In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.
Deze folder is de tweede in een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Aan de hand van praktijkvoorbeelden word geïllustreerd hoe AO toegevoegde waarde levert met betrekking tot voedselzekerheid, klimaatverandering, natuurrampen en de biodiversiteit.Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.
Deze folder is de eerste van een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Het illustreert de verschillende AO technieken, legt uit waar AO data te verkrijgen is en schetst de belangrijkste trends en ontwikkelingen. Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten. Niemand kan de precieze aard en timing van de grote veranderingen en de daaruit voortvloeiende nieuwe risico’s voorspellen, maar goede analyses stellen ons wel in staat om de range aan mogelijkheden te verkennen en ons zo actief voor te bereiden op wat komen gaat.
Deze notitie kan worden gezien als een vertrekpunt voor een proces waarin de snelle technologische ontwikkelingen op het gebied van Blockchain met een veiligheidsbril op worden bezien. Het diende als input voor een HSD-Café in november 2017, waarin een hands-on scenario-oefening rond het thema werd georganiseerd. Op deze wijze informeerde HSD Office de partners in HSD en alle overige belanghebbenden over de mogelijke veiligheidsimplicaties van de snelle ontwikkelingen op het gebied van Blockchain.
Download de PDF via de knop rechts.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten. Niemand kan de precieze aard en timing van de grote veranderingen en de daaruit voortvloeiende nieuwe risico’s voorspellen, maar goede analyses stellen ons wel in staat om de range aan mogelijkheden te verkennen en ons zo actief voor te bereiden op wat komen gaat.
Deze notitie kan worden gezien als een vertrekpunt voor een proces waarin de snelle technologische ontwikkelingen op het gebied van Artificial Intelligence met een veiligheidsbril op worden bezien. Het diende als input voor een HSD-Café in november 2017, waarin een hands-on scenario-oefening rond het thema werd georganiseerd. Op deze wijze informeerde HSD Office de partners in HSD en alle overige belanghebbenden over de mogelijke veiligheidsimplicaties van de snelle ontwikkelingen op het gebied van AI.
Download de PDF via de knop rechts.
2017 is not over yet, but the year was ridden with alarming push notifications buzzing on our mobile phones. Political events are covered around the clock - from Trump’s Twitter antics to terrorist attacks sowing destruction around the world.
2017 is not over yet, but the year was ridden with alarming push notifications buzzing on our mobile phones. Political events are covered around the clock - from Trump’s Twitter antics to terrorist attacks sowing destruction around the world. In this constant barrage of news, it is easy to get caught up in today’s incidents, and lose sight of the risks that may transpire tomorrow. Earlier this year, HCSS published the Monthly Alert New Security Threats and Opportunities, the Other Side of the Security Coin on some of the more positive developments that are still occurring amidst all of the global gloom and doom that we get inundated with on a daily basis. In this November Monthly Alert, we turn our attention to the ‘dark’ side of the security coin and highlight ten emerging but security risks. For this Alert, we specifically looked for plausible but underappreciated security risks that may materialize in the foreseeable future and deserve attention now - also with an eye towards risk prevention and mitigation.
Access the Alert online here.
Or download the PDF via the button on the right.
The ongoing crisis between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the international community represents a textbook case of coercive diplomacy. The international community sought to coerce North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile programs. So far, all efforts failed. The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States has created a new and more dangerous dynamic.
The ongoing crisis between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the international community represents a textbook case of coercive diplomacy. The international community sought to coerce North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile programs. So far, all efforts failed. The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States has created a new and more dangerous dynamic. In contrast to his predecessors, Trump does not seek a multinational solution and has turned the crisis into a personal contest between him and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, while ignoring the interests of other powers. As President Trump has few, if any, options for breaking the stalemate, this Alert argues that personalizing the conflict is very risky. As a matter of fact, for the first time in history a tweet could trigger a major crisis.
This Alert analyses the present standoff and explains how threats and harassments could escalate. Read more about policy options for dealing with North Korea by downloading the Alert via the button on the right.
