New snapshot out now! To read, click here.
The number of terrorist attacks from the far-right spectrum has increased considerably in the US and Europe over the last decade. Even though awareness on this phenomenon is now gradually rising, scholars, policy makers and security forces have long focused predominantly - and perhaps disproportionately - on Islamist terrorism. This negligence towards other types of terrorist threat is now proving to have vital consequences and obstacles in adequately addressing the current threat stemming from the far-right.
This snapshot by assistant analyst Tara Görder examines these consequences and obstacles by outlining the US’ and Europe’s bias in framing the issue of terrorism in diverging ways, securitizing one (Islamist terrorism) but neglecting the other (far-right terrorism). Legislative differences amongst both types and ambiguous definitions complicate the process of designating terrorism for what it is, conflating far-right terrorism with petty or hate crimes and thereby diminishing their gravity for the public perception. Likewise, prosecution and conviction rates relating to Islamist terrorism are proportionally shown to be much higher than for far-right terrorism.
Weighing the little attention it receives against the current pace at which far-right terrorism is rising, underpins how both the US and Europe seem to lack effective and adequate (legal) tools for holding perpetrators from the far-right (as well as potentially arising terrorist groups/ideologies in the future) accountable.
Download the snapshot by Tara Görder here, or click on the PDF button on the right.
New report out now! To read, click here.
How does the Dutch perception of its security threats compare to the outlook of other states? It’s all in the eye of the beholder…
All countries have procedures and – in some cases – methodologies to identify, analyze and prioritize threats to their national security. The outcome of these efforts is typically one or more high-level documents in which the responsible national security bodies provide authoritative statements on threats facing the country. As part of the Dutch Strategic Monitor effort, HCSS was asked to take a closer look at how other actors perceive their threat environments and to what extent they might differ from their Dutch equivalents.
This study sets out to address the following research questions:
1. What similarities and differences exist between the Netherlands’ and other actors’ perceptions of interstate military competition (IMC), conflict in cyberspace, hybrid conflict and economic security, CBRN weapons, and terrorism – all central threats in the Dutch Geïntegreerde Buitenland -en Veiligheidsstrategie (GBVS) and National Security Strategy (NSS) 2019?
2. How do other actors interpret trends relating to the rules-based (liberal) international order?
3. What threats do other actors afford central positions which the Netherlands does not?
4. Do other actors identify opportunities for the future?
We have analyzed a long-list of identified threats – and countries’ perceptions thereof – in order to provide insights with the potential of challenging preconceptions underpinning the Dutch threat perception framework.
Follow this link to read the report by Hugo van Manen.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
New report out now! To read, click here.
What do Chinese naval intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters have in common with Russian bots that spread and amplify disinformation?
This Global Security Pulse examines trends within hybrid conflicts, understood as "conflicts between states, largely below the legal level of armed conflict, with integrated use of civilian and military means and actors, with the aim of achieving certain strategic objectives."
States have ample reason to be concerned about hybrid threats and hybrid conflict. Although at their core hybrid tactics are tactics old as time (military posturing, spreading propaganda and the use of economic measures are well established military strategies), the availability of a diverse and sophisticated set of (technological) tools enhances the impact, reach and congruence of hybrid threats. Paired with the reluctance of states to engage in conventional war due to nuclear, economic and political deterrence, this means that hybrid conflict constitutes an increasingly desirable strategy for states to achieve their political goals.
The principal conclusion of this Pulse is that the international security environment is increasingly subject to hybrid threats, often in a subtle and pervasive way that impedes fast detection, accountability and retaliation. Hybrid threats and hybrid conflict are typified by their complexity, ambiguity, multidimensional nature and gradual impact. These characteristics pose a challenge to effective response measures and therefore to the international order.
Read the new report by Bianca Torossian.
The authors would like to thank Jovana Perovska for her contribution to the international order section of this report.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Dr. Tim Sweijs contributed an article on information warfare at the dawn of the information age, in the Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2020, the annual national security foresight of the Austrian Ministry of Defense.
Dr. Tim Sweijs contributed an article on information warfare at the dawn of the information age, in the Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2020, the annual national security foresight of the Austrian Ministry of Defense.
Read the article by Dr. Sweijs here or download the PDF on the right.
