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**TNO report**

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*Towards a new concept for civil-military cooperation during stabilization operations*

*'Reculer pour mieux sauter'*

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# Samenvatting

In dit rapport analyseert de auteur de ontwikkeling van civiel-militaire samenwerking (CIMIC) als concept en in de militaire praktijk van de laatste tien jaar. Ondanks een erkenning van het belang van CIMIC is het concept zowel in de NAVO doctrine als in het Nederlandse beleid lange tijd gemarginaliseerd tot een ondersteunende, zelfs ondergeschikte rol. De NAVO koos tien jaar geleden namelijk voor het CIMIC concept civiel-militaire samenwerking tijdens *conventionele militaire operaties* als uitgangspunt. De Alliantie probeerde CIMIC zoals dit tijdens de Koude Oorlog reeds bestond aan te passen aan vredesmissies zoals die werden uitgevoerd in Bosnië en Kosovo.

Veel dichter bij de hedendaagse operationele praktijk staat echter civiel-militaire samenwerking bij het bestrijden van een irreguliere tegenstander (*counterinsurgency* operaties). Anders dan CIMIC bij conventionele militaire operaties neemt civiel-militaire samenwerking een centrale rol in bij *counterinsurgency* en vredesondersteunende operaties, die in dit rapport gezamenlijk worden aangeduid als stabilisatieoperaties.

Om CIMIC beter aan te laten sluiten bij de operationele praktijk worden enkele suggesties gedaan voor de herziening van het NAVO CIMIC concept:

**Accepteer dat civiel-militaire interactie in stabilisatieoperaties anders dan bij conventionele gevechtsoperaties van centraal belang is.**
Bij het uitvoeren van stabilisatieoperaties dient CIMIC daarom niet langer te worden beschouwd als een ondersteunende functie of tactisch hulpmiddel. Interactie tussen militairen en hun civiele omgeving moet bij het plannen en uitvoeren van deze operaties het centrale aandachtsgebied zijn. (De term civil-militaire interactie wordt in dit rapport gebruikt als algemene term voor dit proces en staat los van specifieke concepten als CIMIC en *Civil Affairs* en de bijbehorende definities).

**Vermijd wensdenken op het politiek-strategische niveau.**
Westerse militaire eenheden bevonden zich in het recente verleden bij het uitvoeren van stabilisatieoperaties al te vaak in situaties waarin zij taken en missies moesten uitvoeren waarvoor geen toereikend mandaat en opleiding ontvingen. Te denken valt aan civiel bestuurlijke verantwoordelijkheden, politiële verantwoordelijkheden, reconstructie-activiteiten en *counterinsurgency* operaties. Het verdient daarom de aanbeveling dat NAVO lidstaten:
- Voorbereidingen treffen voor het uitvoeren van militair interim bestuur en het tijdelijk uitvoeren van politietaken. Uiteraard dient deze executieve militaire rol in een machtsvacuüm zo snel mogelijk een ondersteunende rol aan het civil gezag worden.
- Accepteer dat in de nabije toekomst stabilisatieoperaties, inclusief counterinsurgency, de hoofdtaak van de krijgsmacht zullen zijn.
- Maak ter voorbereiding op *counterinsurgency* operaties gebruik van historische lessen, voornamelijk uit het Britse koloniale verleden, maar onderzoek de toepasbaarheid daarvan in huidige situaties als Irak en Zuid-Afghanistan. Deze zijn immers complexer dan de Britse historische 'schoolvoorbeelden'. Dit is onder meer het geval omdat de lokale civiele autoriteiten die militair ondersteund dienen te worden hier ontbreken of nauwelijks functioneren.

**Herzie NAVO CIMIC doctrine onder andere door:**

- Het creëren van een tweeledige doctrine. Hierin blijft CIMIC bij conventionele militaire operaties een ondersteunende functie of tactisch hulpmiddel ('in support of the military mission'). Bij stabilisatieoperaties wordt CIMIC echter verheven tot een centraal principe en uitgangpunt voor planning ('in support of polical objectives').
- De definitie van CIMIC enerzijds te verbreden en anderzijds opnieuw worden af te bakenen:
  1 Civiel-militaire interactie kan worden gebruikt als alomvattende en neutrale term om het gehele proces te omschrijven, los van definities en doctrine.
  2 CIMIC personeel voert slecht een beperkt deel van de civiel-militaire taken uit in stabilisatieoperaties. De term 'civil-military operations' (CMO) dient daarom te worden gebruikt om civiel-militaire taken te omschrijven die worden uitgevoerd door al het militair personeel in militaire operaties.
  3 De term CIMIC dient dan te worden gebruikt als benaming voor de staf die professionele ondersteuning biedt aan Civiel-Militaire Operaties.
- CIMIC meer dan in het recente verleden te richten op het assisteren en mogelijk opbouwen van de civiele overheid (met name bestuur en politie) en minder op directe hulpverlening en 'projecten draaien'. Hierbij wordt aangetekend dat de overdreven nadruk op kleinschalige (CIMIC) projecten vooral een probleem is van de CIMIC praktijk en niet zozeer van de huidige CIMIC doctrine.

**Integreer CIMIC als centraal principe in organisatie, opleiding en training.**

- Integreer CIMIC capaciteiten (en PRTs) zoveel mogelijk in de tactische lijn tijdens stabilisatieoperaties.
- Vorm een nationale civiele capaciteit voor (weder)opbouwactiviteiten met de nadruk op bestuur en *security sector reform* om parallel te laten opereren aan de Nederlandse krijgsmacht in uitzendgebied.
- Officiersopleidingen en -trainingen moeten het begrip vergroten van lokale politieke en sociale (machts)verhoudingen en cultuur. Immers, de belangrijkste CIMIC taken worden tijdens operaties door reguliere officieren uitgevoerd.

# Management Summary

This management summary shows the conclusions and recommendations made in this report, and the main argument behind them. The author analyses the development of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as concept and as part of military practice of the past 10 years. Despite recognition of the importance of CIMIC, the concept has been relegated to a supporting and even a subsidiary role both in national and in NATO doctrine. NATO has taken civil-military cooperation during conventional military operations as a starting point of its CIMIC concept, ten years ago. The alliance has tried to adapt CIMIC as it existed during the Cold War to peace missions as executed in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Current operational practice however emphasizes civil-military cooperation during counterinsurgency and peace supporting operations. In this type of operations CIMIC takes center stage, as opposed to its subsidiary role in conventional military operations. These two types of operations are banded together in this report as 'stabilization operations'.

In order to reach a closer alignment of the CIMIC concept with operational reality, the following suggestions are made:

**Accept that civil-military interaction moves center-stage in stabilization operations.**
In stabilization operations CIMIC should no longer be treated as a support function or merely a tactical tool. When performing these operations, civil-military interaction needs to be taken as the starting point for all policy planning and military planning. The term 'civil-military interaction' is used in this report as a generic term for this process, as apart from more specific terms as 'CIMIC' and 'Civil Affairs', which have their own definitions.

**Wishful thinking often dominates policy planning for military operations.**
Western military units deployed in stabilization operations all too often find themselves performing unanticipated tasks for which they often have received no special training:
- Civil administrative responsibilities.
- Policing responsibilities.
- Reconstruction activities.
- Countering insurgencies.

It is therefore recommended that NATO member states:
- Make preparations for executing military interim administration and temporary policing responsibilities. These executive military tasks are, of course, to be appended to the due civilian authorities as soon as possible.
- Accept that in the near future stabilization operations, including counterinsurgency, will be the main tasks of the armed forces.
- Make use of historical lessons for counterinsurgency operations from the British colonial past, but examine the applicability of these lessons in present day situations like in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are more complex than British historical examples, amongst others because local civilian authorities that are to be supported by the military are either absent of hardly functioning.

**CIMIC doctrine needs to be updated'.**

- Create a two-track CIMIC doctrine: one for conventional operations and one for stabilization operations. In the first case CIMIC is a means in support of the *military mission*, in the second it takes center stage and is a means in support of the *political objectives*.
- The definition of CIMIC needs to be broadened and delineated:
    1. Civil-military interaction can be used as a comprehensive and neutral term to describe the process as a whole, apart from definitions and doctrine.
    2. CIMIC staff provides (professional) support to only a limited part of the civil-military tasks in stabilization operations. The term 'Civil-military operations' (CMO) is to be used for describing civil-military tasks that are performed by all military personnel during military operations.
    3. The term CIMIC must be used as a designation for staff that provides professional support to Civil-military operations.
- CIMIC should focus on the local government (civil administration and police) rather than relief work. The current over-emphasis on small scale CIMIC projects is mainly a problem for CIMIC practice and not for CIMIC doctrine.

**Integrate CIMIC as central principle into organization and training.**

- Integrate CIMIC capabilities (and PRTs) as far as possible into the tactical line during stabilization operations.
- Form a national civilian capability for rehabilitation with an emphasis on civilian administration and security sector reform in order to allow it to cooperate smoothly with Dutch military forces in the area.
- Officer training should increase the understanding for local power-relations and culture, because the important CIMIC tasks during operations are performed by regular officers.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Civil-Military Cooperation

NATO military forces are frequently called upon to stabilize countries and regions affected by war. In these operations soldiers find themselves in countries where local civil administration and police organizations are dysfunctional, sometimes even absent, and where the most basic public services are lacking. Whereas peacekeeping in the Cold War era used to be limited to monitoring cease-fires between two warring parties and manning buffer-zones, recent interventions have become far more ambitious. They include elements of stabilization, post-war reconstruction, economic and social rehabilitation, security sector reform, and democratization.

There is a general acceptance that successfully coordinated or integrated civilian and military efforts are key to the successful stabilization and reconstruction. When conducting military operations such as those in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, NATO forces therefore interact with a host of civil actors in order to create a sustainable peace. The term civil-military interaction is used here to refer to this process in general.

In this report, stabilization operations is the term used to describe the overall attempt of restoring order with military and other means. It is a generic term that refers to both peace operations (impartial and performed after a peace settlement has been reached) and counterinsurgency operations (partial and in pursuit of the defeat of an opponent that uses guerrilla-type tactics). While performed under very different mandates and legal circumstances, in practice the two categories often overlap and merge. Long-term reconstruction is outside the scope of this report.

The main categories of civilian actors relevant to the military in stabilization operations are:
- local governments and other civil authorities (such as local civil administration, civil police and the judiciary);
- international global and regional organizations (UN, UNHCR, WFP etcetera);
- national departments and agencies (Ministries and agencies such as USAID and DFID);
- international, national and local non-governmental organizations (OXFAM, MSF, Cordaid etcetera);
- and last but not least, local populations.

The need for an integrated approach to conflict resolution has been one of the most hard-learned lessons from peace operations in the 1990s, but among policy makers and in military circles a debate has erupted regarding the scope of the military in stabilizing and reconstructing war torn societies. Are soldiers who prepare for combat and, like their governments, pursue a strict segregation between the 'military domain' and the 'civilian sphere' to become involved in 'nation building'? Should soldiers be allowed to venture into the murky arena of humanitarian relief, public security, civil administration, and political and social reconstruction?

These highly political questions are highly relevant to this study, but are not taken as the point of departure for this research. Instead, we focus on the NATO concept for civil-military interaction during military operations.

During the second half of the 1990s the Alliance started to create a specialized military branch and new doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The leading idea behind this initiative was to have a separate branch of CIMIC personnel deal with the civil-military dimension, the area where soldiering and civilian responsibilities overlapped. This would allow commanders and regular military units to focus on military matters. These 'straight' military tasks are usually seen as the defeat of conventional enemy forces in all-out war and the separation and possibly the disarmament of warring parties in peace operations.

Within NATO, the Netherlands has played a prominent role in the development of CIMIC since the late 1990s. However, the Dutch have been struggling with the CIMIC concept ever since. It appears to be difficult to grasp by definitions and doctrine, and its purpose is hard to clarify. Defining CIMIC, it has been argued, 'is like nailing yellow to a wall'. The primary debate has revolved around the question whether CIMIC is a support function-facilitating military operations-or if military activities in the civilian domain under the guise of CIMIC may become a purpose on their own? The Dutch are not alone in their struggle with the CIMIC concept. The UN approaches civil-military cooperation differently form NATO, and even within NATO, member states stick to various concepts and explain and practice the same CIMIC concept differently.

This report focuses on the current Dutch approach to CIMIC. Dutch CIMIC policy emphasizes that apart from the overall need to coordinate military effort with civilian actors, the main rationale behind CIMIC is its contribution to 'winning the hearts and minds' of the local population, and therefore to 'force acceptance'. This in turn should enhance 'force protection'. Force protection is thus presented as the ultimate goal of CIMIC. Dutch policy repeatedly stresses that CIMIC does not equal societal and infrastructural reconstruction. Although it may indirectly contribute to such structural rehabilitation, the purpose of CIMIC is presented only to support the military mission.

## 1.2 NATO CIMIC: ten years after Dayton

In order to grasp where CIMIC currently stands, we first need to look at its conceptual roots in the 1990s. Although the historical roots of CIMIC date back much further, NATO's current CIMIC policy, doctrine and capacity were developed largely from the Alliance's operational experience in Bosnia since early 1996. In this period, there was a divide within NATO over the purpose and scope of CIMIC. The traditionalists argued that CIMIC was no more than development of its Cold War status; technical, logistic in nature, wholly concerned with providing resources to the force in order for it to accomplish its military goals. CIMIC therefore constituted of little more than properly trained staff. On the other hand, the enthusiasts held that the purpose of CIMIC was to provide the means of civil reconstruction and development independently from (and almost regardless of) the commander's needs and the military mission. They foresaw a requirement for large numbers of CIMIC troops with civilian skills to conduct civilian tasks.

