In his well-known book The End of Power, Moises Naim argues that urbanization – which he regards as “the most aggressively power-transforming aspect of the mobility revolution” – will have “intense” consequences for the distribution of power within a country. The emerging role of cities in world politics makes governance of cities not just a local or national issue, but an international - or, if you will, a transnational - issue.
In his well-known book The End of Power, Moises Naim argues that urbanization – which he regards as “the most aggressively power-transforming aspect of the mobility revolution” – will have “intense” consequences for the distribution of power within a country. The emerging role of cities in world politics makes governance of cities not just a local or national issue, but an international - or, if you will, a transnational - issue.
More people living in cities will inevitably have consequences for the nature of conflict. In response, cities are stepping up cooperation between them, which is now giving rise “to new power relations altogether” according to sociologist Saskia Sassen. However, it is not a given that cities working together will themselves be able to tackle conflict and violence, let alone take the lead in combating global violence and conflict, especially in the developing world.
For authorities at multiple levels, this prompts the need to rethink existing governance structures so as to ensure not only that different forms of violence and conflict in urban areas can be combated in the most effective ways, but also that appropriate preventative policies that tackle root causes be implemented. The result of such an exercise can be to create an ecosystem of stakeholders, from citizens to international organizations, suitable to address these very issues from a broad-based human security perspective.
The present study examines the relationships between urbanization and conflict from multiple angles, based on data-driven research. Subsequently, it considers the consequences for urban governance, and provides suggestions on how cities and national governments can improve cooperation on urban security together with other relevant stakeholders.
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In a world of complex supply chains, global flows are critical to the welfare of societies at large. They yield enormous economic, social, and cultural value, whether through trade, foreign investment, tourism or the exchange of knowledge and ideas. Mounting interconnectedness, however, also facilitates the growth of negative flows such as human trafficking, the trade in illicit goods including arms and drugs, international terrorism, and cybercrime, which have the potential to disrupt and undermine the resilience of societies. While fundamentally dependent on global flows, modern societies are also critically vulnerable to flow insecurity.
Although many different state and non-state actors have a stake in flow security, they do not necessarily have or feel the responsibility to provide and maintain that security. Clearly, governments have a responsibility in facilitating positive flows while keeping negative flows in check. But what should or could be left to the, often private, owners of flow particles, flow channels and flow hubs? What about the global commons, those parts of the global flow chains where no national authority resides? How to protect the flows themselves, other than the channels - trade routes, digital networks - and hubs - harbors, airports, internet exchange centers - through which they flow? Are security and defense organizations sufficiently prepared to deal with the challenges at hand?
Acknowledging that contemporary security and defense is as much about ensuring uninterrupted access to global flows - both physical and virtual - as it is about safeguarding territorial integrity and global stability, this new HCSS report analyzes flow security as a distinct strategic challenge for the Netherlands. The study defines what flow security entails, describes its relevance to the Netherlands, analyzes its implications for security and defense policies, and outlines a set of policy recommendations concerning the implications of flow security for Dutch security and defense policies and the role, tasks and capabilities of the Dutch defense organization. The report also provides a valuable empirical analysis of the five critical flows, namely flows of goods and services, information, ideas and technology, capital, people and environmental agents, on which Dutch prosperity and stability depends.
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Joint publication of the Atlantic Council, the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures and HCSS.
Authors: Jonathan D. Moyer, Tim Sweijs, Mathew J. Burrows, Hugo van Manen.
Joint publication of the Atlantic Council, the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures and HCSS.
Authors: Jonathan D. Moyer, Tim Sweijs, Mathew J. Burrows, Hugo van Manen.
Today the ability to get other states to act in the international system may be characterized more by formal networks of influence than by traditional measures of coercive material capabilities. Yet, the concept of coercive power, rather than influence, continues to be central both in scholarly and political discourses about international order and the ability of nation states to promote and protect critical national interests. The lack of a clear but also measurable concept of what influence is and what tangible benefits accrue from it may be partly to blame for this. In filling that void, this report presents the highlights of our analysis of the newly compiled Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) Index. The FBIC Index contains bilateral measures of the formal economic, political, and security influence capacity of states worldwide from 1963 to 2016. Our analysis maps the changing dynamics of state influence over time.
Key findings from this report include the following:
• Global influence is concentrated in the hands of the few. Only ten countries possess about half of the world’s influence.
