performance (read: more inclusiveness). The data used correspond to 2018. The Equal Protections Scale indicates the level of equal protection afforded by personnel to the general population and whether discrimination on the provision of security is made based on, among others, sex, ethnicity and religion.
<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the Equal Protection Index was conducted as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The data was re-scaled between 1 and 5. To achieve this, all scores were multiplied by 4 and subsequently increased by 1. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).</li> </ol>

Table 18: Data processing: Equal Protection Index (Inclusiveness)<sup>256</sup>

255 “Freedom in the World Research Methodology - Freedom in the World 2020 Methodology.”

256 Varieties of Democracy, “V-Dem Codebook V9”

The second component of this SSAF’s motivation characteristic, rule of law, is measured using V-DEM’s Rule of Law index. The Rule of law index considers to what extent laws are transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced by the state, and to what extent actions of government officials comply with the law. The data is processed in accordance with the steps outlined in Table 19.

<b>Measurement</b>	To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?
<b>Description</b>	Measuring the degree of rule of law informs to what extent principles of impartiality, fairness and objectivity influence security sectors’ motivations. V-DEM’s 2018 Rule of Law Index (v2x_rule) is a compiled of 15 measures, including “compliance with the high court”, “high court independence” and “rigorous and impartial public administration.” <sup>257</sup> All measures are assigned equal weight, for a total score between 0 and 1. Higher scores are indicative of a better functioning rule of law. The V-DEM dataset provides data on 202 countries.
<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the Rule of Law Index was conducted as follows: 1. The data was re-scaled between 1 and 5. To achieve this, all scores were multiplied by 4 and subsequently increased by 1. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).

Table 19: Data processing: Rule of Law Index (Rule of law)<sup>258</sup>

A country’s final motivation score is the product of its normalized (between 1 and 5) scores on the Freedom House: Average of Political Rights and Civil Liberties Rating, V-DEM Equal protection index and V-DEM Rule of Law Index. In practice, this means that countries can score between 3 and 15 on motivation.

### iii. Operationalizing legitimacy

Within the context of the SSAF, a security sector’s performance within the legitimacy characteristic reflects its transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. These variables are respectively measured by the Fragile States Index’s State Legitimacy Scale, V-DEM’s Accountability Index, and the Fragile States Index’s State Apparatus Scale. The SSAF utilizes each of these indexes to proxy for several questions, outlined in Table 20.

257 Varieties of Democracy.

258 Varieties of Democracy, “V-Dem Codebook V9”

<b>Accountability Index (Accountability)</b>	Are there oversight mechanisms in place in relation to the performance of the security actors?
<b>State Legitimacy Scale (Transparency)</b>	How open and accessible is the decision-making procedure of the security sector?
<b>State Apparatus Scale (Responsiveness)</b>	Does the security sector respond to the security needs of the population in time and according to agreed rules and procedures?

Table 20: Proxy questions, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness

The data processing methods applied within the context of accountability, transparency, and responsiveness are outlined in Table 21, Table 22, and Table 23.

<b>Measurement</b>	To what extent does the security sector respond to the security needs in the country?
<b>Description</b>	V-DEM defines accountability as “constraints on the government’s use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions.” <sup>259</sup> The Accountability index (v2x_accountability) runs from 0-1, contains data on 202 countries, and is available for the year 2018.
<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the Accountability Index was conducted as follows: 1. The data was re-scaled between 1 and 5. To achieve this, all scores were multiplied by 4 and subsequently increased by 1. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).

Table 21: Data processing: Accountability Index (Accountability)<sup>260</sup>

<b>Measurement</b>	How representative and open is the government?
<b>Description</b>	The State Legitimacy Scale is developed as part of the Fragile States Index. It considers the population’s level of confidence in state institutions and processes. It also considers the openness of government with regard to transparency and political representation. <sup>261</sup> Countries can score between 1 and 10, with 10 indicating extreme fragility. The FSI provides data for 178 countries. The SSAF leverages 2019 data. <sup>262</sup>
<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the Fragile States Index was conducted as follows: 1. To normalize data ranging 1-10 between 1 and 5, all 2019 data was first multiplied by -1. It was then normalized between 0 and 1. The products of 0-1 normalization were subsequently multiplied by 4, after which all scores were increased by 1. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).

Table 22: Data processing: State Legitimacy Scale (Transparency)<sup>263</sup>

259 Varieties of Democracy.

260 Varieties of Democracy, “V-Dem Codebook V9.”

261 Fragile States Index.

262 Fragile States Index, “Data 2019” (Fragile States Index, 2019).

263 Fragile States Index, “PI: State Legitimacy.”

<b>Measurement</b>	To what extent does the security sector respond to the security needs in the country?
<b>Description</b>	Security Apparatus Scale data is derived from the Fragile States Index and addresses questions such as “Is the police force under civilian control? Are the police forces considered to be professional? Is the government dealing successfully with insurgencies? Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?” <sup>264</sup> In the raw data, the scale runs from 1-10 (10 = extreme fragility). This SSAF leverages 2019 data.
<b>Processing methodology</b>	Data processing for the Fragile States Index was conducted as follows: 1. To normalize data ranging 1-10 between 1 and 5, all 2019 data was first multiplied by -1. It was then normalized between 0 and 1. The products of 0-1 normalization were subsequently multiplied by 4, after which all scores were increased by 1. This results in a dataset where the lowest-performing country scores a 1 and where the highest-scoring country scores a 5. All countries falling between these two extremes are assigned scores between 1 and 5 (i.e.: 1.1, 4.9, etc.).

Table 23: Data processing: Security Apparatus Scale (Responsiveness)<sup>265</sup>

A security sector’s final legitimacy score is the product of its normalized (between 1 and 5) scores on the State Legitimacy scale, V-DEM Accountability Index and State Apparatus scale. In practice, this means that countries can score between 3 and 15 on legitimacy.

The final action which is recommended for completion as part of Step 1 of the SSAF is the normalization of aggregate country-level ability, motivation, and legitimacy data between 0 and 1. This means assigning whatever country scores lowest (between 1 and 10) on ability a 0 and assigning whatever country scores highest a one – thus effectively calculating that security sector’s performance percentile relative to other countries’ security sectors within each of the SSAF’s three characteristics.

## b. Step 2: Labeling assessment indicators

Within the context of the SSAF, Step 2 is designed to provide users with a method that allows them to control, based on policymaking preferences and/or needs, the outputs of Step 3. The first action to be taken within the context of step 2 is geared towards assigning countries a ‘performance label’ within each characteristic. Performance labels range between low, medium-low, medium, medium-high, and high, and are assigned based on the performance percentile a security sector attains within the ability, motivation, and legitimacy characteristics at the end of Step 2. The SSAF recommends the use of the following percentile cutoff points outlined in Figure 14.

264 Fragile States Index, “C1: Security Apparatus,” Fragile States Index, 2018.

265 Fragile States Index, “PI: State Legitimacy.”




Figure 14: Performance label percentile cutoff points

The percentile cutoff points outlined in Figure 14 are recommended because they resemble a normal distribution. As countries move away from the medium category, it becomes progressively more difficult to score low or high on each of the three characteristics. Countries only obtain a low or high label if they score below the 15<sup>th</sup> or above the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile, respectively. A five-point scale (including medium-low and medium-high) was preferred over a three-point scale (high, medium, low) because it allowed for a more nuanced categorization and resulted in a more meaningful difference between security sector types that more accurately reflects reality. As an example, distinguishing between Ukraine and Iran – both of which perform about equally (medium) on ability – is difficult. In Iran, the security sector is only partly motivated to provide security to the population on an equal basis and partly subject to accountability and transparency mechanisms. The security sector is, in other words, mainly motivated by regime survival. Ukraine, even despite its medium score on ability, has a security sector which, in relative terms, is more strongly motivated by an inclusive understanding of democratic peace. The countries respectively score medium-low and medium on motivation and legitimacy. This means that, had a medium-low performance label not been incorporated, the two countries would both have fallen into a medium-medium-medium category. Despite their security sectors are distinctly different, they would most likely have been sorted into the same security sector type. Table 24, Table 25, and Table 26 outline what it means for countries to score high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, and low on ability, motivation, and legitimacy.

Criteria	Definition
<b>High</b>	The security sector possesses abundant resources intelligence capacity – both in quantity and in quality – to provide security and capability to effectively convert available resources into security provision proficiency. The security sector’s monopoly on the use of force covers the country’s entire territory.
<b>Medium-high</b>	The security sector possesses sufficient resources, intelligence capacity – both in quantity and in quality – and capability to effectively convert available resources into security provision proficiency. The security sector’s monopoly on the use of force covers the country’s entire territory but is occasionally challenged by non-state actors.

Criteria	Definition
<b>Medium</b>	The security sector possesses a reasonable amount of resources, intelligence capacity- both in quantity and in quality - and capability to effectively convert available resources into security provision proficiency. The security sector's monopoly on the use of force covers the country's entire territory, but it is regularly challenged by non-state actors.
<b>Medium-low</b>	The security sector has insufficient resources, intelligence capacity - both in quantity and in quality - and capability to effectively convert available resources into security provision proficiency. The security sector partially holds a monopoly on the use of force and is systematically challenged by non-state actors.
<b>Low</b>	The security sector does not possess the resources, intelligence capacity - both in quantity and in quality - and capability to effectively convert the available resources into security provision proficiency and does not hold a monopoly on the use of force.