The process of developing the CIMIC concept and a specialized military capacity within NATO was driven to a large extent by the U.S. military, with its strong focus on conventional warfare and overall reluctance to perform peace operations, or what it categorized under the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). In the end, the traditionalists won. As in conventional warfare, the purpose of CIMIC has since the 1990s been presented within the military by emphasizing the traditional operational use to the field commander while performing his military mission. As during the Cold War, NATO CIMIC focused on clearing civilian obstacles for the military commander and his tactical units, allowing them to focus on straight military matters.

During the 1990s, NATO's political and military leaders were thus inclined to treat the military and civilian spheres in peace operations as distinct and separate, while in reality, they overlapped and merged. Consequently, CIMIC doctrine as it emerged from the 1990s tends to marginalize civil-military interaction to a support function. The issues involved in civil-military interaction are far broader than hitherto defined and developed in the CIMIC concept.

As soon as 1999, during ground operations in Kosovo, the shortcomings of the existing CIMIC concept and organization were dramatically revealed. NATO soldiers were obliged to perform de facto military governance and were responsible for public security in the power vacuum left behind by retreating Serb security forces and civil authorities. More recently in stabilization operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, military practice showed that civil-military cooperation differs fundamentally from the model for peace operations on which much of the CIMIC concept was built. Not only was the scope of military activities far broader than hitherto encompassed in CIMIC policy and doctrine, much of the civil-military interaction and cooperation needed to be raised far above the level of CIMIC as a tactical tool. CIMIC in stabilization operations has truly become a commander's function, and no longer a matter related just to logistics or force protection.

## 1.3    Towards 'Enhanced CIMIC'?

In 2004, NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) started a process of reinventing, redefining and reforming CIMIC. Accepting CIMIC as one of its *transformational objective areas*, ACT has tentatively called this process 'Enhanced CIMIC'. It accepts that current CIMIC limits itself primarily to the military perspective of an operation and is in practice mostly involved at the tactical level. By mid-2006 the first steps have been set towards a broader, strategically driven concept for CIMIC that is founded on the principles of *Effects Based Approach to Operations* (EBAO).
In contrast to current CIMIC, ACT writes about its own efforts and goals:
- 'Enhanced CIMIC (EC) is defined as the ability to anticipate and effectively coordinate all of the aspects of a military operation that influence the civilian environment. It allows for ongoing assessments of the levels of military involvement and cooperation needed to achieve operational objectives as a means of facilitating the coordination necessary with civilian organizations. By more closely coordinating military planning and actions with the International, National, Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations and Agencies, as well as local authorities, it is expected that NATO military operations will achieve greater operational coherence and more effective accomplishment of their strategic objectives'.

ACT has set the following objective: 'All NATO HQs and forces, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, will be able at the latest by 2015 to cooperate effectively in an effects-based, network-enabled approach to operations with civil actors. These civilian participants include local authorities, IOs, and NGOs in an integrated, multilateral, joint and combined environment across the full spectrum of combat, stability and reconstruction'[1]. As it will take several years for this attempt is translated into a new policy, doctrine and reformed CIMIC capabilities, an opportunity arises for the Netherlands Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces to contribute to this process.

## 1.4       'Reculer pour mieux sauter'

In order to contribute to a new CIMIC doctrine, the Dutch as well as other NATO partners need to understand where CIMIC stands in 2006, almost ten years after its conception. CIMIC doctrine and definitions have often caused more confusion than clarity, leaving commanders and their military personnel to improvise. Consequently CIMIC, while being perceived as overall useful by commanders, has never played the central role in civil-military interaction it was set out to perform during stabilization operations. Before leaping towards a new concept based on a relatively new and still ill-defined concept such as Effects Based Operations, those involved in redefining CIMIC need to understand what are the sources of CIMIC's current limitations and ambiguities. The French refer to such a process as '*Reculer pour mieux sauter*', which may be loosely translated as: taking a step back in order to jump further.

In order to do so we need to place CIMIC within the larger picture of the history of civil-military interaction and the overall changing nature of military operations. All too often, CIMIC is referred to and defined in relation to 'the military mission' without sufficiently analyzing the changing nature of military operations and the changing political context in which they take place. Unless NATO and its member states are capable of examining the causes of the frequent failure of CIMIC to live up to operational reality in the last ten years, it is hard to believe that they will be able to reform CIMIC successfully.

For a better understanding of CIMIC as it is, the following key questions need to be addressed:
1   What different approaches to and concepts currently exist for civil-military interaction? Are the principles that underlie the specific Dutch approach to CIMIC valid (Chapter 2)?
2   Why do NATO and the Netherlands have such difficulty coming to grips CIMIC's parameters and why has it proven so difficult to define the concept (Chapter 3)?
3   As there exists a sizeable conceptual gap between CIMIC theory and civil-military interaction in practice, how do we account for this doctrinal dissonance? Why did NATO choose the wrong conceptual foundation for CIMIC (Chapter 4)?
4   Much of the current assumptions surrounding CIMIC are based on operational experience from the Balkans, but what lessons can be learned from recent Dutch operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Chapters 5 and 6)?
5   What recommendations can be made based on the conclusions to questions one through three (Chapter 7)?

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[1]   NATO Allied Command Transformation, Fact Sheet, Enhanced CIMIC (September 2005).

## 1.5 Sources

This study is based on secondary sources and interviews with Dutch military personnel with operational experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.

Together with TNO operational analyst drs. C. van Wiersum, the author visited Dutch forces in Baghlan Province, in Northern Afghanistan.

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This study also harks back to some of the findings of the author in his dissertation and commercial publication *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, which also includes case studies into operation in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia.

# 2 CIMIC Doctrine and Organization

## 2.1 CIMIC as a part of civil-military interaction

CIMIC is difficult to grasp by definition and doctrine. The attempts to capture its essence and goals have been compared to 'nailing yellow to a wall'. Rather than enlightening its readers, CIMIC and Civil Affairs doctrine seem to add to the confusion. NATO's CIMIC is but one concept amongst several that have tried to come to grips with the fluid and all comprising field of civil-military interaction in military operations. The most important concepts that attempt to deal with the civil-military interface in military operations are:

- Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO).
- Civil Affairs (US).
- Civil-Military Operations (US).
- Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord, UN).

Each of the concepts and approaches presented in this chapter has been under constant development since the 1990s, and covers only part of the civil-military interface. Therefore, for the purpose of this report, civil-military interaction (CMI) is used as a neutral term to describe the entire area where military operations overlap and merge with tasks that under normal circumstances are the responsibility of civil authorities, non-governmental organizations and other civil actors.

The primary conceptual driving force behind CIMIC has been the wish amongst policymakers and military leaders to institutionalize, but also to minimize the military interference in the civilian sphere. Much effort is thus put into formulating what CIMIC is not, or should not be. As a result CIMIC is much smaller in scope than CMI, the actual military role in the civilian domain.

## 2.2 Current NATO CIMIC Doctrine: supporting the mission

NATO is a military alliance and since the end of the Cold War has tried to stick to its military identity. Apart from a civilian leadership at the highest policy level, it has no civilian capacity to deploy alongside its military units, something the United Nations or individual nations can do. The NATO approach to civil-military cooperation therefore focuses on interaction by the military with the civilian 'other': civilian actors outside the Alliance's military operations.

The NATO definition of CIMIC focuses on its function in support to the mission:

- 'The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies'[2].

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[2] NATO CIMIC Doctrine AJP-9.

The core tasks of CIMIC personnel and units listed below are taken from CIMIC doctrine, but reproduced here as presented during a standard briefing at the NATO School in Oberammergau[3]:

**Civil-military Liaison**
- To arrange the co-ordination with civil organizations and agencies.
- To support the planning and execution of a military operation.

**Support to the Force**
- To obtain personnel and material means from *civilian resources* (e.g. harbor facilities in a country where NATO forces are operating).
- To gain support for the operation from the local population (e.g. projects in order to 'win the hearts and minds of the people').
- Co-ordination in order to prevent or reduce confliction with the execution of the military mission (e.g. flows of refugees).

**Support to the civil environment**
- Support within the framework of a military operation.
- Under military Command and Control (and not civilian).
- From military resources (e.g. information, equipment, services, personnel).

During the late 1990s, moving into the civilian sphere (and therefore often CIMIC) was often discarded as 'mission creep'; the real or perceived progression of the military role beyond its original military parameters. 'Mission creep', a term that originates in the U.S. military, soon became a buzzword used throughout NATO as a result of close U.S.-European cooperation in Bosnia. The development of the CIMIC concept was heavily influenced by fears amongst the CIMIC enthusiasts not to be branded as 'mission creepers'. NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP09) places strong emphasis in 'support to the mission', which is often interpreted as support to the military objective of creating a safe and secure environment. As in conventional warfare, the aim of CIMIC during peace operations has been presented within the military by emphasizing the traditional operational use to the field commander while performing his military mission.

Nonetheless, the 2002 version of NATO's policy document on CIMIC (MC411) emphasizes that the purpose of CIMIC may include 'direct support to the implementation of a civil plan'. This cleverly formulated document even stipulates how 'in exceptional circumstances, the military may be required to take on tasks normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority, organization or agency. These tasks will only be taken on where the appropriate civil body is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate and where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise. The military should be prepared to undertake, when requested by the cognizant civil authority and approved by NATO, such tasks necessary, until the mandated civil authority, organization or agency is prepared to assume them'[4]. However, 'support to the civil environment' and this opening given to a military role in vacuum filling (substitution of civil authorities), are officially not allowed to be performed as a purpose of their own. More importantly, this loophole for exercising interim military government provided in CIMIC doctrine seems to have gone unnoticed. It emerged in NATO's CIMIC policy document as a result of realities of Kosovo during 1999-2000, but is has received little or no attention from

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[3]  Taken from a introduction course in CIMIC given in 2003 (emphases in original document).
[4]  NATO Military Policy, MC-411.

NATO and national policymakers and military leaders, in elaborations or amendments on CIMIC doctrine, or in training ever since.

NATO members, while accepting the same NATO doctrine, have taken very different approaches to CIMIC. For instance, German CIMIC units in Kosovo and Afghanistan have been known to engage in large scale reconstruction projects, whereas others NATO members are constantly trying to resist tendencies to become involved in such activities. The scale of CIMIC activities in the region of Kosovo controlled by the Germans since 1999 is unparalleled. Partly as a result, communications, transportation, and agricultural infrastructures in the Prizren region were among those in the best condition in Kosovo. A British KFOR officer described German KFOR as 'acting like a huge NGO doing projects.'[5] He was not alone in asking the crucial question of where the military's priorities should lie and questioning if military forces were the most efficient and professional rehabilitation agency.[6] A similar development is taking place in Afghanistan. The German PRT in Kunduz is taking on reconstruction at a far greater scale than the Dutch PRT in Baghlan. As a result the Dutch PRT in the neighboring province, which takes on reconstruction only at a very limited scale, is often confronted with complaints form the local population who refer to the German efforts.

## 2.3    The US Model (CA and CMO): pursuing military objectives

The U.S. military does not use the term CIMIC, but defines Civil Affairs (CA) activities as those that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present, to enhance the conduct of civil military operations. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are those activities that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and civilian agencies in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional or national government, and may occur in the absence of other military operations. CMO and CA activities contribute to 'shaping the battlespace by focusing on the civil dimension and its impact on military operations'[7].

Experience has shown that the US will deploy a separate CA command that retains its own structure and command and control across the force. This tendency can be traced back to Civil Affairs during the Second World War. The rationale behind this Civil Affairs organization segregated from the tactical chain of command is to keep tactical commanders from getting embroiled in civilian matters in order to allow them to keep 'a straight focus on military objectives.'

## 2.4    The UK Approach to CIMIC: supporting political objectives

In the UK, CIMIC was previously called Civil Affairs and the terms are still used interchangeably. Although the British military accepts the NATO CIMIC definition, the British approach is to 'view CIMIC in the context of enabling military operations to make a more coherent contribution to the achievement of UK and international *political objectives*' (author's emphasis). The UK does this by fully integrating CIMIC staff, and

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[5]  Quoted in: Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers, *NATO and Humanitarian Action in Kosovo*, 28.
[6]  ICG Balkans Report no. 83, *Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over* (13 December 1999) 2.
[7]  US Army Civil Affairs Doctrinary Publication JP3-57.1 CA 2001.

the CIMIC process, into the chain of command[8]. In British doctrine, it is emphasized that this is fundamentally different to the approach of some other nations, notably the US.

The emphasis to the achievement of international political objectives, rather than just operational (military) objectives is a key element in the British military tradition.
The British approach to CIMIC and Civil Affairs can be traced back to Civil Affairs and Military Government during World War Two and to the strong emphasis in the British Army on counterinsurgency during the colonial era. According to UK policy, the 'coherent contribution' requires the combined application of all means at the state's disposal, of which military action is but one. 'We require armed forces which can operate in support of diplomacy alongside economic, trade and developmental levers, to strengthen security and avert conflict as well as conducting effective military operations if required'.

The British 'CIMIC philosophy' emphasizes dialogue and interaction, rather than activities. Although other NATO members pay lip-service to this idea, the UK attempts to live by it by minimizing the military involvement in reconstruction project. In clear contrast to most other representations of CIMIC, no reconstruction or humanitarian projects are to be seen in pictures on UK Doctrine publication. Instead, military officers and men are only portrayed meeting and conferring with the local civilian population. The British Army deploys relatively few CIMIC personnel in operations, but is generally lauded for successfully maintaining relations to civilian actors. IO and NGO personnel are generally positive about the limited British emphasis on 'hearts and minds projects' and strong emphasis of the military on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

## 2.5 The United Nations Definition: balancing civilian and military means

The UN does not use the term CIMIC. Instead, it refers to Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCoord) as 'the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors … to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize conflict, and when appropriate pursue common goals'.