UN peace operations increasingly find themselves deployed in countries where there is no peace to keep, where insurgencies are ongoing, and where peacekeepers face asymmetric threats. In these environments, UN peace operations are asked to perform increasingly challenging tasks to assist governments and to stabilise countries. This requires adequate UN mandates, as well as appropriate military and civilian means. There is also a continuing urgent need to address the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.
UN peace operations increasingly find themselves deployed in countries where there is no peace to keep, where insurgencies are ongoing, and where peacekeepers face asymmetric threats. In these environments, UN peace operations are asked to perform increasingly challenging tasks to assist governments and to stabilise countries. This requires adequate UN mandates, as well as appropriate military and civilian means. There is also a continuing urgent need to address the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.
Almost 15 years after the Brahimi Report, in October 2014, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to find answers to these challenges. Its findings were published in June 2015 in its report: Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People. In over 100 pages and more than 100 recommendations, the report called for change.
This report looks at five key issues that were addressed in the HIPPO report and which require attention to make UN peace operations more effective in the face of current challenges.
The report is a collaboration between the Clingendael Institute, HCSS and SIPRI.
Authors: Jaïr van der Lijn, Robert de Rave, Timo Smit, Rianne Siebenga.
Click here to access the alert.
How should the Dutch government prioritize partnerships with other nations? Which countries are strategically important? Which are compatible in terms of shared values? Traditionally, Dutch foreign policy has a dual orientation: the pursuit of Dutch interests on the one hand and the adherence to and promotion of norm-based values on the other. How to handle relationships in a increasingly connected and complex world? HCSS is developing a Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI) as an analytical basis for a framework to provide guidance on this.
This Monthly Alert presents the findings of a high-level analysis of this first current iteration of the DFRI. It offers, from the Netherlands’ perspective, an overview of the utility and compatibility of states worldwide and the changes therein over time. Clusters of countries are derived based on a combination of these two dimensions. The alert concludes with suggestions as to how the DFRI could be further developed and leveraged as an analytical input into the partnership prioritization process in Dutch official foreign and security policy making.
Click on the graph to access the alert.
Top 20 strategically important countries (Utility, 2016)
De politie in Nederland heeft te maken met een snel veranderende omgeving en een dynamische samenleving, waarin nieuwe veiligheidsvraagstukken zich in rap tempo aandienen. Dergelijke vraagstukken staan niet op zichzelf en maken onderdeel uit van een serie mondiale ontwikkelingen waarmee de Nederlandse samenleving wordt geconfronteerd. Om haar koers, positie en inzet in de toekomst vast te kunnen stellen, is het van belang dat de politie zicht heeft op deze ontwikkelingen en de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan, om daar adequaat op te anticiperen.
De politie in Nederland heeft te maken met een snel veranderende omgeving en een dynamische samenleving, waarin nieuwe veiligheidsvraagstukken zich in rap tempo aandienen. Dergelijke vraagstukken staan niet op zichzelf en maken onderdeel uit van een serie mondiale ontwikkelingen waarmee de Nederlandse samenleving wordt geconfronteerd. Om haar koers, positie en inzet in de toekomst vast te kunnen stellen, is het van belang dat de politie zicht heeft op deze ontwikkelingen en de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan, om daar adequaat op te anticiperen.
Dit rapport bevat een inhouds- en omgevingsanalyse en levert input op voor vervolgstappen in het strategietraject van de Politie. Het rapport presenteert maatschappelijke vraagstukken en verhaallijnen die houvast bieden voor te organiseren discussies met de belangrijkste stakeholders en de eigen medewerkers over de toekomst van de politie. Het is daarmee een eerste stap om blijvend te werken aan een kennisintensieve, lenige en toekomstbestendige organisatie.
Previous HCSS monitors found India to be significantly less assertive than the other great powers. In our 2016 Great Power Assertivitis study, we even claimed that the subcontinent was the sole exception to the rule that great powers seem to exhibit a quasi-pathological proclivity to throw around their weight in negatively assertive ways.