Table 24: Ability scores criteria

Criteria	Definition
<b>High</b>	The security sector is highly motivated to provide security to the population on an equal basis and to protect citizens' rights and freedoms impartially across social groups. The security sector values and adheres to the rule of law. There is very limited partiality in security provision and very limited violation of the rule of law.
<b>Medium-high</b>	The security sector is motivated to provide security to the population on an equal basis and protect citizens' rights and freedoms impartially across social groups. The security sector values and adheres to the rule of law. There is occasional partiality in security provision and occasional violation of the rule of law.
<b>Medium</b>	The security sector is generally motivated to provide security to the population on an equal basis and to protect citizens' rights and freedoms impartially across social groups but falls short on its implementation. The security sector generally adheres to the rule of law. There is regular partiality in security provision and regular violation of the rule of law.
<b>Medium-low</b>	The security sector is marginally motivated to provide security to the population on an equal basis and marginally protects citizens' rights and freedoms across social groups. The security sector marginally values and adheres to the rule of law. There is systematic partiality in security provision and systematic violation of the rule of law.
<b>Low</b>	The security sector is not motivated to provide security to the population on an equal basis and does not adhere to the rule of law.

Table 25: Motivation scores criteria

Criteria	Definition
<b>High</b>	The security sector is consistently subject to accountability and transparency mechanisms and responsive to its citizens' security needs and expectations.
<b>Medium-high</b>	The security sector is subject to accountability and transparency mechanisms and responsive to citizens' security needs and expectations. There is occasional partiality in the management, oversight and execution of security provision.
<b>Medium</b>	The security sector is generally subject to accountability and transparency mechanisms and generally responsive to its citizens' security needs, and expectations. There is regular partiality in the management, oversight and execution of security provision.
<b>Medium-low</b>	The security sector is partly subject to accountability and transparency mechanisms and partly responsive to its citizens' security needs and expectations. There is systematic partiality in the management, oversight and execution of security provision.
<b>Low</b>	The security sector is not subject to accountability and transparency mechanisms and not responsive to its citizens' security needs and expectations.

Table 26: Legitimacy scores criteria

The methodology developed within the context of the SSAF is designed with user-friendliness in mind. Depending on exercise needs, users can modify what countries fall within which of the six security sectors outlined in Step 3 by adjusting the percentile cutoff points associated with the performance labels (low, medium-low, medium, medium-high, high). Though it is generally recommended that any adjustment to the cutoff points does not result in their exhibiting an abnormal distribution. End users could theoretically implement any of the following changes.

- **Increase ease of scoring in high or low categories.** Increasing the ease of scoring in high or low categories can be done by loosening the tolerances associated with them. As an example, countries could be assigned 'high' scores in ability, motivation, and legitimacy upon scoring in the 70<sup>th</sup> percentile or higher and could be assigned 'low' scored upon scoring in the 30<sup>th</sup> or lower. Such a change would increase the number of countries in each of the categories, reducing the population of the medium-low, medium, and medium-high categories.
- **Reduce ease of scoring in high or low categories.** Reducing the ease of scoring in high or low categories can be done by tightening the tolerances associated with them. As an example, countries could be assigned 'high' scores in ability, motivation, and legitimacy upon scoring in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile or higher and could be assigned 'low' scores upon scoring in the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile or lower. Such a change would reduce the number of countries in each of the categories, increasing the population of the medium-low, medium, and medium-high categories.



- **Modify cutoff points on a characteristic-by-characteristic basis.** Modifying cutoff points to be more or less lenient on a characteristic-by-characteristic would result in, as an example, ‘low’ being more (or less) meaningful within motivation than it is in legitimacy. Transposed into the actions outlined within Step 3, this can result in countries receiving different security sector labels.

## c. Step 3: Identifying security sector type

### i. Security sector identification

Upon assessing and labeling security sector’s performance within ability, motivation, and legitimacy (Step 2), users can apply Step 3 to identify their security sector type. This SSAF allows for the identification of six distinct security sector types. Each of these types is recognized in the literature and occur within the available data. Each is associated with distinct policymaking implications.

Table 27 describes six security sector types and indicates the likely scores that the security sector type has on the three characteristics and the implications this has for stability (see Chapter 3). The SSAF provides practical and comprehensible criteria for how to identify security sector types and helps break-down the extensive literature on security sectors to highlight the characteristics essential to stability that help direct further research and inform decision-making. It is important to emphasize that, although the six security sector types identified are based on the literature and corroborated; they are not exhaustive. There may be additional security sector types not addressed in this report and/or combinations of scores on the three characteristics that do not neatly fit the identified criteria (see Annex B Data). This report is the first indication of security sector types. It should be complemented by further research.

Identifying security sector types is important from a policy-making perspective. Two countries that score similarly on ability may diverge in terms of their relative motivation to provide security. For example, Poland and Mexico both score medium on ability, indicating that both security sectors possess a reasonable amount of resources, intelligence capacity and capacity to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. However, Poland and Mexico diverge in relation to their motivation to provide security, whereas Poland scores high, Mexico scores medium. This indicates that Mexico’s security sector is not exclusively interested in protecting the population and instead exploits the people it is supposed to protect. Assessing only the ability of security sectors does not, therefore, provide a complete assessment of security sectors’ contribution to stability. Identifying the security sector type helps policymakers better understand how and why security sectors contribute to or undermine stability to tailor the design of policy accordingly.







Security Sector Type	Description	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
<b>Criminal</b> 	Systematically challenged by non-state actors and criminal networks that are directly or indirectly tied to security actors. Corruption is deeply imbedded in the security sector.	Medium	Medium	Medium
<b>Repressive</b> 	Structured, commanded, staffed and equipped exclusively to protect the regime. The security sector is not a guardian of public security and rules by coercion to clamp down on internal and external opposition.	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
<b>Oppressive</b> 	Exercises authority brutally to protect the regime. It does not have the resources, intelligence capacity and capability to function in a cohesive and effective way according to the law.	Low/ Medium-low	Low/ Medium-low	Low/ Medium-low
<b>Fragmented</b> 	Lacks effective, centralized and well-coordinated security institutions. The provision of security is decentralized due to direct and indirect ties to informal local security actors.	Low	Medium	Medium-low / Medium
<b>Transitioning</b> 	Does not adequately protect the population due to old regime structures that prevail and influence contemporary structures and decision-making and/or regional instability.	Medium/ Medium-high	Medium-high/High	Medium/ Medium-high/High
<b>Stable</b> 	The ideal structure that positively contributes to stability. It is founded on the principles of good governance and accordingly has a high degree of ability, motivation and legitimacy.	High	High	High

Table 27: Security sector types

## 5.2 In Lieu of a Conclusion

The SSAF provides a first indication of the security sector's potential contribution to stability. The three steps outlined in the SSAF provide practical and comprehensible criteria for how to identify security sectors' performance on three characteristics ability, motivation, legitimacy and based on this analysis the security sector's likely security sector type. This constitutes a first step towards tailor-made engagement strategies with security sectors in fragile states. The inherent complexity of security sectors means they are not easily categorized and often have overlapping features that require that the SSAF and the typology provided in this report are complemented with in-depth country case studies. The SSAF offers a categorization of security sectors on the basis of particularly relevant features to understand security sectors' potential contribution to stability that is not exhaustive but provides direction for further analysis. The SSAF provides a methodology for conducting such research that helps policymakers better understand, contextualize and compare security sectors' potential contribution to stability. The SSAF is intended to facilitate understanding of security sectors by providing a workable frame that gives policymakers direction for conducting further research. The design of a tailored security sector reform requires additional research using the proxy questions to provide a more in-depth understanding of the specific challenges posed by the country in a detailed country case study report. This manual will help analysts prepare that assessment.

## 6. Annex B: Data

### 6.1 Country-level Ordinal Scores

This annex provides the ordinal scores of all countries to which the assessment framework was applied. It provides countries' scores within the three characteristics and countries' security sector types on the basis of these scores. The majority of the countries for which data were obtained in this report fit neatly into the six identified security sector types: criminal, repressive, oppressive, fragmented, transitioning and stable. There are a number of countries that do not neatly fit the identified security sector types and require further research. This annex provides a global overview of security sector types, lists these countries, their scores within the three characteristics and offers possible explanations for why these countries are exceptions (6.2 Security Sector Types: Outliers).