Within the UN system the issue of coordination and integrated civil-military operations is perceived as far less problematic than within NATO. Although the UN is often hampered by limited means in peace operations, UN missions have one serious advantage over NATO or other multi-dimensional post-conflict operations.
Both civilian and military components in a mission operate under the single leadership of a UN special representative, who reports to the UN Secretary General. This allows military commanders and civil actors within the UN system to operate in a truly integrated fashion[9]. Examples of successfully integrated UN civil-military peace-building operations are its mission in Cambodia, Eastern-Slavonia and more recently in Liberia. This latter mission, according to a recent report by a Dutch NGO, represents 'the most developed version of UN reform as an integrated peace support mission'[10].

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[8]  Articulated in UK CIMIC Policy and agreed by Chiefs of Staff in February 2003.
[9]  The other key advantage of UN peace operations is their inherent legitimacy, but this topic is outside the scope of this report.
[10] Georg Frerks, Bart Klem, Stefan van Laar and Marleen van Klingeren, *Principles and Pragmatism: Civil-Military Action in Afghanistan and Liberia* (Study commissioned by Cordaid, May 2006) 7.

Successful civil-military cooperation these UN-led operations is a reminder that most of the problems in civil-military interaction are not solved by deploying CIMIC or Civil Affairs staff. Instead, the conditions for successful civil-military cooperation in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction are created by:

- The right balance in civil and military capacities.
- Installing the proper coordinating mechanisms between the military component and the various civilian components.
- Instilling military and civilian staff with a sense of operating towards common goals.

## 2.6 The Dutch Approach to CIMIC: supporting the military mission

The Netherlands officially adheres strictly to the NATO definition and CIMIC doctrine. However, as a result of national policy requirements and the translation of doctrine and definitions, the Dutch have come to emphasize specific elements of the limits and purpose of CIMIC. For instance, the Dutch Army CIMIC Handbook translates the NATO definition by emphasizing that CIMIC is: 'Supporting the *military* mission through coordination and cooperation between military commanders and civilian actors, including the civilian population and local authorities, and also international, national and non-governmental organizations and institutions' (author's emphasis)[11].

According to Dutch policy, CIMIC aims at supporting the military operation by maintaining relations with civil parties. The contacts thus established support the acceptance by the local population of the presence of the military forces, which supports the security of the mission[12]. As a result of policy rather than military requirements or culture, Dutch doctrine places much emphasis on 'force protection' when conducting CIMIC activities.

The policy requirements that have shaped the perception of CIMIC in the Netherlands are partly dictated by the Ministry of International Development, which in the Netherlands is integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to seperate the civil and military spheres in this field, much emphasis is placed on the issue that CIMIC does not equal post-conflict reconstruction or humanitarian assistance.

The extra emphasis placed in the Netherlands on separating military operations and CIMIC from reconstruction, humanitarian aid and state-building is related to another trend in the field of civil-military cooperation in Netherlands; the tendency to overemphasize the military-NGO relationship. In the Netherlands, the primary focus of the political and public debate surrounding CIMIC has been on the relationship between military forces and NGO's, particularly NGO's that focus on humanitarian aid and reconstruction. The perception among military personnel as well as civilians involved is that CIMIC revolves mainly around the problematic relationship between soldiers and relief workers in NGOs, and the encroachment of the military into 'humanitarian

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[11] Koninlijke Landmacht, Handboek CIMIC (2 april 2002). Also the introduction of the Dutch CIMIC Handbook emphanizes that CIMIC supports the executon of the military mission.

[12] Kamerbrief Beleidskader Civiel-Militaire Samenwerking (28600 X, nr. 45 d.d. 19 mei 2003); See also: Directie Algemene Beleidszaken van Defensie (bundel voor nieuwe bewindslieden), 5.3 Civiel-militaire samenwerking (Cimic).

space'[13]. Military personnel often do not distinguish between NGOs and international *governmental* organization, referring to all relief organization as NGOs. NGOs are but one category in a long list of relevant civilian actors in the field of stabilization and reconstruction, and their contribution to the grand total of aid provided has often been overestimated. Military personnel is also often not aware that only a relatively small share of the humanitarian aid and reconstruction aid is directly provided by non-governmental organizations [14].

The relationship between the military and local and international (interim) authorities and the informal power-brokers is underrepresented in the debate on civil-military cooperation that, in the Netherlands, revolves around 'force protection', projects, reconstruction and development. Meanwhile, in operational areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the primary issues related to civil-military interaction for Dutch troops centre matters on power and authority. What clearly emerged from these two missions, as well as the earlier operation in Kosovo, was that the clause 'in support of the mission' in CIMIC doctrine becomes irrelevant in missions that primarily revolve around supporting local or international (civil) authorities.

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[13] See Judith Zweers, More than a battle for words: an explorative analysis of CIMIC and Civil-Military Interaction in the Dutch humanitarian context (PSO Report, The Hague 2004); Georg Frerks, Bart Klem, Stefan van Laar and Marleen van Klingeren, Principles and Pragmatism: Civil-Military Action in Afghanistan and Liberia (Study commissioned by Cordaid, May 2006).

[14] Eighty percent of all (non-bilateral) aid in the 1990s was provided through the United Nations and its subsidiary organisations such as WFP, UNICEF, FAO and the ICRC. The remaining twenty percent was provided by the NGO community. There were an estimated 20,000 NGOs active in the world, and of those 7,500 were registered with the United Nations. Of the twenty percent of the aid provided by the NGOs, ninety percent is provided by thirty major NGOs such as CARE, Oxfam, World Vision, MSF, and CRS. For these figures see: Peter Leentjes, 'Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations', Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, Hawaii (no date. Available online at *http://coe-dmha.org/TAPpdfs/19-InteragencyCoordination.pdf*)

# 3 CIMIC: Central or Support Function?

## 3.1 Introduction

During the late 1990s the tendency to downgrade the military role in civil tasks to the margins of military operations clearly manifested itself in the development of policy, doctrine and planning for a CIMIC capacity within NATO. While recognizing the need to smooth the cooperative effort between soldiers and civilians in complex peace operations, NATO leaders continued to perceive and define CIMIC more narrowly than the situation most often faced by troops on the ground.

Particularly in the initial phase of interventions there was a large discrepancy between the official scope of CIMIC and the actual challenges emerging in the murky area where military and civilian tasks overlapped. The tendency to marginalize the civil-military dimension in de development of the CIMIC concept manifested itself in four dominant forms[15]. The symptoms of the marginalization of the civil-military dimension in peace operations are:

1   Current NATO doctrine, which marginalizes CIMIC to a support function.
2   An organizational form that formally assigns civil-military cooperation primarily to designated CIMIC (or Civil Affairs) personnel.
3   The exaggerated emphasis in the representation of CIMIC as a means ('hearts and minds' projects) to a military end (force protection).
4   The separation of CIMIC from public security related issues and Security Sector Reform (SSR).

## 3.2 Doctrine: 'CIMIC on the Side'

The marginalization of CIMIC and its symptoms have already been treated Chapter 2. Until 2001, NATO's CIMIC doctrine described the purpose of CIMIC as establishing and maintaining the full cooperation of the military commander and the civilian authorities, organizations, agencies and population 'in order to allow him to fulfill his mission'. The NATO Military Committee added that this could include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan[16]. However, such activity was never presented and therefore not perceived as a central aspect of a commander's mission. In short, cooperation with civilians or the execution of civilian tasks was never seen as the essence of the mission, without which security could not be established.

In reality, support to, or substitution of civil authorities is often the key to establishing a safe and secure environment. Other than in traditional peacekeeping missions, security cannot be provided in complex peace operations or modern stabilization operations (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) through autonomous military operations. Nevertheless, CIMIC doctrine was based on the assumption that military commanders could single-handedly create the secure conditions for the civilian 'other' to establish lasting peace and rebuild war torn nations.

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[15]   The four manifestations of the marginalisation of the CIMIC concept are taken from the conclusion of the author's book, *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam University Press 2006).

[16]   NATO CIMIC Policy, MC 411.

### 3.3        Organization: CIMIC as a function for specialized units

The second manifestation of CIMIC as a marginal function has been the urge to assign the task of managing the civil-military interface primarily to designated CIMIC personnel and units. This was encompassed in the 1997 version of NATO's CIMIC doctrine where civil-military cooperation was defined as 'the resources and arrangements' which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the civilian agencies and authorities in his area of operations[17]. CIMIC, like its American counterpart Civil Affairs, was thus predominantly treated as a role and function for specialized CIMIC or CA personnel and units executed at a designated CIMIC Center or Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC).

Although CIMIC has since 2001 been treated more as a commander's responsibility, NATO still does not treat civil-military cooperation as a technique or skill applied by soldiers throughout the ranks as part of their ongoing mission, as is the approach taken by for instance the British military. The peripheral approach to soldiers interacting with their civil environment as laid down in doctrine bore little resemblance to the realities faced by Dutch and other battalions in operations in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Iraq, where commanders and their subordinates proved that successful civil-military cooperation was the result of a certain mind-set and flexible adaptation to the challenges as they emerged in the field-rather than related to formal arrangements or the deployment substantial numbers specialized personnel in a separate organization.

The Dutch armed forces, together with the German Army, took a leading role in creating a CIMIC Group North (CGN), an elaborate CIMIC framework within NATO with hundreds of specialist functions that was modeled to a large extent on the American Civil Affairs organization[18]. CGN was joined by Danes, Norwegians, Poles and Czechs, focused on bureaucratic concerns with regard to the composition of large, sustainable CIMIC units. The ambitions expressed in the NATO-CIMIC model were tremendous. CGN set out to recruit reserve officers to provide 'functional expertise, advice and assistance in identifying and assessing' in the areas of:
- Civil infrastructure.
- Civil administration.
- Humanitarian affairs.
- Economy & commerce.
- Cultural affairs.

Tasks foreseen in the for instance the administrative field encompassed-amongst others-advice on economic policy, public finance, legal assistance in rewriting existing laws and legal systems, spatial and environmental policy, educational and cultural

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[17]  In NATO Allied Joint Publication 09 CIMIC was defined as 'the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed'. It was only in 2001 that CIMIC was officially redefined as 'the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies'. While this definition placed more emphasis on CIMIC as the military commander's direct responsibility, it still failed to expand the overall notion of the military entanglement in civilian tasks beyond coordination and cooperation.

[18]  For an elaboration of the development of a Dutch CIMIC capacity within NATO framework see H. Rappard, 'An Active Dutch CIMIC Policy Is Not A Bridge Too Far'.

policy, social policy, movement and transport policy, public health policy, security policy, media and communications policy and agricultural policy.[19]

The actual effectiveness and efficiency of the system of CIMIC functional specialist is doubtful. Whereas much of the comparative advantage of CIMIC has been presented as its ability to put into the field reserve military staff with specialist civilian skills, it would be interesting to sum up the actual numbers fielded between 2000 and 2006 (for instance by NATO countries that have contributed to CIMIC Group North). The actual number of Dutch functional specialists actually deployed for a certain number of months to operational areas such as Bosnia, Macedonia, Afghanistan and Iraq is probably limited. Closer scrutiny of their numbers is likely to show that many CIMIC specialist were sent to areas where the environment was relatively secure, which raises questions as to the use of sending a person in uniform.

According to Dutch CIMIC policy, CIMIC should adhere to the principle 'as civilian as possible and as military as necessary', but the Dutch have not done so when deploying CIMIC specialist to the Balkans. Much valuable work may have been done, but the need to deploy CIMIC functional specialists to prove their value seems to have been the primary driving force for deploying them.

Moreover, when functional specialists are most needed-and they are certainly needed under certain circumstances-for instance in a complete power vacuum with a breakdown of all public services such as in Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003, the vast majority of the available personnel turned out to be difficult to deploy rapidly on a tactical commander's request. Instead, they are deployed after elaborate CIMIC assessments or civil assessments and after lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, the most important specialists are poorly represented in the CIMIC pool for functional specialists. In a post-conflict power-vacuum the civilian expertise most needed is that of civil administrators and police personnel with the capability to train and lead local police. Other than in the highly mobile Allied Civil Affairs teams operating in liberated and occupied Europe in 1943-1945, CIMIC has not been able to provide this capacity.

## 3.4        Representation: CIMIC as 'project management'

The third manifestation of NATO's narrowly focused CIMIC concept was that during the 1990s and thereafter, CIMIC was perceived first and foremost as an issue related to the reconstruction of nations affected by war. Perceptions of CIMIC as a concept and capability in the Netherlands, like in other NATO countries, tended to be rather ambivalent. On the one hand, extreme emphasis is placed on CIMIC as a function in support of military objectives. On the other hand, the way in which CIMIC has been portrayed by policymakers as well as researchers in the Netherlands has been to emphasize the role soldiers played in supporting or directly performing humanitarian work and reconstruction in countries affected by war. In most of the publications, conferences and policy statements the sole emphasis was on the envisaged military role in supporting the reconstruction of infrastructure, housing and basic services such as schools and hospitals. CIMIC was presented mainly as the execution of such tasks by means of small scale projects.

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[19]   H. Rappard, 'An Active Dutch CIMIC Policy Is Not A Bridge Too Far', in: M.T.I. Bollen, R.V.A. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels, J.L.M. Soeters (eds.), *Civil-Military Cooperation: A Marriage of Reason, NL Arms 2002* (Alblasserdam 2002) 74-77.

Although important in and of itself, this emphasis on reconstruction and projects as well as for the facilitation of military operations by 'winning the hearts and minds' for force protection tended to divert attention from what military peace operations were most often about-protecting the local population from violence. The reason was that, whereas the building of schools and playgrounds by soldiers was a tangible manifestation of CIMIC, soldiers and relief agencies, civil police and administrators working towards a common purpose through information sharing and a proper distribution of labor were not as visible for the public. After all, this makes for tedious illustrations in the printed media and on websites.