Previous HCSS monitors found India to be significantly less assertive than the other great powers. In our 2016 Great Power Assertivitis study, we even claimed that the subcontinent was the sole exception to the rule that great powers seem to exhibit a quasi-pathological proclivity to throw around their weight in negatively assertive ways. In our recently published Changing International Order (Geodynamics) Alert, however, which covers the first half of 2017, some of the indicators we use to track global GPA - especially our global event datasets - started painting a different picture of India. An analysis of the quantitative and qualitative evidence over the last 6 months reveals a significant uptick in the country’s economic and military assertiveness, specifically towards its great North-Eastern neighbor, China. Since the Indian subplot of the great power story receives so much less attention from Western governments, institutions and media, HCSS decided take a closer look at some of the domestic and international dynamics at work here.
To many, the world seems to be on fire. A small, newly nuclear-armed authoritarian country is incessantly taunting the world's sole remaining superpower. That superpower itself is now increasingly seen even by some of its staunchest allies as a "threat to world peace". Russia's large military exercise along its Western borders has Europeans on their seat's edge. And less mediatized, but no less impactful for the world was the tense military standoff between the two giant and nuclear-armed Asian great powers.
To many, the world seems to be on fire. A small, newly nuclear-armed authoritarian country is incessantly taunting the world's sole remaining superpower. That superpower itself is now increasingly seen even by some of its staunchest allies as a "threat to world peace". Russia's large military exercise along its Western borders has Europeans on their seat's edge. And less mediatized, but no less impactful for the world was the tense military standoff between the two giant and nuclear-armed Asian great powers. In the midst of these events are unprecedented technological changes and climate-related cataclysms, that potentially herald fundamental shifts. Are all these events glimpses of a larger underlying iceberg or merely a statistical anomaly of our fascination with extreme events? And how can we even be sure?
These questions are not purely of academic interest - also not (limited) to the Netherlands. On January 1, 2018, the Kingdom of the Netherlands will take a seat at the most prominent and prestigious international table - the United Nations Security Council - for a period of one year. It will even chair the Security Council during the month of March 2018. As it prepares for this weighty responsibility, getting a better evidence-based understanding of the actual geodynamics behind the current international order is of the utmost importance. This alert presents a few selected highlights from our datasets in 'nowcasting' geodynamics in the period Jan- Jul 2017.
Photo credit: Kate-2112 via Visualhunt.com / CC BY
This study looks at the foreign and security policies of 17 Populist Sovereignist political parties and analyzes the implications for international security and defense.
This study looks at the foreign and security policies of 17 Populist Sovereignist political parties and analyzes the implications for international security and defense.
Populist Sovereignism (PopSov) did not begin with Brexit nor did it end with Marine Le Pen losing the French Presidential election in May 2017. PopSov Parties reject the current political establishment and advocate taking back national control. They are far from a fringe movement. Currently, populist sovereignist parties rule alone or are part of the governing coalitions in 8 countries, including the US, and they hold more than 10 percent of a total of 11 countries’ seats in the European Parliament.
Consequences: risky business or a healthy feedback signal?
Many observers warn that PopSov parties threaten to upend a decades old liberal consensus about the benefits of free trade in promoting economic growth and welfare, the importance of global and regional governance to solve transnational challenges, and the benefits of liberal democracy. Threats – and actions – to exit the European Union, leave NATO, and dissolve free trade agreements certainly sound like the death toll of that consensus.
Stephan De Spiegeleire, one of the authors of the study argues that Popsovism is best framed as ‘a potentially healthy feedback signal about certain negative aspects of the recent rush towards a supposed global liberal utopia that have been underestimated by national, European, and international policymakers.’ But he also adds a note of caution: ‘the health of a democracy depends on such signals being voiced and – even more importantly – heard.'