Figure 15: Global overview of security sector types

Security Sector Structure	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
<b>Criminal</b>	Brazil	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Colombia	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Ecuador	Medium	Medium	Medium
	El Salvador	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Lesotho	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Liberia	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Mexico	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Peru	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Ukraine	Medium	Medium	Medium
<b>Repressive</b>	Cambodia	Medium	Low	Medium-low
	China	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Guinea	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Iran	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Thailand	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
	Turkey	Medium	Medium-low	Medium-low
<b>Oppressive</b>	Bangladesh	Medium-low	Low	Medium-low
	Pakistan	Low	Medium-low	Medium-low
	South Sudan	Medium-low	Low	Low
<b>Fragmented</b>	Mali	Low	Medium	Medium-low
	Myanmar	Low	Medium	Medium-low
	Nigeria	Low	Medium	Medium
<b>Transitioning</b>	Costa Rica	Medium-high	High	High
	Czechia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Estonia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Latvia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Lithuania	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Slovakia	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Uruguay	Medium-high	High	Medium-high
	Botswana	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Bulgaria	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Croatia	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Hungary	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium
	Chile	Medium	High	Medium-high
	Poland	Medium	High	Medium-high
	Slovenia	Medium	High	High
	Tunisia	Medium	High	Medium
	Ghana	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	India	Medium	Medium-high	Medium
	Indonesia	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Jamaica	Medium	Medium-high	Medium
	Jordan	Medium	Medium-high	Medium
Panama	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high	
South Africa	Medium	Medium-high	Medium	

Security Sector Structure	Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
Stable	Australia	High*	High	High
	Austria	High*	High	High
	Belgium	High*	High	High
	Canada	High*	High	High
	Denmark	High*	High	High
	Finland	High*	High	High
	France	High*	High	High
	Germany	High*	High	High
	Iceland	High*	High	High
	Ireland	High*	High	High
	Japan	High*	High	High
	Luxembourg	High*	High	High
	Mauritius	High	High	High
	Netherlands	High*	High	High
	New Zealand	High*	High	High
	Norway	High*	High	High
	Portugal	High*	High	High
	Sweden	High*	High	High
	Switzerland	High*	High	High

\* This score is assigned based on expert judgement and secondary sources.

Table 28: Security sector types, list with countries

## 6.2 Security Sector Types: Outliers

Most countries will neatly fit into one of the six identified security sector types. There are some outliers however and countries that do not neatly fit the identified security sector types and require further research. Countries with security sector's that score medium on motivation but that are not the criminal security sector type due to higher or lower levels of ability and legitimacy fall into this category and require further research and analysis.

Several countries with medium levels of motivation are highly able but experience key challenges to maintaining legitimacy. In Singapore and Argentina, reform efforts to improve governance and public sector management have enhanced the accountability

and responsiveness of the security sector.<sup>266</sup> However, a lack in the transparency of administrative procedures and clientelist schemes that influence political agendas remain structural problems to legitimate security governance.<sup>267</sup> In Montenegro and Serbia, the security sector possesses the resources and organizational capacity to provide security but the sector's legitimacy is affected by the presence of ethnic and/or political favoritism and patronage networks. The party systems of Montenegro and Serbia are mostly dominated by one political party and government administration is commonly controlled by individual personalities who have long been active in the political domain.<sup>268</sup> Such political ties and patronage relationships and public distrust of government institutions trickle down to the security sector and the security forces whose functioning are still regularly influenced by political favoritism and corruption.<sup>269</sup> This is also evident in Macedonia where the legitimacy of public state institutions is challenged by ethnic politics. These ethnic and political relationships affect the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of the security sector such that it becomes partisan and acts in favor of segments of society.<sup>270</sup> Overall, even though the countries within this sub-category have undertaken reform programs to enhance accountability and transparency within the security sector, democratic and civil oversight over the security institutions often still suffer from nepotism, corruption schemes and patronage relationships.

There are also several countries with medium motivation that score slightly lower on ability either because the security forces have insufficient resources at their disposal or because they are challenged by the presence of criminal networks within their government territory. Although slightly less able, these countries face the most challenges in relation to security governance processes, as indicated by the medium-low, medium, or medium-high scores on legitimacy. Deficiencies in accountable and transparent governance of the security forces obstruct the general responsiveness of the security sector to the population's security needs and expectations. In Sri Lanka, for instance, local governance institutions have become less transparent and accountable to civilian oversight mechanisms causing heightened corruption levels.<sup>271</sup> The appointment of positions within the security sector, such as high-ranking security officials, is commonly based on personal or political preference. Civilian participation

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266 "More Efficiency, Transparency, and Accountability in Argentina," World Bank, accessed April 1, 2020, <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/results/2015/09/22/more-efficiency-transparency-and-accountability-in-argentina>; Jon S T Quah, "Preventing Police Corruption in Singapore: The Role of Recruitment, Training and Socialisation," *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 28, no. 1 (June 2006): 59–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2006.10779315>.

267 Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: Argentina" (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018); Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: Singapore" (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

268 Security Sector Integrity, "Building Integrity: Process and Impact Montenegro," Security Sector Integrity, accessed March 31, 2020.

269 Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: Serbia" (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

270 Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: Macedonia" (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018); Adela Gjorgjioska and Anastas Vangeli, "Macedonia in Crisis," *Jacobin*, February 23, 2017.

271 GAN Integrity, "Sri Lanka Corruption Report," GAN Integrity, August 2017.

in decision-making is relatively deficient and the general trust of the public towards government authorities including the local police forces remains weak.<sup>272</sup> In countries like Kuwait and Zimbabwe, rates of corruption in the security sector have been consistently high while integrity and public confidence are poor.<sup>273</sup>

Finally, there are countries with medium levels of motivation that score particularly low on ability. The security sectors of these countries are relatively motivated to provide security and experience foremost challenges to security provision due to lack of available resources and intelligence or the presence of criminal networks and organizations. Countries within this subcategory are generally developing countries both in terms of their economies as well as their democratic consolidation such as Nepal and Niger.<sup>274</sup> In Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, the ability of security forces to perform effectively is severely undermined by the lack of available financial, human and material resources and intelligence on emerging threats. This weakens the capacity of the security forces to maintain security throughout its total government territory.<sup>275</sup> Consequently, a lack of resources, intelligence and capability result in a security vacuum that is filled by informal security networks that are localized and community-based. It could also lead to the proliferation of non-state actors.<sup>276</sup>

Countries with security sectors that do not neatly fit the six identified security sector types do have overlapping features that help understand their potential contribution to stability. Assessing these countries within the three characteristics ability, motivation, legitimacy remains valuable for understanding how and why they contribute to stability. This analysis should then be complemented with additional in-depth and case-specific research to identify the security sector type that most closely resembles the security sector under study. Future research could help identify additional security sector types not yet addressed in this report.

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272 International Crisis Group, “Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016); R. Ramesh, M. M. Ijhas, and R. Dickwella, “Accountability, Transparency and Corruption in Decentralized Governance: A Case of Local Government in Sri Lanka,” *Proceedings of the Third International Symposium*, 2013, 57–62.

273 Transparency International, “Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index: Kuwait,” Transparency International, 2015; Darlington Mutanda, “Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe: Scrutinising the Rationale for Police Reform,” *African Security Review* 28, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 151.

274 Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Nepal” (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018); Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Niger” (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018); Paul Jackson, “Security Sector Reform and State Building,” *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 10 (2011): 1803–7.

275 Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Papua New Guinea” (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018); “Papua New Guinea - Security,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed April 1, 2020; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, “Philippines - Local Government,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed April 1, 2020; Aries A. Arugay, “The Philippines in 2017: Security Challenges in a Time of Conflict & Change,” in *Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector*, NIDS Joint Research Series No.16 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2018), 61–69.

276 “Papua New Guinea - Security”; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, “Philippines - Local Government.”



Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
Montenegro	High	Medium	Medium
North Macedonia	High	Medium	Medium-high
Serbia	High	Medium	Medium
Argentina	High	Medium-high	Medium-high
Singapore	High	Medium-high	Medium-high
Albania	Medium-high	Medium	Medium-high
Belarus	Medium-high	Medium	Medium-low
Dominican Republic	Medium-high	Medium	Medium
Kuwait	Medium-high	Medium	Medium
Malaysia	Medium-high	Medium	Medium
Romania	Medium-high	Medium	Medium-high
Sri Lanka	Medium-high	Medium	Medium
Zimbabwe	Medium-high	Medium	Medium-low
Algeria	Medium	Medium	Medium-low
Togo	Medium	Medium	Medium-low
Kenya	Medium-low	Medium	Medium-low
Nepal	Medium-low	Medium	Medium
Niger	Medium-low	Medium	Medium
Papua New Guinea	Medium-low	Medium	Medium
Philippines	Medium-low	Medium	Medium-low

Table 29: Security sector types: outliers

## 7. Annex C: Case Studies

### 7.1 Liberia: The Criminal Security Sector

Liberia's security sector is exemplary of the criminal security sector. It lacks the resources (financial, material, human), intelligence capacity, and capability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force and address widespread crime. Apart from a lack of resources, the security sector is insufficiently motivated to combat pervasive criminal networks in the country. Criminal networks are often directly or indirectly tied to security actors and deeply imbedded in the structure and functioning of the security sector. The security sector is systematically challenged by the parallel existence of these criminal networks that hold substantial power to determine who is protected. This dynamic, in addition to the institutional inertia and unprofessionalism of the security forces, overshadows attempts to promote stability despite the fact the security sector possesses some resources, intelligence capacity, and capability. Insecurity is further exacerbated by the security sector's insufficient accountability and transparency mechanisms that enable security actors to act with relative impunity.

The combination of moderate ability and motivation is crucial to understand Liberia's criminal security sector. The security sector does not have a monopoly on the use of force because it lacks the resources, intelligence capacity, and the capability to use these resources effectively but also because it lacks the motivation to provide security. This combination enables criminal networks to maintain a hold on power and to threaten the security of the population. Liberia's security sector scores medium on all three characteristics of ability, motivation, and legitimacy.