The way in which CIMIC has been portrayed in the Netherlands in recent years has been very ambivalent. On the cover of a Army Lessons Learned publication on CIMIC, a Female medic measuring the pulse of an elderly woman in Bosnia. Further in the booklet the authors write: 'The CIMIC assignment eventually translates itself in reconstruction projects' (the picture shows soldiers aiding the in rebuilding of a house in Bosnia). In the conclusion to the 2001 document it says: 'CIMIC results: a tangible contribution to reconstruction of society' (picture of a school rebuilt). As far as Dutch policy and doctrine are concerned all such tasks are borderline-activities.

The CGN homepage on the internet 2002-2004 presented CIMIC as a military recruiting office for civilian specialists for rehabilitation activities: 'Looking for a change of environment and some adventure? Have you built enough bridges and roads in the Netherlands and are now looking for a new challenge, for example in the Balkans? With CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation) the armed forces offer you a temporary job in an environment where, as an extension of your civil duties, you can do useful work for a population that needs all the help it can get'. The same text was placed on the CIMIC Group North recruitment folder. (In the new Dutch Army CIMIC folder, however, much emphasis is put in the operational use to the commander).

Relief agencies watched with suspicion at the increased direct engagement of soldiers in the humanitarian sphere and the blurring of the dividing lines between military activity and development aid. This was not only the result of their fear of competition from the military for development funds. During the 1990s, a much-heard critique within the humanitarian community-the envisaged civilian partners for civil-military cooperation-was that aid workers, rather than seeing the military expand its role into the field of humanitarian aid and infrastructure projects, preferred to see peacekeepers expand their notion of the military's primary mission to provide a secure environment for civilians in which to live and work.

The pivotal CIMIC relationship of military units with local and international civil authorities is very much underrepresented in brochures, pictures, policy statements and therefore in the media. In Kosovo for instance, the relationship between KFOR and the international governmental organizations operating under the UNMIK-umbrella, the quintessential civil-military link for the establishment of international control over Kosovo, was overall better than that between the military and NGOs. In the field of civil administration and policing there was no turf-battle as there was in the humanitarian sphere. While direct military involvement in humanitarian aid and project such as building schools was often controversial, temporary military input in the reconstruction of civil infrastructure and rudimentary institution-building in the field of administration and police capacity was generally welcomed by the NGO community.

### 3.5    Separating CIMIC from Public Security and SSR

This brings us to the fourth symptom of the marginalization of CIMIC. Whereas CIMIC was developed to manage the civil-military interface, the military involvement in public security fell largely outside the scope of CIMIC. Nevertheless, it was in this area that the dividing lines between the military and the civil spheres most frequently became blurred. The problems emerging in this grey area, which from 1997 onwards became known as the 'public security gap', permeated every element of peace operations in the 1990s. Whereas little emphasis was placed on public security in CIMIC policy and doctrine, the most crucial civil-military relationship in most peace operations proved to be that between soldiers and policemen, either from the local police forces or from an international civilian police force.

Sergio Vieira de Mello concluded after his experience as interim governor of Kosovo and East-Timor: 'Unlike other nation-building tasks, the maintenance of law and order can not wait. If there is no law from day one, criminal activity thrives. Once established, it is very hard to eradicate'[20]. In his pre-departure press conference on December 17, 2000, UN Special Representative in Kosovo Bernard Kouchner said the principle lesson of Kosovo was that 'peacekeeping missions need to arrive with a law-and-order kit composed of trained police, judges and prosecutors and a set of security laws. This is the only way to stop criminal behavior from flourishing in the postwar vacuum of authority.' Paddy Ashdown, the High Commissioner in Bosnia, came to a similar conclusion that, 'in hindsight we should have put establishing rule of law first. Everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society and public confidence in police and courts'[21]. However, according to Ashdown the prevailing doctrine reserved establishing the rule of law as phase three in 'peace-building'.

These contemporary comments clearly resemble the analysis of F.S.V. Donnison, who wrote in 1966 in the official British history of Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Second World War: 'Modern war consumes governments and administrations in its path, leaving anarchy and chaos behind. If authority and the necessary minimum order and administration are not at once re-established, disorder and subversion can all too quickly erode the victory that has been won in the field'[22]. It was this realization that made the Western Allies accept responsibility and prepare for the occupation of friendly and enemy territory in time.

The need to restore the local law and order system through 'Security Sector Reform' (SSR), a term and concept that was used after 2000 for this subject, is widely underwritten. However, whereas Civil Affairs during the Second World War was fully immersed in public security, often in cooperation with military police or constabulary forces, CIMIC staff in peace operations during the 1990s and thereafter left these tasks

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[20] Sergio de Mello, 'How Not to Run a Country: Lessons For the UN From Kosovo and East Timor'. Executive Summery Report on the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in East Timor, January 31, 2000; 'Unless you can impose order, you cannot begin to rebuild. All else rests on that foundation'. Sergio Vieira de Mello, 'How to Put the Pieces Together', *Newsweek*, 17 December 2001, 37.

[21] The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum (CPRF), *Bridging the 'Post-Conflict Security Gap'*. (October 2003) Notes of Dr. Joseph J. Collins (United States Department of Defense), Robert Perito (United States Institute for Peace) and Dr. Joanna Spear (United States Foreign Policy Institute, George Washington University). http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF/CPRFOctober2003.pdf

[22] F.S.V. *Donnison,* Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organisation and Planning *(London 1966).*

to others. Even though CIMIC Functional Specialist in public security were on the recruiting list of NATO's CIMIC organization, no Dutch examples of their operational deployment and contribution to security sector reform or advice to local police are known to the author. Since public security and military security are so closely related in stabilization operations, the CIMIC organization never assumed this pivotal role in peace and stabilization operations. Usually, this task was performed by Military Police in peace operations.

# 4 Why NATO chose the wrong conceptual foundation for CIMIC

## 4.1 Introduction

Since 1996, NATO has tried to establish a doctrinal foundation for CIMIC that would suit both conventional combat operations and stabilization operations. This has proved to be unwise since the primary rationale behind engaging in the civilian sphere is different in either type of operation. As a result, civil-military cooperation was deferred to the margins of stabilization operations, whereas civil-military interaction proved to lie at the heart of this type of operation[23].

## 4.2 CIMIC in support: conventional warfare

During conventional combat operations in the Second World War, when occupation and liberation of territory was crucial, Allied military forces were able to delegate all civil authority to a specialized Civil Affairs organization. Civil Affairs was in many ways the predecessor of CIMIC. The establishment of this separate organization of many thousands of mainly American, British, and other Allied Civil Affairs personnel under General Dwight D. Eisenhower's full command allowed him to control conquered territory. Officers and men with specific Civil Affairs training helped establish public order, managed the flow of refugees, prevented disease and exploited the host nation's logistical and infrastructural resources in support of the war effort. This enabled the commander and his combat units in Italy and North Western Europe to focus exclusively on the tasks that lay ahead of them and that were considered inside the military scope-fighting and defeating the enemy. Civil Affairs in combat was strictly 'in support of the military mission'. However, in the immediate post-war situation in Germany, with no irregular armed opposition from the Germans, Civil Affairs' facilitating role for military operations came to an end, as will be elaborated upon on Paragraph 4.4.

One of the key lessons learned during 1942-1945 was the importance of integrating Civil Affairs into the tactical chain of command. This lesson was learned after the campaign in Italy, where the Civil Affairs organization reported only directly to Eisenhower. The primary disadvantage of the separate chain of command for military governance was that it endangered 'unity of command'. After all, commanders below the supreme headquarters could not control the Civil Affairs units that were roaming through their area of operations. A similar mistake was made by NATO in Bosnia in 1996, when the bulk of all CIMIC assets were placed in a separate organization (CIMIC Task Force). The second disadvantage of the segregated command structure during the Italian campaign was that as a separate entity civil affairs had a hard time gaining access to essential Army resources and had to beg 'like a stranger' for relief goods,

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[23] This argument is also made by the author in an article tentatively entitled 'CIMIC and Countering Insurgent-Terrorism: Why NATO Chose the Wrong Historical Foundation'. The article will appear in a special issue on CIMIC and counter-terrorism of the journal *Small Wars and Insurgencies*. The special issue, which is planned to appear in the winter of 2006-2007, is edited by Thomas Mockaitis and Joseph Soeters.

logistical support, engineer support, and combat troops and Military Police in order to maintain law and order[24].

As NATO prepared for the defense of Western Europe during the Cold War, CIMIC was similarly geared towards facilitating conventional military operations by clearing civilian 'obstacles' such as flows of refugees, and by exploiting civilian resources for military purposes. CIMIC was fully in support of military objectives.

While the American military retained a civil affairs organization of approximately 5,000 personnel since the Second World War, consisting mainly of Army reserves, European armies had no designated military capacity for CIMIC or civil affairs while they were preparing for conventional battle on the West-German plains. The potential civil problems likely to arise from maneuvering with large armed formations were arranged through a series of formal agreements with the sovereign states of north-western Europe and with local governments particularly in Germany. No military occupation by NATO forces was anticipated. CIMIC was expected to present a primarily logistical challenge and its practical handling was delegated to military personnel that temporarily filled these posts and did not specialize for this as did their American colleagues.

## 4.3      CIMIC in support: traditional peacekeeping

Prior to 1989, UN peacekeeping was almost exclusively focused on separating two national armies along a status-quo line. These operations aimed at solving territorial disputes by restoring internationally agreed boundaries or providing the shield that allowed them to be adjusted by diplomatic means. The principles of peacekeeping were consent of the parties involved, neutrality, observation and the use of force limited to self-defense.

These traditional 'thin blue line' peacekeeping operations allowed for very little contact between peacekeepers and the civilian population and local civilian administration. Peacekeeping forces engaged in interposition hardly found themselves in densely populated areas or urban terrain. Involvement in public security and administrative support tasks were generally not conceived to be part of a peacekeeper's duty. Therefore, like soldiers in conventional operations, peacekeepers expected to operate in an almost exclusively military domain and accordingly, local civilians were regarded as an obstacle while executing their mission. CIMIC-type operations were conducted, but on a very limited scale and not by designated and specialized personnel.

Peacekeeping as an operation that revolved around military-military contact became the exception rather than the rule in the course of the 1990s. Peace operations changed drastically after international intervention in the internal affairs of a state-either with or without the consent of the government in question-became the norm. When performing this role after the end to intra-state conflict, the military tried desperately to stick to clear military objectives, as was witnessed in Bosnia after 1995 when NATO assumed control of peace operations. However, in this type of military operation civilians were not only ever present, they were the *raison d'être* for such intervention forces.
Soldiers from different national backgrounds did not equally accept this fundamental

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[24]   For these historical examples of seperated or integrated Civil Affairs organisations see: Brocades
      Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 28-32, 275-284.

point. Often, military attitudes could be traced back to their national historical tradition and the interrelated perception of what a soldier's proper task was.

## 4.4    CIMIC as a central principle: counterinsurgency operations

The British experience in counterinsurgency operations is often used when explaining the overall successful British approach in peace operations and stabilization operations in general, and civil-military cooperation in particular. While fighting insurgencies during the wars of decolonization, the methods used to reach lasting success proved to be the employment of military forces, the police force and the civil administration towards a common strategic goal. Apart from employing the minimum necessary force and the maximum degree of tactical flexibility, cooperation within a civil-military committee system with a strong emphasis on gathering and sharing intelligence proved the key to successfully fighting insurgents. Military support to the civil power was undertaken not by specialists but as part of a combat commander's daily operations.

Counterinsurgency is rapidly becoming the most important form of military operations for Western armed forces. However, in the Netherlands, there appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding as to the essence of counterinsurgency operations. The most common mistake among policymakers and military officers alike is to confuse counterinsurgency with 'search and destroy' missions[25]. The terms counterinsurgency and guerilla are avoided in both military and policy circles, whereas in both the UK and the US counterinsurgency is the common term to describe operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A British military source involved in planning for NATO operations in Southern Afghanistan in November 2005 was quoted saying: 'The debate is not whether, but to what extent these troops will get into counterinsurgency … We are not talking war fighting, but the is a potential for armed conflict in some areas'[26].

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[25]  Conversations with military personnel and civilian staff working in the Ministry of Defense. However, the interest amongst military personnel in counterinsurgency is increasing in some higher circles.

[26]  Simon Tisdall, Troops Await Afghan Order, *The Guardian*, 16 November 2005.

CIMIC and Civil Affairs conceptual development since WWII

For a better understanding of the essence of counterinsurgency campaigns, we have to return to the assembled experience on successful colonial policing and counterinsurgency operations as unofficially codified by Sir Robert Thompson, who had played an important role as a colonial civil servant in Malaya. His five basic principles for successful internal security operations were laid down in his book, Defeating Communist *Insurgency*, written in 1966 after his disillusionment with his advisory role in to the South Vietnamese government and the U.S. Army[27].

All counterinsurgency theory is based on the assumption that the military is there in support of the civil power, which is under siege of an insurgent movement, mostly one that applies guerilla tactics. When Thompson refers to the government, he includes the security forces supporting it. Permeating all Thompson's principles was his emphasis on fighting the cause of an insurgency instead of merely eradicating the symptoms:
- First and most important, the government had to identify the legitimate grievances that fed the insurgency and tackle this central problem. To that end, it had to define a clear political aim, which in the colonial context was to create a free, independent and united country that was stable and economically viable. By removing the prime

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[27] Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (London 1966) 185. Thompson clearly rose above the usual focus on the military aspects of counterinsurgency and the methods used. Although recommending methods that would be considered rather harsh by the end of the twentieth century, his analysis gained a timeless quality. The principles more or less became British doctrine and were taught at Sandhurst. He put particular emphasis on their application in Malaya and on their misapplication in Vietnam. While acknowledging the difference in circumstances facing the Americans in Vietnam, most analysts of low-level operations have since reconfirmed and elaborated on his findings. See for instance: Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London 1971).

cause of discontent, the government would be outbidding the insurgents for the loyalty of the people. It was the most potent weapon in the counterinsurgency arsenal and the essential element of 'winning the hearts and minds of the people' in order to separate the moderates from the insurgents.