Foreign and security policies: what PopSov parties want
In order to better understand the potential consequences for the international order, the authors analyzed the party manifestos of 17 PopSov parties in Europe and the US and identified their positions on national security and foreign and security policy. Amongst the key findings are:
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PopSov Parties are not illiberal per se, and they are not necessarily isolationist. Yet, their proposed reforms at times sit uncomfortably with the tenets of liberal democracy, in particular where it concerns protections for minorities.
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Popsov Parties are strongly in favour of reasserting the sovereignty of the nation-state by reducing the power of international organizations and push back against a decades-old trend of increasing multilateral cooperation through strong, rules-based institutions.
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Most PopSov Parties support NATO, but most are also supportive of warm relations with Russia. With the exception of 1, all parties want to significantly boost military and defense capabilities over current levels.
On the basis of a scenario analysis, the report offers four recommendations to policymakers in nation states and the EU:
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Foreign and Security Policy Starts at Home. The real center of gravity of PopSovism is not formed by the political strongmen and -women who are spearheading them, but by those parts of our societies that are and/or feel left behind by technological change and globalization. The social contract between state and society must be restored by getting domestic policies ‘right’ for all constituencies.
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Resist Knee-Jerk Reactions and Address Legitimate Grievances. Instead of dismissing the concerns of PopSov supporters as backwards or unfounded, policymakers should get better at parsing fact from fiction and legitimate from contrived grievance and – most importantly – at addressing both.
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Give Democracy a Chance. Recent developments in the US and in various European countries show the resilience of the more traditional democratic model.
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Develop Homeland Defense and Bolster Resilience. Societal, economical and political resilience is crucial. Aspects that may require specific and increased attention by defense and security organizations lie less in the realm of the ‘agents of conflict’ (’the enemy’) than in the realm of the ‘agents of resilience.’
Dutch foreign policies and the EU
With respect to Dutch foreign policies, the report concludes that its interests can best be upheld (ironically) through the vehicle of the European Union. The US is distancing itself from Europe, and the Dutch relationship with Russia is likely to remain difficult: there will be few alternatives but to pursue an even more proactive position in the European Union.
Energy transition, necessary for the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, requires development and large-scale deployment of low-carbon technologies. These will increase global demand for different minerals and metals, what mandates a wide range of adjustments at the state level. The need to re-think, reduce, replace, recycle, redesign and re-distribute the use of scarce commodities is particularly heightened.
Energy transition, necessary for the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, requires development and large-scale deployment of low-carbon technologies. These will increase global demand for different minerals and metals, what mandates a wide range of adjustments at the state level. The need to re-think, reduce, replace, recycle, redesign and re-distribute the use of scarce commodities is particularly heightened.
The message put forward at the 2017 Raw Materials Conference on June 23rd in The Hague was threefold: 1) realizing energy transition requires large amounts of raw materials and a significant upscaling of mining activities; 2) such activities have to be carried out in a sustainable manner, and should respect human rights, the needs of local communities, and the environment; 3) transition to a circular economy model in product chains is required to mitigate existing and emerging challenges in the short run. Circular design of windmills and solar panels is needed.
The challenges, takeaways and recommendations outlined in this policy paper were compiled on the basis of extensive in-house research, information gleaned at the round-table and the raw materials conference, and reflect the informed opinions of relevant stakeholders representing the government, private industry and knowledge institutes.
Download the policy paper via the button on the right.
Na de ontdekking van het Groningen aardgasveld in 1959, het grootste gasveld in West-Europa, is Nederland meer dan een halve eeuw zelfvoorzienend geweest met deze energiebron. Het keerpunt kwam door de aardbeving in Huizinge in de provincie Groningen in augustus 2012 met een kracht van 3,6 op de schaal van Richter. die gebeurtenis heeft geleid tot een plafond voor de jaarlijkse productie van 21,6 miljard kubieke meter (Billion Cubic Metres, BCM), ruim de helft minder dan in de jaren vóór 2014.
