The July 2023 Vilnius summit has been viewed as another success that builds on the 2022 Madrid summit. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has returned to its core activities of conventional defence and deterrence, as the Strategic Concept underlines writes Paul van Hooft in an article for the magazine of the Netherlands Atlantic Association. However, the Allies need to prepare for a world with long-term structural changes in the distribution of power in the international system and deep uncertainty as a consequence of populist movements on both sides of the Atlantic. The ease and enthusiasm with which old reflexes returned is hardly uplifting.
Though seemingly obvious for NATO, for the past quarter century conventional defense and deterrence were not at the core of its activities. The organization had searched for a purpose and task after the end of the Cold War. The early 1990s were the time of “out of area or out of business”; besides adding new members, the driving purpose of the Alliance had become expeditionary crisis management mis[1]sions. This led to the costly detours of Afghanistan, Libya, and (de facto) Iraq. Many of those policies were taken for granted in the context of American unipolarity, the years during which everything seemed possible, yet arguably few real strategic priorities were set, precisely because everything seemed possible. The subsequent failures of Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq dampened that enthusiasm; the election of Donald Trump ended up punctuating the end of the era of optimism that had dominated American thinking about its place in the world as well as the debates within NATO. In 2019, French President Macron infamous[1]ly told The Economist that NATO was “braindead.”1 Vilnius, like Madrid, despite the “will-they-won’t-they” discussions surrounding future Ukrainian membership that may have dominated reporting on the summit, seemingly proved him wrong; the return of the Russian threat for which the Alli[1]ance was originally created, seemed to reinvigorate NATO as an organization. Yet what is happening goes much further than a return to basics and founding principles. Finland and probably Swe[1]den will join the Alliance, strengthening NATO’s position in the North and near the Baltics, while at the same time Russia’s invasion accelerated the cooperation between the United States, Europe, and East Asian States, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Australia. All three, as well as New Zealand, were present in Vilnius. Moreover, though vetoed by France now, discussion of opening a NATO coordination office in Japan continues. Simply put, NATO is further en[1]larging and expanding its geographic scope, continuing the pattern of the 1990s.2
That is not necessarily good news; the Alliance is in no way facing the permissive unipolar environment of the 1990s, where other states fall in line, nor is there a solid consensus among Washington elites on the desirable trajectory of US power and grand strategy. While lip service is paid to the impact of the rise of China, the real implications remain under-examined, such as the need to better focus military and diplomatic resources, as well as how states outside of the West can now play different great powers and blocs off each other. Europeans cannot afford to ignore any of these trends and fall back into familiar, comfortable patterns and assume they are back in the 1990s.
NATO in the Indo-Pacific
Slowly but surely, China is entering European strategic thinking; it was mentioned explicitly in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept, which framed the Chinese challenge as a revisionist parallel to the Russian threat. In that sense, NA[1]TO’s priorities are shifting in line with those of the United States. The National Defense Strategies of both the Biden and the Trump administration noted that China is the “pacing threat” for the Department of Defense, and the only state with the means to challenge US power.3 Of course, China is unavoidable, as Europe has extensive economic and political interests in the region, and already back in 2019, the EU Commission stated China was a “partner”, “competitor”, and “systemic rival.” The EU also has its own strategy for the Indo-Pacific, and European states, including France, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands, have published regional strategies, as well as increased their naval presence in the region.4
It is questionable, however, whether NATO is the appropriate organization to include the Indo-Pacific in its scope. NATO’s founding purpose was to provide security to Europe; one that it has only recently fully committed itself to again. While there is no official intention to give NATO a military role in the Indo-Pacific region, involving it not only diffuses strategic focus within Europe and within the transatlantic relationship, but it also suggests that, as in the 1990s, NATO is an all-purpose Swiss knife of an organization that can be made to suit any objective, whether military or political.
At best, giving NATO a presence in the Indo-Pacific creates unrealistic expectations in the region. European states are rebuilding their militaries to meet the challenge posed by conventional defence against and deterrence of Russia, while incorporating Finland, and possibly Sweden. The military focus is not going to be a naval one, so acquisitions are more likely to be centered on land and air weapons, as well as the enablers Europe sorely lacks.
At worst, the growing centrality of NATO alienates the regional states further from the West. In contrast, the EU has a much more suitable set of tools to engage with states in Southeast Asia, specifically trade, investment, and capacity-building. With these it can create an alternative for regional states to Chinese economic pressure. In doing so, Europeans may possibly even help stabilize regional dynamics. At the very least, the small and middle powers of Eu[1]rope and Asia share an interest in an order based on rules, where it is not only might that makes right. An escalation of the Sino-American competition is in no one’s interest.
Playing both side for national interests
That the 1990s party is over is also apparent in other ways. The importance of the recent meeting of the BRICS should not be overstated, but neither should it be ignored. States that are not integral parts of the US-led alliances and partnerships are more and more explicitly pursuing their own national interests. After the Russian invasion, D.C. and European capitals seemed shocked and dismayed that many states in South America, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South- and Southeast Asia chose to remain non-committed in their response to the Ukraine-Russia War. Like the BRICS meeting and expansion, their subdued responses were seen almost exclusively as a referendum on the attractiveness of US or Western values, or even as an explicit vote of support for Russia.