• Similar to trends in the global distribution of power, global influence has been dispersing. A growing number of states wield greater amounts of influence over larger geographical distances.
• The United States still retains a global lead in terms of its share of global influence capacity, but its share has been decreasing and is considerably smaller than its share of the world’s coercive capabilities.
• China’s upward trajectory has been impressive. It has vastly expanded its influence, not only in its own region but also outside of it, including in NATO member states and in Africa at large, where it has surpassed the United States.
• Russia’s trajectory has been similarly sizeable, but in the opposite direction: it has lost considerable amounts of influence, including in countries in the former Soviet space.
• European states, including some small ones such as the Netherlands, significantly punch above their weight in comparison to the size of their economies.
• Great powers continue to vie over spheres of influence for a variety of military-strategic, economic, and ideological reasons. Pivot states are located in the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and West Africa.
• The past two decades saw the emergence of new networks of influence and the reconfiguration of others around dominant hubs including in the Middle East and China.
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For the methodological annex which reviews the rationale for including the individual dimensions, and provides a discussion of the data-sets we use, see here.
European defence cooperation appears to have gained momentum. Particularly in the EU, new cooperation initiatives, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Fund and a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, address a number of weaknesses that defence cooperation was suffering from. It is clear that a number of external incentives have spurred on recent quick developments: an increasing critical and disengaged White House, a deteriorating security situation around Europe and an assertive Russia.
European defence cooperation appears to have gained momentum. Particularly in the EU, new cooperation initiatives, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Fund and a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, address a number of weaknesses that defence cooperation was suffering from. It is clear that a number of external incentives have spurred on recent quick developments: an increasing critical and disengaged White House, a deteriorating security situation around Europe and an assertive Russia. However, it was perhaps the EU’s internal upheavals, such as Brexit, that really turned the tide. The Commission under Juncker’s leadership broke a number of taboos by becoming involved in defence cooperation and the French and German tandem chose defence as the policy area where they wanted to excel.
Amidst these new developments, this report wants to take a step back and look at the broader landscape of European defence cooperation. How do these new initiatives and existing cooperation formats fit together in a logical framework? What kind of patterns are developing and how can the recent developments be connected to the many already existing cooperation initiatives, both operational and in capability development? As new ideas seem to fall over each other, can we still make sense of European defence?
This report is a collaboration between the Clingendael Institute and HCSS.
Authors: Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee and Eric Wilms.
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Russia’s disinformation campaigns have targeted liberal democracies in Europe and North America with the goal to undermine societal coherence and distort the democratic process. The methods employed by the Kremlin include the dissemination of false, misleading and manipulative information and bear resemblance to the techniques, tactics and procedures used by the Soviet Union.
Russia’s disinformation campaigns have targeted liberal democracies in Europe and North America with the goal to undermine societal coherence and distort the democratic process. The methods employed by the Kremlin include the dissemination of false, misleading and manipulative information and bear resemblance to the techniques, tactics and procedures used by the Soviet Union.
The past few years Western governments have been struggling with the question of how to appropriately respond to counter Russian subversive activities. Appropriate responses have been fiercely debated and are increasingly implemented. This new HCSS report considers lessons for liberal democracies based on an analysis of the postures, strategies, organizational setups, programs, products, and capabilities that the following five actors have developed in recent years: the European Union, NATO, Finland, Latvia and Ukraine.
This study is based on extensive desk research and in-depth personal interviews with relevant high level representatives of these five actors. It offers recommendations for liberal democracies on how to deal with Russia’s disinformation operations. The point of departure is the appropriate role and competence of government, as well as the constraints placed thereon in the context of a liberal democratic order. Of particular interest is how overall (top-down) visions, strategies and capabilities can help provide the best circumstances for societal resilience such as through (bottom-up) societal initiatives.
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In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.
Deze folder is de derde in een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Aan de hand van praktijkvoorbeelden word geïllustreerd hoe AO toegevoegde waarde levert met betrekking tot maritieme surveillance, grensbewaking, non-profilatie, militaire operaties en de openbare orde.Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.
Deze folder is de tweede in een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Aan de hand van praktijkvoorbeelden word geïllustreerd hoe AO toegevoegde waarde levert met betrekking tot voedselzekerheid, klimaatverandering, natuurrampen en de biodiversiteit.Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer.