- Second, Thompson emphasized the importance of operating in accordance with the law. The government could be quite authoritarian in an emergency situation, as long as the laws were applied equally to all and as long as the people felt it was providing security and meeting their basic needs[28]. He advocated the use force in a highly selective manner, implicitly referring to the concept of the minimum use of force and ruling out any form of collective punishment. The success achieved by enforcing these regulations strongly relies on an effective local government. 'Where this is lacking, the regulations may do more harm than good, since inequitable enforcement brings resentment and non-enforcement brings contempt'[29].

- The third and arguably pivotal principle in the effective execution of a counterinsurgency campaign was the creation of a comprehensive plan for integrated civil and military operations. What made Thompson's treatise rise above most earlier learning was his ability to move beyond the military aspects of fighting an irregular opponent, and merge civilian and military measures and objectives on all levels-political, strategic, operational and tactical. Thomas Mockaitis wrote in his treatise on British counterinsurgency that the development of a distinctly British approach between 1919 and 1960 was 'a history not of campaigns but of principles as these were applied by soldiers, colonial administrators and police'[30]. In Malaya, the formalized triangular committee system for civil-military cooperation on the district, state and federal level, also known as the 'war by committee-structure', was a culmination of this experience. Civil-military cooperation was crucial for effective intelligence gathering and sharing. The primacy of intelligence has been added as a separate principle by other counterinsurgency specialists such as Colonel Frank Kitson.

- The fourth principle prescribed giving absolute priority to countering the subversion of the people, rather than killing or capturing guerrillas. To illustrate this Thompson wrote that 'the battle in the populated areas represents a straight fight between the government and the insurgents for the rural population'. Mirror-imaging Mao Tse-Tung's metaphor of the insurgent being a fish and the water being the populace, the British in Malaya had set out to isolate the insurgents from their population base. Providing the population with security against retaliation from the insurgents proved absolutely crucial to winning them over, which in turn was indispensable for human intelligence gathering.

- The fifth principle revolved around the need to secure the government's base area and to progress gradually from there. While maintaining military pressure in all areas not cleared of guerrillas, other areas are designated as sufficiently secured for emergency regulations to be lifted. In time, the security role in these areas could be fully taken over by police and local home guard. Thompson and all other analysts of counterinsurgency that followed him emphasized over and over again that defeating an insurgency required patience. There are no quick-fixes or shortcuts.

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[28] Sir Robert Thompson in interview. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, 186.

[29] Clutterbuck, *The Long War,* 40. Crucial to success in Malaya was that the British, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, were in full control of all government institutions and able to use the Malays or Indians who were usually reliable as a result of their aversion to the Chinese Communists.

[30] Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency* (New York 1990) xi.

While no recipe for an easy victory over insurgent forces using guerilla-style tactics, adherence to these principles has proved the key to any successful counterinsurgency campaign. 'Winning the hearts and minds of the local population' runs like a red thread through Thompson's principles. However, the term became a platitude in the course of the 1960s at the time of the Vietnam War, and again in more recent years in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was often misused to simply point at the desired effect of soldiers conducting small-scale humanitarian projects, called 'civic actions' in Vietnam, to win over the local population. The same has happened during more recent peace and stabilization operations. However important these measures are and are for psychological effect, the phrase 'winning the hearts and minds' had a far broader significance in counterinsurgency theory.

'Winning the hearts and minds' in counterinsurgency operations revolved around four factors:
- The success and popularity of the political plan that underlies the counterinsurgency campaign.
- Public security: the protection of the population against both criminal and political violence.
- Information campaigns / propaganda.
- Military civic action.

Since controlling the population is essential to counterinsurgency, there is only a very thin line dividing coercion from 'winning the hearts and minds'. The British answer to rebellion in the empire in colonial days has been called that of a 'police state with a conscience'.

It is important to state that civil-military cooperation in recent stabilization operations has become more complex than in colonial days. During the British campaign in Malaya, arguably the most successful example of civil-military cooperation during counterinsurgency operations, civil-military cooperation had a relatively easy point of departure. The military forces in Malaya were all part of a British command structure and the colonial administration and police forces were all established and reporting to the same colonial government. Moreover, at the height of the emergency General Gerald Templer was placed in overall command of both the military and civilian powers.

In peace operations such as those in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the sheer complexity of the civil-military playing field made it far more difficult to generalize about the degree of coordination between civil and military and even more so about its success.
For instance, by August 1999 Kosovo was host to some twenty different national peacekeeping contingents that were inclined to follow national guidelines and priorities rather than those of the Force Commander, dozens of national and international governmental organizations and several hundreds of non-governmental organizations.

## 4.5 CIMIC as a central principle: (Post-Conflict) Stabilization Operations

CIMIC policy and doctrine have been founded on the basis of conventional military operations, which proved an unsuitable foundation for civil-military cooperation in (post-conflict) stabilization. Whereas the comparison of CIMIC in stabilization operations with Civil Affairs during the mobile phase of operations in the Second

World war is incorrect, the comparison with the situation faced by the Allies after the German capitulation in May 1945 is more appropriate.

After May 1945, Civil Affairs' supporting role for conventional combat operations in Europe came to an end. Once Germany was defeated and the mobile phase turned into the static phase of occupation, Civil Affairs and Military Government was no longer a marginal function, but propelled onto center-stage. Once the enemy was defeated, the combat commanders became military governors and the stabilization of occupied territory became a purpose unto its own. In effect, tactical troops were used in support of the Allied Military Government (manned by the Civil Affairs organization), instead of the other way around.

There is in interesting parallel here with the occupation of Iraq in 2003-2004. After the defeat of Saddam Hussein's conventional forces, American-led military forces where faced with a similar situation when their core tasks was reduced to supporting as well as substituting the Coalition's interim government.

# 5 CIMIC in Iraq

## 5.1 CIMIC: substituting and supporting civil authorities in Iraq

Dutch military forces deployed in the Southern Iraqi province Al-Muthanna early August 2003. The mission of the Dutch Battlegroup was 'to conduct security and stabilization operations within boundaries in order to set the conditions for Iraq to become a stable, self governing state'. The 1200 Dutch troops took over from a U.S. Marine Corps unit that had been operating in the area since what President George W. Bush has called, 'the end of major combat operations'. Over the next 20 months, first the Dutch Marines and later the Dutch Army helped to stabilize the southern, predominantly Shi'ite southern part of Iraq as part of the British-led MND-SE .

The mission of the Stabilization Force Iraq (SFIR) to which the Dutch contributed was to help the Coalition Forces create order in a state whose regime had recently been toppled. Secure conditions were to be created in order to allow the Anglo-American Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to establish administrative control over Iraq. This included the maintenance of law and order by Dutch military forces. From June 2004, after the formal transfer of sovereignty of the Coalition to the Iraqi interim government, the Dutch rendered support to the new Iraqi authorities.

Support to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was officially limited to the creation of a secure environment for this interim authority. At the time of the deployment of the first two Dutch rotations, this interim government was led from Bagdad by Ambassador Paul Bremer. Since the Netherlands did not officially have the status of occupying power, and since it did not want to become an army of occupation by default, the Dutch government created two important caveats for their contribution the coalition forces. The Netherlands refused to take on tasks that normally belong to the civil administration and intended not to contribute to 'executive law enforcement development activities'. The official evaluation of the Dutch Ministry of Defense concluded quite frankly that these caveats proved unrealistic[31].

The British commander under whom the Dutch were serving based his concept of operation on four *lines of operation*: security, essential services, economy and governance. Of these, the British military forces (Coalition Forces) and the Dutch (SFIR), were only responsible for the first. The other lines of operation where a CPA responsibility. However, the second Dutch Battlegroup commanders still had to step for, and support the CPA in all three 'civilian' lines, even though the province Al-Muthanna was more stable than any other province in Iraq outside the Kurdish zone.

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[31] Ministerie van Defensie, Defensie Staf, Afdeling Evaluation, *Periodieke Evaluatie van de Nederalndse Deelneming aan de Stabilization Force Iraq 2003-2004* (14 May 2004).

MND(SE) Lines of Operation.

The reason given for the expansion of SFIR's tasks was that the U.S. Marines who the Dutch relieved in the area had actively filled the vacuum in the absence of the CPA. They had in fact formally assumed CPA responsibilities. As the Dutch arrived in August 2003, the CPA consisted of one diplomat and never consisted of more than a handful of U.S. and British personnel. During the first six months of the Dutch operation the official Iraqi authorities were in a very poor shape and the large numbers of IOs and NGOs that were expected to start operating in Iraq never came for political reasons or due to the poor security conditions. As a result, CIMIC had to be taken far beyond its original parameters laid down in Dutch policy and doctrine.

## 5.2 The SFIR CIMIC Organization

Another salient development, similar to that in Kosovo, was that the CIMIC liaison tasks were performed by personnel other than dedicated CIMIC staff. One of the commanders leading a Dutch Battlegroup recalled: 'CIMIC was a far broader issue in Iraq than the way it was prescribed in 'the book' […]. The substitution of civil administrative tasks was no longer part of our activities, but it was still my mission to support the local Iraqi civil authorities and its security forces in creating a safe and secure environment. CIMIC was an integral part of that mission and encompassed far more than executing hearts and minds or reconstruction projects'.

Tactical commanders were dominant in the liaison role to the local civil authorities. The battalion commander performed this role towards the provincial governor and company commanders were the primary points of contact for mayors and administrators in the towns and districts.

The dedicated SFIR CIMIC capacity was made up of the following elements:

- Within the Battlegroup the S9 was the staff officer advising the commander on civil-military cooperation. The S9 was a regular officer from a tactical unit.
- Military personnel from the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) stepped in during the Fall of 2003 to provide the S9 with additional CIMIC capacity. They had to fill the void left by the U.S. Government Support Team (GST), the name given to the Civil Affairs unit attached to the U.S. Marine battalion. Even though the need for a robust CIMIC capacity was obvious during the planning phase, this personnel was not provided by the Dutch element in CIMIC Group North[32].
- A CIMIC Support Element (CSE) was attached to the Battlegroup late 2003 consisting of designated CIMIC personnel, who where nevertheless mostly 'double hatted' regular military personnel.
- A modest number of CIMIC functional specialists (reserves) deployed in Iraq.

The CSE was made up primarily of officers and NCOs and had a total strength varying from 25 to 40 personnel. Although the CSE was crucial in strengthening the CIMIC capacity of the Battlegroup, its officers have expressed some critique of the CSE and the 'dedicated' CIMIC staff in the CSE.

- The CSE was most needed upon deployment in August 2003, but deployed late.
- The quality of the CSE staff varied substantially and was often not regarded sufficiently professional in the field of civil-military cooperation. Its staff was double-hatted and in a number of cases apparently not selected on their specific background, training and experience.
- CSE personnel at times lacked flexibility to operate in a place like Iraq. According to two independent sources a regular Marine corporal charged with petrol distribution in Al-Muthanna (a serious problem at the time) proved more efficient and flexible in executing his job than a major from the CSE who followed him up in performing this duty.

In Iraq, the dedicated CIMIC staff attached to the Dutch SFIR contingent worked extremely hard, but was not seen as fully capable of performing an advisory role with regard to maintaining the crucial relationship with the civil authorities.
Overall, dedicated CIMIC personnel was not better prepared, trained or informed for this mission than regular military officers temporarily selected for this task.
Battlegroup commanders mainly used their Political Advisor in this advisory role. Commanders also made extensive use of his personal human intelligence sergeant, who always accompanied them during such meetings. Meanwhile, the available CIMIC staff and support element was primarily involved in the execution of, and advice on, reconstruction projects.

'CIMIC was definitely useful for the so-called 'integrated approach'', one officer of the Battlegroup recalled, 'but CIMIC was not sufficient in Iraq. The CSE worked hard, but the whole effort was ad hoc.' The CIMIC section (S9) was sufficiently integrated in the regular staff organization, but the exchange of information between this section and the companies was often not good. 'For instance', the officer stated, 'the companies knew too little of projects undertaken since this info was not plugged into information systems such as ISIS. In order to better integrate the CSE into our operations we placed two of its CIMIC personnel with each company. This worked very well, as it had done with the previous Battlegroup. We wanted to integrate CIMIC at the lowest possible

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[32] A likely reason for this planning failure was the Dutch political stance that The Netherlands was not an occupying force and that Dutch forces were not to perform civil administrative tasks.

level, which enables your troops and CIMIC staff to operate seamlessly. However, CIMIC Group North, who was providing the CSE, was opposed this integrated approach.' The primary motive seems to have been that such reorganization would make the CSE less visible.

However, integrating CIMIC personnel into the battalion's three infantry companies turned out to be successful. It was in line with the British model to Civil Affairs and CIMIC that prescribed integrating CA and CIMIC down to the lowest possible tactical level. Although one a much lower level, it also echoed one of the most important lessons on Civil Affairs learned by the Allies during the Italian campaign in the Second World War.

## 5.3 CIMIC and Security Sector Reform

One of the crucial responsibilities of the Dutch detachment in Iraq was the training of security forces. Both Iraqi national guard and a national police forces had to be created. A Dutch SFIR2 CIMIC officer argued that much of what the Dutch military police was doing in training and liaising with the Iraqi police could be considered CIMIC. The size of the police force in Al-Muthanna was 1270. Various projects were undertaken in relation to SSR:

- Training and integration program: a week-long basic police training.
- Investment in materiel: Patrol vehicles, pistols and ammunition communications-equipment, uniforms etc.
- A Dutch police advisor, Military Police Colonel, was assisting the Chief of Police of Al-Muthanna in 2004.