Na de ontdekking van het Groningen aardgasveld in 1959, het grootste gasveld in West-Europa, is Nederland meer dan een halve eeuw zelfvoorzienend geweest met deze energiebron. Het keerpunt kwam door de aardbeving in Huizinge in de provincie Groningen in augustus 2012 met een kracht van 3,6 op de schaal van Richter. die gebeurtenis heeft geleid tot een plafond voor de jaarlijkse productie van 21,6 miljard kubieke meter (Billion Cubic Metres, BCM), ruim de helft minder dan in de jaren vóór 2014.
Er zijn veel vragen over de leveringszekerheid in de toekomst: wat zijn de consequenties op langere termijn van de voorgenomen beslissingen over Groningen? Kan de productie in Groningen in de toekomst nog verder worden verlaagd? Wat is de rol van de productie van aardgas uit de kleine velden? Is ondergrondse gasopslag nodig? Kan de import van aardgas dan wel de inzet van duurzame energiebronnen de productie van Groningen vervangen? Wat zijn daarvan de kosten en geopolitieke consequenties? Hoe realistisch is een snelle vermindering van de aardgasvraag in Nederland eigenlijk gegeven de Nederlandse energieagenda? Deze en veel andere vragen komen in dit paper, aan de orde. Het paper is een gezamenlijke studie van TNO en HCSS.
Download het paper via de knop rechts.
China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project was formally introduced by Chinese President Xi-Jinping in 2013. The project, aimed at integrating trade and investment in Eurasia, encompasses over $900 billion in planned investments of infrastructure across Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project was formally introduced by Chinese President Xi-Jinping in 2013. The project, aimed at integrating trade and investment in Eurasia, encompasses over $900 billion in planned investments of infrastructure across Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
A dedicated forum for cooperation with CEE countries has been around now for several years. Originally created in April 2012, ‘the so-called ‘16+1’ framework constitutes a platform which brings heads of state together annually to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between China and the CEE region. Chinese investment interests within the CEE region appear strongly related to privatization opportunities, including large scale infrastructure projects and public procurement opportunities.
China’s interest in the CEE region, and the creation of the ‘16+1’ format in particular, also gives rise to concerns that China is attempting to use the region as a medium through which to influence the EU from within. This influence manifests itself primarily in the form of initiatives which aim to persuade and/or pressure CEE countries to adopt favorable policies vis-à-vis China. These concerns stem from two directions. First, there is a fear that some deals concluded with China may not comply with EU rules on public procurement, or other regulations and guidelines. Second, there is a fear of political influencing, which some see exhibited by the EU in avoiding direct references or statements towards China’s legal defeat over the South China Sea after the objection by some member states
China’s engagement in the Middle East is arguably the most important component of the OBOR initiative as far as its strategic objectives are concerned. Beijing enunciates a clear interest in developing strong structural ties within the region, particularly with fossil fuel exports being the centerpiece, at least for the initial stage. This also means of course that China will almost inevitably get embroiled in political matters, and thus pose a challenge to the interests of other key players such as Russia, the US and the EU. While China seeks to avoid becoming yet another outside power that meddles in the region’s affairs, it does already show signs of being prepared to become politically engaged. In its engagement in the Middle East, China’s policy is banked on the hopes of being the newish entrant in the region, which absolves it from any imperialist or interventionist baggage. This notwithstanding, regional players, are going to be tempted to play the China card when dealing with the other major (outside) powers, which will effectively pull China into the region’s political vortices.
Given OBOR’s unprecedented scale, this new study by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) investigates the extent to which ‘Belt and Road’ related investments in CEE and the greater Middle East bring sufficient economic weight to both regions that at the same time can be turned into political influence. If this is indeed the case, a pertinent question to ask is whether China is prepared and willing to play a greater political (and/or security) role in CEE and the Middle East in the first place? In addition, the paper seeks to understand whether China’s role can be judged as positive or negative for regional security, as seen from the viewpoint of Europe and the Netherlands.
The study can be downloaded via the button on the right.
The report was also featured by the Morning Vertical; Radio Free Europe's daily Russia brief.