Figure 16: The criminal security sector structure

Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
Liberia	Medium	Medium	Medium

Table 30: Scores of Liberia’s security sector

## 7.1.1 Assessment of Liberia’s Security Sector

### Ability

Liberia’s security sector scores medium on ability meaning it has some resources, intelligence capacity, and capability and is able to maintain a monopoly on the use of force to a reasonable degree. The security sector is able to challenge the proliferation of criminal networks but has insufficient resources, intelligence capacity and capability to maintain a complete hold on the use of force. This is partly because Liberia has a very small police force as compared to the total population and police officers often lack basic training and qualifications.<sup>277</sup> The majority of the police personnel is deployed in Montserrado County, leaving the rest of the country and especially rural areas vulnerable and relatively unprotected from violence.<sup>278</sup> Although significant developments have been made in the training, equipment, and deployment of police forces, most security forces lack appropriate equipment, including logistical support, vehicles, and fuel.<sup>279</sup> Reform efforts aimed at addressing professionalization, command and communication within the security institutions have also insufficiently been able to foster professionalism and effective institutional capabilities.<sup>280</sup> The lack of resources also undermines the security sector’s intelligence capacity and, consequently, the ability to effectively identify and address threats to security. Security actors are often absent in rural areas where criminal actors freely and routinely engage in violence and threaten the local population.<sup>281</sup> The security sector is highly disintegrated as numerous formal security actors and private security corporations, including community policing factions, co-exist and compete.<sup>282</sup> This lack of professional organization and management results in the inefficient use of available resources for effective security provision.

277 As of 2017, the strength of the Liberia national police (LNP) stood at 5,127 officers. With a little over 100 officers per 100,000 people, the LNP is below the median for the rest of the continent. The majority of the police service or 3,858 officers are deployed in Montserrado County as of that date, leaving only 1,284 officers deployed throughout the rest of the country. International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “Liberia SSR Snapshot.”

278 Richard Reeve and Jackson Speare, “Human Security in Liberia: Local Perspectives on Formal and Informal Security Sectors,” *Accord*, no. 23 (n.d.): 40–43; Simon Blatchly Police Commissioner, Establishing Policing to Serve Communities, United Nations Peacekeeping, April 9, 2018.

279 Folke Bernadotte Academy, “Liberia.”

280 Blatchly, Establishing Policing to Serve Communities; Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studio, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia” (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Institute, 2011), 6.

281 Kantor and Persson, “Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia,” 16–17; Folke Bernadotte Academy, “Liberia”; Abu Sherif and Grace Maina, “Enhancing Security and Justice in Liberia” (South Africa: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), 2013), 5.

282 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “Liberia SSR Snapshot.”

## Motivation

The security sector lacks the ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force but also the motivation to protect the population at both the institutional and actor level. The security sector only partially adheres to the principles of inclusiveness and rule of law. There are some mechanisms in place to constrain the use of force and to ensure adherence to the rule of law of security institutions and actors. Since 2004, Liberia has undertaken institutional reforms and endorsed several important human rights instruments addressing police misconduct and corruption schemes that undermine the population's fundamental rights to personal security and equal protection.<sup>283</sup> However, in practice, such reforms are adhered to only haphazardly and meaningful efforts to improve adherence to human rights standards are lacking.<sup>284</sup> The security sector's insufficient commitment to protect the population and prevent crime at the institutional and actor level results from its mutually interdependent relationships with criminal networks through which they obtain rewards off the trade of licit and illicit goods.<sup>285</sup> The security sector's insufficient resources and capability allow organized criminal networks composed of loosely organized crime groups based on ethnic or familial ties to gain traction.<sup>286</sup> These criminal networks are predominantly involved in cross-border smuggling operations and low-intensity gang violence and exist in parallel to the security sector to which they have direct and indirect ties and have substantial power to control who is protected.<sup>287</sup> These symbiotic relations explain security actors' preference for an unstable security environment which is accommodating to their trade.<sup>288</sup>

Security actors do not operate coherently in the interest of protecting the population in its entirety but rather according to their individual ties to criminal networks. This motivation to achieve personal interests results in partial security provision whereby security actors protect the population only if doing so serves their personal interests.<sup>289</sup> This dynamic bolsters insecurity and creates an additional incentive for formal security

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283 This includes the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and other cruel Inhuman or Degrading treatment, and the Protocol directed to abolish the death penalty. Additionally, the creation of the Independent National Commission on Human Rights and the formation of a National Human Rights Action Plan 2013-2018 constitute valuable advances against human rights violations and towards fair and equal security provision International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT); Valerie Brender, "No Money, No Justice: Police Corruption and Abuse in Liberia" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013).

284 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "Liberia SSR Snapshot."

285 Christine Cheng, *Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia: How Trade Makes the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 32–35, 41; Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime?," 1–5, 22–25.

286 Cheng, *Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia*, 32–35; Matt Herbert, "Gangs and Smuggling in Liberia," Matt Herbert, February 1, 2009.

287 Pearce, "Elites and Violence in Latin America," 1.

288 Webmaster Admin, "Who Oversees The Liberia National Police?," *Liberian Observer*, June 7, 2019; Webmaster Admin, "Bring Criminal Charges Against Augustine Nagbe, Aka General Power," *Daily Observer*, November 25, 2019; Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime?," 8.

289 Kari Øygaard Larsen et al., "Policing in Liberia: A Study of the Frameworks and Practices of Fair Trial, Corruption and Civilian Oversight," *DIGNITY Publication Series on Torture and Organised Violence No. 19* (Copenhagen: DIGNITY - Danish Institute Against Torture, 2018), 15; Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime?," 8–11; United Nations, "UNMIL," United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2020.

actors to cooperate with criminal networks. The security sector becomes progressively more unable and unwilling to protect the population, stimulating the latter to also rely on criminal networks for security.<sup>290</sup> The population's inability to rely on security actors for protection weakens their general support for the security sector and willingness to cooperate with the security sector in ways that contribute to stability. For instance, by providing intelligence on security threats.<sup>291</sup> This further undermines stability by strengthening the criminal networks hold on the use of force. These informal arrangements increase uncertainty for the population that does not receive protection as a fundamental right but has to buy protection through ties to criminal networks. The population's dependence on these criminal networks further undermines the security sector's monopoly on the use of force to the extent that directly and indirectly supporting criminal networks may no longer serve the security sector's interests.<sup>292</sup>

### Legitimacy

Liberia's security sector scores medium on legitimacy suggesting it is accountable, transparent, and responsive to some degree. Some security sector reform programs to establish legislative accountability and transparency mechanisms over the security sector have been implemented including, for instance, the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) and the Professional Standards Division.<sup>293</sup> Established accountability and transparency mechanisms are adhered to only partially and arbitrarily due to insufficient effort to address transgressions in addition to the security sector's limited authority, restraints on budgets, and deeply imbedded schemes of corruption.<sup>294</sup> In practice security actors abuse positions of power to protect personal networks in the trade of licit and illicit goods meaning that corruption is rampant in the security sector functioning and logics.<sup>295</sup>

The security sector's insufficient accountability and transparency mechanisms have allowed a security sector-criminal nexus to develop between security actors and criminal networks. Liberia's post-war context and the security sector's weak capacity and capability are attractive to criminal networks and the development of informal trade networks in licit and illicit goods in which security actors themselves are deeply

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290 Kantor and Persson, "Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia," 16-22.

291 Kantor and Persson, 18-22; Larsen et al., "Policing in Liberia: A Study of the Frameworks and Practices of Fair Trial, Corruption and Civilian Oversight," 15; Sherif and Maina, "Enhancing Security and Justice in Liberia," 6.

292 Kantor and Persson, "Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia," 24-27; Alex Boucher, "Priorities for Security and Justice in Liberia - Africa Center," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 2, 2018.

293 Larsen et al., "Policing in Liberia: A Study of the Frameworks and Practices of Fair Trial, Corruption and Civilian Oversight," 19; International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "Liberia SSR Snapshot"; "UNPOL Hands over Facility to LNP," United Nations Mission in Liberia, October 11, 2013.

294 Blatchly, Establishing Policing to Serve Communities; Boucher, "Priorities for Security and Justice in Liberia - Africa Center"; Brender, "No Money, No Justice: Police Corruption and Abuse in Liberia."

295 Jo-Anne Prud'Homme et al., "Police Practice in Liberia: A Study on the Legal Frameworks and Practices of Fair Trial, Corruption, and Civilian Oversight" (Denmark: Danish Institute Against Torture, 2018), 21; Reno, "Liberia," 101.

implicated.<sup>296</sup> Institutionalized links between criminal actors and political and security officials or with formal businesses have their origins in Liberia's war economy, but present continuous obstacles for stability.<sup>297</sup> Estimates suggest that a substantial segment of the population has paid police forces a bribe.<sup>298</sup> Within the security sector's judicial institutions practices of extortion are also evident at all stages of investigation and arbitrary arrests without the opportunity for fair and transparent trials are prevalent. Liberians perceive the security sector as ill-equipped, ineffective, inaccessible, and extremely corrupt and only 25 percent of the population believes the police would take their case seriously without paying bribes to investigate a crime.<sup>299</sup>

Corruption schemes deeply imbedded in the security sector enable criminals to routinely engage in violence and compromise the security of the population.<sup>300</sup> Criminal networks are established and imbued in both the security sector and society at large to such a degree that it becomes exceedingly difficult with the limited resources available to effectively combat them. In some states, criminal networks have even established local authority and legitimacy and replaced state functions.<sup>301</sup> The blurred distinction between security actors and criminal networks leaves the population vulnerable and forces it to cooperate with such criminal networks to protect themselves.<sup>302</sup>

Insufficient accountability and transparency mechanisms cause that there is systematic impunity for the excessive use of force. The tangible benefits of police reform and training to strengthen adherence to the rule of law are negligible in view of the continuing reports of police misconduct. This undermines the population's trust in the police that is already low, partly due to the fact the several police recruits were involved in the Liberian civil war as armed actors and brutally repressed the population. Efforts to improve the vetting system have been successful to some degree, but not robust enough to prevent powerful police officers that participated in the war from intimidating others not to reveal this to the vetting team.<sup>303</sup>

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296 Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime?," 28.