In de wereld van vandaag is de beschikbaarheid van data en informatie enorm toegenomen. Aardobservatie (AO) is één van de methodes om data te verzamelen en tot informatie te verwerken. Niettemin is Ao vaak nog omgeven door onbekendheid, zeker bij het grote publiek. En dat terwijl op velerlei vlakken AO toepassingn al gebruikt worden, of het nu gaat om de vitale infrastructuur, voor het meten van klimaatverandering, of voor waterbeheer. Op veiligheidsgebied kan de beschikbaarheid van informatie een groot verschil maken ter assistentie van politiediensten, in het kader van militaire operaties of of bijvoorbeeld smokkelactiviteiten te traceren.
Deze folder is de eerste van een driedelige serie die op een toegankelijke wijze zowel het belang als de toepassingen van aardobservatie in kaart brengt. Het illustreert de verschillende AO technieken, legt uit waar AO data te verkrijgen is en schetst de belangrijkste trends en ontwikkelingen. Tot slot is er ook een lijst met websites en rapporten bijgevoegd voor verdere informatie.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten. Niemand kan de precieze aard en timing van de grote veranderingen en de daaruit voortvloeiende nieuwe risico’s voorspellen, maar goede analyses stellen ons wel in staat om de range aan mogelijkheden te verkennen en ons zo actief voor te bereiden op wat komen gaat.
Deze notitie kan worden gezien als een vertrekpunt voor een proces waarin de snelle technologische ontwikkelingen op het gebied van Blockchain met een veiligheidsbril op worden bezien. Het diende als input voor een HSD-Café in november 2017, waarin een hands-on scenario-oefening rond het thema werd georganiseerd. Op deze wijze informeerde HSD Office de partners in HSD en alle overige belanghebbenden over de mogelijke veiligheidsimplicaties van de snelle ontwikkelingen op het gebied van Blockchain.
Download de PDF via de knop rechts.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten.
De wereld verandert snel. Dat er sprake is van een ‘technologische tsunami’ wordt breed erkend. Desondanks worden we niet zelden overvallen door rap opkomende technologieën die, naast nieuwe kansen, ook nieuwe bedreigingen inhouden die soms veel verder gaan dan wat we op grond van onze ervaringen uit het verleden konden verwachten. Niemand kan de precieze aard en timing van de grote veranderingen en de daaruit voortvloeiende nieuwe risico’s voorspellen, maar goede analyses stellen ons wel in staat om de range aan mogelijkheden te verkennen en ons zo actief voor te bereiden op wat komen gaat.
Deze notitie kan worden gezien als een vertrekpunt voor een proces waarin de snelle technologische ontwikkelingen op het gebied van Artificial Intelligence met een veiligheidsbril op worden bezien. Het diende als input voor een HSD-Café in november 2017, waarin een hands-on scenario-oefening rond het thema werd georganiseerd. Op deze wijze informeerde HSD Office de partners in HSD en alle overige belanghebbenden over de mogelijke veiligheidsimplicaties van de snelle ontwikkelingen op het gebied van AI.
Download de PDF via de knop rechts.
2017 is not over yet, but the year was ridden with alarming push notifications buzzing on our mobile phones. Political events are covered around the clock - from Trump’s Twitter antics to terrorist attacks sowing destruction around the world.
2017 is not over yet, but the year was ridden with alarming push notifications buzzing on our mobile phones. Political events are covered around the clock - from Trump’s Twitter antics to terrorist attacks sowing destruction around the world. In this constant barrage of news, it is easy to get caught up in today’s incidents, and lose sight of the risks that may transpire tomorrow. Earlier this year, HCSS published the Monthly Alert New Security Threats and Opportunities, the Other Side of the Security Coin on some of the more positive developments that are still occurring amidst all of the global gloom and doom that we get inundated with on a daily basis. In this November Monthly Alert, we turn our attention to the ‘dark’ side of the security coin and highlight ten emerging but security risks. For this Alert, we specifically looked for plausible but underappreciated security risks that may materialize in the foreseeable future and deserve attention now - also with an eye towards risk prevention and mitigation.
Access the Alert online here.
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The ongoing crisis between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the international community represents a textbook case of coercive diplomacy. The international community sought to coerce North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile programs. So far, all efforts failed. The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States has created a new and more dangerous dynamic.