At the dawn of the Information Age, all signs point towards the proliferation and maturation of tools and the sophistication of tactics used in disinformation campaigns. 5G will supercharge the velocity of information flows, drive the widespread adoption of augmented and virtual reality applications, and fundamentally change the way in which humans ingest information and experience social and physical reality. This will unlock a range of new opportunities for information war. A comprehensive agenda to deal with measures should focus on three aspects: increasing the resilience of our societies through more investment in Humboldtisches forms of education; strengthening the protections that shield against the deliberate manipulation of information through private sector regulation; and designing a strategic deterrence posture which includes the ability to reciprocate in kind and hit opponents where it hurts.
New Report: Cross Domain Deterrence and Hybrid Conflict
Liberal Western democracies have been too complacent when it comes to dealing with contemporary hybrid adversaries. We have been following rather than leading. It’s time to seize back the strategic initiative, but how do we do that?
In this new joint HCSS/TNO paper, Tim Sweijs and Samo Zilincik argue that Western democracies can and should develop a strategic deterrent posture in an age of hybrid conflict. Based on an extensive review of cross domain deterrence theory and practice, they offer four recommendations to policymakers:
• maintain strong monitoring capabilities to expose hybrid actions in a timely fashion;
• develop options for proportionate responses to inappropriate behavior;
• showcase intent and capabilities to adversaries with clear guidelines when transgressions will be punished;
• review and refine the legal framework for hybrid deterrence options;
Would you like to know more? Download the report here, or click on the PDF button on the right.
New report out now! To read, click here.
As Russian and Chinese defense expenditures pivot towards the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons systems, can Europe keep up on innovation? Hugo van Manen and Tim Sweijs present the latest report on Interstate Military Competition.
As geopolitical rivalry is regaining prominence and technology is advancing, states are more actively engaging in interstate military competition (IMC). This is evident in activities such as the ramping up of military investments in dual-use AI technologies and the growing militarization of space. Even though instances of direct military confrontation remain limited, internationalized intrastate conflicts have grown in both their prevalence and intensity. The adversity fostered by these dynamics, combined with the proliferation of new technologies, is placing considerable stress on the international order. This can clearly be seen in, for example, the erosion of existing arms control regimes, as well as in states’ use of proxy actors to circumvent regulations. This results in a significant increase in the threat posed by IMC to the Netherlands. In concrete terms, this threat may manifest in an increased chance of armed conflict on NATO’s territory. The threat level is further raised by the fact that IMC increasingly manifest itself in non-traditional forms, which are associated with a host of negative externalities and effects for economic security and societal cohesion.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on IMC was published in February 2019. This research report examines the underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the GSP’s two trend tables. It covers trends in interstate military competition and international regime developments over the past ten years. It builds on the previously published Strategic Monitor Report (2018-2019) and updates its empirical analysis of contemporary trends in IMC. It does so by gauging states’ intention and capacity to engage in such competition, and their actual activity in this realm. This report continues with an analysis of trends within the international order through an assessment of five interstate military competition-related norms and rules.
Read the report here.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on Conflict in Cyberspace was published in June 2019 and tracked emerging trends in relation to peace and security in cyberspace. This complementary research report delves into the two trend tables presented in the GSP by examining their underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) on Conflict in Cyberspace was published in June 2019 and tracked emerging trends in relation to peace and security in cyberspace. This complementary research report delves into the two trend tables presented in the GSP by examining their underlying quantitative and qualitative evidence.
First, the ‘Threats in Cyberspace’ trend table, which measures a variety of indicators over a period of ten years, is examined. These indicators measure the seriousness of conflict in cyberspace by gauging the intention and capacity of states to engage in cyber conflict, as well as the level of malicious activity reported in cyberspace. The report continues with an analysis of the second trend table, ‘International Order in Cyberspace’, which measures the acceptance of norms and rules in this contentious field. Lastly, the conclusion illuminates how states can forge norm coherence and adoption in this complex, multi-stakeholder environment in order to enhance stability and peace in cyberspace.
Read the report here.
Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
The three main tasks for Defence can be found in the Constitution, Article 97, which states that a defence force exists to defend the Kingdom and the territory of the alliances (NATO and EU), to maintain and promote the international rule of law and to support the government in upkeeping the law, fighting disasters and delivering humanitarian support. Another way to look at these tasks is in the terms of so-called Strategic Challenges that the Netherlands Armed Forces want to achieve: “to Remain Safe, to Foste
The three main tasks for Defence can be found in the Constitution, Article 97, which states that a defence force exists to defend the Kingdom and the territory of the alliances (NATO and EU), to maintain and promote the international rule of law and to support the government in upkeeping the law, fighting disasters and delivering humanitarian support. Another way to look at these tasks is in the terms of so-called Strategic Challenges that the Netherlands Armed Forces want to achieve: “to Remain Safe, to Foster Security and to Secure Connections”. In this recent report more background and insights to this approach can be found.