The new assertiveness of the rest of the world is hardly a referendum on profound preferences. Previously, these states had few choices but to fall in line behind the United States, or at least avoid directly challenging it. Moreover, with American power at historically incredible heights during the turn of the century, the norms, institutions, and economic model of the United States – and the rest of the West to some extent – received a reflected secondary glow of attractiveness. It is not an accident that the dominance of the so-called liberal, internationalist rules-based order – encapsulated in the Washington Consensus – coincided with the absolute dominance of the United States.
Yet, American power has declined in relative terms over the past decades. Where the United States had no serious challengers then, and afterwards spent a decade fighting so-called rogue states and terrorist organizations, US defence planners now ponder whether the United States can defend and deter in both Europe and Asia simultaneously.5 This is a clear departure from the era of the Washington Consensus when states could not afford to not fall in line behind American power. Moreover, the credibility of the US – and the West – as an alternative to China and/or Russia still suffers from the memory of Iraq and the other conflicts during the so-called war on terror.
Even on the sidelines of the Vilnius summit an illustration of these changing global dynamics was visible. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have put aside his opposition to the accession of Sweden to NATO, by allowing the Turkish Parliament – where his party has a majority – to consider the matter. Yet, the basis for Erdogan’s shift was transactional, centered on more assistance for fighting the Kurdish PKK, and a promise by the United States to provide F-16s to replace the F-35s that were cancelled. Why were the F-35s cancelled? Because Erdogan had decided to import the Russian S-400 air defence system. It is telling that even a long-time member of NATO is looking to more explicitly exploit the menu of options that has emerged recently for the first time since the end of the Cold War as a con[1]sequence of the redistribution of power. Leaders pursue perceived national interests. The West will need more than an attractive “narrative” to continue to compete; it must relearn to take the agency and interests of the vast majority of the world’s states seriously again.
Domestic turbulence in the United States
It is not only the international environment that has drastically changed in ways that should affect how NATO positions itself. The long-term trajectory of the Alliance is going to be shaped – if not determined – by the outcome of domestic US politics. Here too the current situation stands in stark contrast to the 1990s. Partisanship and polarization between Republicans and Democrats are not new, nor are impeachments of presidents; however, there was a consistent and robust consensus between the two parties about the American role in the world. The consensus included an appreciation of NATO and an American stake in European security. The Trump administration was a departure from this consensus, but one that should not be assumed to remain confined to those years. At the end of his administration, Trump was actively working to undermine NATO while centrist Republicans looked to keep US foreign policy on the same course. If given another chance, Trump would ensure that he was not restrained from within his administration. Nor would he be likely to maintain current US support for Ukraine, or at least to the same extent. One look at the candidates within the Republican primaries should not inspire any European with confidence that future Republican administrations will expend much effort on behalf of NATO Europe.
Nor should Europeans become too comfortable with the Democratic side of the aisle when looking towards the future. Biden is arguably the most Atlanticist president of the past decades, but probably also the last one that feels personally invested in Europe. Younger generations of Democratic politicians do not share the same foundational experiences with Europeans and NATO from the Euromissile crisis, the height of the second Cold War of the 1980s, the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the largely peaceful dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, or the optimistic preparations for the enlargement of NATO and the EU.
Of course, in a sense, a foreign policy consensus still exists in the United States, but only in the form of a bipartisan concurrence that China is the major challenge to US hegemony. That consensus drives the inclusion of China in the transatlantic technology agenda, particularly through the semiconductor and manufacturing export controls, as well as in the transatlantic security agenda – of which the Strategic Concept is an example. Like President Obama, future Democrats are more likely to be preoccupied by China, as well as domestic affairs, than Europe.
Getting Real
The NATO summit in Vilnius is thus a mixed bag that risks putting policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, but especially Europeans, too much at ease. The summit presents a continuation of the refocusing on NATO’s core activities of defence and deterrence from 2022, while also worryingly allowing itself to fall into the patterns of the past – without accepting that the fortuitous circumstances of the 1990s are no longer present for the Alliance, for Europe, or for the United States. The accession of Finland and Sweden would definitely improve NATO’s security in the Baltic Sea, but it is unclear whether reasonable expectations are in place.
for Ukraine’s accession. The ambiguous messaging of the 2008 Bucharest summit is thus still in place, which does little to provide security for Ukraine itself, nor prepare the Alliance for providing extended nuclear deterrence to a new member involved in an unsettled conflict with Russia, nor give the latter any incentives to terminate the war. At the same time, as in the 1990s, NATO is already looking outside the region towards the other side of the world, with the risk of spreading resources thin and incentivizing further cooperation between Russia and China. Put differently, while the NATO body is still warm and the limbs are active, Macron might not have been entirely off the mark in 2019. The Allies need to prepare for a world with long-term structural changes in the distribution of power in the international system and deep uncertainty as a consequence of populist movements on both sides of the Atlantic. The ease and enthusiasm with which old reflexes returned is hardly uplifting.
Dr. Paul van Hooft is a Senior Strategic Analyst at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and Chair of the HCSS Europe in the Indo-Pacific Hub as well as of the HCSS Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relationship.
Source: Atlantisch Perspectief, september 2023
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