The ongoing crisis between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the international community represents a textbook case of coercive diplomacy. The international community sought to coerce North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile programs. So far, all efforts failed. The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States has created a new and more dangerous dynamic. In contrast to his predecessors, Trump does not seek a multinational solution and has turned the crisis into a personal contest between him and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, while ignoring the interests of other powers. As President Trump has few, if any, options for breaking the stalemate, this Alert argues that personalizing the conflict is very risky. As a matter of fact, for the first time in history a tweet could trigger a major crisis.
This Alert analyses the present standoff and explains how threats and harassments could escalate. Read more about policy options for dealing with North Korea by downloading the Alert via the button on the right.
UN peace operations increasingly find themselves deployed in countries where there is no peace to keep, where insurgencies are ongoing, and where peacekeepers face asymmetric threats. In these environments, UN peace operations are asked to perform increasingly challenging tasks to assist governments and to stabilise countries. This requires adequate UN mandates, as well as appropriate military and civilian means. There is also a continuing urgent need to address the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.
UN peace operations increasingly find themselves deployed in countries where there is no peace to keep, where insurgencies are ongoing, and where peacekeepers face asymmetric threats. In these environments, UN peace operations are asked to perform increasingly challenging tasks to assist governments and to stabilise countries. This requires adequate UN mandates, as well as appropriate military and civilian means. There is also a continuing urgent need to address the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.
Almost 15 years after the Brahimi Report, in October 2014, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to find answers to these challenges. Its findings were published in June 2015 in its report: Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People. In over 100 pages and more than 100 recommendations, the report called for change.
This report looks at five key issues that were addressed in the HIPPO report and which require attention to make UN peace operations more effective in the face of current challenges.
The report is a collaboration between the Clingendael Institute, HCSS and SIPRI.
Authors: Jaïr van der Lijn, Robert de Rave, Timo Smit, Rianne Siebenga.
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How should the Dutch government prioritize partnerships with other nations? Which countries are strategically important? Which are compatible in terms of shared values? Traditionally, Dutch foreign policy has a dual orientation: the pursuit of Dutch interests on the one hand and the adherence to and promotion of norm-based values on the other. How to handle relationships in a increasingly connected and complex world? HCSS is developing a Dutch Foreign Relations Index (DFRI) as an analytical basis for a framework to provide guidance on this.
This Monthly Alert presents the findings of a high-level analysis of this first current iteration of the DFRI. It offers, from the Netherlands’ perspective, an overview of the utility and compatibility of states worldwide and the changes therein over time. Clusters of countries are derived based on a combination of these two dimensions. The alert concludes with suggestions as to how the DFRI could be further developed and leveraged as an analytical input into the partnership prioritization process in Dutch official foreign and security policy making.
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Top 20 strategically important countries (Utility, 2016)
De politie in Nederland heeft te maken met een snel veranderende omgeving en een dynamische samenleving, waarin nieuwe veiligheidsvraagstukken zich in rap tempo aandienen. Dergelijke vraagstukken staan niet op zichzelf en maken onderdeel uit van een serie mondiale ontwikkelingen waarmee de Nederlandse samenleving wordt geconfronteerd. Om haar koers, positie en inzet in de toekomst vast te kunnen stellen, is het van belang dat de politie zicht heeft op deze ontwikkelingen en de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan, om daar adequaat op te anticiperen.
De politie in Nederland heeft te maken met een snel veranderende omgeving en een dynamische samenleving, waarin nieuwe veiligheidsvraagstukken zich in rap tempo aandienen. Dergelijke vraagstukken staan niet op zichzelf en maken onderdeel uit van een serie mondiale ontwikkelingen waarmee de Nederlandse samenleving wordt geconfronteerd. Om haar koers, positie en inzet in de toekomst vast te kunnen stellen, is het van belang dat de politie zicht heeft op deze ontwikkelingen en de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan, om daar adequaat op te anticiperen.
Dit rapport bevat een inhouds- en omgevingsanalyse en levert input op voor vervolgstappen in het strategietraject van de Politie. Het rapport presenteert maatschappelijke vraagstukken en verhaallijnen die houvast bieden voor te organiseren discussies met de belangrijkste stakeholders en de eigen medewerkers over de toekomst van de politie. Het is daarmee een eerste stap om blijvend te werken aan een kennisintensieve, lenige en toekomstbestendige organisatie.