Applying the lens of the Strategic Challenges to look at the security environment and the role of the Netherlands therein, has consequences for the types of missions and tasks the Armed Forces must be capable of, and thus for the (future) military capability portfolio. The objective of this Study is to add (1) future-oriented elements to further substantiate the narrative for each of the Strategic Challenges; and thereby (2) to link (the dynamics within) the Strategic Challenges to (future) missions for the Armed Forces and associated defence capability portfolio choices. These results can be used within the context of the next Defence White Paper (presumably labelled as a ‘vision’ with a 10-15-year time horizon), scheduled for publication in the first half of 2020.
In this paper Assistant Analyst Liam van de Ven and Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder examine the opportunities, challenges and urgency of Dutch activity in space. They offer a two-track approach, involving both tailor-made nanosatellites and international constellations.
In this paper Assistant Analyst Liam van de Ven and Strategic Analyst Patrick Bolder examine the opportunities, challenges and urgency of Dutch activity in space. They offer a two-track approach, involving both tailor-made nanosatellites and international constellations.
Cyberspace represents one of the greatest inventions of mankind, reshaping personal, social, business, and political relationships. Unfortunately, due to attacks on and through cyberspace, urgent action is needed to ensure its stability. This concept of cyberspace stability—like its close cousin, international stability—requires a shared vision, one in which all parties recognize that geopolitical disagreements and changes which affect cyberspace must be managed in relative peace, and that cyberspace stability must be assured.
Cyberspace represents one of the greatest inventions of mankind, reshaping personal, social, business, and political relationships. Unfortunately, due to attacks on and through cyberspace, urgent action is needed to ensure its stability. This concept of cyberspace stability—like its close cousin, international stability—requires a shared vision, one in which all parties recognize that geopolitical disagreements and changes which affect cyberspace must be managed in relative peace, and that cyberspace stability must be assured.
The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace began its work convinced that an issue traditionally reserved to states—international peace and security—could no longer be addressed without engaging other stakeholders. Cyberspace is a multistakeholder environment: those who build and manage cyberspace, and those who respond to attacks on and through cyberspace, are as likely to be non-state actors as government officials. Our Commissioners were selected to reflect this characteristic. Besides former senior government officials with experience in international security issues, our ranks included acknowledged leaders from the fields of Internet governance, the human rights and development communities, and technology and industry. Together, our 28 Commissioners from 16 countries provided a wide range of experience and views, and they were aided by public comments in response to Commission outreach.
The Commission’s final report represents three years of hard work. We gratefully recognize those who made this possible: our Commissioners, our advisors and researchers (many of them also volunteers), our financial supporters, and our management board. Finally, our appreciation goes to the Secretariat, which not only ably managed the process but was instrumental in the Commission’s creation as a civil society initiative.
Throughout its work, the Commission remained cognizant of other cyberspace initiatives, both past and present. Our report—Advancing Cyberstability—complements and reinforces the work of others, while providing new ideas for advancing the stability of cyberspace.
Read the full report here or download the PDF on the right.
About the Commission
Launched at the 2017 Munich Security Conference, the mission of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) is to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace. The Commission helps to promote mutual awareness and understanding among the various cyberspace communities working on issues related to international cybersecurity.
The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace was initiated by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), which, together with the EastWest Institute constitute the GCSC Secretariat. In addition to the Commission body itself, the GCSC is supported by a number of partners, including the governments of the Netherlands, Singapore and France, as well as Microsoft, the Internet Society, Afilias, other sponsors and supporters, and a Research Advisory Group that connects the GCSC to the academic community.
For more information, please visit www.cyberstability.org or contact loukfaesen@hcss.nl
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments.
The Global Security Pulse (GSP) tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide, allowing you to stay ahead in new security developments. This month we present novel developments and must-reads on hybrid conflict. Our research suggests that the international security environment is increasingly characterized by hybrid strategies that fall under military, political, economic, information, and cyber domains. Hybrid threats are characterized by their complexity, ambiguity, multidimensional nature, and gradual impact, making them difficult for states to effectively respond to and posing a significant challenge to the international order. Whilst hybrid tactics in and of themselves are not entirely new, the availability of diverse and sophisticated (technological) tools is enhancing the impact, reach, and congruence of these strategies. This aspect, paired with states’ unprecedented aversion to engage in conventional war due to nuclear, economic and political deterrence, and recent shifts in global power means that hybrid conflict constitutes an increasingly desirable strategy to achieve political goals.