297 Cheng, *Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia*, 41; Vorrath, "What Drives Post-War Crime?," 3–5, 8; FrontPageAfrica, "Liberia: 9 Police Officers Suspended in Connection with the Escape of Murder Suspect from Jail," FrontPageAfrica, September 12, 2018.

298 Brender, "'No Money, No Justice': Police Corruption and Abuse in Liberia"; Afrobarometer, "Almost Half of Liberians Perceive Increase in Corruption over the Past Year, New Afrobarometer Survey Shows," Afrobarometer, November 21, 2018.

299 Boucher, "Priorities for Security and Justice in Liberia – Africa Center"; Kantor and Persson, "Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia," 16–18; Larsen et al., "Policing in Liberia: A Study of the Frameworks and Practices of Fair Trial, Corruption and Civilian Oversight," 15–16; International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "Liberia SSR Snapshot."

300 Cheng, *Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia*, 33; Richard Reeve and Jackson Speare, "Human Security in Liberia: Local Perspectives on Formal and Informal Security Sectors," Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (London: Consiliation Resources, 2012).

301 Cheng, *Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia*, 33; Kantor and Persson, "Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia," 21, 27–28.

302 Reno, "Liberia," 102.

303 Kantor and Persson, "Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia," 18; Larsen et al., "Policing in Liberia: A Study of the Frameworks and Practices of Fair Trial, Corruption and Civilian Oversight," 10.

The security sector's responsiveness is generally low because security forces tend to respond to the security needs of segments of the population that serve its interests leaving generally poorer classes in rural areas unprotected.<sup>304</sup> Security actors neglect their duties when, by doing so, they will be rewarded by leaders of criminal organizations and vice-versa adhere to duties when doing so is awarded. The entrenched patronage networks result in high levels of nepotism as security actors prioritize the provision of security to their own networks over others.<sup>305</sup> The resultant security vacuum is filled by non-state criminal groups that over time gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people vis-à-vis perceived corrupt and incompetent formal security actors that lack the resources and commitment to protect the population.<sup>306</sup> Although the population may not be confident that criminal networks offer a reliable source of security, the security sector's insufficient responsiveness means adapting to the authority of criminal networks becomes the only way to obtain at least some protection.<sup>307</sup> Past efforts to eradicate corruption and increase transparency have produced limited results. Although the constitution and the 2009 Information Act acknowledge public access to information as fundamental to guarantee government accountability in practice accountable and transparent civilian oversight mechanisms are deficient.<sup>308</sup>

### 7.1.2 Conclusion

Liberia's criminal security sector contributes to instability because it enables and to varying degrees also encourages the proliferation of criminal networks that are directly and indirectly tied to the security sector.

Assessment of the security sector's ability alone does not provide an accurate understanding of why the security sector is unable to maintain a complete monopoly on the use of force. The security sector is challenged by criminal networks partly because it lacks sufficient resources and intelligence capacity to prevent their proliferation and partly because the security sector only has a medium level of motivation to provide security since it profits off criminal networks by trading licit and illicit goods. The symbiotic relations with criminal networks also undermine the security sector's legitimacy because it leads to spoilers that purposely undermine the security sector's accountability and transparency mechanisms to sustain an unstable environment that is permissive to their trade. The interaction between the ability, motivation, and legitimacy is crucial to understand Liberia's security sector.

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304 Cheng, *Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia*, 33; Reeve and Speare, "Human Security in Liberia: Local Perspectives on Formal and Informal Security Sectors," 2012.

305 Reno, "Liberia," 100; Judith Vorrath, "From War to Illicit Economies: Organized Crime and State-Building in Liberia and Sierra Leone" (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2014), 22–25.

306 Reeve and Speare, "Human Security in Liberia: Local Perspectives on Formal and Informal Security Sectors," n.d.

307 Kantor and Persson, "Understanding Vigilantism - Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia," 11–12.

308 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), "Liberia SSR Snapshot."

## 7.2 Nigeria: The Fragmented Security Sector

Nigeria is exemplary of the fragmented security sector type and scores low ability, medium motivation, and medium-low legitimacy. The security sector has insufficient resources and intelligence capacity and lacks effective, centralized, and well-coordinated security institutions to maintain security throughout the government territory. The provision of security is decentralized due to direct and indirect ties to local security providers including, for instance, vigilante groups. Although these vigilante groups often assume considerable authority and legitimacy among the population, their presence also results in fragmented security governance. The security sector is an actor in a wider complex and dynamic competition between state and non-state actors for security provision.




Figure 17: The fragmented security sector structure

Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
Nigeria	Low	Medium	Medium-low

Table 31: Scores of Nigeria's security sector

### 7.2.1 Assessment of Nigeria's security sector

#### Ability

The security sector scores low on ability because it has insufficient financial, material, and human resources, intelligence capacity and capability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. Nigerian police officers lack sufficient equipment and have to buy their own pick-up trucks, armor, and communication equipment.<sup>309</sup> The Nigeria Police Force, that numbers only 377,000 policemen for 170 million people, and State Security Service that operates on a federal level are understaffed and underequipped.<sup>310</sup> The security

309 Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis" (London: Chatham House, 2014).

310 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Criminal Justice Personnel"; Matthew T. Page, "Nigeria Struggles With Security Sector Reform," Chatham House, April 2, 2019.



sector also lacks intelligence capacities to identify potential security threats and the ability to effectively convert available resources into security provision proficiency. The Nigerian government has undertaken some reform to strengthen operational capability and independence from bureaucratic supervision by integrating security agencies like the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Federal Road Safety Corps and Nigeria Immigration Service into the police.<sup>311</sup> These efforts have not significantly improved the security sector's effectiveness, however. Deficiencies in resources, intelligence on security threats, and capability to use available resources in an effective way renders the security sector unable to control the activity and proliferation of informal security actors including insurgent groups. Insurgent groups including, for instance, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have gained a considerable foothold over the years and routinely engage in ethnic and religiously motivated violence.<sup>312</sup>

### Motivation

Nigeria's security sector scores medium on motivation because it is partially inclusive and adheres to the rule of law to some degree. The motivation to provide security on an inclusive basis is undermined by the security sector's direct and indirect ties to informal security actors, including vigilantes, on which it relies to provide security.

The wide-spread violence that accompanies the proliferation of insurgent groups leaves a security vacuum that is filled by informal vigilante security groups who assume the role of security providers at the local and community levels.<sup>313</sup> These groups operate with the connivance of security sector officials to provide security on their behalf. In some governorates, local authorities actively equip vigilantes with official uniforms and equipment and even pay salaries for their security provision activities.<sup>314</sup> Local vigilante groups are often seen as legitimate by the population due to shared ethnic ties, language, and culture and compensate for the absence of formal security actors in rural areas as a result of resource deficiencies.<sup>315</sup> Cooperation with vigilante groups can, therefore, bolster the security sector's effectiveness and ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. In counter-insurgency operations, vigilante groups reinforce security sectors' intelligence capacity by using their acquaintance with the rural areas to identify, track, and combat insurgents.<sup>316</sup> The 30,000 strong militia group Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has been instrumental in halting insurgents' progress and made

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311 Page, "Nigeria Struggles With Security Sector Reform."

312 de Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis"; United Nations Security Council, "Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)," United Nations Security Council, February 23, 2020.

313 Ogbosor, *Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria*, 2016, 16.

314 Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria," May 20, 2002; Kwaja, "Non-State Security Actors in North-Central Zone of Nigeria," 32; Obidiegwu Uche and Elekwa Blessing, "The Extent Vigilante Security Group Collaborate With the Police in Minimizing Crime in ABIA State."

315 LeVan and Ukata, *The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics*, 658; Insa Nolte, "Ethnic Vigilantes and the State: The Oodua People's Congress in South-Western Nigeria," *International Relations* 21, no. 2 (2007): 218.

316 International Crisis Group, "Double-Edged Sword."

important contributions to Nigeria's military efforts to restore stability.<sup>317</sup> Vigilante groups including, for instance, the Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch have important policing roles. The Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch cooperates with the State Task Force (STF) to conduct patrols and is provided by the STF with material and financial support.<sup>318</sup>

The reliance on informal security actors is also problematic, however, because it enhances their local power while they continue to enjoy considerable autonomy.<sup>319</sup> Formal and informal endorsement of vigilantes allows these groups to gain authority, thereby increasing the likelihood of them becoming entrenched in the formal security sector of the state.<sup>320</sup> Imbedding of vigilantes in the formal security sector undermines the security sector's inclusiveness and adherence to the rule of law. While the security sector is subject to well-defined laws that constrain individual and institutional behavior and use of force, the collaboration with vigilante groups weakens the security sector's motivation to provide security to the population on an equal and inclusive basis. Vigilante groups engage in partial security provision by virtue of being rooted in local communities and prioritize the protection of their own ethnic, religious, or otherwise affiliated groups. The security sector becomes part of these fragmented and hybrid security networks in which vigilante groups pursue narrow agendas that contradict the security sector's motivation to provide security to the entire population. In this way, the formal and informal security networks co-exist, cooperate, and compete.