The police advisor concluded in May 2004 that, although the measures were paying off, much still had to be done to create a properly functioning police apparatus. The level of training was insufficient in all areas. Approximately 30 percent had not finished the required level of secondary school and for many the Training and Integration Program provided by the Dutch had been the only police training they ever received. The police force consisted for a large part of civilians and ex-military who had never held a police-function before. Police facilities and equipment were extremely poor, but the level of motivation was nevertheless rather good.

The authority of the local police rested primarily on the presence and support of the Dutch military forces. The provincial police chief told the Dutch police advisor he was constantly worried about insurgents and militias armed with heavier equipment such as RPGs and machine-guns.

## 5.4 Counterinsurgency?

Although the Dutch operations in Southern Iraq have generally been perceived as a peacekeeping operation in the Netherlands, the question can be raised whether Dutch forces in Iraq were actually involved in a counterinsurgency operation. One of the commanders of the Dutch Battlegroup Al Muthana has said that Dutch counterinsurgency doctrine as is existed since 2003 was far more useful than the existing Dutch Army Doctrine for peace operations.[33] Since a Sunni insurgency had already started elsewhere in Iraq and as counterinsurgency revolves around supporting civil authorities,

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[33] The Commander referred to LDP IIC (Combat-operations against an irregular opponent).

his analysis was right from the start. The fragile authorities that the Coalition and the Dutch troops were supporting were always being undermined by a competition between tribal factions, political and former anti-Baathist insurgent movements. It became even more apt since the insurgency of the radical Shi'ite group led by Moqtada Al Sadr started to affect Al-Muthanna in the course of his tour in 2004.

There is an interesting parallel here with Dutch Marines operating in the UN peace operation in Cambodia in 1992. Also here, a Dutch operations officer (S3) in a Marine battalion concluded that the British counterinsurgency manual proved very useful, whereas peacekeeping doctrine had little practical relevance for the situation he faced in Cambodia.

## 5.5 CIMIC becomes reconstruction

Dutch CIMIC activities in Iraq were not conducted according to NATO doctrine or Dutch policy regarding CIMIC. The vast number of projects undertaken and the (at times) lavish funds available for CIMIC projects, made a direct contribution to what is called 'reconstruction', and not just 'support to reconstruction'. In total, the Dutch undertook 500 projects over a period of 20 months and were able to spend US$10 million. The scale of Dutch military involvement in reconstruction was unprecedented in crisis response operations in the previous years. These projects were financed from various funds, most notably those provided by the CPA, the British-led Multinational Division and the Dutch Ministry of International Development, which is integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The availability of funds varied substantially over time. At the time when the second and third Dutch battalions were operational, the funds received from US and British sources where enormous, and hardly had to be accounted for. Instead of finding funds, the hard part turned out to be spending the available money adequately on public services and small scale projects. However, after the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government in June 2004, the Dutch were suddenly short of funds. This put them in a precarious situation as the Sadr revolt destabilized the province and the local authorities at the time, albeit not as seriously as elsewhere in the Shi'ite dominated parts of Iraq. This discontinuity was a clear policy failure on the national and Coalition level.

## 5.6 Continuity in vacuum filling: the Kosovo comparison

The commander of the second Dutch Battlegroup in Iraq considered it very unlikely that future operations would see CIMIC operations exercised on a scale similar to that in Iraq[34]. Considering that Dutch forces operating in Kosovo had exercised de facto governance for several months, his predictions are daring. It is not at all unlikely that Dutch military forces will be deployed under similar circumstances in the future, and to a certain extent, Dutch forces are currently confronted with comparable challenges in Southern Afghanistan.

In Kosovo, a Dutch artillery battalion had deployed in a total power vacuum, with no policy and no civil administration, with just two CIMIC officers. Obviously, it took more than just the two CIMIC officers to manage the civil-military interface. Therefore the challenge was to establish a viable civil-military coordinating mechanism

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[34]   Richard Oppelaar, Quo Patet Orbis (2004) p9.

by employing the available officers and men creativity. Regular staff performed these aspects of the mission. The intelligence officer (S2) coordinated the policing effort, and later the coordination with the UN police when it finally arrived several months into the mission.

As the numbers of civilian organizations in the field, both IOs and NGOs, rose sharply in after one month in theatre, many staff officers were given a secondary task of performing a liaison role. The battalion's operations officer (S3), the logistics officer (S4), and the Chief of Staff were spending much of their time performing these tasks which could be placed under the heading of CIMIC. However, they were hardly bothered by the label put on the job they performed. The signals officer (S6) was in charge of supporting, with logistical means and armed guards, the ICTY and the various forensic teams working to find and investigate the many mass graves and war crime sites around Orahovac.

Meanwhile, the two dedicated CIMIC officers were performing the basic liaison task to the Serb and Albanian population in the Dutch area of operations. CIMIC tasks in Orahovac were certainly not the exclusive domain of the officer-corps. The extent to which CIMIC became integrated in the overall operation of the Dutch battalion made the employment of non-commissioned officers necessary. The two most senior non-commissioned officers were taking testimonies of the local Albanian population in the makeshift police station. In some cases, even regular soldiers were used to liaise with specific NGOs performing humanitarian work in remote villages.

The Task Force clearly needed more dedicated CIMIC staff, but the Dutch Ministry of Defense and the Dutch Army's Operational Staff refused to honor the repeated requests for additional liaison officers and specialists to fill the niches in the operation when mere improvisation would not suffice.

Despite the Kosovo experience, substitution or takeover by the military exercising certain civil responsibilities belonging to a civil authority in the public security and administrative sphere are still officially not regarded as part of the equation. The official Dutch KFOR evaluation of the Ministry of Defense, while acknowledging that 'in practice, KFOR performed for a certain period the duties of a military government,' failed to assess in any depth what this entailed for the Dutch battalion on the ground. The evaluation drew no relevant conclusions. Close scrutiny of the Dutch CIMIC Handbook published in 2002 shows that it once briefly mentions that in 'exceptional circumstances' soldiers can assume tasks that belong to civil authorities, but this appears to be the only official tangible result of the Kosovo experience in the conceptual development of CIMIC[35]. In Kosovo, the Dutch battalion commander lauded the German national development organization *Technische Hilfswerke* (Technological Relief Organization) for their professional and quick response to crises resulting from the completely dysfunctional public services. They specialized in technical knowledge and provided the necessary materials in order to provide basic services to the population of Kosovo, such as water supply and garbage disposal. Cooperation between this governmental development organization and the military was exemplary. Van Loon later wondered why the Netherlands 'does not have such a club'. In the context of operations in Kosovo, he regarded this more useful than the creation of elaborate CIMIC structures with civilian specialists in uniform. Although he saw the need for

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[35]     Ministerie van Defensie, *Kosovo Evaluatie* (2001); Koninklijke Landmacht, *Handleiding CIMIC* (2002).

these CIMIC specialists in some instances, he preferred to cooperate with civilian institutions that could be integrated into a coordinated civil-military effort to stabilize and rebuild.

It is interesting to see how the two Dutch Political Advisors operating in Southern Iraq in 2003-2004 came to a similar conclusion. In an interview they claimed they stated that the Netherlands 'should deploy far more civilian personnel during military interventions'. They called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to focus on creating such a deployable civilian capability[36].

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[36] Interview Michel Rentenaar and Marcel de Vink, BZ Blad, 2004 (Magazine Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Exact date unknown. The function of a POLAD to a battalion level operation did not exist at the time of Dutch participation in KFOR. The creation of this position at this level was the direct result of the Kosovo experience, where the battalion commander had to take highly political decisions.

# 6 PRTs and CIMIC in Afghanistan

After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001 the International
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) was deployed in Kabul. The mission of this force
of 5,000 military personnel was to support interim President Hamid Karzai in his effort
to exert his government's authority in the capital and its direct surrounding. The Dutch
Army contributed one infantry company to this international military effort and for six
months provided its military headquarters with the Germans after NATO had taken over
the operation.

In 2002 and 2003 ISAF operated only in an around Kabul, but in the course of 2004,
after NATO took control of the mission, it expanded its stabilization force to the
Northern and Western Afghan provinces by deploying small units called *Provincial
Reconstruction Teams* (PRTs). From September 2004 the Netherlands established one
of these PRTs in Pol-e-Komri, the capital of the Afghan province Baghlan.

For the purpose of this TNO-study two TNO researchers visited this Dutch PRT in the
Northern region. The primary aim of their research was to analyze whether the Dutch
CIMIC policy and concept matched or clashed with the new PRT concept. The underlying
question was if a military *reconstruction team* can be regarded an autonomous CIMIC
mission, or if CIMIC within a PRT is still performed 'in support of the mission', as
CIMIC doctrine prescribes. A secondary goal was to evaluate CIMIC as it functions
within the framework of the PRT and possibly provide recommendations for future
Dutch operations in Southern Afghanistan.

## 6.1 The PRT concept

PRTs were first deployed by the Americans during *Operation Enduring Freedom*, the
U.S.-dominated mission aimed singularly at finding and destroying the remnants of
Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban in the wake of '9/11'. PRTs combine U.S. military personnel
and civilian government personnel. The team is usually between one hundred and two
hundred strong. The military contribution consists of Civil Affairs staff and regular
military personnel for force protection purposes. The civilian part is made up of
diplomats from the U.S. State Department, staff from the U.S. Agency of International
Development (USAID) and staff of other U.S. departments.

The dual purpose of the PRT was to create popular support for U.S. counter-terrorist
operations by engaging in reconstruction activities-the so-called 'hearts and minds'
campaign-and to support the new Afghan provincial government structures.
Even though the PRT concept was controversial from its conception, NATO latched on
to this model.

The controversy around PRTs is primarily about the expansion of military activities in
the humanitarian-type activities in Afghanistan. Humanitarian organizations, especially
NGOs, have argued that the neutral 'humanitarian sphere' has been tainted by soldiers
providing aid for other than humanitarian purposes, namely in pursuit of military goals
(i.e. the destruction of the Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban). A similar argument has been
used by many NGOs before '9/11' against the military use of CIMIC assets.
Compared to the use of CIMIC operations in these impartial UN led or sanctioned
peacekeeping operations, the use of similar means in the 'war on terror' has added fuel

to their argument. As a result the opposition against military encroachment in the 'humanitarian sphere' has gained ground. Even though NATO PRTs have been viewed with less suspicion by the humanitarian community than US PRTs, they are still often seen as a threat and cooperation between PRTs and NGOs is limited.

A study on PRT conducted by the United Stated Institute of Peace in 2005 concluded: 'Many NGOs weigh the risk associated with cooperating with military contingents against what appear to be meager benefits and opt to go it alone; it is more important to retain their image of independence and impartiality by avoiding association with the military'. A Dutch study concluded that whereas local NGOs are often more open to collaboration, 'their capacity and integrity are not always highly esteemed.' As a result, the military often has difficulty finding suitable implementing agencies for their project[37]. This is problematic, since the Dutch emphasize the importance facilitating reconstruction by having others, NGOs or the local authorities execute projects funded by the Netherlands.

Apart from being controversial, the PRT concept was not born out of free will. PRTs were always the second-best option for Western military operations in Afghanistan. It can be argued that after the toppling of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan needed a stabilization force of tens of thousands of troops. However, at the time neither Americans nor the other NATO member states where willing to put forward sufficient troops. Instead the U.S. deployed PRTs in support of an understaffed counter-terrorist operation, while the Atlantic Alliance deployed PRTs as a substitute for the infantry battalions it was not yet ready to provide.

Other than in normal stabilization operations such as those conducted on the Balkans and the one already operational in Kabul, the PRTs are not assigned to, or capable of, creating a secure environment. PRTs have only very limited combat forces at their disposal and these are primarily assigned to self-protection (*force protection*).
The mission of the PRT is limited to supporting the local Afghan authorities. According to NATO the primary task of PRTs are:
- to 'help the government of Afghanistan extend its authority';
- to facilitate the development of a secure environment in the Afghan regions, including the establishment of relationships with local authorities;
- to support, as appropriate, security sector reform activities, within means an capabilities, to facilitate the reconstruction effort' (NATO 2003).

The locations of U.S. and other PRT in September 2005 can be seen below. In the summer of 2006 several of the PRTs in the South of Afghanistan were taken over by British, Canadian and Dutch forces under NATO command. Other than the PRTs in the North and East, PRTs in the South are not autonomous, but make up a small part of much larger Task Forces consisting of up to 3,000 personnel. These are primarily combat-ready forces that will also engage in counterinsurgency-style operations.

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[37] Frerks, p. 53.

U.S. Central Command

### 6.2       The Dutch PRT

Between 2004 and 2006 the Dutch PRT in Baghlan varied in size from 130 to 180
personnel. Only one of those, the Political Advisor (POLAD) from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, is a civilian. The first three Dutch PRT rotations, each lasting four
months, were led and manned primarily by Air Force personnel, with Army units in a
force protection role. In the late summer of 2005 the Navy took change of the PRT,
which then became manned by personnel from the fleet and the Royal Netherlands
Marine Corps, with some Army staff in support.

The Dutch PRT is led by a colonel and consists of a staff, three Military Observation
and Liaison Teams (MOLTs), a CIMIC and PSYOPS section, a force protection
element, Military Police, a logistical unit, and a small unit of Special Forces which is
primarily used for reconnaissance and human intelligence gathering tasks. As the Dutch
PRT was established in a relatively safe province, the unit was only very lightly armed.
In the Dutch PRT a secondary role for the force protection element is the training of the
Afghan National Army (ANA) in cooperation with two U.S. military trainers.
Part of the Military Police capacity is in charge of training the local Afghan police.
(A simplified scheme of the organization of the Dutch PRT is presented below).

The first Dutch PRT became operational in October 2004. Initially, the Netherlands Defence Staff admitted, there was 'some confusion concerning the execution of the PRT-concept.' As a result, it appears from the early report of the mission teams, the PRT stuck to what is new best: issues related to security. The first few months they did little more than gathering information on the province, mostly on the distribution of power and whereabouts of arms and armed units[38].