The GSP is a product made in collaboration with the Clingendael Institute. It uses an advanced horizon-scanning methodology which involves a systematic scan of literature, conferences, twitter, and validated expert input. The GSP product is based on the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the Clingendael Institute. It is part of the Strategic Monitor Program (2018–2019 can be found here, and older publications are listed here), which receives funding from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Authors: Bianca Torossian, Tara Görder, Lucas Fagliano (HCSS). Contributors: Tim Sweijs, Hugo van Manen, Dylan Browne-Wilkinson (HCSS), Danny Pronk (Clingendael)
Use the button on the right to download the Pulse or Click Here.
DISCLAIMER
The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
As NATO celebrates the 70th anniversary of its Founding Treaty this year, many fundamental aspects of its future are widely debated within the Alliance itself. Western views on NATO’s future have, throughout the seven decades of its existence, ranged from those who predicted NATO’s imminent demise to those who claimed that the many ties that bind the two sides of the Northern Atlantic are so deep and enduring that they are bound to last for decades to come. Throughout this period, the center of gravity in this debate has always tended to lean towards the latter view.
As NATO celebrates the 70th anniversary of its Founding Treaty this year, many fundamental aspects of its future are widely debated within the Alliance itself. Western views on NATO’s future have, throughout the seven decades of its existence, ranged from those who predicted NATO’s imminent demise to those who claimed that the many ties that bind the two sides of the Northern Atlantic are so deep and enduring that they are bound to last for decades to come. Throughout this period, the center of gravity in this debate has always tended to lean towards the latter view. More recently, however, the Western outlook on NATO’s future is increasingly being painted in decidedly more somber hues.
But what do other key players in the international system think about NATO’s future(s)? To answer this question, the Dutch ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs asked HCSS to take a closer and more systematic look at how Chinese and Russian experts have been analyzing NATO’s future in their languages over the past three years – basically since the beginning of the Trump presidency. Many of the key Chinese and Russian scholars working on these issues also publish in English. Given the nature of these countries’ regimes, however, it is often unclear to what extent they are signaling to the broader Western or international community as opposed to reflecting their own opinions or views. This may differ from publications in their own language primarily targeted at domestic audiences, which also clearly include part of their countries’ elites whose knowledge of the English language might preclude them from being exposed to their projections and ideas.
This document is structured in four sections. After a succinct overview of the method used in Chapter 2, the Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the main findings for the Chinese and the Russian language domains respectively. The final Chapter 5 gives the conclusions as well as some broader reflections on the promise and peril of this type of foresight work for improving the government’s strategic anticipation capacity.
DISCLAIMER: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should it be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Based on our recent report by the same name, this Policy Brief by Dr. LLM Arlinda Rrustemi & Professor Rob de Wijk sheds a light on the consequences of foreign influences in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Policy Brief highlights challenges and opportunities for Western actors in the region, including setting out a coherent accession plan to the EU and NATO for these states.
Based on our recent report by the same name, this Policy Brief by Dr. LLM Arlinda Rrustemi & Professor Rob de Wijk sheds a light on the consequences of foreign influences in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Policy Brief highlights challenges and opportunities for Western actors in the region, including setting out a coherent accession plan to the EU and NATO for these states.
This report examines how and to what extent multiple external actors are increasing their influence over the political elites and peoples of Western Balkans countries.
This report examines how and to what extent multiple external actors are increasing their influence over the political elites and peoples of Western Balkans countries. It considers economic, political, religious cultural and security-related factors, and their impact on the future of peace and state-building processes. Increasingly, Eastern actors have been using hybrid threats (disinformation warfare, covert operations to win the hearts and minds of the population by Russia), spreading violent extremism (Gulf countries), potentially debt-trapping some Western Balkans countries (China), violating the EU laws on arms trade (Gulf countries) and implementing identity reengineering (Gulf countries, Iran, Russia, Turkey) in order to advance their geopolitical interests. Indeed, the Eastern actors often adopt a holistic approach in focusing on winning hearts and minds of the Western Balkans population.