The inclusiveness of the security sector is poor due to the fact that security sector forces are either passive in addressing violent incidents against Christians or are actively contributing to infringements of their integrity.<sup>321</sup> The adoption of Sharia in the north of Nigeria made Christian minorities fear arbitrary persecutions and arrests under its provisions.<sup>322</sup> In the Jos area, violent episodes between Hausa-speaking Muslims and Christian members of the Berom community have been recurring since 2001.<sup>323</sup> The unrestricted activity of Islamic and jihadist groups in the area is also worrisome; Christians are being tortured and executed by the members of these radical groups.<sup>324</sup> The protection of women by the police has also been inadequate and cases of abduction,

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317 Oluwaseun Bamidele, "Civilian Joint Task Force' (CJTF) – A Community Security Option: A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach of Reducing Terrorism," *Journal for Deradicalization*, no. 7 (2016): 124–44; "UNDP Trains Vigilantes and Civilian Joint Task Force Members in Human Rights and Leadership," United Nations Development Programme, July 9, 2019; "On Boko Haram Front Line, Nigerian Vigilantes Amass Victories and Power."

318 Ernest Ogozor, "Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria" (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2016), 12–13.

319 International Crisis Group, "Double-Edged Sword."

320 Nolte, "Ethnic Vigilantes and the State."

321 The Washington Post, "Why Is Nigeria Cracking down on Peaceful Religious Protests?," The Washington Post, February 4, 2019.

322 The Washington Post.

323 Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria: Use Restraint in Curbing Jos Violence," Human Rights Watch, January 19, 2010; Chika Oduah, "Nigeria: Vote Violence Haunts Religiously Divided Jos," accessed April 22, 2020.

324 de Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis."

rape, forced marriage, and trafficking are prevalent.<sup>325</sup> Women are discouraged by the police to report rape incidents. If they persist with filing the report and fail to settle disputes with the perpetrator outside the courts, they may even be threatened and abused by police officers.<sup>326</sup>

This dynamic is exacerbated by the widespread presence of vigilantes that act violently and receive direct and indirect support of security actors. Nigeria is deeply divided due to ethnic and political rivalries that have led empowered vigilantes to turn into predatory and quasi-criminal organizations that undermine the security sector's ability to provide security. The Bakassi Boys are a particularly infamous vigilante group that operates in South-East Nigeria and imposes its rule through coercion and engagement in acts of murder, torture, and arbitrary detention.<sup>327</sup> Rural states actively support them by providing uniforms and equipment and even state offices, while the central government is releasing the few vigilante group members that are arrested and detained by the police on criminal charges.<sup>328</sup> In 2000, for instance, state governors in Abia and Anambra state offered the Bakassi Boys official backing and provided them with funding, vehicles, formal names, and political power.<sup>329</sup> Besides the Bakassi Boys in the South-East, powerful vigilantes include the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the Borno state and the notorious O'odua People's Congress (OPC) in the southwest that enjoy the support of government officials.<sup>330</sup> These vigilantes have exploited the population's sense of disenfranchisement and the security sector's inability to maintain law and order and violently asserted its authority.<sup>331</sup> The CJTF actively contributes in the fight against insurgents alongside official state sector actors but has often been criticized for abuses of power, including rape, extortion and murder.<sup>332</sup>

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325 WILPF International, "Outcome of CEDAW Review of Nigeria: More Action Needed to Implement the WPS Agenda," Women's International League for Peace & Freedom, August 8, 2017.

326 Human Rights Watch, "'Everyone's in on the Game': Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force," Human Rights Watch, August 17, 2010.

327 Carina Tertsakian, "Nigeria: The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture," Human Rights Watch, A ; Vol. 14, No. 5. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002), 24–32; Johannes Harnischfeger, "The Bakassi Boys: Fighting Crime in Nigeria," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 1 (2003): 23–49; Ogbosor, "Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria," 2016; Spencer, "Vigilantism Is Flourishing in Nigeria – with Official Support."

328 Daniel Jordan Smith, "The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence, and Political Imagination in Nigeria," *Cultural Anthropology* 19, no. 3 (2004): 430; Tertsakian, "Nigeria: The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture," 36–38.

329 Tertsakian, "Nigeria: The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture"; Smith, "The Bakassi Boys," 431.

330 Nolte, "Ethnic Vigilantes and the State"; Okenyodo, "Governance, Accountability, and Security in Nigeria"; Spencer, "Vigilantism Is Flourishing in Nigeria – with Official Support."

331 "Nigeria: OPC a Continuing Threat to Security," Human Rights Watch, February 28, 2003, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/02/28/nigeria-opc-continuing-threat-security>; "The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): | Fighting Violence with Violence," Human Rights Watch, February 28, 2003, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/02/28/oodua-peoples-congress-opc/fighting-violence-violence>.

332 The New Humanitarian, "Civilian vigilante groups increase dangers in northeastern Nigeria," The New Humanitarian, December 12, 2013; "On Boko Haram Front Line, Nigerian Vigilantes Amass Victories and Power"; Chitra Nagarajan, "Protecting and Harming Civilians: Perceptions of the CJTF in Northeast Nigeria," *Center for Civilians in Conflict* (blog), June 29, 2018; Spencer, "Vigilantism Is Flourishing in Nigeria – with Official Support."

## Legitimacy

The security sector is only partially accountable and transparent and does not adequately respond to the population's expectations for security provision. Accountability and oversight mechanisms to control unbecoming conduct of the security forces are regulated in Nigerian law but not properly enforced due to high levels of corruption manifested in bribes, vote-buying, and nepotism.<sup>333</sup> Corruption is also prevalent among judges and prosecutors.<sup>334</sup> The Nigerian police is regulated under the Police Act. However, cases of abuse ranging from physical harm to arbitrary detainment prove that legal rules are not respected.<sup>335</sup> In 2019, 30.2 percent of the population paid or was asked to pay a bribe to a state official. There is no reliable data on the level of nepotism in the public sector but 84 percent of the population considers it to be a practice.<sup>336</sup> There is also regular collusion of state officials with criminal groups.<sup>337</sup>

Independent oversight agencies have restrictive mandates. For instance, the Public Complaints Commission cannot review complaints related to the conduct of police and lack sufficient resources to function properly. The complaints procedure is equally problematic since complainants are discouraged to submit reports against police officers about their misconduct, receiving threats of arbitrary detainment when doing so. Monitoring procedures do not extend to oversight officers that are perceived as corrupt and habitually appoint officials in key positions in line with their party affiliations without facing charges.<sup>338</sup> Reform measures to strengthen transparency are mostly pursued by civil society groups that receive little support from governmental authorities and inadequate funding from foreign authorities.<sup>339</sup>

These insufficiencies are exacerbated by the fact that vigilante groups who provide security in rural areas on the security sectors' behalf are not regulated and subject to the same accountability mechanisms.<sup>340</sup> Local leaders encourage the activity of these groups by either not charging perpetrators of violent incidents of ethnic and religious discrimination or by giving them impunity from such charges, signifying local leaders' unwillingness to address tensions of ethnic and religious bias.<sup>341</sup> The security sector's

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333 Okenyodo, "Governance, Accountability, and Security in Nigeria."

334 Peter Chukwuma Obutte, "Corruption, Administration of Justice and the Judiciary in Nigeria," SSRN Scholarly Paper (New York: Social Science Research Network, 2016).

335 Human Rights Watch, "'Everyone's in on the Game': Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force"; Al Jazeera, "Nigerian Security Forces Kill 18 during Curfew Enforcement," Al Jazeera, April 16, 2020.

336 Innocent Chukwuma and Eban Ebai, "Promoting the Rule of Law Through Evaluation and Performance Measurement in Nigeria: Challenges & Prospects" (New York: CLEEN Foundation; Africa Center for Justice, Security and Rights, 2013).

337 Henrik Persson, "Nigeria - An Overview of Challenges to Peace and Security" (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 2014).

338 Okenyodo, "Governance, Accountability, and Security in Nigeria."

339 Samson Itodo, "Nigeria's Movement for Transparency and Accountability" (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2018).

340 Nolte, "Ethnic Vigilantes and the State," 219.

341 Persson, "Nigeria - An Overview of Challenges to Peace and Security," 31-32; Tertsakian, "Nigeria: The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture," 37.

ties to vigilante groups and insufficient functioning of accountability and oversight mechanisms allow vigilante groups operating with the authorities' consent to engage in gross violation of human rights with relative impunity.<sup>342</sup> Vigilantes maintain de facto monopoly on the use of force and largely determine how force is used and who receives protection, further straining Nigeria's already volatile security environment.<sup>343</sup>

### 7.2.2 Conclusion

Nigeria's fragmented security sector contributes to instability because it is not able to maintain a monopoly on the use of force due to lack of resources on the one hand, and insufficient accountability and transparency mechanisms on the other, despite being fairly motivated to provide security to the population.