The first commander called the PRT an 'outpost' of the feeble Afghan central government[39]. 'Facilitating and assisting' the local authorities are the most commonly heard terms in the PRT staff, but the Dutch had no budget to engage in direct reconstruction, or to fund local or international organizations to take on this task. The Dutch emphasized repeatedly that actual reconstruction should be left to the Afghans themselves and to international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Only in time, the PRT became fully entangled in issues such as *good governance* and *security sector reform*. By early 2006 the Chief of Staff of the PRT reported that while reconstruction is mainly seen in the Netherlands as building schools and bridges, his unit focused primarily on stimulating democratization of administrative institutions and training and mentoring the institutions involved in the public security: police, judges, and the army. The motto of the Dutch PRT in the winter of 2005-2006 became 'from monitoring to mentoring'.

According to the Dutch POLAD in early 2006, the PRT is still an 'odd construction'. He argued that what the PRT does is in fact a civilian task and should be performed by civilians. 'For the military part: stabilization is a necessary condition for reconstruction that can be provided by the military, but we as the PRT do not take on this task directly. Even our force protection capacity is very limited. Stabilization only happens indirectly'. He continued: 'We are a reconstruction team, but we only engage in reconstruction indirectly. Nevertheless, I believe in the concept. Only two years ago there were many no-go areas for the international community in this region and this has much improved. The PRT is trusted by the local population, who believe that the

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[38]  Idem, 264.
[39]  Arthur ten Cate, 'Voor het winnen van de vrede: 1(NL)PRT Pol-e-Komri in historisch perspectief', *Militaire Spectator*, Vol. 175, No. 6 (Juni 2006), 267.

presence of the Dutch forces caused the local authorities to behave better towards them'.[40]

It is true that, although financial support is rendered to the local authorities on a limited scale, much of the positive effect of the deployment of the PRT results from its monitoring role towards the local administrators and police commanders. Apart from monitoring and influencing the behavior of the official authorities, the PRT also has to deal with the commanders and warlords, who are often referred to as 'the local power brokers' who are outside the formal power structures, but who still wield substantial influence in Afghan society. In some of the outer districts, they are even to a large extent in control.

The security situation in Baghlan worsened in the winter of 2004-2005.
Whereas regular two-vehicle convoys were still normal in late 2004 on the road towards Kunduz in the north, the Dutch resorted to armored convoys when moving through the area dominted by the Pashtun population. The threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and rockets fired at the PRT base, while still small compared to other places in Afghanistan was rising.

## 6.3     CIMIC within the PRT

The PRT mission revolves around supporting the local civil authorities, in order to allow the central government to get a stronger grip on the Afghan provinces.
This places civil-military interaction at the heart of the PRT's mission. Where then, does this leave CIMIC as a function in support of the military mission? Does the CIMIC staff have a leading role in civil-military cooperation? Are the doctrinal foundations on which CIMIC was built still valid in the context of the operations of a Provincial Reconstruction Team?

A closer look at the distribution of tasks within the PRT shows that the majority of the key civil-military liaison roles are taken on by elements other than CIMIC.
Civil-military cooperation therefore takes place largely outside the designated CIMIC staff. The MOLTs, also known as 'mission teams', are a key element of the PRT. They can be considered its 'tactical units' and consist of a MOLT commander and his deputy, a medic, a translator, a force protection element, and can be augmented on an ad hoc basis with personnel from CIMIC of PSYOPS. Mission teams penetrate the province on one to four day missions. Usually driving in four vehicle convoys, they liaise on the districts-level with civil administrators, police, as well as commanders and warlords. Mission teams monitor the local political and security situation, the state of public services and act as mediators if needed. Dutch mission teams commanders and deputies operating in Baghlan have been drawn from the air force and fleet. They have little or no experience in military ground operations. They receive only very limited CIMIC training and have no specific background in public administration or police matters. For much of their work, which is a mix of reconnaissance, diplomacy, intelligence gathering, and making CIMIC assessments, they have to rely on common sense.

The PRT commander (C-PRT), in close cooperation with his political advisor, deals directly and primarily with the provincial governor. Apart from being the other

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[40]   However, the POLAD said to fear that the population will grow skeptical. 'They don't see the government services they have been promised and they see little of the direct support that is being provided by ISAF'.

principle point of contact for the governor, the POLAD is leading in dealing with the IOs, NGOs and the local judiciary. The number of IOs and NGOs that operate in Baghlan is, however, limited in comparison to larger urban centers. The POLAD, through the Dutch Embassy in Kabul also in identifies and monitors project proposals for a 4,5 million euro reconstruction fund provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The projects are implemented by local NGOs and the local government.

Two other key formal authorities on the provincial level are the chiefs of police the two poorly functioning and competing police organizations, the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Highway Police (HP). The commander deals directly with them, aided by the Dutch Military Police contingent whose personnel is also involved in police training. During the fifth Dutch PRT rotation also the Chief of Staff (CoS), who is usually internally focused on the staff process within a military unit, played a key role in liaising with the local authorities, particularly the police commanders and the local power-brokers.

With all these tasks executed by other elements within the PRT, what tasks remain for CIMIC? The most visible part of the work performed by CIMIC is, as always, the CIMIC projects it executes. Can we therefore can it be concluded then that the role of the CIMIC staff within the PRT is reduced to running CIMIC projects?

Projects are indeed the mainstream of the work done by CIMIC, but even the number and size of projects financed by CIMIC are quite limited. Whereas the PRT became operational in October 2004, it took until the spring of 2005 for the Dutch PRT to be provided with CIMIC funds. Only in December 2004 for a so-called civil assessment by CIMIC-specialist was made. Their aim was to make an inventory of the possibilities for Dutch contributions to the reconstruction of Baghlan province. The budget that was consequently made available to the CIMIC-staff was a mere 500,000 euros for a similar period of one year. Proposals for projects financed from this budget have to be approved by The Hague. An additional 'heart and minds' fund of 50,000 euro for each PRT rotation can be directly spent by the PRT commander.

Even the task of initiated CIMIC projects was at one time taken over by a non-CIMIC staff officer. In the fourth PRT, the first to be run by the Navy, the planning officer (S5) within the staff was officially appointed as the 'custodian' of reconstruction, on of the *lines of action* in the PRTs *Masterplan*. According to the S9 (CIMIC) at the time, he and his staff appeared to be degraded to running projects initiated by the S5 and the MOLTs. This situation was redressed during PRT 5, when the S9-an officer experienced in CIMIC-became the custodian for reconstruction.

CIMIC appeared to be reasonably well integrated into the overall operation during the PRT 5 rotation. This was primarily due to the presence of the S9 during the so-called policy meetings, and smooth cooperation between the CIMIC section, the MOLTs and the POLAD. Previously, the S9 was excluded from the policy meeting, than included the commander, chief of staff, and the PRT staff's operations officer, planning officer and intelligence officer.

Changes in the way CIMIC functioned within the PRT appear to be very dependent on the personnel involved, such as an energetic and communicative deputy S9 and a Chief of Staff who was keen on giving CIMIC a more proper role within the PRT.
These aspects appear to have improved since PRT4 and possibly also compared to

previous PRT. However, it should be noted that no research was done into these earlier PRT rotations.

## 6.4 Dutch PRT compared

The various national governments that deploy PRTs exercise considerable influence over their operations. ISAF headquarters appears to have had limited influence over PRT operations in the provinces. PRTs tend to report directly to their national capitals and as a result of their geographical isolation are more autonomous than regular tactical units within peace and stabilization operations. NATO through its ISAF headquarters has merely a coordinating role, and within the Dutch PRT staff headquarters tends to be regarded as a burden asking for reports and assessments, rather than a headquarters that provides guidance.

The PRTs contribution to reconstruction and security is therefore open to interpretation by participating countries. The distinctive makeup's reflect national priorities, policies and agenda's. There are many differences between PRTs, which have been studied quite extensively by amongst others, Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2005)[41]. This report will not repeat this exercise of comparing PRTs in general, but focus on the singular most prominent difference between the Dutch PRT and other PRTs.

The key difference between the Dutch PRT and other PRTs is, that whereas US, UK, Canadian and German teams all have a substantial civilian political and development element more or less integrated into the organization, the Dutch have only one civilian in the PRT: the POLAD. The Anglo-Saxon PRTs all have an embedded staff from their foreign ministries and related development agencies (US Agency for International Development, UK Department for International Development, Canadian International Development Agency). The German PRT in Kunduz has a separate political and development component consisting of diplomatic personnel and the *Gezellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) that is not housed on the PRT base.

National policies and interpretations of the PRT concept have a profound impact on the overall effectiveness of the PRT, and even more so on the *perception* amongst the local population of the effectiveness of the PRT. Such perceptions are clearly more important than the actual effectiveness, since the true physical impact of PRTs on the overall reconstruction of Afghanistan is actually quite limited.

Since the vast majority of Dutch funds for Baghlan (4,5 million euros) have been channeled not directly through the PRT, but consists of money allocated to the central Afghan government for development of the province, the results are not visible as those of the PRT. This clearly frustrates PRT commanders and personnel, who are constantly confronted with the complaint that the Germans next-door in Kunduz are doing far more for the Afghan people.

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[41] Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient*, Danish Institute for International Studies Report 2005: 6.

## 6.5 'PRTs' in Southern Afghanistan: counterinsurgency revisited

The Dutch armed forces have currently deployed over 1600 military personnel as part of ISAF in Southern Afghanistan. Most of them are deployed in Uruzgan province where, together with Australian forces they form Task Force Uruzgan. The Dutch PRT consists of no more than 40 personnel commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, but the PRT is nevertheless presented by the Dutch Ministry of Defense as 'the most important part of the mission'. Even though the bulk of Task Force Uruzgan is made up of a Battlegroup (strengthened infantry battalion), artillery and air support, the entire Dutch-led operation in Uruzgan was initially often referred to as a PRT until the summer of 2006. According to the Minister of Defense the Task Force was 'build around the PRT' and the Dutch troops in Uruzgan would operate according to the PRT concept that had proven itself elsewhere[42]. The Battlegroup was formally only responsible for the protection of PRT while conducting reconstruction operations and the Dutch press echoed this by presenting the entire operation as a PRT[43].

In the first half of 2006 also NATO, the British and Canadians (the other main troop-contributors) have publicly referred to the NATO mission in southern Afghanistan as a peace support operation or reconstruction effort. Nevertheless, the terms in which the mission was presented by their governments was overall more realistic. As early as November 2005 a British military officer told a reporter from The Guardian: 'The debate is not whether, but to what extent these troops will get into counter-insurgency […]. We are not talking war-fighting. But there is the potential for armed conflict in some areas. The reality is that there are warlords, drug traffickers, al-Qaida, al-Qaida wannabes and Taliban'[44].

Since the spring of 2006, NATO forces were confronted with a Taliban offensive far more ferocious than had been anticipated in the previous year. Nevertheless, the reference to counter-insurgency was never officially made in the Netherlands relation to the Dutch operations in Uruzgan province in southern Afghanistan. It may come as no surprise, however, that military forces earmarked for Southern Afghanistan have been trying to gather the lessons of counterinsurgency. Just before deploying in the volatile province, the Dutch Battlegroup commander Lieutenant-Colonel Piet van der Sar said quite frankly that his operational concept was based on counter-insurgency experience and principles. He engaged in a study of military history, where he found lessons from insurgencies and counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya, Vietnam and the Netherlands-East Indies. The primary lesson Van der Sar drew from these and other historical examples was that success is only possible if the perceptions and safety of the local population are chosen as the center of gravity of such operations, rather than

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[42] Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, DVB/CV-388/05 aangaande de voorgenomen bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan, 22 december 2005; 'Kabinet van plan militairen in te zetten in Afghanistan, Regering.nl, 22 december 2005.

[43] 'Kabinet stuurt meer militairen naar Uruzgan', NRC Handelsblad, 19 april 2006; 'Minder vechters en meer oorlog in Uruzgan', NRC Handelsblad, 19 april 2006.

[44] Simon Tisdall and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'UK Tries to Form Coalition to fight in Afghanistan', *The Guardian*, 14 November 2005.

focusing singularly on the defeat of the enemy[45].

Taking counter-insurgency principles and lessons as a starting point for operational and political planning appears to be logical. Counterinsurgency principles and tactics place much emphasis on non-military means, or what is currently referred to as 'non-kinetic' means. Taking 'reconstruction' as the focal point for policies and operations, as the Dutch have formally done, is important as a counterweight to tendencies to rely merely on 'kinetic' means, but has negative side effects46. It has created unrealistic expectations with policy-makers and the public alike. The idea that the mission is centered on the PRT also creates wrong impression with some military personnel, who may perceive their role as merely protecting the PRT who performs the core task of the TFU[47]. Taking safety and security for the local population as the rhetorical focal point of the operation may create a more realistic picture. After all, the most important 'construction work' in the coming two years has to be done in the field of security sector reform.

The rationale behind emphasizing the role of the PRT in Task Force Uruzgan appears to be primarily political, but the Dutch Ministry of Defense should review the practicality of the current force structure. Evaluations of current operations will have to show out whether taking the PRT as the focal-point for planning and organization may have had negative side-effects on operations.

The PRT concept was developed several years ago based on the idea that they would operate virtually autonomously. When PRTs are deployed as part of larger military units, such as in Southern Afghanistan in 2006, there appears to be no logic in maintaining a separate PRT. Stripped of all its support and force protection elements and-in the Dutch case-lacking a substantial civilian capacity, the PRT is in fact a topped-up CIMIC of Civil Affairs capacity with a somewhat broader mandate[48]. Lessons from Dutch operations in Iraq already showed that integrating CIMIC in the tactical chain of command down to company level was beneficial to the operation as a whole. Within the TFU, integrating rather than separating the PRT from regular military units is likely to be beneficial for the stabilization effort. Again, this would be in line lessons learned by the Allies during the Second World War as well as similar lessons during peace operations during the previous fifteen years.