These security risks can derail the stability of the region in the long term with negative ramifications towards the EU and NATO integration processes as well as EU regional policies. For instance, it has been found that for political reasons, the West is now less attractive to the Western Balkans. Local elites may be less willing to engage with the West because they are reticent to promote the rule of law, or because of a lack of personal ties between the Western Balkans elites and Western counterparts. Moreover, there is fatigue to engage with the West because interaction is very time-consuming and complicated, for instance with regard to obtaining grants. Most importantly, factors such as the lack of coherent strategy from the West, the failed post conflict reconstruction due to the prioritization of stability over democracy, the lack of a realistic EU enlargement agenda, and the lack of engagement with the local population has disillusioned both elites and common people across the Western Balkans region. This is why engagement with Eastern partners often seems more appealing: it is easier to obtain grants for projects, leadership styles are more similar, and local elites feel more secure about their own positions and the maintenance of the status quo, effectively perpetuating the grip on power by illiberal elites.
The central objective of this report is to outline policy recommendations which can holistically deal with the challenges posed by Western and Eastern actors in the Western Balkans region. In aiming to bolster peace and security in the Western Balkans region, the policy recommendations are grouped from general to specific, focusing on aspects of law, economic, security and social affairs.
Generally, the region may be at a turning point where populations that are generally torn between the West and the East may begin gravitating more towards the latter. The West, therefore, needs to craft a response soon in order to avert further instability in the region. For this purpose, it would be crucial to re-establish legitimacy while strengthening the moral authority of the West, speaking with one voice in the region, and, crucially, maintain a realistic EU Enlargement Agenda, such as opening the membership negotiations for North Macedonia and Albania. It would also be beneficial to award Bosnia and Herzegovina a candidate status, and to agree to visa liberalization for Kosovo. The agenda needs to remain proactive and to be implemented thoroughly. Existing instruments need to be employed and more exposure needs to be generated to show and explain Western engagement with the region, not only aimed at the elites but also at the local population.
It is therefore crucial that Western actors respond swiftly and reinforce their efforts to promote democracy. This in turn would help in winning the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, it is important to provide alternatives to local governments to prevent them from getting caught in the debt trap diplomacy of China, to counter Turkish authoritarian propaganda, to prevent violent extremism, supported by the Gulf countries and Iran, as well as to counter disinformation warfare conducted by Russia, as well as the rising far right violent extremism identified in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.
In the legal sphere, our recommendations call for implementing laws on transparency and strengthening of the judiciary, regulating housing prices and building new mosques. In the security sphere, it is crucial to harmonize security policies of Western Balkans countries with those of the EU and its member states; consider sanctions for arms exports if in violation with the EU laws; promote individual responsibility; strengthen the border control; and to limit the appointment of foreign imams. Regarding economic measures, it is suggested to open the EU Cohesion Fund to Western Balkans countries and to encourage further investment in rural areas. In terms of societal measures, it is important to increase the prominence of public awareness campaigns, and to promote civil society engagement. It is also proposed to challenge the attractiveness of Eastern actors by informing the local public about these countries’ strategies to sow social divisions. It is also important to increase cultural exchanges and language courses. Finally, it is essential to monitor the changes in societal values and beliefs. A combination of these types of measures may assist in strengthening democracy in the region as well as countering external influences. However, this necessitates tailored implementation tracks for each country which requires further in-depth research on how to implement such strategies through a governmental and societal approach.
On 17 September a report about Quantum Computing was published by HSD Office: Understanding the strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security, Implications of Quantum Computing within the Cybersecurity Domain. This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).The report was launched during the HSD Café about Quantum Technology.
On 17 September a report about Quantum Computing was published by HSD Office: Understanding the strategic and Technical Significance of Technology for Security, Implications of Quantum Computing within the Cybersecurity Domain. This report was commissioned by and executed for the Hague Security Delta (https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/).The report was launched during the HSD Café about Quantum Technology.
For more information, please see the HSD website.
The objective of the Quantum Technology initiative within the Hague Security Delta (HSD) is to create the practical facilities for cyber security companies to experiment with Quantum Key Exchange technology. These companies can improve practical skills and knowledge and realise innovative solutions for their (encryption) products. In this way we will get prepared for the post-quantum era.
Quantum computers are widely seen as a breakthrough technology, especially when employed in disciplines like artificial intelligence, cryptography, and big data analytics. Yet, with the undeniable promise of quantum computing come vast amounts of hype and confusion, ranging from what a quantum computer precisely entails, to when one can expect a quantum computer, to what sort of applications it might offer. We need to be prepared for this in future.
To download the report, click on the button to the right or visit the HSD website.