Analysis of Nigeria's security sector indicates the crucial importance of understanding the security sector's legitimacy alongside its ability and motivation to provide security. The incentive to provide security is not enough, even supposing sufficient resources and intelligence capacity are available, because there may be spoilers that exploit weaknesses in the security institution to achieve their own interests. These actors need to be controlled and managed effectively for the security sector's motivation to provide security to result in actual stability on the grounds. The Nigerian case indicates that assessment of the three characteristics ability, motivation, and legitimacy independently does not yield an accurate understanding of Nigeria's security sector and its potential contribution to stability.

## 7.3 Tunisia: The Transitioning Security Sector

Tunisia's security sector is exemplary of the transitioning security sector. The security sector is relatively stable but not fully resilient due to persistent authoritarian ways inherited from the past regime and geographical location in a volatile region where regional and international terrorist organizations thrive.<sup>344</sup> Tunisia's security sector scores medium on ability and legitimacy yet has high levels of motivation to provide security to its citizens.

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342 International Crisis Group, "Double-Edged Sword"; Spencer, "Vigilantism Is Flourishing in Nigeria – with Official Support."

343 Nagarajan, "Protecting and Harming Civilians"; Freedom C. Onuoha and Owonikoko Saheed, "Child of Necessity: (Ab)Uses of the Civilian Joint Task Force in Borno State, Nigeria," *Journal of African-Centered Solutions in Peace and Security* 3, no. 1 (2019): 27–40.

344 International Crisis Group, "Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016); Hamza Meddeb, "Precarious Resilience: Tunisia's Libyan Predicament" (Middle East North Africa Regional Architecture, April 5, 2017).




Figure 18: The transitioning security sector structure

Country	Ability	Motivation	Legitimacy
Tunisia	Medium	High	Medium

Table 32: Scores of Tunisia's security sector

### 7.3.1 Assessment of Tunisia's security sector

#### Ability

Tunisia's security sector possesses sufficient resources, intelligence capacity and capability to maintain a reasonable degree of monopoly on the use of force within the state's territory. The dismantling of Ben Ali's regime in 2011 and the defection of a considerable portion of the police forces left a vacuum in the country's security sector.<sup>345</sup> The military was deployed alongside the police to provide internal security but largely remained at the margins and asserted its intention to abdicate its new role once the police would be capable of fulfilling its internal security responsibilities independently.<sup>346</sup> An estimated 12,000 new police personnel were recruited to fill the gap. However, training programs for these officers were only reformed later.<sup>347</sup> In addition to sufficient police forces, the security sector also possesses sufficient material resources, such as uniforms, vehicles, and communications equipment to operate effectively. The security sector has overcome past internal divisions between security sector institutions and enhanced overall capacities and effectiveness to some degree.<sup>348</sup> Despite these improvements, the security sector falls short on expertise at the institutional and actor level. This

345 Merouan Mekouar, "Police Collapse in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from Tunisia," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 10 (2017): 857–869.

346 Querine Hanlon, "Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year after the Jasmine Revolution" (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, March 2012), 3; Alex Walsh, "Restarting Police Reform in Tunisia: The Importance of Talking About Everyday Security," *Civilianizing' the State in the Middle East and Asia Pacific Regions* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 2019), 1.March 2012

347 It is difficult to establish the size of Tunisia's internal security forces due to limited publicly available data however estimates suggest that the internal security forces currently number between 60,000 and 80,000. Bassem Bouguerra, "Reforming Tunisia's Troubled Security Sector" (Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, 2014), 1; Hanlon, "Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year after the Jasmine Revolution," 5–6.

348 Stefano Maria Torelli, "Internal Threats to Tunisian Security - From the Borders to the Cities," *Terrorism Monitor Volume 17*, no. 4 (2019): 6–8.

especially the case for Tunisia's intelligence agencies that have been relatively neglected in the wider security sector reform processes since 2011 and the mission of intelligence agencies in Tunisia's new constitution are not clearly defined.<sup>349</sup> The dismantling of the Directorate of State Security (DSE) which had a critical role in liaising between intelligence and security agencies further undermines the security sector's ability to effectively filter and share information.<sup>350</sup>

The inherited ways of the old regime affect the security sector's modus operandi in destabilizing ways and undermine the ability to effectively manage the security sector to respond to contemporary security threats.<sup>351</sup> The fact that the security sector's newly consolidated democratic structures and reforms are not equally woven into the fabric of civil-security sector relations further undermines the enactment of reforms.

### Motivation

Tunisia's security sector is highly motivated to provide security and adheres to the principles of inclusiveness and rule of law. Early in the transition and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) announced plans to reorient and redefine the security sector's function from a brutal apparatus of internal repression to a professional and neutral law enforcement apparatus that is inclusive and adheres to the rule of law. This included abolishing the political police that spied on and harassed opposition to the regime. To date progress has been slow, raising the risk of authoritarian return.<sup>352</sup> The security sector's authoritarian tendencies are reinforced by the presence of terrorist organizations that have led the security sector to implement a state of emergency and increasingly militarized measures inherited from the past.<sup>353</sup> Reforms have strengthened security forces' professionalism, counterterrorism strategies, inter-agency intelligence sharing and coordination allowing it to stifle the proliferation of terrorist organizations to a reasonable degree.<sup>354</sup> The spread of terrorist violence also undermines the motivation to

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349 Florina Cristiana Matei and Jumana Kawar, "Tunisia's Post-Arab Spring Intelligence Reform," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 33, no. 1 (December 18, 2019): 135–158.

350 Matei and Kawar, 140; Luis Martinez, *The State in North Africa: After the Arab Uprisings* (New York, United States: Oxford University Press, USA, 2020), 55.

351 DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa, "Security Sector Development in Tunisia: Country Assessment and Results Monitoring" (Geneva: DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa, 2017), 31, 33; Ruth Hanau Santini and Giulia Cimini, "The Politics of Security Reform in Post-2011 Tunisia: Assessing the Role of Exogenous Shocks, Domestic Policy Entrepreneurs and External Actors," *Middle Eastern Studies* 55, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 225–41; Walsh, "Restarting Police Reform in Tunisia"; Matei and Kawar, "Tunisia's Post-Arab Spring Intelligence Reform."

352 Stephen J. King and Abdeslam Maghraoui, *The Lure of Authoritarianism: The Maghreb After the Arab Spring* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2019).

353 Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: Tunisia" (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018); Bouguerra, "Reforming Tunisia's Troubled Security Sector," 2014; International Crisis Group, "Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy," 6; Torelli, "Internal Threats to Tunisian Security - From the Borders to the Cities," 1–2; Amnesty International, "Tunisia: Abuses in the Name of Security Threatening Reforms," Amnesty International, February 10, 2017; Amnesty International, "Tunisia: 'We Want an End to the Fear' Abuses under Tunisia's State of Emergency," Amnesty International, February 13, 2017.

354 DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa, "Security Sector Development in Tunisia: Country Assessment and Results Monitoring"; International Crisis Group, "Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy," 8–9; Santini and Cimini, "The Politics of Security Reform in Post-2011 Tunisia," 230; Torelli, "Internal Threats to Tunisian Security - From the Borders to the Cities," 7.

provide security on an inclusive basis according to the rule of law.<sup>355</sup> Tunisia's transition has seen a head-on fight between parts of the security sector and the old regimes' political elite supportive of authoritarian ways on the one hand and the population supportive of the democratic transition on the other.<sup>356</sup> The security sector has become a hybrid system that is democratic but shows authoritarian tendencies. Practices of human rights violations including arbitrary arrests, abuse, torture, and assassinations have abated since the revolution but not disappeared completely.<sup>357</sup> Reform has not led to the fundamental reorganization of the security sector's institutional culture and practices of repression and excessive use in the name of regime security often go unpunished.<sup>358</sup>

The security sector's deficiencies primarily result from fragile legitimacy due to the intractability of old regime structures that affect the security sector's modus operandi in destabilizing ways and undermine societal trust in the security sector.<sup>359</sup> Trust and strong civil-security sector relations are critical for the security sector's effectiveness because it enhances the population's willingness to cooperate with security actors and provide them with relevant information on security threats.<sup>360</sup> The security sector has pursued to strengthen accountability and transparency mechanisms. However, the culture of the security sector's autonomy and impunity prevails and undermines input and output legitimacy. In 2017, only 53 percent of the population trusted the national police while 61 percent trusted the national guard and 87 percent the army to provide protection.<sup>361</sup> The police played an important role against the 2011 revolution since they had the most to lose from the fall of Ben Ali's police state and unlike the marginalized military that supported protesters, the police brutally repressed against protesters.<sup>362</sup>

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355 Melek Saral, "The Protection of Human Rights in Transitional Tunisia," *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 16, no. 1 (2019): 18; Amnesty International UK, "Tunisia"; World Politics Review, *Tunisia's Young Democracy Risks Being Consumed by the Very Forces It Unleashed*.

356 King and Maghraoui, *The Lure of Authoritarianism*; International Crisis Group, "Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015). The security sector includes National Security, police, National Guard, civil defence and correctional services.

357 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, "Human Rights Committee Asks Tunisia about State of Emergency and Torture, Urges Human Rights Protection in Counter-Terrorism," United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, March 4, 2020.

358 DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa, "Security Sector Development in Tunisia: Country Assessment and Results Monitoring," 65; Hanlon, "Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year after the Jasmine Revolution," 3–7; Myriam Amri, "Ben Ali May Be Dead, but His Regime Is Not," *Al Jazeera*, September 26, 2019.