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[45] Lieutenant-Colonel P. van der Sar in an interview in: B.A. Zonnenberg en E.A.O. Onderlinden, 'Uruzgan: Veel Meer dan een Vechtmissie', *Carré*, 7/8 (2006). 20-21. Van der Sar's comments in this magazine for Army officers went unnoticed in the press, even though the term counterinsurgency made its first short appearance in the newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* in August 2006. The Dutch commander of the third Dutch Battlegroup in Iraq made a similar reference to the relevance of counterinsurgency doctrine in relation to his operations in 2004. Since November 2003, the Dutch Army has an official doctrine for counterinsurgency operations. Although there has clearly been an increased interest in counterinsurgency tactics and strategy amongst Dutch officers, its principles and history are still fairly unknown in military circles. From various conversations with officers in recent years, the author found that counterinsurgency is quite often still thought of as 'search and destroy' missions, rather than a fully integrated civil-military strategy geared towards political ends.

[46] In their wars of decolonisation the French used the more proper terms 'constructive' and 'destructive' techniques. A third category or 'line of operation' was 'politico-psychological techniques.'

[47] This impression was fed by conversations by the author with some Dutch officers on TFU operations, one of whom was earmarked to deploy as part of the Battlegroup in 2007. Remarks by officers such as Lieutenant-colonel Van der Sar show that such ideas are clearly not predominant in the Taks Force as a whole.

[48] Despite the broader PRT mandate in Uruzgan, direct involvement of military personnel in reconstruction tasks is officially still shunned. The Australian Reconstruction Team, with its engineer capacity, takes a more direct role in reconstruction.

Maintaining within the TFU a separate PRT next to the Battlegroup is likely to create coordination problems. Like Civil Affairs units during the Allied campaign in Italy, it is likely to result in the PRT having to beg for support 'from the sideline' from man oeuvre units. Throughout history, Civil Affairs and CIMIC personnel has proven more successful when integrated into tactical lines of command to the lowest possible level. Although hampered by some practical problems, and struggling for full acceptance in a combat oriented organization, integrated CIMIC personnel is more effective than that in a stovepiped Civil Affairs or CIMIC organization operating alongside the regular tactical units.

# 7        Conclusions and recommendations

## 7.1        General

### 7.1.1        *Accept that civil-military interaction moves center-stage in stabilization operations*
In stabilization operations CIMIC should no longer be treated as a support function or merely a tactical tool. When performing these operations, civil-military interaction needs to be taken as the starting point for all policy planning and military planning. A focus on 'straight military matters' and thus on military-to-military contact with 'CIMIC on the side' is possible only in conventional warfare and during traditional peacekeeping operations that revolve around interposition and disarmament and demobilization (see recommendation 7.2.1).

It is impossible at this point to judge the work of Allied Command Transformation (NATO ACT) on CIMIC and its future impact. However, the early signs of the development of a new NATO concept for 'Enhanced CIMIC' are positive for broadening the scope of CIMIC by focusing on strategy and the interagency process, rather than merely on operational support and tactical tools. NATO ACT should emphasize the reason why in stabilization operations-other than in conventional combat-the civil-military interface moves center-stage.

The reason for the central role of civil-military interaction is that stabilization operations are conducted amongst the people and revolve for a large part around military support to the civil power (the government, its civil administration and police force). This can be local authorities and/or an international interim authority like in Kosovo and East-Timor. This support role requires modesty and patience from military forces.

Civil-military interaction as the central tenet in stabilization operations does not imply that the military should *focus* its role on reconstruction or 'nation-building'. It means that it is impossible to create a safe and secure environment without supporting, substituting and sometimes monitoring civilian authorities. The key partners of military forces in stabilization operations are civil administration, and police and military support in rebuilding those institutions is often the key to creating a secure environment. After all, the aim of stabilization operations is most often to help the state regain the monopoly on the use of force. Elements of 'nation building' therefore do enter the military realm. Still, the purpose of military operations should not be defined as 'nation-building' or 'reconstruction' since this would delineate the operation to too narrow a area.

### 7.1.2        *Wishful thinking should not influence military planning*
Wishful thinking seems to have played a role in the decision-making process surrounding military deployments in the past fifteen years. Notwithstanding the most thorough mission analysis and the best intentions of military and political leaders, military units deployed in stabilization operations all too often find themselves performing unanticipated tasks. For such tasks they often receive no special training, and more problematic even, no specific policy guidance. Policymakers and military

leaders within NATO may unwittingly have created this situation by hoping that the military forces they deployed would not become in entangled in:
- civil administrative responsibilities:
- policing responsibilities;
- reconstruction activities;
- countering insurgencies.

The overall tendency in Western democracies to take the desired scope of military activity in the civilian sphere as the foundation for policy and doctrine has turned out to be very damaging during the immediate post-conflict situation in Bosnia in 1996 and Kosovo in 1999, but even more so during the unfolding insurgencies in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Time and again the military found itself in unanticipated situations.

## 7.2      CIMIC doctrine needs to be updated

### 7.2.1    *Create a two-track CIMIC doctrine*
The caveat 'in support of the mission', which is currently emphasized in CIMIC doctrine, is irrelevant in stabilization operations. Stabilization operations take place amongst the people and revolve around supporting or substituting a civil authority. Again, this does not mean that the military should fully engage in long-term reconstruction and large-scale humanitarian activities. However, as military activity in stabilization operations is most often part of a cooperative effort with civilian agencies, CIMIC should be defined as making a coherent contribution to national or international **political objectives**[49].

Nevertheless, the caveat 'in support of the (military) mission' can and should be maintained in CIMIC doctrine for conventional combat operations and peacekeeping operations that are limited to interposition and demobilization.

### 7.2.2    *The definition of CIMIC needs to be broadened and delineated*
CIMIC is too narrowly defined to cover the civil-military interaction. NATO's attempt to limit CIMIC to a support function has resulted in much confusion surrounding the concept and term. For reasons of clarity NATO armed forces should consider introducing delineating several terms:

- **Civil-military interaction** can be used as a comprehensive and neutral term to describe the process regardless of the international organizations or nations involved. Civil-military interaction encompasses CIMIC, CMO, CA, CMCoord etc.
- **Differentiate between Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and CIMIC assets:**
  - The term **Civil-Military Operations** (CMO) should be used within NATO as the general term to describe civil-military tasks performed by all military personnel in military operations (and not just by CIMIC personnel).
  - **CIMIC** staff provides (professional) support to Civil-Military Operations. U.S. Army Civil Affairs doctrine, while not to be considered a model for CIMIC, makes a similar and important distinction between CMO and Civil Affairs.

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[49] The British take this broader approach to CIMIC as is witnessed in the UK CIMIC Policy as agreed by Chiefs of Staff in February 2003.

7.2.3    *CIMIC should shift emphasis from 'hearts and minds' activities and the often troubled*
         *relationship with relief organizations to government support.*
         The image of CIMIC has become distorted over the last ten years by an exaggerated
         emphasis on 'soldiers doing reconstruction projects' and 'winning the hearts and
         minds'. Far too much attention is given to the military-humanitarian relationship,
         particularly to the clashes of culture and interest between the military and NGO's.
         NGO's and humanitarian organizations are often being perceived as the principle
         partner for CIMIC, while they are in fact of secondary importance as a partner for the
         military in stabilization operations[50]. The clash of interest between the military and
         NGOs is far less likely to occur when CIMIC focuses on government while avoiding-as
         much as possible-becoming entangled in humanitarian relief work.

         As security is still the primary aim of stabilization operations, reconstruction of
         institutions such as civil administration, police and other organisations related to public
         security should be the primary target of a CIMIC effort. More specialized CIMIC staff
         should be generated for this particular purpose in the early phase of operations, even
         though these capacity building and monitoring tasks should be performed by
         international civilians whenever possible (see 7.4.1).

## 7.3    Political guidance and planning are to address operational realities during stabilization operations rather than politically desirable military tasks

7.3.1    *Accept counterinsurgency as the wave of the future*
         In several cases during the 1990s, peace operations have already started to resemble
         counterinsurgency, even though they were executed in the absence of a formal enemy.
         The primary reason In Iraq Coalition forces are faced with a full-blown insurgency.
         In (Southern) Afghanistan NATO is also faced by a large-scale insurgency, even if the
         Alliance initially wished to sell the operation under the guise of peace support
         operations and reconstruction.

         The basic principles of successful counterinsurgency campaigns as they emerged from
         the British colonial experience seem rather straightforward when summarized, but they
         are still valid. Two points in particular are relevant in this report[51]:
         - Install an effective system of civil-military-cooperation on all government levels in
           order to implement an overall politico-military plan.
         - Intelligence is the key to the defeat of the insurgents. Knowing the enemy and his
           whereabouts allows minimum force or non-destructive means to be brought to bear
           to neutralize him. Operations therefore need to be 'intelligence driven' and civil-
           military cooperation plays a crucial part in information sharing between the
           military, administration and police.

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[50] For CIMIC, humanitarian organisations are of primary importance only during humanitarian catastrophes
     that are not caused by military operations.
[51] The others being:
     - Have a clear political aim that addresses the legitimate grievances amongst the population.
     - Use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish your aims.
     - Give priority to defeating the political subversion by isolating the insurgent form the population,
       instead of focusing primarily on killing or capturing the insurgents.
     - Plan for the long term. There is no quick-fix or military shortcut to a successful counterinsurgency
       campaign, which invariably requires a steady expansion of secured territory.

7.3.2    *Prepare for a worst-case scenario: prepare for military interim government*
There is an inescapable role for the military in short-term vacuum-filling after the defeat
of the enemy in combat. Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003, and arguably also Afghanistan 2001
showed that the costs of the failure to fill a post-war vacuum are astronomical.
Ten years after the initiation of a NATO CIMIC policy many of the civilian tasks in the
power vacuum still fall to regular military units by default. NATO commanders are
very unlikely to receive timely advice on civil administrative matters and public
security from CIMIC staff, as too little emphasis is placed on these special functions
within NATO's CIMIC doctrine and organization.

More damaging than this lack of professional CIMIC support are the caveats placed
upon military contingents by national governments, which often do not allow military
forces fill a power vacuum. The military should be prepared to take on all sorts of
civilian tasks in an emergency situation, and politicians should accept that much of this
process will always be improvised. The history of the occupation of Germany and Japan
shows that military forces are pragmatic in their approach and not ill-suited as vacuum
fillers per se. What they do need is political guidelines and some room to improvise as
local circumstances in crisis areas vary substantially. A swift hand-over to international
civilian agencies or local government should, however, always be the primary goal
during a military intervention.

**7.4        Organize and train for civil-military interaction at the heart of military operation**

7.4.1    *By integrating CIMIC and PRTs into the tactical chain of command*
One of the key lessons learned by the Allies in the field of Civil Affairs during
1942-1945 was the importance of integrating Civil Affairs into the tactical chain of
command. Nevertheless, there have been tendencies within NATO since the mid-1990s,
partly driven by the U.S. armed forces, to create separate organizations for CIMIC and
Civil Affairs. Current operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan again point at
the importance of integrating CIMIC staff, even down to company level. This ensures a
more integrated approach and prevents CIMIC from being marginalized and deprived of
logistics and other means. Obviously, the same is true for PRT staff when a PRT
operating within a larger military organization.

7.4.2    *Creating a national civilian capacity to deploy alongside the (Dutch) military*
As shown in British colonial history, success in civil-military cooperation during
stabilization operations often depends on the right military attitude and the right civilian
counterparts rather than on large numbers of CIMIC staff.

Dutch troops in the Afghan province Baghlan and Southern Iraq have addressed the
need for a (national) civilian operational capacity for development, civil administrative
support and security sector reform. Several officers interviewed in the course of this
research have expressed the need for professional civilian partners from a national pool
to cooperate with during stabilization operations.

Within the Dutch ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs there appears to be talk of
creating a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) comparable to that created by the
British under DFID. Building such a pool of civilian specialists should be given a high
priority since it might take years to bring it to fruition. For more flexibility, the
possibility of combining civilian and military experts in the fields of civil

administration and SSR into a single pool of 'double hatted' staff might be considered as well.

Although the Dutch PRT in Baghlan province performed reasonably well, it would be advisable for the Dutch ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs analyze the imperfections of the Dutch 'militarized' approach to the PRT concept more extensively. It should compare its overall policy with other nations; engage in extensive research into the experiences of organizations such as DFID, CIDA, USAID, GIZ, and their cooperation with the British, Canadian, U.S. and German military respectively; and apply 'best practice' where possible.

*7.4.3*    *By focusing officer training on an increased understanding of local power-relations and culture*

The training of officers who operate in the field should focus on a deeper knowledge of the culture they are getting involved in and an understanding of the local power-relations. Former CENTCOM commander U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni has said on this experience in Somalia and many other theatres: 'We never did a good job of cultural intelligence, of understanding what makes people tick, what their structure is, where authority lies, what is different about their values and ways of doing business'. Although Dutch troops may have overall displayed better cultural sensitivity than U.S. forces over the past years, there is still a lack of understanding of local power relations in which military forces invariable meddle when they engage in stabilization operations.

In the recent past, solutions to the steady progression of the military into the civilian domain have been sought in rewriting doctrine and the creation of specialized units and adding personnel such as political advisors. However, most civil-military operations (CMO) will always be executed by regular military personnel, both officers and men. NATO memberstates should radically increase the level of training, both general and mission oriented, of personnel in dealing with civil-military responsibilities.
Such training should have a strong emphasis on politics, culture, civil administration and public security.

# 8 Signature

The Hague, March 2007  TNO Defence, Security and Safety

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