359 Matei and Kwar, "Tunisia's Post-Arab Spring Intelligence Reform."

360 Bouguerra, "Reforming Tunisia's Troubled Security Sector," 2014, 2.

361 Edna Bonhomme, "What's behind Tunisia's Growing Military?," *Africa Is a Country*, October 5, 2018; Marwan Muasher and Sarah Yerkes, "Tunisia's Corruption Contagion: A Transition at Risk" (Massachusetts, United States: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 25, 2017); Saïd Haddad, "Strengthening the Tunisian Armed Forces? Reforming Defense and Military Policy-Making in Tunisia," in *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, by Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn (Berlin: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 213–29.

362 Eric Goldstein, "A Tunisian Revolution That's More Bloody than Jasmine," Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2011; Human Rights Watch, "Tunisia: End Police Attacks on Protesters: Beatings in Plain View Show Need to Rein in Security Forces," Human Rights Watch, January 31, 2011; William C. Taylor, "The Tunisian Military's 'Ambitious Support' of the Arab Awakening," in *Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East* (New York, United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 57–82.



## Legitimacy

The security sector scores medium on legitimacy meaning there are accountability mechanisms in place to monitor security sector actor's behavior and ensure security actors are responsive to peoples' security needs and penalized for deviant behavior. Although decision-making processes are largely transparent, these are undermined by the politicization of security services and undemocratic attempts to dismantle checks and balances.

Security sector accountability and oversight over the security institution's decision-making, organization and performance have strengthened significantly in recent years.<sup>363</sup> For instance, the 2015 counterterrorism law grants security actors extensive surveillance powers that have occasionally been abused in counterterrorism operations.<sup>364</sup> In 2017, the Tunisian national strategy for good governance and fight against corruption was instigated and the government adopted a law protecting whistle-blowers in corruption lawsuits. Within a year more than 9,000 complaints relating to corruption were reported to the National Anti-Corruption Agency.<sup>365</sup> Such reforms remain somewhat superficial as they inadequately address the core of the security sector's destabilizing structures and ways allowing authoritarian practices and rhetoric to persist. The culture of impunity remains entrenched in the security sector and institutional reforms are insufficient to end excessive use of force, abuse of power and the politicization of security provision.<sup>366</sup>

Security actors with ties to politicians act as spoilers and politicize the management and provision of security to consolidate power and may exploit social and political polarization and circumvent and attempt to obstruct checks and balances.<sup>367</sup> Old regime handovers that hold a veto over reforms in critical areas including the security sector hinder the laying-down of norms and structures needed to establish a democratic and resilient security sector. These actors have allowed authoritarianism to seep back in via security sector institutions.<sup>368</sup> The judiciary is wrought with high levels of corruption and still employs figures from the old regime that are resistant to change and viewed as repressive.<sup>369</sup> The security sector has made progress but not without concessions to old-

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363 DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa, "Security Sector Development in Tunisia: Country Assessment and Results Monitoring," 27–30, 58–59. In 2013, Tunisia adopted legislation to address crimes of the past and created in this context a Truth and Dignity Commission mandated to investigate all serious human rights violations from 1955 to 2013 and to provide accountability for torture, forced disappearances, and other abuses. Between 2013 and 2018 when it operated, the commission received more than 62,000 complaints and held confidential hearings for more than 50,000 of these. See: Human Rights Watch, "Tunisia: Truth Commission Outlines Decades of Abuse," Human Rights Watch, April 5, 2019; Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Tunisia," Human Rights Watch, December 12, 2019.

364 Bertelsmann Stiftung, "BTI 2018 Country Report: Tunisia," 10.

365 DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa, "Security Sector Development in Tunisia: Country Assessment and Results Monitoring," 19.

366 Sharan Grewal, "Time to Rein In Tunisia's Police Unions" (Washington, D.C.: Project on Middle East Democracy, March 2018), 1.

367 International Crisis Group, "Stemming Tunisia's Authoritarian Drift."

368 Grewal, "Time to Rein In Tunisia's Police Unions," 1. Reform has been undermined by the power of Tunisia's police unions, which have pressured judges and blackmailed politicians to secure impunity. .

369 King and Maghraoui, *The Lure of Authoritarianism*.

regime holdovers and the protection of their interests.<sup>370</sup> Spoilers do not necessarily aim to restore the status quo ante and instead their primary rationale may lie in protecting their own positions of power and interests that are more difficult to achieve in a stable security sector with rigid accountability and transparency mechanisms. The rapid reversal of the police's position of power to one of weakness after the revolution in 2011 led the police to create unions to defend their interests. These unions have become progressively more powerful and actively seek to stem the revolutionary desire for reform.<sup>371</sup> Corruption is therefore deeply imbedded at the top echelons of the security sector and across security sector institutions.<sup>372</sup>

Despite the adoption of new constitutional laws regarding public access to information, transparency within the security sector remains insufficient.<sup>373</sup> The population does not enjoy unrestricted access to information on the security sector's decision-making processes and performance as respective ministers do not consistently apply and comply with the new rules and regulations.<sup>374</sup> The importance of counter-terrorism has allowed the proliferation of anti-terror laws and the frequent declaration of a state of emergency that has occasioned national security immunities.<sup>375</sup> These efforts have legitimated curtailment of transparency laws and re-ignited the institutional culture of concealment prevalent in Ben Ali's security state.<sup>376</sup> It has given the security sector including the MOI justification for expanding its prerogative and bypassing independent of oversight bodies. The MOI has further hindered progress by ignoring requests for information about the identity of police agents accused of involvement in a crime.<sup>377</sup> Although the security sector and individual security actors have become more responsive to the security expectations and needs of the population, excessive use of force by police forces remains a persistent challenge.<sup>378</sup> Such transgressions are left unaddressed indicating the continued impunity with which the internal security forces operate.<sup>379</sup>

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370 Daniel Brumberg and Maryam Ben Salem, "Tunisia's Endless Transition?," *Journal of Democracy* 31, no. 2 (2020): 112; Grewal, "Time to Rein In Tunisia's Police Unions."

371 Grewal, "Time to Rein In Tunisia's Police Unions," 2.

372 Max Gallien and Isabelle Werenfels, "Is Tunisia Really Democratizing? Progress, Resistance, and an Uncertain Outlook," *Fanack.com*, May 15, 2019; Grewal, "Time to Rein In Tunisia's Police Unions," 2.

373 Transparency International, "2020 Government Defence Integrity Index - Country Overview: Tunisia" (Berlin: Transparency International, 2020), 3–4; GAN Integrity, "Tunisia Corruption Report," GAN Integrity, July 2017.

374 DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa, "Security Sector Development in Tunisia: Country Assessment and Results Monitoring," 56; Querine Hanlon, "The Prospects for Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year After the Revolution" (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 40–42.

375 Transparency International, "2020 Government Defence Integrity Index - Country Overview: Tunisia," 1; Amnesty International, "Tunisia's New President Must Prioritize Human Rights," Amnesty International, October 22, 2019.

376 Cengiz Günay and Fabian Somavilla, "Tunisia's Democratization at Risk," *Mediterranean Politics*, 2019, 2.

377 Human Rights Watch, "Tunisia," April 5, 2019.

378 Grewal, "Time to Rein In Tunisia's Police Unions."

379 Sharan Grewal and Shadi Hamid, "The Dark Side of Consensus in Tunisia: Lessons from 2015-2019," *Foreign Policy at Brookings*, January 2020, 8; Amnesty International, "Tunisia: Where Running from Police Can Be Deadly," Amnesty International, April 4, 2019.

Security actors do not consistently comply with new regulations and are only partially responsive to the general population's security needs but have shifted towards more authoritarian tendencies.<sup>380</sup> Tunisia's population experiences feelings of insecurity and a lack of confidence in the police force's ability to protect the rights and freedoms of all Tunisians. The feeble and not yet fully consolidated democratic norms and the population's fragile trust of the security sector creates an unstable environment that can easily break out in violence and conflict. Police violence and clashes between the police and the population are frequent occurrences and have incited renewed political tensions within Tunisian society.<sup>381</sup>

### 7.3.2 Conclusion

Tunisia's transitioning security sector contributes to instability due to historical legacies that influence the security sector's contemporary ways and decision-making in destabilizing ways. These legacies persist and have gained traction in recent years due to increasing security threats from regional and international terrorist organizations.

The security sector appears to contribute to stability on the basis of its performance on two characteristics ability and motivation, however, when assessing the characteristic legitimacy this initial assessment somewhat changes. The unsatisfactorily consolidated democratic procedures and the population's deficient trust of the security sector contribute to a fragile security environment that could easily deteriorate into instability. Analysis of the transitioning security sector validates that having sufficient resources and high levels of motivation is not a guarantee for a stable security environment. It is therefore of critical importance to also assess the security sector's legitimacy and the structural deficiencies that directly and indirectly impact the security sector's functioning and potential contribution to stability.

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380 Grewal, "Time to Rein In Tunisia's Police Unions," 5.

381 Middle East Monitor, "Angry Protests Erupt in Tunisian City Demanding Development," Middle East Monitor, April 29, 2019; Walsh, "Restarting Police Reform in Tunisia"; Tarek Amara, "Tunisia's Police and Demonstrators Clash in Third Night of Protests," Reuters, December 2, 2019.

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